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Christine van Hooft 
 
Nearer to the people:  
The interaction between decentralisation and the political economy in Uganda 
 
Since the introduction of decentralisation in Uganda in the late 1980s, the 
number of districts has nearly quadrupled, in a process known as district proliferation. 
Accordingly, districts have become highly dependent on the central government for 
funding. This dependence renders sub-national governments unable to respond to 
local development priorities, weakening the core goals of decentralisation.  
 
A majority of the literature relating to decentralisation in Uganda views 
decentralisation through a prism of broader economic and governance reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s. As a result, authors downplay the importance of the political 
economy context in which decentralisation has been implemented for determining its 
outcomes and results. Regarding the specific issue of district proliferation in Uganda, 
analysis in the existing literature is focused on the experiences and incentives of elite 
actors. Authors have engaged less with non-elite and rural perspectives: the 
viewpoints of those at the ‘grassroot’.  
 
This thesis analyses the drivers of district proliferation in Uganda, and includes 
the viewpoints of those at the grassroot in addition to urban elites. The research 
captures the incentives driving multiple actors across a number of binaries: rural and 
urban, elected and employed, elites and non-elites. It is argued that the rapid 
proliferation of districts in Uganda arises from the rational pursuit of self-interest by 
multiple actors within the political economy. Accordingly, the research moves beyond 
the dominant explanation of district proliferation: as a vector for elites to generate 
patronage networks and claim access to the resources of the state. Instead, the 
research positions district proliferation in the context of livelihood strategies at the level 
of the grassroot and within the bureaucracy, and as a political survival strategy for 
those in elected roles. The continued proliferation of new districts in Uganda is shown 
to be an outcome of the interaction between decentralisation and the political 
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Map 1. Map of Uganda with districts (at 30 June 2017)1 2 
 
 
Blue – western districts 
Red – central districts 
Green – eastern districts 
Yellow – northern districts  
 
 
1 An additional thirteen districts have been announced to commence on 1 July 2017 (six districts) and 
1 July 2018 (seven districts). A complete list of districts with their location, parent district and year of 
commencement is given at Appendix A.  
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Chapter One:  
 
Situating district proliferation within the Ugandan political economy 
 
Both the road and the ‘regional centre’ would thus make possible a 
strong government or ‘development’ presence in the area… Both 
these innovations are considered essential prerequisites to any sort 
of ‘development’ in the mountain region. 
- Ferguson, ‘The Anti-Politics Machine’3 
 
An important challenge for governments in achieving improved development is 
how to transfer resources from the capital city to populations living in rural areas. In 
many countries, decentralised governance has been implemented to achieve progress 
against this goal. Decentralisation requires that sub-national governments be 
established and be allocated a range of responsibilities. Governments implement 
decentralisation for a range of reasons, and may have implicit as well as explicit goals 
for its implementation. In Uganda, the Government’s decentralisation goals have been 
complex, and have included political as well as development objectives.  
 
This chapter introduces the central concepts and themes of this research, and 
provides relevant background regarding the Ugandan national context. The research 
idea for this thesis examines the implications of decentralisation in Uganda, and asks 
how decentralisation has interacted with the existing political economy.4 This research 
explores how these two elements affect one another. This two-directional research 
question contributes to a more complex understanding of the ways in which 
decentralisation affects the context in which it is implemented, and is in turn affected 
by that context. By utilising a political-economy approach, the research undertaken for 
this thesis hopes to contribute to a stronger understanding of district proliferation in 
Uganda. Accordingly, the research question addressed by this thesis is:  
How does the political economy interact with decentralisation in Uganda? 
 
3 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. Page 78. 
4 Following Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Aiding Economic Growth in Africa: The Political Economy of 
Roads Reform in Uganda’, ‘political economy’ is understood as the institutional context of 




Rather than consider that decentralisation is a technical or administrative reform, this 
thesis positions decentralisation within a specific context, and analyses how the local 
context drives the outcomes of this policy mechanism. In turn, by analysing the effect 
of the political economy on decentralisation, this thesis assesses the extent and ways 
in which the outcomes of decentralisation are distorted or shifted from their origins, to 
deliver unpredictable or even undesirable outcomes.  
 
The impact of decentralisation on the local context, and vice-versa, has 
contributed to an unusual phenomenon that has been observed in Uganda: the rapid 
creation of a large number of new districts5 and sub-counties.6 Map 6 below illustrates 
the growth in the number of districts since 1995. The existence of this phenomenon, 
referred to in Uganda as ‘district proliferation’,7 is widely acknowledged, and the fiscal 
burden this phenomenon has created has been openly debated and discussed. 
Nonetheless, the causes and factors that drive administrative-unit proliferation have 
been less common. In particular, the question of why district and sub-county 
proliferation continues to occur,8 even after it has been strongly critiqued and its fiscal 
burdens acknowledged, presents a puzzle. This thesis seeks to address this puzzle, 
by examining the interaction between decentralisation and the Ugandan political 
economy.  
 
5 Districts are the highest level of sub-national government in the Ugandan decentralised structure 
(they are the first level of government below the national government). Districts are comprised of 
between one and five counties, which are themselves comprised of sub-counties. Sub-counties are 
comprised of parishes, within which a number of villages is defined. 
6 This thesis focuses on the creation of districts and sub-counties, though it is noted that the quantity 
of their equivalent urban structures (town councils and municipalities) has also expanded rapidly over 
the same period of time. Indeed, the creation of an additional district usually results in the creation of 
a new town council in turn, to serve as the headquarters of the newly-created district. In most districts 
in Uganda, the name of the district and the name of the Town Council that is the capital of that district 
are the same (so the capital of Pallisa is Pallisa Town, and of Ntungamo is Ntungamo Town, etc). 
Throughout this thesis, place names should be understood to be the district, rather than the town, 
unless the ‘Town’ suffix is added.  
7 ‘District proliferation’ is defined by Grossman and Lewis (Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, 
‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’, American Political Science Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 
196–217. Page 198) as “A political process resulting in a large number of local governments splitting 
into two or more units over a relatively short period”. 
8 A new administrative unit is created through a decision of the parliament or council above that level. 
For example, a new district is created through a majority decision of the national Parliament, and a 
new sub-county is created by a majority-passed motion of a district council. According to the 
Constitution of Uganda, s.179(4), the conditions under which a new administrative unit can be created 
are as follows: “Any measure for the alteration of the boundaries of or the creation of districts or 
administrative units shall be based on the necessity for effective administration and the need to bring 
services closer to the people, and it may take into account the means of communication, geographical 
features, density of population, economic viability and the wishes of the people concerned.” There is 





Map 6: Comparing maps of Ugandan districts, 1995 vs 2017 
 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to understandings of the rapid 
creation of new districts in Uganda, including an expanded notion of its causes and 
driving factors. The research undertaken for this thesis has explicitly included the 
perspective of citizens at the village level, and so contributes the bottom-up 
perspective of villagers. The analysis of district proliferation that arises from this 
research is important in light of the argument that Ugandan decentralisation is a model 
for other countries, and has been successful at transferring resources to the 
grassroot.9 This thesis argues that the proliferation of new districts results from 
demand from the grassroot10 for development to be realised, where decentralisation 




9 Villadsen and Lubanga, Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local 
Governance. 
10 The term ‘grassroot’ is used throughout this thesis in the manner it is used in the Ugandan context, 
which is to signify the village level of the social and economic structure. This is distinct from its more 
common international usage, which indicates community-based organisations that operate at the 
village level. In Uganda, this term is used to refer to the village itself, or to rural villages in general, or 
to people who live in such a village – rather than to organisations that operate at the village level. 
Examples of this usage can be found in Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of 
Governance in Uganda; Ayeko-Kümmeth, ‘Districts Creation and Its Impact on Local Government in 
Uganda’; Tukamushaba, ‘Human Resource Capacity Building and Service Delivery in Kanungu 
District, Uganda’.  
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In conducting this research, different research approaches have been utilised 
compared to the majority of authors11 in this field, whose research focuses 
predominantly on the standpoint of elite actors in the Ugandan context.12 Instead, the 
author has utilised survey methodology to include the viewpoints, goals and opinions 
of those living at the village level. Assessing this phenomenon from multiple 
perspectives – including those of the people at the grassroot itself – allows for an 
exploration of the multiple motivations of actors that coincide and contribute to the 
creation of additional districts and sub-counties. The creation of sub-national units 
facilitates the survival, livelihood and access strategies of a broad range of actors in 
the political economy context. This thesis argues that it is the politicisation and 
manipulation of the decentralisation process that has generated the perception that 
decentralisation can be a successful instrument for transferring resources to the 
village level. However, the fiscal burden caused by the rapid proliferation of sub-
national units may limit the sustainability of this mechanism.  
 
Chapter One positions the research in a broader context and background, and 
offers some contextualisation and explanations of key terminology. Firstly, important 
concepts relating to decentralisation will be framed in the specific Ugandan context. 
The research purpose and motivation will be described, as well as the contribution of 
the research. It will be argued that the research methods used in this thesis, that are 
inclusive of the perspectives of actors at the grassroot level, moves the analysis 
beyond the dominant framing of decentralisation in the existing literature. Rather than 
focusing on decentralisation as an elite-dominated process, this research analyses 
the motivations of actors across the political-economy spectrum.  
 
 
11 Such as Elliott Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’, Crisis States Working 
Papers Series 2 (2008b); and Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’, 
American Political Science Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 196–217, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000567. 




1.1 How decentralisation is implemented in the Ugandan context  
 
This section begins by describing the way in which decentralisation has been 
implemented in Uganda, including the fiscal, administrative and political elements of 
decentralisation in this specific context. From there, this section describes theoretical 
concepts regarding decentralisation in a generalised contextual environment. Finally, 
descriptions are offered of the key concepts that underpin decentralisation theory, and 
how these are conceptualised and implemented in the Ugandan context.  
 
Decentralisation: Meaning, types and use in the Ugandan context  
 
The idea of creating multiple tiers of government, and assigning rights and 
responsibilities to these tiers, is at the core of decentralisation. The term 
‘decentralisation’ is used throughout the literature in slightly varying ways, and on 
occasion is blurred with other terminology.13 In this thesis, ‘decentralisation’ is used to 
mean the transfer of responsibilities for the delivery of key projects and policies from 
the central government to sub-national governments.14 In the Ugandan context, 
decentralisation has been implemented in three ways. These are: administrative 
decentralisation, the creation of sub-national public administrations or bureaucracies, 
such as at the district level; political decentralisation, the creation of sub-national 
elected bodies, such as councils; and fiscal decentralisation, the assigning of tax-
collection and revenue-raising rights to sub-national units.15 Each of these will now be 
discussed in turn, in reference to the established practices in the Ugandan context.  
 
 
13 For example, ‘devolution’ is sometimes used interchangeably with decentralisation. The author 
takes devolution to mean a slightly different practice from decentralisation. Devolution indicates the 
transfer of central government responsibilities to a sub-national administration, without the 
assumption that the sub-national administration undertakes its own planning processes for those 
responsibilities. The sub-national administration simply implements the policies and programs decided 
upon at the national level. ‘Deconcentration’ is also used interchangeably with decentralisation, but 
refers specifically to the practice of changing the physical location of a government office to a location 
other than a capital city. The office in question remains an agency of the national government; it is not 
a part of any sub-national government.  
14 For example, responsibility for the delivery of primary schools is transferred to sub-national units. 
15 Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa’. 
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Political decentralisation in Uganda 
 
In the Ugandan structure, five levels of political decentralisation and two levels 
of administrative and fiscal decentralisation have been implemented.16 Each 
corresponds to an administrative unit, as illustrated below.  
 
Administrative Unit Council Public service present? 
District LC5 Yes 
County LC4 No 
Sub-county17 LC3 Yes 
Parish LC2 No 
Village  LC1 No 
 
1.1 Levels and types of decentralised political structures in Uganda 
 
Political decentralisation has been achieved via the creation of five levels of 
councils, called Local Councils (LCs), that operate below the level of the central 
government. These are numbered in sequence, from LC1 at the level of the village, to 
LC5 at the level of the district. LC1 councillors are elected by universal adult suffrage 
at the level of the village. Councillors from LC2 to LC5 are comprised of councillors 
from the level below (so an LC2 council is comprised of councillors from the LC1 
councils of each village within the parish, elected by citizens of the parish).18 LC519 
councils are likewise comprised of representatives from the sub-county (LC3) councils 
that comprise that district. Councils at each level contain a range of sub-committees20 
tasked with addressing particular issues, or the management of specific sectors. The 
Council is chaired by the LC5 Council Chair, supported by the LC5 Speaker 
(corresponding Chair and Speaker roles are also present in the LC3 Councils).21 
 
 
16 Ndegwa, ‘Decentralization in Africa’. 
17 Also referred to as Gombolola. 
18 Devas and Grant, ‘Local Government Decision-making—Citizen Participation and Local 
Accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and Uganda’. 
19 LC4 councils do not operate in practice.  
20 Examples include the Parish Development Committee, and the District Executive Committee.  
21 Ndegwa, ‘Decentralization in Africa’. 
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Among other roles, councils are responsible for debating and approving the 
district and sub-county’s annual budgets and workplans. This decision-making 
authority over the allocation of resources gives local councils power, and means that 
those who hold council positions have attained high status within the community. 
Despite this, councillors are not paid salaries. Councillors are entitled to allowance to 
meet the cost of performing council duties, such as sitting allowances to attend council 
meetings, and vehicles and office spaces are provided.22 In this sense, election to the 
role of Councillor entitles an individual to claim resources from the state.  
 
Administrative decentralisation in Uganda  
 
Administrative decentralisation is implemented via the creation of public service 
organisations at the district and the sub-county levels, with responsibility for 
undertaking the full project cycle regarding the provision of public services. The 
responsibilities of district and sub-county governments, as established in the Local 
Government Act 1997 Cap. 243, include annual budgeting and planning, contracting 
and procurement, financial management, and project management. These levels of 
bureaucracy are also able to charge taxes and levies, and so raise revenue locally.23 
Sub-national governments are also required to consult the citizens of their regions on 
their development priorities, in a system known as bottom-up planning. As will be 
analysed in more detail in sections 4.1 and 6.2, bottom-up planning is to begin at the 
village level, with citizens gathering for regular planning meetings chaired by the LC1 
Council. These meetings produce a village development plan, which is passed to the 
LC2 council, and then upwards through the LC3 and LC5, so that District Development 
Plans are inclusive of village-level development priorities.24 However, funding 
processes are largely top-down, with funding originating from the central government, 
the implications of which will be discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Diagram 1.2 below 




22 Grossman and Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’. 








Parliament – approves National Budget 
Framework Paper 
Parliament – Receives draft National 
Budget Framework Paper 
  
MoFPED and Sectoral Ministries – 
determine budget allocations per sector 
MoFPED – receives districts’ Local 
Government Budget Framework 
Papers; includes in draft National 
Budget Framework Paper 
  
LC5 Council and District Public Service 
– receives annual funding allocations, 
with guidelines on which sectors and 
activities should receive funding  
LC5 Council – consolidates LC3 plans 
into District Development Plan, District 
Annual Workplan, and Local 
Government Budget Framework Paper 
  
LC3 Council – receives funding and 
instructions on which sectors and 
activities should be funded 
LC3 Council – consolidates LC2 plans 
into sub-county development plan 
  
 LC2 Council – consolidates Village 
Development Plans into parish 
development plan 
  
 Village Development Plan – LC1 council 
formulates, following village planning 
meeting 
 
1.2 The top-down financing system and bottom-up planning system in Uganda 
 
The responsibilities of the central government still include provision of public 
goods that are not delivered at the sub-national level, such as national defence, and 
the construction of major roads (roads that pass through more than one district). The 
central government also undertakes monitoring and supervision of the work that is 
implemented by sub-national governments, to encourage compliance and quality 
standards to be met.25  
 
 
25 Ahmad and Brosio, Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction? 
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The staffing structure26 of the public service at the sub-national level is 
extensive, being comprised of the Chief Administration Officer (CAO), a Deputy CAO, 
District Planner, and sectoral teams for Education, Health, Water, Community 
Development, and other services sectors. A Chief Financial Officer, and District 
Human Resources Officer are also engaged. Technical officers such as an engineer 
may also be employed directly at the village level. These senior roles are supported 
by more junior-level staff. This structure is replicated at the sub-county, though with 
fewer supporting staff. For all officers in the district public service, there is a minimum 
education level of Senior Four,27 the fourth year of high school. There is no minimum 
education requirement councillors at any level. Finally, each district is assigned three 
representatives from the central government, namely the Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC); a police officer; and a District Internal Security Officer (DISO).  
 
Fiscal decentralisation in Uganda 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is a more complex story, and is one that has shifted over 
time. With the introduction of decentralisation in Uganda in the contemporary era,28 
from 1986 onwards, districts were granted the right to charge local levies and taxes. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, in many districts the tax base is low. 
Districts’ locally-raised revenue comprises only a small part of incoming funding, and 
districts remain heavily dependent on the central government for financing their 
budgets. For sub-counties, likewise, the local tax base is low, and sub-counties’ 
budgets are largely comprised of transfers from districts and from the central 
government. Furthermore, the high level of conditionality29 built into the system of 
transfers from the central government restricts the ability of sub-national governments 
 
26 The staff of district and sub-county administrations are recruited, paid and employed by the District 
Service Committee in each district. Staff are therefore employed specifically for their own district, and 
cannot for example be promoted into a more senior role in a different district. The exception to this is 
the senior public servant at the district, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who is an employee of 
the Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) at the national level, and is employed via a fixed-term contract. 
CAOs may be transferred to a different district by MoPS. Officers in the public service receive regular 
salary payments and pensions, and are entitled to use office space and equipment. Senior officials 
are also entitled to use a vehicle with a driver and fuel. 
27 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
28 Noting that earlier forms of decentralisation had been established during the colonial era 
29 Under which grants are issued for a particular purpose, as specified by agencies in the central 
government. For example, grants may be allocated for the provision of primary schools. The funding 
contained in this grant can only under very limited circumstances be allocated to an expenditure item 
other than the provision of primary schools.  
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to exercise discretionary authority over funding. This presents a barrier to the ability of 
sub-national governments to be responsive to the development needs and priorities 
of the community. While the official position in Uganda is that fiscal decentralisation 
has been implemented, the continuing dependence of sub-national units on the central 
government for the overwhelming majority of their budgets draws this claim into 
question.  
 
The rationales and assumptions underpinning decentralisation  
 
Implementing decentralisation30 is far from a costless exercise, with 
government budgets absorbing the cost of creating sub-national units, paying salaries 
for new administrators and elected officials, constructing new offices and providing 
facilities and vehicles. In resource-constrained developing countries, where the 
opportunity cost of this expenditure is substantial in terms of direct financing of public 
services, it is necessary for central governments to present clear statements of the 
benefits that will accrue from the implementation of decentralisation. Section 2.1 
details in historical perspective the way these rationales have shifted over time, in line 
with changing trends in international development policy and economic theory. In the 
most recent era, decentralisation is oriented around the achievement of two principal 
rationales.31 They will be briefly outlined here, and will be discussed in greater detail 
in section 2.1.  
 
Decentralisation and improvements in service delivery  
 
The first argument made in favour of decentralisation in the contemporary era 
is that decentralisation brings the site of decision-making over public services nearer 
to the population that will be the end-users of these services. Compared to the central 
government, which may be geographically remote, the nearness of a sub-national 
government is said to mean that government obtains a greater level of cognisance of 
local development priorities. According to this rationale, public services are more 
 
30 From here on, the term ‘decentralisation’ is used to refer to all three of fiscal, administrative and 
political decentralisation.   
31 Bardhan, ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’. 
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closely targeted to their areas of greatest need, meaning that allocative efficiency of 
budgetary expenditure improves.32  
 
Decentralisation and improvements in participatory governance  
 
Secondly, the proximity of sub-national governments to the community is 
thought to improve the accountability of government to the population. This operates 
in two ways. Firstly, the nearness of sub-national governments to the population 
means that members of the community are thought to be more able to complain to 
government about any poor standards of delivery of services. Secondly, the greater 
proximity of local governments to the population is thought to mean that local 
governments are able to be more consultative of local communities when formulating 
workplans and budgets. Local governments are able to develop consultative and 
participatory programs of work, that are inclusive of members of the community.33 The 
outcome of this practice is that the day-to-day operations are thought to be more 
democratic and participatory than when decisions are made by central governments 
in a distant location, far from where local citizens can practically reach.  
 
The greater accessibility of local governments to the population, finally, 
indicates that local governments can in theory be held to account more effectively than 
a remote central government. Because local representatives can be observed more 
easily than central government representatives, they can be held to account more 
effectively via local elections.34  
 
Decentralisation and Members of National Parliament  
 
It should be noted, however, that both the supply-side and demand-side 
arguments in favour of decentralisation that are described here disregard one 
important relationship: that of the community to their local MP. These theories indicate 
that a desirable mechanism for improving the supply of and demand for good 
 
32 Craig and Porter, ‘The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion 
Strategies in the Rise of “Inclusive” Liberalism’. 
33 Hansen and Twaddle, Developing Uganda. 
34 Faguet and Sánchez, ‘Decentralization and Access to Social Services in Colombia’. 
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governance and good services to the population is to shift the site of governance 
nearer to the population. However, such a relationship already exists, in the form of 
citizens’ local representative in the national parliament. Local MPs should be well-
informed about the development needs and priorities of their local communities, and 
so ought to be able to improve the targeting and the allocative efficiency of public 
service delivery in their electorate. MPs in the national parliament also have as their 
mandate to consult local populations during the formation of the annual budget and 
workplan of the national parliament and public administration. The introduction of 
decentralisation, using these same arguments, can therefore be held to be a tacit 
acknowledgement that decentralisation is necessary where MPs in the national 
parliament are failing to facilitate this same supply of, and demand for, targeted and 
good-quality public services at the local level.  
 
Key theoretical concepts relating to decentralisation 
 
In addition to the description of how decentralisation is implemented in the 
Ugandan context as explained earlier in this chapter, a number of theoretical concepts 
underpin the notion of decentralisation itself. These concepts are here analysed and 
contextualised in detail, in order to frame the research. These are the concepts of: 
nearness and proximity, legitimacy, participation, responsiveness, and the concept of 
the political economy. Each of these is discussed here in turn, in reference to Uganda.  
 
Nearer to the people 
 
The foundational assumption underpinning the introduction of decentralisation 
into a specific governance context is that the quality of governance is improved with 
greater proximity to the population being served. By drawing the site of government 
decision-making nearer to the people, the relationship between the state and society 
obtains a greater level of closeness. This literal and metaphorical closeness is 
assumed to facilitate greater communication, greater accountability, and greater 
mutual understanding, than that in the relationship between central governments and 
the population.35  
 




The corollary of this argument is to ask what degree of closeness and proximity 
should be considered the optimal level. In a country such as Uganda, where transport 
infrastructure is weak and travel is slow, but mobile telephony is becoming increasingly 
pervasive and radio broadcasts are in wide use, the question remains as to how 
physically near the government must be to the community in order to facilitate 
communication and consultation. Also subject to question is the importance of barriers 
other than physical distance in achieving communication, such as a cultural aversion 
to calling into question decisions that were made by those in a position of greater 
social status. The full implications of these questions of the appropriateness of 
distance as a measure of closeness can be seen when assessing the rapid 





The issue of the legitimacy of the government has been especially relevant in 
the Ugandan context, and has been of particular concern to the ruling national party 
in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Decentralisation was first 
formalised in the contemporary era in 1992,36 as Uganda emerged from the substantial 
period of civil conflict known as the Bush War. The introduction of Local Councils (LCs) 
during this time period, as will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2, was an 
important element of NRM’s transition from a military to a civilian government, in that 
it signalled to the population that consultation and participation would be important 
elements of the new regime. This marked an important point of distinction from the 
previous post-independence governments, whose authoritarianism had contributed to 
significant, damaging social unrest. The introduction of decentralisation was thus an 
important mechanism for signalling a new era of governance, and for establishing in 
the minds of the community that NRM’s objectives were to be more consultative of the 
population.37 The continued success of NRM has been further entwined with 
decentralisation, as will be discussed in chapters Six and Seven.  
 
36 Saito, ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’. 






The concept of popular participation in governance and government decision-
making has become an important part of development theory and practice, and is an 
important element of decentralisation. The notion that the poor themselves should be 
involved in development planning and poverty-reduction strategies has become 
accepted by most bilateral and multilateral donor organisations, and supposedly 
marks a shift from the paternalism of past development practices and models. 
Participatory governance holds that the citizenry has the right, and the capacity, to be 
involved in annual budgeting processes and in planning, delivering and monitoring 
public services. Decentralisation is an important element of this, as the transfer of 
planning and budgeting of services to sub-national areas is thought to make 
participation easier, more practical and more affordable.38 In implementing 
decentralisation, mechanisms for generating participation at the village level, such as 
village meetings, are in wide use. The underlying assumption is that by conducting a 
public meeting, the views of the population are both accurately obtained and 
recorded.39 The implications of these assumptions in the Ugandan context are 




A fourth concept underpinning the rationales of decentralisation is that of the 
responsiveness of local governments to the development needs of the community. A 
common argument made in favour of decentralisation is that local governments are 
better informed about local development needs than the more-remote central 
government, and so are better placed to be able to respond to these development 
priorities.40 For example, a local government may be able to ascertain that a particular 
village in the community lacks access to a reliable source of water, and can respond 
to this by providing funding for the construction of a borehole.  
 
 
38 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. 
39 Francis and James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation’. 
40 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
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However, this assumes that sub-national governments have been granted 
sufficient autonomy to be able to respond decisively to local development needs and 
priorities. That is, it assumes that having identified the lack of water supply in a village, 
the local government has the authority, the social capital and the ability to re-direct 
funding from an alternative line of expenditure to that of the borehole. In practice, local 
governments’ budgets may be too rigid or prescribed to allow such a transfer, or lack 
the technical capacity to manage such a change. There is also the possibility of 
political interference in resource allocation, for example seeing the location of a 
borehole redirected to be nearby the home of powerful local elites (potentially including 
councillors themselves).41 The implications of these potential weaknesses to the 
practice of responsiveness are discussed in further detail in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
The political economy 
 
Like decentralisation, the term ‘political economy’ is in wide use throughout the 
literature. This thesis takes the term to indicate the space in which the factors that 
drive political decisions intersect with economic priorities. The political economy space 
is an environment in which institutions are formed, changed and sustained, depending 
on the forces applied by actors and their motivations.42 In some circumstances, the 
political economy space may be the scene of trade-offs, where economic goals are 
rendered secondarily important to political objectives, at least from the perspective of 
those in political power. An analysis of the political economy space allows researchers 
to explore the nexus between production and governance, and ask what political 
factors drive the decisions that comprise economic policy.43  
 
Positioning decentralisation within this political-economy space facilitates an 
analysis of which political factors and which economic targets influence decisions 
relating to decentralisation. Research reveals the driving factors behind the decision 
to implement decentralisation: are the goals of decentralisation political or economic? 
What do political leaders hope to gain from decentralisation, and to what extent are 
 
41 Scott, ‘Decentralisation, Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical Review’. 
42 Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Aiding Economic Growth in Africa: The Political Economy of Roads 
Reform in Uganda’. 
43 Weingast and Wittman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 
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their actions constrained by the need to achieve economic growth? Introducing 
decentralisation represents a substantial change to a country’s institutional settings 
and hierarchies. An analysis of these changes is located within the political economy 
space in order to expose and make explicit the goals of actors within this space, and 
how they might leverage decentralisation in order to achieve these goals. As will be 
discussed in section 2.2, the initial stages of decentralisation in Uganda are 
themselves reflected through political-economy lenses. Some authors argue44 that the 
introduction of decentralisation in Uganda was primarily motivated by domestic, 
political objectives: specifically, the transition to a civilian government and the 
establishment of the NRM following the Bush War. For others,45 decentralisation was 
motivated by economic and international objectives: that is, governance reforms that 
sought to build relationships with the international donor community. The analysis of 
the initial introduction of decentralisation in Uganda through a political-economy lens 
highlights the differing views on motivations and goals that lead to the introduction of 
decentralisation. 
 
44 For example: Terrell G. Manyak and Isaac Wasswa Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in 
Uganda: Governance Adrift’, African Studies Quarterly; Gainesville 11, no. 4 (2010): 1–24; and G. 
Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and 
Practices (Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
45 Such as Paul Francis and Robert James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen 
Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program’, World Development 31, no. 
2 (1 February 2003): 325–37, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00190-0; and Ehtisham Ahmad 
and Giorgio Brosio, Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction? 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009). 
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1.2 Background: Uganda’s economic and political context 
 
This section presents the political, economic and cultural context in which 
decentralisation is being implemented in Uganda. This context is significant in that it 
determines how decentralisation has been implemented, and in which ways the goals 
of decentralisation’s implementation have been affected. The recognition of the 
political-economy context also allows for an analysis of which actors, motivations, 
policy goals and resource-allocation decisions have coincided to create the current 
model of decentralisation in Uganda. This section will address the context in which 
decentralisation has been implemented, the history of decentralisation in Uganda, and 
an overview of the goals and rationales of implementing decentralisation in this 
specific national context.  
 
The political context of decentralisation in Uganda  
 
The contemporary political era began in 1986 in Uganda, when the current 
ruling party, NRM, first came to power following their military victory in the Bush War.46 
The current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, was the military leader of the 
NRA. He became the political leader of NRM, and so President, following the NRA’s 
victory in 1986; he remains the commander in chief of the armed forces. At the time of 
the Bush War the NRA was dominated by members from the southern region of 
Uganda, while the forces they defeated were northern; this created the basis for 
ongoing conflict in the northern regions of Uganda until 2006.47 The origins of NRM as 
a military party mean that the military remains a powerful force in Ugandan politics, 
with ten seats in Parliament reserved for members of the army, known as the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Members of the President’s family hold important 
leadership roles in UPDF, including the President’s son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, a major 
general and former Commander of the Special Forces Group, and the President’s 
brother, General Caleb Akandwanaho (also known as Salim Saleh),48 a prominent 
member of UPDF.  
 
46 The political history of decentralisation in Uganda will be discussed in detail in the literature review, 
in section 2.2.  
47 Branch, ‘The Violence of Peace: Ethnojustice in Northern Uganda’. 




Initially when NRM seized power in 1986, and for nearly two decades thereafter, 
NRM implemented a system of ‘no-party rule’. Parliament was comprised of MPs who 
were officially independent, rather than members of parties, but who could 
nonetheless be aligned with parties. Cabinet included MPs who were aligned with 
opposition parties, in order for parliament to be inclusive of all groups.49 The rationale 
behind this system was that competition between political parties had caused civil 
unrest and conflict in Uganda, and following the destruction of the Bush War, a period 
of national rebuilding was first required before multi-party elections could be allowed.50 
Museveni went as far as to claim that the Ugandan citizenry was unable to cope with 
the demands of party politics, so no-party rule had been implemented for their own 
protection.51 Corresponding to the no-party system is the concept of NRM as a 
‘movement’: a system in which all citizens are part of the drive towards national 
development, and neither tribes nor political parties are as important as membership 
of the national project.52  
 
As the international community became more engaged with the Ugandan 
political economy from the mid-1990s onwards, criticism grew about the lack of 
political competition in Uganda.53 Pressure mounted on NRM to allow political parties 
to officially form, and to undertake political activities such as campaign rallies.54 This 
was put into place in time for the 2006 national elections, which were the first to be 
multi-party in the contemporary era. Also in 2005 a new Constitution was implemented. 
Museveni used the development of this new Constitution as a rationale for running for 
President again at the 2006 election, in spite of the two-term limit that was in place for 
presidential candidates.55 56 2005 also saw the abolition of the Graduated Tax, which 
had been a poll tax applied to all adult males. The Graduated Tax had been highly 
 
49 Dicklitch, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa. 
50 Meredith, The State of Africa. 
51 Mugaju, J. and Oloka-Onyango, J.  (eds.), No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities. 
52 Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. 
53 A more detailed discussion of the international community’s engagement in Ugandan 
decentralisation takes place in the literature review, in section 2.1.  
54 Francis and James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation’. 
55 F. Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’, in Saito, ‘Politics and Local 
Government in Uganda’. 
56 For some commentators, Museveni leveraged the re-setting of term limits was a form of ‘trade’, in 
exchange for ‘allowing’ multi-party elections to be conducted. See for example: Vokes and Wilkins, 
‘Party, Patronage and Coercion in NRM’s 2016 Re Election in Uganda: Imposed or Embedded?’ 
 
 63 
unpopular, due in part to the forceful tactics deployed in its collection. The removal of 
the tax was a popular decision among voters, and thus a crucial election strategy 
before the first competitive, multi-party election in 2006.57 However, the tax had formed 
an important revenue base for district governments. While districts were initially 
compensated for the removal of the tax, this compensation had largely fallen away by 
the late 2000s.58  
 
Elections are held every five years, with Presidential elections held 
approximately three days before elections for LC3 and LC5 councils. While political 
opposition parties have been permitted to form since 2005, their activities have been 
systematically constrained, with increasing degrees of restriction placed on their 
operation.59 For example, and Museveni’s rival candidate for President from the 
opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party, Kizza Besigye, has repeatedly 
been the subject of actions by the UPDF and the Uganda Police,60 has been placed 
under house arrest, and has been charged with treason.61 In 2018, a period of violence 
surrounding a byelection in Arua resulted in the hospitalisation, arrest, and court 
martialling of a number of independent and opposition MPs.62 This included the 
prominent politician and former musician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (also known 
as Bobi Wine), whose high profile focused international attention63 on the incident.  
 
Authors such as Perrot et al.64 categorise Uganda as a ‘hybrid regime’, in which 
the appearance of political competition and democratisation is a screen hiding the 
government’s actual goal: the further entrenchment of the ruling party.65 There is also 
evidence of increasing assimilation of NRM, the state, and Museveni.66 The President 
encourages citizens to approach him personally with problems that he can address, 
 
57 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’, in Saito, ‘Politics and Local 
Government in Uganda’. 
58 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
59 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
60 ‘Kizza Besigye, Main Opposition Candidate in Uganda, Is Arrested Again - The New York Times’. 
61 ‘Uganda: Museveni Rival Kizza Besigye Charged with Treason - BBC News’. 
62 ‘“Tortured” Bobi Wine Charged in Army Court - The East African’. 
63 Kagumire, ‘Bobi Wine and the Beginning of the End of Museveni’s Power’. 
64 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
65 For example, in the Ugandan context, the introduction of multi-party, competitive elections has not 
generated genuine democratisation, due to NRM’s continued drive for dominance and remaining in 
power.  
66 Mwenda, ‘Personalizing Power in Uganda’. 
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with the goal of establishing patron-client relationships;67 these occurrences are then 
publicised widely. For example, the website ‘Uganda Elections 2016’ detailed the 
President’s pre-election visit to Budaka District, where the family of a fighter killed in 
the Amin era appealed personally to the President for assistance:  
We are very poor and we request the President to construct for us 
houses. … We want the President to help our children go to school 
and uplift the standards of our family. 68  
Museveni also regularly and openly distributes cash payments (funded from the 
national budget) to individuals and groups during visits to rural electorates.69  
 
Accordingly, voters report a belief that there is little to be gained from voting for 
opposition parties, for two reasons. Firstly, opposition parties are highly unlikely to win, 
in which case it is beneficial to be seen to support NRM; and secondly, NRM is better 
resourced than opposition parties and so can conceivably address an individual’s 
concerns more easily, in pursuit of clientelist goals.70 Of Uganda’s 426 parliamentary 
seats, 293 (69 per cent) are held by MPs aligned with NRM.  
 
The Ugandan economic context and population trends 
 
Despite recent high rates of economic growth, Uganda remains a low-income 
country.71 Uganda’s principal industries are agricultural, with coffee, tea and sugar as 
key exports; the recent discovery of oil reserves in the eastern region of the country 
could potentially have a positive impact on exports and rates of economic growth.72 
Infrastructure in Uganda remains poor, with a small percentage of roads being 
tarmacked, and frequent wash-outs of unsealed roads during the rainy season. Rates 
 
67 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
68 See for example the discussion on the Uganda Elections 2016 website, produced (by the NRM) in 
the lead-up to the 2016 presidential elections: http://www.elections.co.ug/new-
vision/election/1413567/museveni-sironko-mbale  
69 Vokes and Wilkins, ‘Party, Patronage and Coercion in NRM’s 2016 Re Election in Uganda: 
Imposed or Embedded?’ 
70 Wilkins, ‘Who Pays for Pakalast? The NRM’s Peripheral Patronage in Rural Uganda:’ 
71 United Nations Development Program, ‘Human Development Reports: Country Report for Uganda’. 
72 African Development Bank, ‘Uganda Economic Outlook’. 
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of access to motorised vehicles among the population is low, and concentrated in 
urban centres. Rural households tend to travel by foot, by bicycle, or by motorcycle.73  
 
Approximately 75 per cent of the Ugandan population is employed in 
subsistence farming, growing crops for food on a small, single-household plot.74 Cash 
crops75 are sometimes grown in addition to crops for household consumption, such as 
coffee, or surplus crops that are sold at market. Farming techniques remain simple, 
with most ploughing completed using hand tools. The use of livestock to assist in 
farming is rarely observed. In rural areas, villages are generally not served by shops. 
Instead, household members travel to a nearby trading post or small town to access 
markets, to purchase essential non-agricultural supplies such as kerosene, and to 
seek medical care when needed. Employment sources other than agriculture tend to 
be concentrated in towns and cities, and include retail services, professional services 
such as accounting, and tourism and hospitality services. Other large employers 
include the public service, and the military and police.76  
 
Uganda’s fertility rate, of six children per woman, is one of the world’s highest, 
and contributes to annual population growth rates of three per cent. Uganda’s 
population is amongst the world’s youngest, with an estimated fifty per cent of the 
population aged under fifteen. Projections of population growth suggest that Uganda’s 
population will reach 50 million people by 2040, compared to 35 million in 2016.77 This 
high population growth rate presents a challenge for service delivery, for example with 
large numbers of additional children needing school places each year. A high 
population growth rate also generates pressure on agricultural land, with already-
modest household farming plots being divided among the large number of children 
who inherit them. Population growth rates are not predicted to slow, with little 
emphasis on family planning or reducing family sizes in evidence.78  
 
73 African Development Bank, ‘Eastern Africa’s Manufacturing Sector’. 
74 Bank of Uganda, ‘Structural Change and Economic Growth in Uganda’. 
75 Of the three districts that were studied for this thesis, farmers in one district (Ntungamo) reported 
growing coffee as a cash crop, though in small quantities (an average of five coffee trees per 
household). In the other two studied districts (Pallisa and Lira), farmers reported growing crops for 
household consumption only, with the exception of some excess crops that were sold at market to 
raise cash for school fees. However, all crops grown in these two districts were food crops.  
76 Bank of Uganda, ‘Structural Change and Economic Growth in Uganda’. 
77 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ‘Statistical Abstract’. 




The Ugandan tribal context and historical significance  
 
Uganda is a highly culturally and linguistically-diverse society, with 40 separate 
languages spoken.79 Language divisions are powerful, with even neighbouring tribes 
not necessarily speaking mutually-comprehensible languages.80 Tribes and kingdoms 
have a long history in Uganda, but they are also not universal: some areas of Uganda 
operate under different traditional systems, such as family or kinship groups. The 
colonial experience in Uganda resulted in the administrative boundaries between 
tribes becoming fixed and defined, in order to be easier to categorise and administer.81 
Tribal identities within Uganda had played a substantial role in the civil unrest that 
followed Independence, and lasted for several decades. For example, Idi Amin 
formulated a support network amongst soldiers with West Nile heritage, but remained 
distrustful of officers from Lango or Acholi backgrounds, as these communities were 
said to have been loyal to (Amin’s predecessor as President) Milton Obote.82  
 
The implications of the colonial period for tribal identities were still being felt 
when NRM rose to power in 1986. In the contemporary era, particular tribes are said 
to be closer to Museveni and other important leaders (the Baganda and especially the 
Banyankole), leading to accusations of unequal access to opportunities and 
resources.83 Officially, however, tribes do not have a formal role in politics or decision-
making over state resources, and instead provide guidance and maintain knowledge 
of cultural practices. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the assertion of tribal 
identities has been an important contributing element in the pursuit of additional 
districts in Uganda.  
 
The Ugandan political economy  
 
The Ugandan political economy is characterised by a number of themes, upon 
which the national image of Uganda has been built. Key terms are used with distinct 
 
79 Pawlikova-Vilhanova, ‘Swahili and the Dilemma of Ugandan Language Policy’. 
80 Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda. 
81 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 
82 Meredith, The State of Africa. 
83 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
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meanings in the Ugandan context, differently from their usage in other English-
speaking environments, and analysing these local meanings offers an insight into local 
constructions of the Ugandan image and story. One example of this phenomenon is 
the use of the word ‘producing’. In the Ugandan context, production describes more 
than the output of economic an economic process. Rather, it describes the contribution 
that an individual makes to the collective society, including agricultural production, 
child-rearing, and selling goods at a market. In this usage, ‘producing’ implies work 
done by the people, for contribution ‘upwards’, such as supplying agricultural products 
that support one’s family or can be sold to provide food for others.84 The mirror image 
of ‘producing’ is ‘giving’, that which is done for the population by its elected leaders. 
The word ‘giving’ is applied to actions by Museveni, such as providing funding for 
scholarships, cash grants to youth groups, or notably, when a new district is created.85 
The use of ‘giving’ as opposed to ‘producing’ has a top-down connotation, to match 
the bottom-up connotation of ‘producing’.  
 
This dichotomy emphasises that while the bulk of physical outputs and physical 
capital is the result of the labour of the population, the work of ‘giving’ is done by 
political leaders who control the financial capital generated by this manual work. The 
assets of the state are distributed by those in political power, and often as a result of 
a personal86 meeting or personal connection with those leaders.87 From the 
perspective of leaders, their powerful position entitles them to determine the 
distribution patterns of assets, and to favour those of their own patronage network.88 
From the perspective of villagers working in subsistence farming, the need for them to 
be producing is constant, while they benefit from giving only occasionally, if at all – 
and as a result of the personal whim of someone in power.  
 
This reliance on personal connections to the elite for the distribution of 
resources is an important context for the study of decentralisation, as the 
predominance of personal patronage networks for resource allocation makes 
 
84 National Resistance Movement, ‘NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress: Taking Uganda to 
Modernity Through Job-Creation and Inclusive Development’. 
85 Grossman and Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’. 
86 A vivid illustration of this is the phrase “know-who”, used to signify resources gained by knowing the 
right person (as compared to “know-how”, resources gained through personal skill).  
87 Mwenda, ‘Personalizing Power in Uganda’. 
88 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
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transparent the generalised failure of formal institutions.89 Where formal systems for 
resource transfer have failed, such as mechanisms for agricultural modernisation, or 
employment generation in the formal sector, interpersonal connections come to 
dominate resource transfer instead.90 In the context of creating sub-national 
governance institutions such as local governments, a generalised reliance on informal 
and personal mechanisms presents a challenge to installing formal mechanisms that 
will be accepted as legitimate. Where citizens have become accustomed to seeking 
informal and personalised mechanisms for gaining access to the resources they 
require, the implementation of new governance systems may generate unanticipated 
outcomes.91 The dominance of informal mechanisms for accessing resources also has 
important implications for ‘nearness’ to the people. Where an individual actor 
perceives that the best mechanism for obtaining access to resources from the state is 
through being closely connected to an actor in political power, they are more likely to 
seek the creation of additional districts, in an attempt to bring these actors nearer. 
 
89 Hyden, ‘Institutions, Power and Policy Outcomes in Africa’. 
90 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘The Master of Institutional Multiplicity? The Shifting Politics of Regime 
Survival, State-Building and Democratisation in Museveni’s Uganda’. 
91 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
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1.3 Motivations for the research  
 
This research arose from an observation that the framing of decentralisation 
within the existing research literature and development practice is highly consistent, 
even across dissimilar contexts. Despite the wide variety of national contexts in which 
decentralisation is implemented, the stated rationales for its introduction are similar 
across locations.92 As will be discussed in detail in section 2.1, decentralisation is often 
framed as a technical reform, that achieves a range of governance and economic 
targets. The decision to implement decentralisation is often framed as being 
dominated by central elites, and addresses issues relevant to the central government, 
such as the goal of establishing downward-reaching patronage networks. Particularly 
in the Ugandan case, the phenomenon of district proliferation is under-studied, other 
than to discuss the motivations of elite actors at the central level in seeking the creation 
of additional districts. The study of decentralisation generally, and district proliferation 
specifically, in the Ugandan context facilitates an analysis of the connections between 
decentralisation and the political economy. District proliferation emerges as an 
important outcome of the interaction between these two elements. 
 
The choice of Uganda as a case study for the research 
 
Uganda is an important case study for the examination of decentralisation 
because it has one of the most detailed and extensive decentralisation systems in the 
world.93 The Ugandan decentralisation system has established 122 district 
governments,94 below which are a further four levels of governance hierarchy. The 
Ugandan decentralisation model is regarded as a model from which other countries 
are to learn about decentralisation, owing to its perceived success.95 Uganda has also 
long been considered a ‘donor darling’, in that it has emerged from a period of civil 
war in the 1970s and early 1980s and has demonstrated stability and economic growth 
over a period of some thirty years.96  
 
92 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. 
93 Ndegwa, ‘Decentralization in Africa’. 
94 At 30 June 2017. 
95 Villadsen and Lubanga, Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local 
Governance. 




However, Uganda is also thought to be at a critical moment in its history, with 
the positive gains arising from this period of stability and growth being eroded by a 
drift away from genuine democracy.97 Oppression of political opposition, pressure on 
free media and a growing police force and military have caused concerns for Uganda’s 
development partners, as have headline-generating restrictions on the human rights 
of homosexual people. It is also argued that governance in Uganda is moving towards 
an increasing degree of ‘personification’, in which governance is seen to be 
concentrated in the hands of the President personally,98 with Parliament and other 
governance institutions becoming increasingly side-lined.99 Viewed in this light, 
governance in Uganda is being pulled in two directions: firstly, greater participation in 
governance and decision-making by the population is driving towards improving 
democratic governance demands. On the other hand, the move towards centrist 
politics and the personification of governance at the level of the central government is 
moving away from participatory and consultative governance.  
 
Decentralisation stands at the heart of this conflict. Decentralisation has as one 
of its two stated aims that it ‘brings government closer to the people’; that is, it allows 
the population to participate in government decision-making more effectively. On the 
other hand, decentralisation can be manipulated in such a way as to establish 
increasing patronage networks, and to further increase the dominance of the central 
government over sub-national areas. The extent to which decentralisation reinforces 
either of these trajectories depends on how decentralisation interacts with the political 
economy of that context. The informal and formal processes at the heart of the ways 
in which individuals and groups relate to one another will both affect, and be affected 
by, decentralisation, potentially leading to unforeseen effects for governance, 
resource-allocation and service delivery.  
 
 
97 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
98 van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems’. 
99 Mwenda, ‘Personalizing Power in Uganda’. 
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1.4 Contributions of the research 
 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of the political and economic factors 
that interact with decentralisation in Uganda. By focusing on the driving factors behind 
the very-rapid creation of new districts since 1986, this thesis addresses the 
confluence of interests and motivations of actors that drive this phenomenon. District 
proliferation is presented as the outcome of individual agents’ pursuit of their own self-
interests, and while these interests are heterogeneous, they coincide at the point of 
district proliferation. For senior politicians, the creation of additional districts presents 
an opportunity to extend their political support networks, solidifying their political 
survival. For elites at the district level, gaining a new district can represent a political 
and economic strategy, expanding both influence and livelihoods opportunities. For 
political non-elites at the district and sub-county level, the creation of a new district 
presents the chance to expand urban livelihoods opportunities, and to gain economic 
advantages and business opportunities. Finally, for the rural poor, the creation of a 
new district or sub-county is perceived to bring the promise of new public services 
being created, in ways that may not have been successful under an old, larger district. 
District proliferation thus appears to be analogous to development itself, when viewed 
from the perspective of the grassroot. However, as will be discussed in Chapters Six 
and Seven, this perception may not be accurate; instead, worsening social inequality 
may emerge from district proliferation.  
 
In addition to contributing a detailed understanding of the driving factors 
underlying district proliferation, this thesis utilises a unique combination of research 
methodologies to facilitate the analysis of key issues from multiple perspectives. 
Firstly, the research utilises quantitative data to analyse the public financial 
management system, and the methods revealed within it for prioritisation of the state’s 
objectives, as will be discussed in section 3.3. Analysing public finance outcomes 
allows an investigation of the genuine purpose of a state or regime, as the financial 
commitments made through national budgeting processes render transparent the full 
goals and priorities of the state. By tracing expenditure outcomes over a two-decade 
period, the research reveals the patterns, trends and directions of expenditure. 
Contrasting these quantitative data with the qualitative results revealed through 
interviews and surveys allows for a discussion of conflicts or inconsistencies that arise 
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between stated goals and those that are operationalised through public financial 
management.  
 
Secondly, the research uses qualitative interview methods to ascertain the 
perspectives of elites in the public service, at several levels of government. The thesis 
compares and contrasts these perspectives to develop an understanding of central 
issues relating to public financial management, resource allocation processes and 
consultation methods from the perspective of these actors. The research then 
incorporates the perspectives of elected leaders, again at various levels of 
government, to analyse the motivations and political goals that are the driving 
incentives for political elites. The research also includes interviews with members of 
civil society, whose goals are variously to monitor or to influence the actions of 
government, to discuss the perspectives of those whose positionality from public 
service is external, and yet intertwined.  
 
Additionally to qualitative interviews, the research uses survey methodologies 
to include and analyse the perspectives of those at the grassroot themselves: 
members of households in rural areas, in six locations. Working in subsistence 
agriculture, these actors are the recipients and users of public services, and those 
whom government seeks to engage in democratic governance practices. By including 
the poorest members of society in research relating to public governance, this thesis 
seeks to contribute an alternative to the top-down perspectives that can characterise 
research on public-sector governance, and by including the voices of citizens 
themselves. In this way, the thesis uniquely considers the motivations and 
perspectives of villagers in rural areas, and asks how they are able to leverage their 
capabilities and assets in order to maximise their own benefits and goals.  
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1.5 Overview of thesis 
 
This thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter One has described the context and 
background of the research, and offered explanations and contextualising of key 
terminology. Chapter Two positions the research within the field of existing literature, 
including literature relating to clientelism and patronage more broadly, and examines 
the concept of decentralisation in historical perspective. It is argued that 
decentralisation is described by many authors to be a mechanism that achieves 
governance and economic reforms; this is reflected in writing on the origins of 
decentralisation in Uganda. Chapter Three describes the analytical framework of the 
research, and sets forth the methodologies and logical frameworks used for the work. 
The approach to fieldwork and research methods is also described, as are the 
limitations of the work.  
 
Chapter Four presents the results of interview-based fieldwork, with a 
concentration on the perspectives of elite actors. The issue of district proliferation is 
described, including its implications for successful public financial management. 
Numerical results from the national budget process are also presented, including 
conditionality in funding, dependence of districts on the central government, and the 
dominance of central-government priorities in funding outcomes. Chapter Five 
discusses the results of fieldwork relating to the perspectives of non-elite actors, 
including those at the household level. The viewpoints of non-elite actors contribute 
an alternative framing of decentralisation: rather than delivering targeted service 
delivery and responsive governance, decentralisation is described as non-impactful at 
the grassroot level.  
 
Chapter Six draws together the three sets of results from the qualitative and 
quantitative data collection, and highlights where these support or qualify existing 
research. This chapter presents an analysis of the three sets of fieldwork results, 
arguing that the lack of development outcomes generated by decentralisation has 
fuelled the demand for, and supply of, additional districts. It will be argued that district 
proliferation is generated by the coinciding incentives of a wide range of actors within 
the Ugandan political economy, rather than only those of elite actors. Chapter Seven 
presents a theoretical framework for the arguments emerging from the field research, 
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and contrasts these to the dominant paradigms of the existing literature. District 
proliferation will be related to concepts of social inclusion, rural livelihoods and political 
survival, as actors within the political economy leverage decentralisation to achieve 
their goals. Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, positions the research within its 




Chapter Two:  
 
Literature review:  
Framing and Contextualising Decentralisation 
 
Provided the Local Governments are elected, monitored by the 
electorate and the electorate is educated enough to know their 
rights or is sensitised enough to do so, local governments can be 
good medicine against bad governance, corruption, and ensuring 
efficient service delivery. 
- President Yoweri Museveni, Statement to the  
Commonwealth Local Government Conference, 15 May 2013 
 
As a result of the popularity of decentralisation as a policy option in developing 
and developed countries, the literature and analysis relating to decentralisation is 
substantial. Decentralisation relates to many research areas, including political 
analysis, economic policy, rural development, accountability, and public 
administration. While the literature on decentralisation is wide-ranging, there are also 
distinct themes that can be drawn upon and further discussed. The focus of this 
chapter will be five key themes that describe the interconnected nature of 
decentralisation and the broader political economy. These arguments provide the 
contextual base for the research, and discuss the main concepts and ideas upon which 
the research will expand. This chapter will review relevant literature regarding the 
political economy of decentralisation, and will situate the thesis within this literature 
and within literature regarding African politics more broadly. Key lines of enquiry will 
be identified that build on arguments made in the existing literature, and that locate 
the contribution of this research within broader knowledge. The five areas that will be 
the focus of this literature review are as follows.  
 
First, the links between literature relating to decentralisation and to broader 
economic and governance reforms will be analysed, using an historical literature 
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review. From the 1980s onwards, decentralisation was linked to other economic and 
governance reforms that aimed to reduce ‘government failures’ that were dominant in 
economic theories at that time, such as corruption and inefficiency. It will be argued 
that the framing of decentralisation within the international development policy 
literature100 from these eras follows similar trends to overall political-economic 
neoliberal reforms. The purported benefits that would accrue to countries that 
undertook decentralisation accordingly shift over time, following trends in broader 
neoliberal reforms. As a result of this framing of decentralisation as a part of a broader 
suite of reforms, it will be argued that the current body of literature101 positions 
decentralisation as an technical reform that can be utilised to address governance 
issues.  
 
Second, literature that positions the thesis within broader literature on politics 
in sub-Saharan African contexts will be reviewed, with a focus on work relating to 
clientelism and patronage. This section examines literature relating to the linkages that 
political elites create with voters, in order to influence voting behaviour in their favour. 
Furthermore, this section will review literature that positions decentralisation in relation 
to clientelism and patronage, and asks whether decentralisation can be thought to 
worsen or improve these practices. For some authors, decentralisation exacerbates 
clientelistic and patronage-based allocation of resources, as it draws political actors 
nearer to the voters they seek to capture. For others, decentralisation can be viewed 
as undermining the patronage networks established by national elites, with the result 
that decentralisation may be resisted or only partially implemented in some contexts. 
It will be argued in this section that decentralisation alters the institutional context in 
which clientelistic and patronage-based relationships are situated, and in so doing, 
contributes to relationships between patrons and clients that based on expectations of 
reciprocity and exchange.   
 
 
100 A distinction is made between the academic and development policy/practitioner literature. The 
former refers to peer-reviewed publications, while the latter refers to policy and research publications 
of international development institutions.  
101 With exceptions, such as Jean-Paul Faguet and Caroline Pöschl, Is Decentralization Good for 
Development?: Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers (Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Lídia Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Scope, Motivations and Impact on Service Delivery and 




Third, the question will be analysed of whether decentralisation was introduced 
into Uganda by external actors, or emerged from the local political and economic 
context. For some authors,102 decentralisation arises from the political economy 
context of the mid-1980s, at the conclusion of the Bush War. For others,103 
decentralisation was introduced in Uganda and driven by external actors in the context 
of structural adjustment and democratisation reforms. By analysing the origins of 
decentralisation in Uganda, it is possible to identify the political and economic goals of 
actors who were involved in its implementation from the late 1980s, as well as of the 
current era. It will be argued that NRM’s goals in introducing decentralisation were 
initially motivated by attempting to obtain domestic political support, and later by 
gaining the support of the international development community. 
 
Fourth, the existing technical literature will be surveyed regarding the rapid 
creation of new districts in Uganda and the fiscal consequences of this policy, while 
noting that the perspective of those at the ‘grassroot’ is not always considered in detail 
within the current body of work. While the issue of district proliferation is frequently 
framed as a mechanism for generating patronage and political advantage for actors 
within the central government, the perspectives of those at the village level are not as 
frequently considered. This thesis contributes to addressing this gap, and considers 
the objectives and goals of household members, and how the creation of a new district 
may help these goals to be achieved. This thesis contributes the viewpoint of the 
grassroot, to complement existing research that focuses on the perspectives and 
incentives of elite actors.  
 
Finally, the technical literature relating to social inclusion and rural livelihood 
strategies will be reviewed. This wide literature establishes theoretical models of 
survival and of gaining access to resources, from the perspective of those at the 
grassroot level of society. By addressing the strategies that are used by non-elite 
 
102 For example, Apolo Nsibambi, Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda : The Quest for Good 
Governance (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 1998); and Elliott Green, ‘Decentralisation and 
Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 4 (2008a): 427–50. 
103 Such as Paul Francis and Robert James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen 
Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program’, World Development 31, no. 
2 (1 February 2003): 325–37, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00190-0; Ehtisham Ahmad and 
Giorgio Brosio, Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction? (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2009); and Florence Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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actors to gain access to the resources of the state, it becomes possible to view the 
rapid proliferation of additional districts and sub-counties through this lens of livelihood 
generation and resource access. This thesis will add to existing literature by arguing 
that for residents of rural areas, or who are not members of sub-national elites, the 
creation of additional administrative units represents a perceived opportunity to gain 
access to improved service delivery and greater employment opportunities. Each of 





2.1 Decentralisation and reform: A technical mechanism for economic 
efficiency and ‘good governance’ 
 
The academic literature relating to decentralisation from the 1980s until the 
present decade undergoes a number of transitions. Particular ideas dominate policy, 
research and practice for a period of time, and are then replaced by new ideas and 
research about the best ways to generate economic growth, political stability and 
improvements in the quality of life of citizens. Beginning in the 1980s, ideas of 
‘government failure’ and the supposed superiority of market-based resource-allocation 
dominate the literature. In the 1990s, the existing literature then moves through 
alternative theories and models, such as ideas of structural adjustment and 
liberalisation, including a focus on deregulation and removing the role of the state in 
managing core utilities. From the 2000s onwards, economic and political theory begins 
to reckon with some of the negative effects of rapid structural adjustment,104 and the 
literature moves towards considering pro-poor economic growth, service delivery, and 
improving poverty rates world-wide. These phases are discussed in turn below.  
 
Structural adjustment and reducing the size of government  
 
Within the literature on economic reform and development dating from the late 
1980s and 1990s, as the Cold War drew to a close, distinct lines of argument emerge 
about the ideal role of the state in achieving development. According to authors105 
from the neoliberal school, the role of the state should be minimal, with the market 
mechanism left as unfettered as possible in allocating resources to their most efficient 
use. Market-oriented reforms were common practices in many countries in this era, 
along with reducing the size of governments.106 This position led to recommendations 
of privatisation of state-owned enterprises, liberalisation of trade and currencies, the 
reduction of the welfare state, the downsizing of bureaucracies, and deregulation of 
industries. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) aimed to improve the efficiency 
 
104 Delius Asiimwe and Frederick Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in 
Uganda (Kampala: Fountain Pub Ltd, 2007). 
105 For example, Larbi, ‘The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States’; Gopal and World 
Bank, Decentralization in Client Countries. 
106 Larbi, ‘The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States’. 
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and effectiveness of government, and were connected to the provision of budget 
support for developing countries.107  
 
Decentralisation is associated with these reforms as a way of creating a leaner, 
more efficient, central government.108 For some authors who were writing at this time, 
decentralisation is beneficial in that it reduces the size of the central government, and 
so reduces the risk of the central government becoming too dominant in central 
economic planning, or seeking too great a role in the economy. For example, Hickey 
and Mohan109 argue that decentralisation rose in popularity in the sense of avoiding 
the development of a large, dominant central government. In this context, popular 
participation in the design and implementation of social services becomes increasingly 
popular as a development model. Larbi110 and Young111 explain the ways in which 
decentralisation was recommended to developing countries in the 1980s as a 
mechanism for reducing the size and improving the efficiency of their governments. 
Decentralisation was thus perceived during this era as a mechanism for reducing the 
power and size of central governments. 
 
For other authors, the benefit of decentralisation is its use in overcoming the 
perceived failings of large central government in general. For example, authors such 
as Krueger112 argue that decentralisation reduces the size and power of the central 
government, and so can be used as a mechanism for overcoming corruption, 
improving efficiency in resource allocation, and improving the responsiveness of 
cumbersome and slow central governments to the development needs of the 
community. Furthermore, multilateral organisations such as the World Bank113 cite 
decentralisation as a process of improving government knowledge of the community’s 
development needs, so that resources can be targeted more efficiently to the exact 
priorities of the community.  
 
 
107 William Easterly, ‘IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty’, in Managing 
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226155425.001.0001. 
108 Ndegwa, ‘Decentralization in Africa’. 
109 Hickey and Mohan, ‘Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of Development’. 
110 George A Larbi, ‘The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States’, 1999. 
111 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 
112 Krueger, ‘Government Failures in Development’. 
113 Gopal and World Bank, Decentralization in Client Countries. 
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Service delivery and the supply-side of governance   
 
While the emphasis in the development policy literature of the 1980s and 1990s 
discussed in the previous section was on limiting perceived failures and over-large 
size of central governments, in the 2000s the focus of development policy literature 
shifted to service delivery.114 Influenced by the Millennium Development Goals, this 
argument is framed in the literature in terms of improving social capital, so that poor 
individuals can improve their employment opportunities and wages, and so work their 
way out of poverty.115 Literature from this time period positions decentralisation as a 
policy mechanism for improving the targeting of services to areas of greatest need. In 
this rationale, by taking the site of government decision-making nearer to the 
population, local governments are able to identify the needs of the community more 
readily than the central government. As described by Cheema and Rondinelli,116 for 
example, public services can then be targeted more accurately to the local populations 
that are most in need of these services. Rather than providing standardised solutions 
for every location within a country, services can be delivered that best address local 
development concerns. 117 Cabral118 argues that the improved knowledge of local 
development needs held by local governments compared to the centre enables more 
efficient service delivery: services are only provided where needed, meaning that 
fewer resources are required to meet local needs. The World Development Report of 
2000-01119 argues that the benefits of decentralisation for improved targeting of 
service delivery is based upon participation: local governments must engage with local 
communities in order to determine their development needs. Planning processes that 
begin at the village level – known as bottom-up planning – provide a mechanism for 




114 For example, Sachs and McArthur, ‘The Millennium Project: A Plan for Meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals’. 
115 Baldacci et al., ‘Social Spending, Human Capital, and Growth in Developing Countries’. 
116 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance. 
117 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing 
Countries. 
118 Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa’. 
119 World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2000/2001 : Attacking Poverty’. 
120 Lambright, Decentralization in Uganda. 
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Decentralisation is thought to help improve the quality and reach of service 
delivery, as a result of a local government’s greater proximity to the community.121 By 
being located nearer to the population it serves, a local government is argued to be 
better placed than a more-remote central government to provide services that respond 
directly to the community’s development needs and priorities.122 Local governments 
are argued to be more aware of local poverty issues, of any localised problems such 
as droughts, and more aware of which villages or even households are experiencing 
poverty – thus improving the supply-side of governance.123 For example, Kuteesa et 
al.124 describe the way in which decentralised service delivery in Uganda was 
motivated partly by a push to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery.125  
 
Overall, drawing the site of government closer to the community it serves is 
argued to lead to improved knowledge of local development needs, thus improving 
both the responsiveness of government to the community, and the targeting and 
efficiency of service delivery.  
 
Consultation and participation in decision-making: The demand side of governance 
 
The second common rationale for decentralisation in the current literature 
describes the ways in which decentralisation is thought to improve the participation by 
local communities in government decision-making. By moving the site of government 
nearer to the community, communication between the two groups can improve126 – 
even due to such simple factors as easier travel from a village to a district capital. This 
represents an improvement to the demand side of governance. As argued by Ribot127 
and Craig and Porter, 128 citizens are thus able to communicate with local leaders to 
complain about a poor-quality local service, for example, in a way that might not be 
 
121 Scott, ‘Decentralisation, Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical Review’. 
122 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda; and Faguet, 
‘Decentralization and Governance – A Special Issue of World Development, 2013’. 
123 Kuteesa et al., ‘Uganda’. 
124 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
125 Crook, ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Local–Central Relations’. 
126 Jutting et al., ‘What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-Poor?’ 
127 Ribot, African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability. 
128 Craig and Porter, ‘The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion 
Strategies in the Rise of “Inclusive” Liberalism’. 
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feasible with the central government. In addition, the nearness of local governments 
under decentralisation can improve transparency. As argued by Mansuri and Rao,129 
due to the greater proximity of sub-national leaders, communities have greater access 
to information relating to budgets and expenditures, and can assess whether planned 
expenditures have in fact been delivered. Cheema and Rondinelli130 describe the ways 
in which decentralisation came to represent improved governance effectiveness, via 
improving consultation and participation of the community. 
 
Advocates of decentralisation further argue that local communities are better 
placed to hold a local government to account for service delivery and public 
governance than they are a more-remote national government. This is principally due 
to the presence of local-level elections.131 At the national level, elections tend to be 
contested with reference to national issues, and the specific issues affecting a small 
community are unlikely to be addressed in response to voters’ pressure for change. 
On the other hand, at the local level, voters can hold politicians to account for their 
responses to local concerns. Where local leaders perform poorly, communities are 
more likely to be able to assess the performance of sub-national leaders, and to hold 
them to account via their voting choices in local elections.132 Ahmad and Brosio133 also 
argue that the implementation of decentralisation leads to stronger participatory 
democracy, with a stronger sense that the community can hold government to account 
for high-quality services and transparent use of public funds.  
 
Regarding participation, authors such as Cabral134 argue that decentralisation 
can improve the empowerment of local people, through increasing their participation 
in government decision-making. Villadsen and Lubanga135 argue that decentralisation 
contributes to good governance by bringing government nearer to the community, 
meaning that citizens can be more involved in decision-making. Members of the public 
are better able under a decentralised structure to hold government to account for its 
 
129 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. 
130 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance.  
131 Ahikire, ‘Localised or Localising Democracy’. 
132 Faguet and Sánchez, ‘Decentralization and Access to Social Services in Colombia’. 
133 Ahmad and Brosio, Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction? 
134 Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa’. 




use of resources, and to enforce transparency. Citizens are therefore able to ‘demand’ 
good governance from their leaders. As Hickey and Mohan136 phrase this point, 
decentralisation institutionalises participation. A local government, being nearer to the 
population it serves, is argued to be better placed to undertake consultation with local 
communities, and to communicate successfully with their constituents.137 The two-way 
communication that will be generated by decentralisation will, by reducing the physical 
distance between governments and communities, improve transparency, 
accountability and responsiveness, and so propel governments closer to the ideals of 
‘good governance’ that became popular during this time period. Overall, by holding 
local leaders to account for their ability to respond to local development priorities, 
voters are said to be better able to demand good governance under decentralisation 
than they are under centralised138 governance structures. 
 
Good governance and anti-corruption 
 
An additional example of the way in which authors writing on decentralisation 
mirror the language and themes of the broader development policy literature is seen 
in discussions on ‘good governance’. Throughout the 2000s and into the 2010s, 
development researchers and practitioners developed literature on the indicators of 
government that constitute successful governance.139 Amongst these are positive 
indicators relating to accountability, transparency, strong electoral democracy, and 
governments that are consultative with the community.140 Conversely, attributes that 
are considered negative for governance include corruption, patronage-politics and 
nepotism. In particular, participation of local communities in governance is thought to 
improve the accountability and transparency of governments, as citizens can hold 
government to account for their use of resources.141 By adopting reforms to improve 
their accountability, transparency and participatory governance, governments are 
 
136 Hickey and Mohan, ‘Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of Development’. 
137 Dauda, ‘Democracy and Decentralisation’. 
138 It is noteworthy that these two rationales for decentralisation – improved responsiveness in service 
delivery, and improved participatory governance – could also be achieved by an area’s MP. The 
rationales underpinning decentralisation implicitly assume that MPs are not succeeding in delivering 
responsiveness or consultation to local citizens. Decentralisation, and district proliferation, are 
demanded by citizens because their national-level MPs are failing to deliver these attributes.  
139 Crook and Manor, ‘Democratic Decentralisation and Institutional Performance’. 
140 Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. 
141 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. 
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thought to be able to manage public resources successfully, and to create a strong 
social contract with the population.  
 
Likewise, throughout this time period, literature relating specifically to 
decentralisation begins to reflect the same focus on ‘good governance’ practices that 
is seen in the overall development policy literature. The greater nearness of the 
population to government is argued to mean that populations are better able to hold 
government leaders to account.142 Decentralisation is described in the literature as a 
mechanism for reducing corruption and patronage politics. By transferring some 
powers and resources away from the central government, the scale of the network of 
the patrons politicians can influence is reduced, as is the possible scale of corruption. 
For example, Jütting143 outlines the rationale of this argument: bringing governance 
and decision-making nearer to the population increases transparency; as a result, the 
population is better able to identify corruption and punish those who commit it through 
the ballot box. Decentralisation begins to be recommended as a tool for generating 
these good-governance behaviours. For example, by moving the sites of government 
decision-making nearer to the community, authors such as Nsibambi144 argue that 
transparency and accountability improve. For Balunywa et al.,145 the popularity of 
decentralisation as a policy option derives from citizens’ frustration with the poor 
records of central governments on corruption and embezzlement.  
 
Conversely, other authors146 argue the opposite: that implementing 
decentralisation in fact creates more opportunities for the central government to 
undertake patronage and corruption.147 In this argument, implementing 
 
142 Golooba-Mutebi, F., ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’, in Saito, ‘Politics and Local 
Government in Uganda’. 
143 Johannes Jütting et al., ‘What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-Poor?’, The 
European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 4 (2005): 626–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810500367649. 
144 Apolo Nsibambi, Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda: The Quest for Good Governance 
(Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 1998). 
145 Balunywa et al., ‘An Analysis of Fiscal Decentralization as a Strategy for Improving Revenue 
Performance in Ugandan Local Governments’. 
146 For example: Lídia Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Scope, Motivations and Impact on Service 
Delivery and Poverty’, 2011; and Richard C. Crook, ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: 
The Politics of Local–Central Relations’, Public Administration and Development 23, no. 1 (2003): 
77-88. 
147 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’; Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and 
Politicians in Democratic Polities’; Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
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decentralisation does not eliminate corruption and patronage; rather, these are also 
decentralised. Authors such as Prud’homme148 argue that sub-national governments 
are in fact more prone to corruption than central governments, due to greater 
expectations of resource ‘sharing’ caused by closer inter-personal connections at this 
level. Bardhan and Mookherjee149 argue that local governments are more prone to 
capture by vested interests at the sub-national level than the centre. Literature 
regarding the connections between decentralisation, patronage and clientelism is 




148 Prud’homme, ‘The Dangers of Decentralization’. 
149 Bardhan and Mookherjee, ‘Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels’. 
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2.2 Clientelism and patronage 
 
A second area of the literature relating to decentralisation seeks to position 
decentralisation within a broader narrative on sub-Saharan African politics, particularly 
in regards to clientelism and patronage in African countries. As authors such as 
Scott150 note, the study of patron-client relationships in developing-country political 
systems hopes to improve understanding political contestation in these societies, 
rather than explaining these relationships with reference to factors such as ethnicity 
or religion. Instead, this literature seeks to examine the informal relationships that exist 
between political leaders (particularly incumbents) and voters, and the effects of these 
relationships on policymaking, service delivery and voter behaviour. In light of this 
examination of relationships, this body of literature frames decentralisation as a 
political mechanism, and one that has specific goals in regard to creating linkages 
between the central government to voters at the village level and to sub-national elites. 
This section describes this literature and positions the thesis within this broader 
context of the political motivations of African governments implementing 
decentralisation.  
 
Linkages between leaders and voters 
 
One area of research that is described in the existing literature is the 
examination of how elected leaders seek to create downward linkages to voters, and 
the types of informal and relationship-based strategies that are implemented in order 
to achieve these linkages. Authors such as Helmke and Levitsky151 argue that the 
incentives that shape the behaviour of actors in political systems are just as likely to 
be guided by information rules and systems than formal institutions. The mechanisms 
that politicians and electoral candidates use to form a connection or link to voters forms 
part of these informal mechanisms, with Kitschelt152 arguing that elites choose 
between various mechanisms of linkage-formation as part of their electoral strategies. 
Muno153 adds that practices of clientelism and patronage are examples of these 
 
150 Scott, ‘Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia’. 
151 Helmke and Levitsky, ‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda’. 
152 Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’. 
153 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’. 
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informal rules that govern relationships between voters and political leaders, and that 
these practices include aspects of exchange, power and dominance, and reciprocity 
between parties in the relationship.  
 
A number of authors in the existing literature frame decentralisation in terms of 
these informal linkages between political leaders and voters. This analysis seeks to 
identify how urban-based national governments can create linkages with voters in rural 
and remote locations, in order to further the political objectives of political leaders. In 
this sense, authors argue, decentralisation is undertaken by central governments for 
explicitly political reasons, with the objective of seeking control of, or influence over, 
sub-national areas and populations.  
 
For example, as argued by Boone,154 the motivations of politicians who seek to 
leverage decentralisation in pursuit of their own political motivations means that true 
power-sharing between the centre and periphery does not occur – which is a partial 
explanation for why decentralisation has disappointing compared to its promise. 
Boone adds that power-sharing only genuinely occurs when sub-national elites are 
incentivised to advocate for it, and then they have sufficient power to insist on this 
change. Because the incentives and power of sub-national elites can vary from 
location to location, even within one country, the outcomes of decentralisation can 
vary locally as well. Authors such as Cheeseman155 describe the challenge for central-
government elites of engaging with populations in rural areas, even though they lack 
a physical presence in these areas, and argue that decentralisation forms a 
mechanism for bridging this gap. Building on this idea, Riedl and Dickovick156 argue 
that in Uganda specifically, the GoU uses decentralisation as a mechanism for 
influencing the population, by building links between Kampala and rural areas.  
 
Following this argument, decentralisation can be viewed as a mechanism for 
transferring resources to, and improving communication with, voters at the sub-
national level – with explicitly political motivations. For Boone,157 decentralisation is a 
 
154 Boone, ‘Decentralization As Political Strategy In West Africa’. 
155 Cheeseman, ‘Patrons, Parties, Political Linkage, and the Birth of Competitive-Authoritarianism in 
Africa’. 
156 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
157 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. 
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strategy that can allow central governments to interact differently with different regions 
within a country, depending on their priorities and engagement strategies in each 
location. In some locations, central-government leaders may seek to usurp the power 
of competitor elites at the sub-national level, while in other locations, central-
government elites may seek to share the power of cooperative local-level elites. These 
different objectives for different locations will generate different forms of relationships 
between the centre and the periphery, and different funding and power-sharing 
relationships may be adopted in various locations. In Boone’s terminology, these 
‘political topographies’ result from varying institutional forms that are established by 
political leaders in different locations, in accordance with their political goals in those 
sites. Decentralisation can facilitate these political topographies, by providing a 
mechanism through which national-government leaders can either support or 
disengage from local-level leaders and elites.  
 
Sjögren158 builds on this concept of linkages that vary according to 
geographical space by applying this model to Uganda specifically. Sjörgen argues that 
decentralisation in Uganda has led to multiple sites of contestation emerging: one is 
over the creation of additional districts, and the second is over who is able to gain 
control of a district (either established or newly-created districts). This contestation, 
according to Sjögren, results in fragmentation of geographical spaces (in the form of 
district proliferation), and the uneven reach of the state into rural areas. In this sense, 
while decentralisation has allowed the state to gain access and create linkages with 
rural areas, the political dynamics of gaining control over decentralised structures 
generates inconsistent linkages between the centre and different locations within 
Uganda.  
 
Decentralisation and clientelism  
 
A number of authors in the existing literature argue that as well as linkages 
between politicians and voters, the use of clientelism specifically is a clear feature of 
 




Ugandan political life. Indeed, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey159 argue that the practice 
of clientelism is becoming an increasingly prevalent practice in Uganda, and has 
formed an important part of the Ugandan political settlement. Levitsky and Way160 
point to the connections between competitive authoritarianism and clientelism, arguing 
that the former creates an environment in which clientelism is more likely to emerge, 
because of the unstable nature of a strong state that nonetheless experiences 
resistance to their rule from opposition parties.  
 
While Medina and Stokes161 argue that there are several alternative definitions 
of clientelism, there are nonetheless common elements that can be identified. 
Clientelism is defined by Stokes et al.162 as benefits that are transferred to an individual 
in exchange for their vote, such as cash, other gifts, or an employment opportunity; 
the relationship between the principal and the client is understood to be reciprocal, 
and is hierarchical. Muno163 emphasises the hierarchical nature of this relationship: an 
individual of a higher status (patron) uses their influence and resources to direct the 
behaviour of a lower-status client. Expanding on this, Schmidt et al.164 explain that 
clientelist relationships have political relevance where they form a connection between 
actors who would not otherwise come into contact with each other, such as rural voters 
and political elites. These authors further emphasise the reciprocity of the clientelist 
relationship, which they argue is held together by the threat of social sanction if one 
party does not follow through on the implied commitment. Furthermore, as Stokes et 
al.165 explain, in order for clientelism to succeed there must be monitoring of the 
eventual vote of the client, such that the client perceives that the principal will know 
(or plausibly could discover) whether the client did in fact vote for the politician who 
delivered the benefit to them.  
 
Because there is therefore a high informational demand – because the 
politician must know what kind of gift will induce a voter to change their vote in favour 
 
159 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
160 Levitsky and Way, ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’. 
161 Medina and Stokes, ‘Clientelism as Political Monopoly’. 
162 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
163 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’. 
164 Schmidt et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions. 
165 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
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of the politician, and also know whether they did in fact vote in their favour – this 
information gathering is conducted by local party loyalists or other brokers.166 While 
authors including Hicken167 note that the extent of clientelism is difficult to measure or 
quantify, van de Walle168 notes that the redistributive effect of clientelism may be 
overstated. This is because the resources that are transferred from central elites to 
sub-national areas tend to concentrate in the hands of sub-national elites. However, 
as political competition increases, the number of people who must be included in 
clientelistic resource transfer also increases, with the result that clientelism tends to 
have stronger redistributive effects in these circumstances. Clientelism is therefore a 
form of ‘political monopoly’, as defined by Medina and Stokes,169 in which the 
incumbent politician holds control over the resources that voters want, and can also 
monitor the voters’ actions at the ballot box, so that voters know they will be rewarded 
(or punished) for voting in particular ways, and act accordingly.  
 
Within this broader discussion of clientelism within sub-Saharan African 
economies is a more specific set of research on how decentralisation can either 
improve or exacerbate clientelism. According to Kitschelt170 and Diamond,171 because 
decentralisation results in government agents being brought nearer to the population, 
the information barrier that clientelism requires (such as knowledge of voter behaviour) 
is reduced. Kitschelt and Wilkinson172 add that information can be exchanged through 
a ‘broker’ between the voter and the politician, particularly at the subnational level, in 
the form of a party loyalist. In contrast, Grindle173 argues that in some locations, the 
introduction of decentralisation shifts the balance of power away from local ‘big men’ 
and towards the national leader, giving the national leader greater control over 
clientelist structures.  
 
 
166 Stokes et al. 
167 Hicken, ‘Clientelism’. 
168 van de Walle, ‘The Democratization of Political Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
169 Medina and Stokes, ‘Clientelism as Political Monopoly’. 
170 Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’. 
171 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. 
172 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ‘Citizen–Politician Linkages: An Introduction’. 
173 Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa. 
 
 92 
However, Wahman and Boone174 and Wantchekon175 argue that voters in 
different locations will respond differently to attempts to capture their vote through 
patronage. These authors that the clientelistic incentives that compel voters to change 
their vote will vary across geographical spaces, meaning that central governments will 
need to approach clientelism in some locations differently from others. 
Decentralisation can facilitate these different approaches, by allowing voters in one 
region to be targeted differently from voters in another region; for example, 
employment opportunities may be a more powerful incentive to adjust one’s vote in 
some locations than in others. Decentralisation allows politicians to target more 
accurately the resources and opportunities that will be more persuasive to voters in a 
specific location.   
 
In particular, as described by Kitschelt,176 clientelism tends to be chosen as an 
electoral strategy by political leaders where parties are based on ethnocultural 
connections between voters and politicians. This is because lines of segmentation of 
voters along ethnocultural lines facilitate that monitoring of clientelist exchanges, and 
because these exchanges form a club good that incentivise a voter to identify with a 
particular ethnicity. Building on this argument, Eaton et al.177 point to the ways in which 
clientelism under decentralisation can be used to build linkages within specific tribal 
groups, such as a politician directing resources to communities that share their tribal 
identity, in order to establish a reciprocal, clientelist exchange of voters for resources. 
The implications of this connection between the creation of additional districts under 
decentralisation in Uganda, and this ethnocultural self-identification of voters (as 
incentivised via a club-good connection to ethnicity) is further discussed in later 
chapters of this thesis.  
 
Decentralisation as a platform for patronage  
 
 
174 Wahman and Boone, ‘Captured Countryside? Stability and Change in Sub-National Support for 
African Incumbent Parties’. 
175 Wantchekon, ‘Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin’. 
176 Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’. 




A number of authors in the existing literature178 have raised arguments about 
the links between decentralisation and patronage politics, including the ways in which 
patronage can undermine the goals of decentralisation such as improved 
transparency in governance. Patronage, as described by Stokes et al.,179 occurs when 
a person obtains a benefit as a result of their loyalty to, or membership of, a particular 
political party; this benefit may be in the form of an employment opportunity in the 
public service, for example. Muno180 adds to this definition that access to resources or 
opportunities tend to be based on interpersonal connections. Crawford and 
Hartmann181 argue that while decentralisation is broadly thought to improve the 
standards of governance in African countries, its benefits are undermined by local 
capture and by patronage politics. This is particularly the case where central-
government elites use decentralised governance as a mechanism for creating patron-
client relationships with sub-national elites. This might be done as a way of maintaining 
local-level support, or alternatively fracturing local-level resistance. Diamond182 adds 
that  decentralisation can worsen patronage, as the movement of government nearer 
to the population makes political capture easier to achieve.  
 
Eaton183 adds to this argument by discussing the ways in which decentralisation 
becomes a stage for power struggles between central- and local-government elites. 
For example, central-government politicians might view decentralisation as an 
opportunity to engage in patronage, and bring resources to their home electorate or 
community. More broadly, Eaton argues that central-government politicians will be 
supportive of decentralisation when they see short-term political advantages in doing 
so, but may withdraw their support (or even seek to undermine or destabilise 
decentralisation) in the future if their incentives shift in that direction. Furthermore, 
Grossman and Lewis184 argue that decentralisation can be introduced in which central-
to-local patronage networks are known to be problematic for maintaining the central 
government’s power, as a mechanism for disrupting these networks. 
 
178 For example, Branch and Cheeseman, ‘Democratisation, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: 
Lessons from Kenya’. 
179 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
180 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’. 
181 Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
182 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. 
183 Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’. 




In addition, Riedl and Dickovick185 argue that decentralisation can be used to 
transfer employment opportunities and resources to the supporters of a particular 
political leader, or to supporters of ruling political parties more generally. They argue 
that in Uganda, the NRM uses decentralisation as a mechanism for implementing 
patronage between the central government and sub-national populations. 
Furthermore, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey186 argue that the use of decentralisation as 
a vector for achieving patronage is used not just by NRM or by political elites, but by 
Museveni personally. In their argument, they suggest that Museveni engages in ‘rent-
sharing’, in which he either travels to rural areas himself, or sends an intermediary or 
envoy on his behalf, and uses state resources to directly solve the personal problems 
facing individual voters. The use of decentralisation generally, and district-creation 
specifically, are then used as a mechanism for the transfer of resources to local areas. 
This is reflected in the way in which the decision to form a new district is often 
announced: by Museveni personally, and often at a campaign rally. Golooba-Mutebi 
and Hickey conclude that the high cost of creating new districts may eventually impose 
a limit on using district proliferation for patronage politics in this manner: this 
“inflationary patronage”187 may be self-limiting in practice. The use of district 
proliferation as a mechanism for achieving political influence is the subject of chapters 
six and seven of this thesis.  
 
However, some authors argue in the opposite direction: that there might be 
reasons that powerful political elites might resist implementing decentralisation, as it 
may be disruptive to their established patronage networks. Ribot188 suggests that the 
reason democratic decentralisation has progressed slowly in many countries is that 
elites are reluctant to fully implement decentralisation, where it is disruptive to the 
patronage systems they have already established; decentralisation in these contexts 
remains incomplete or only partially implemented. Golooba-Mutebi189 argues that the 
nature of sub-national politics means that a well-connected network of patrons will not 
 
185 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
186 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
187 Barkan, Joel, quoted in Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey. 
188 Ribot, Waiting for Democracy. 
189 Golooba-Mutebi, in Saito, ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’. 
 
 95 
in practice demand decentralisation from their leaders, provided they are deriving a 
benefit from their presence in office. Boone190 argues that central governments will be 
unlikely to devolve significant amounts of power or resources to areas within a country 
that contain local elites that are relatively powerful, and over whom the centre may not 
be able to exert control. In such locations, the central regime may attempt to 
undermine or usurp the power of local elites, rather than undertaking power-sharing 
with them, through such mechanisms of decentralisation. Because the power of local 
elites can vary even within one country, different locations within a single country might 
receive different decentralisation outcomes from the central government, meaning that 
the outcomes of decentralisation can vary even within a single country.  
 
Decentralisation, linkages, patronage and clientelism  
 
Finally, a number of authors point to the harm that can be caused to good-
quality service delivery and governance by a tendency towards clientelism and 
patronage in the politics. For example, Stokes191 argues that clientelism can hinder 
the effectiveness of democratisation, can reduce the success of elections in accurately 
expressing the political will of voters, and can worsen the chance of tyranny developing 
if voters are afraid to vote against their patron. Crook192 argues that clientelism 
undermines local taxation systems, as voters expect specific resource transfers in 
exchange for the payment of taxes. Furthermore, Stokes et al.193 argue that when 
there is a tendency amongst voters to vote for politicians who provide them with 
individual gifts (such as cash or employment opportunities), politicians are in turn 
incentivised to offer these individual gifts – rather than investing in the delivery of public 
services or programs. As a result, the distribution of resources becomes 
individualised, with access to resources determined by connection to a member of the 
elite, rather than membership of a broader community. Grindle194 argues that where 
clientelist and patronage-based relationships exist, these can be time- and resource-
consuming to maintain, and can divert resources away from their best use. 
 
190 Boone, ‘Decentralization As Political Strategy In West Africa’. 
191 Stokes, Political Clientelism. 
192 Crook, ‘Democratic Decentralisation, Clientelism and Local Taxation in Ghana’. 
193 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
194 Grindle, Going Local. 
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Furthermore, drawing a connection to decentralisation, Barkan and Chege195 suggest 
that decentralisation is more likely to occur in societies that show elements of 
clientelistic relationships, but are resource-poor. This is because decentralisation 
allows political leaders to ‘give’ something to the voter base in order to meet their 
clientelistic expectations, but without draining significant state resources.  
 
This section has reviewed literature relating to the informal relationships 
between patrons and clients that create expectations of reciprocity, enforced by the 
threat of social or resource-based sanctions, that are hierarchy-based and long-term. 
Decentralisation alters the scale of these relationships by altering the geographic 
space between patrons and clients (and potentially intermediaries or brokers). In this 
way, decentralisation creates a context for determining actors’ expectations of these 
exchange-based relationships, and so determines the context in which elite political 
leaders and voters pursue their own objectives. The implications of this literature for 
the implementation of decentralisation in the Ugandan context, and in particular for 
the emergence of district proliferation, is explored in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
 




2.3 Decentralisation in Uganda: foreign or local? 
 
An area of debate in the existing body of literature relates to whether 
decentralisation in Uganda is a policy that was introduced by external actors, or 
whether it is an indigenous policy decision. Many authors refer to the way in which 
international development agencies encouraged the Ugandan Government to 
undertake a range of governance reforms in exchange for fiscal support. Others argue 
that the decentralisation policies that have emerged in Uganda grew from the 
aftermath of the Bush War in the early 1980s, and helped the NRM government 
transition from a military government to a civilian government. The question of whether 
decentralisation is a national or an international policy in Uganda is important for 
discerning the Government’s goals in implementing decentralisation reforms: was their 
goal to align themselves with the international community, or to galvanise national 
support? Does the Ugandan Government think of decentralisation as an technical, 
administrative mechanism, or an explicitly political tool for mobilising the public’s 
support for NRM? This section discusses these questions in greater detail.  
 
Decentralisation as a locally-driven initiative  
 
Several authors196 within the body of literature relating to decentralisation in 
Uganda describe the introduction of decentralisation from 1986 onwards as an 
indigenous process: one that was instigated by the Ugandan Government, to suit its 
own goals.197 Decentralisation is argued to have its origins in the Bush War, which 
lasted from 1980 to 1986. During this time period, the National Resistance Army 
(NRA), led by now-President Museveni, fought against the forces of Milton Obote and 
then Tito Okello. In order to be successful in these conflicts, the NRA relied upon the 
support of the broader Ugandan population, for food supply, road maintenance and 
 
196 Including authors such as Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance; Nsibambi, 
Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda : The Quest for Good Governance; Villadsen and 
Lubanga, Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local Governance; Green, 
‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’. 
197 According to the GoU Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy 2002, the goals of decentralisation in 
Uganda are to: “increasing local governments’ autonomy, widening local participation in decision 
making and streamlining of fiscal transfer modalities to local governments in order to increase the 





keeping fighters hidden.198 In order for this support to be organised, the NRA 
established a system of Resistance Councils (RCs) in the areas they had gained 
control over. According to authors such as Hansen and Twaddle, 199 the role of the 
RCs was to organise the local population in that immediate area to provide logistical 
support to the NRA, and to collect intelligence from rural areas and provide this to the 
NRA leadership. As explained by Villadsen and Lubanga, 200 these RCs were 
organised into a hierarchy, beginning with RC1s at the village level, and rising upwards 
to RC5 at the level of an administrative district.  
 
Following the success of the NRA in gaining military control over Uganda, the 
NRA was faced with the challenge of converting itself from a military government to a 
civilian one. As Kuteesa et al.201 explain, the support of the population had to be gained 
as part of this process, so that the government could claim that they were legitimate, 
civilian leaders with a broad base of support. In particular, as described by Crawford 
and Hartmann,202 key leaders in the Baganda community began to agitate for 
federalism at this time; decentralisation was introduced partly as a compromise 
compared to this governance arrangement.  
 
In addition, a leadership structure had to be installed at the sub-national level.203 
In order to achieve these goals, the RCs that had been so crucial to the success of 
the NRA were retained, and converted into Local Councils (LCs). As had been the 
case with RCs, the LCs were arranged in a hierarchy, with LC1s established at the 
village level, progressing upwards to LC5s at the district level. An important part of the 
rationale behind establishing the LC system is that it is highly participatory. Each adult 
member of the village is automatically a member of the LC1, and is able to vote for the 
membership of the village’s LC1 council, which includes a chairperson, treasurer, 
secretary, and representatives of women, youths, and the elderly.204 The inclusion of 
each adult member of the village in the LC1 means that each member of the 
 
198 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
199 Hansen and Twaddle, Developing Uganda. 
200 Villadsen and Lubanga, Democratic Decentralisation in Uganda: A New Approach to Local 
Governance.  
201 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
202 Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
203 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
204 Devas and Grant, ‘Local Government Decision-making—Citizen Participation and Local 
Accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and Uganda’. 
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community is officially a part of the local council system. As Ahikire205 explains, this is 
significant, in that it allowed NRA, and then NRM, to argue that each member of every 
village was an essential part of the NRA’s victory over the Obote and Okello forces. 
As an initial step in building a sense of one cohesive Uganda, the LC system created 
a sense of belonging and of enthusiasm in participating in the new governance system. 
It also suggested by authors such as Cheema and Rondinelli206 that the new 
government was invested in including each member of the population in the new 
nation-building process, and that this process would be participatory in nature. The 
early stages of the decentralisation process in Uganda were thus explicitly political, 
and aimed to generate the support of the general population for the new NRM 
government. 
 
Decentralisation is Uganda is also argued to be indigenous to Uganda in that it 
is built on institutions and systems that were established during the colonial period 
under British rule, and on structures that pre-date British involvement in Uganda. The 
administrative districts that were the basis of the RCs, and so became the basis for 
LCs, have their origins in the colonial period. As described by Mamdani, 207 during the 
era of British rule in Uganda, the country was divided into districts, each of which had 
an appointed administrator, in order for indirect rule to be achieved. With a single 
administrator holding authority over a large land area and large population, the districts 
system allowed for efficient administration in terms of the labour required. For some 
districts, the borders of the districts were associated with the borders of the kingdoms 
that pre-dated British engagement in Uganda, such as the Buganda Kingdom. Where 
kingdoms did not already exist, such as in northern Uganda, the British administrators 
grouped families together, gave a name to the group, and defined a geographical 
boundary around it. As Young208 describes, in some locations, the created groups 
were not grounded in existing tribal identities.  
Although Buganda and Bunyoro were large precolonial states 
whose political identity readily translated into ethnic ideology, most 
of the districts that served as the basis for British rule fell clearly in 
 
205 Ahikire, ‘Localised or Localising Democracy’. 
206 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance. 
207 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. 
208 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 
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the category of ‘imagined communities’. Acholi, Madi, Bugisu, Kiga, 
Teso: all were novel ethnic entities whose district elites acquired a 
proprietary interest in the nurture and promotion of these identities. 
In this way, districts were either created that were co-bordered with kingdoms, or were 
based on tribal identities that were created for the purpose of anchoring a district. 
Where smaller tribal groups existed, these tended to be placed underneath a larger 
kingdom, and were thus marginalised, and made to pledge allegiance to another king 
than their own.209 These administrative arrangements have had important social 
effects, such as entrenching the dominance of some kingdoms and tribes over others, 
and in formalising the confluence of an administrative unit with the population and 
language group that resides within it. This effect continues to have important 
consequences in light of district proliferation, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  
 
Decentralisation as an introduced mechanism  
 
A separate line of argument in the literature suggests that decentralisation in 
Uganda was introduced by external agencies, rather than being developed internally 
by NRM. In this argument, described by authors such as Green, 210 decentralisation 
was implemented in Uganda from the 1990s onwards as part of a suite of liberalisation 
reforms, that were made at the encouragement of multilateral lending agencies. 
Uganda’s perilous financial position at the conclusion of the Bush War rendered it 
unable to avoid seeking assistance from the international community; with this 
assistance came pressure for reforms.211 These liberalisation reforms were 
undertaken in Uganda in a similar way to those undertaken in other countries, 
including the implementation of decentralisation. For example, Souza212 describes the 
implementation of decentralisation in Brazil, including clear links between 
decentralisation and wider neoliberal reforms. Cheema and Rondinelli213 further 
describe the support a range of countries have received from international donors, to 
make wide-ranging governance reforms. 
 
209 Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda. 
210 Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
211 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
212 Souza, ‘Political and Financial Decentralisation in Democratic Brazil’. 




Initially, the goal of implementing decentralisation was to limit the size of the 
central government, partly in response to the then-recent history of authoritarianism in 
Uganda.214 As time progressed, according to this argument, the goal of implementing 
decentralisation shifted from reducing the size of the central government to improving 
service delivery. According to authors such as Francis and James, 215 this was part of 
a broader shift towards poverty-reduction policies, including Uganda’s development of 
a series of Poverty-Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Kuteesa et al. 216 argue that these reforms were conditional for the receipt of 
assistance from the World Bank and IMF, including Highly-Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) Program debt relief.217 Decentralisation was seen as an essential element of 
poverty reduction and the delivery of the PRSP, as it would generate better and more 
responsive delivery of public services. 
 
In this line of argument, the introduction of decentralisation served several 
purposes, each of which aligned to the priorities of the international development 
community. As detailed in the section 2.1, as the international community’s priorities 
for economic development and poverty reduction changed, so too did the stated goals 
and priorities of introducing decentralisation. This shift in rhetoric can be clearly seen 
in the Ugandan case, where the rationale for implementing decentralisation in 
partnership with the international development community shifted over time: from 
wanting to avoid the creation of a large central government, to wanting to improve 
service delivery and reduce poverty.218 Decentralisation is viewed in this body of the 
literature as a technical mechanism for achieving other policy goals. For these authors, 
decentralisation was implemented in Uganda on the instruction of international lending 
agencies, whose power over the Ugandan government was driven by the size of the 
loans given to the fledgling NRM government in the late 1980s. The Government’s 
dependence on international agencies for financial resources resulted in their inability 
to resist the proposed reforms put forward, including the implementation of 
 
214 Dicklitch, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa. 
215 Francis and James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation’. 
216 Ahmad and Brosio, Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction? 
217 International Monetary Fund, ‘Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries: Point Report: 
Uganda’. 
218 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
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decentralisation. Rather than serving NRM’s domestic political objectives, such as 
improving their popularity amongst the local population, decentralisation was instead 
implemented in order to achieve improved relationships with the international 
development community. 
 
Decentralisation incentives in the Ugandan context  
 
These two alternative viewpoints within the literature on the origins of 
decentralisation in Uganda offer different perspectives on the Ugandan Government’s 
motives for implementing decentralisation. For those who consider decentralisation to 
be an indigenous policy developed by NRM, the motivation to introduce it becomes 
domestic, and political. For those who consider decentralisation to have been 
introduced at the will of foreign donors, the motivation for decentralisation becomes 
international, and administrative.  
 
Understanding the origins of decentralisation in Uganda is important for 
contextualising the goals of the Government of Uganda (GoU) in implementing 
decentralisation. Depending on the starting assumptions of different authors, 
decentralisation can be viewed as an administrative, technical mechanism, or 
alternatively as a tool for mobilising the political support of different actors for the 
central government. The emergence of decentralisation in the immediate219 aftermath 
of the Bush War suggests that that NRM views decentralisation as an important 
mechanism for leveraging community support, and improving the legitimacy of 
government. Indeed, as argued by Ndegwa, 220 the participatory nature of the RCs and 
then LCs – elected by members of the community at the RC1/LC1 level – marked a 
shift from the authoritarianism of the Obote and Amin regimes, with a view to 
reassuring the population of NRM’s intended participatory and consultative approach 
to governance. Nsibambi221 adds that decentralisation was implemented rapidly after 
1986, and was implemented before the international community had begun to play a 
substantial role in shaping policy in Uganda.  
 
219 As described by Green (Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’.), monthly meetings of 
the RCs, and then LCs, began as early as 1987. These meetings were an important part of the 
transition from the Bush War to greater stability and the establishment of NRM. 
220 Ndegwa, ‘Decentralization in Africa’. 




The research undertaken for this thesis builds on this line of enquiry by 
analysing the extent to which decentralisation is viewed by the current GoU as a 
politically-influential mechanism. Given that NRM viewed decentralisation as a way to 
mobilise the political support of the population in 1986, it is possible to further argue 
that NRM in the current decade still considers decentralisation in this light. That is, that 
the NRM considers decentralisation to be an opportunity for generating increased 
political support for itself amongst voters, as was the case in generating support for 
the new government in 1986. Accordingly, the research undertaken for this thesis 
explores the ways in which the central government in Uganda utilises decentralisation 
as a political tool, in order to generate popular support and to solidify their continued 
political power in Uganda. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 




2.4 District proliferation  
 
The previous section discussed the ways in which decentralisation has 
potentially be used as a mechanism for political gain by NRM, and how this process 
is described in the existing literature. This section discusses the treatment in the 
literature of one example of this use of decentralisation for political gain: the rapid 
creation of new districts in Uganda. In the Ugandan context, the proliferation of new 
districts and sub-counties has become a prominent issue, with contestations regarding 
the sustainability and desirability of this phenomenon occurring publicly.222 The 
creation of a large number of new districts in Uganda has accelerated, particularly 
since 2006, with substantial implications for public financial management. However, 
district proliferation is not widely studied at present, despite the popularity of 
decentralisation as a policy reform.223  
 
The stated policy rationale for creating a new district is often the same rationale 
as for decentralisation itself: bringing governance and service delivery nearer to the 
people. 224 In other words, the process of creating an additional district is described in 
terms of further decentralising governance, or as decentralising more intensively, 
without a separate rationale being offered for the creation of a specific new district. 
Amongst authors who have conducted existing research on district proliferation in 
Uganda, the causes of this phenomenon are frequently attributed to the incentives and 
motivations of elite-level actors. Two major lines of argument have been put forward 
in the existing literature. The first, as mentioned earlier in section 2.2,  is that creating 
additional districts allows the central government to expand its patronage system in 
Uganda, such as rewarding allies at the sub-national level with the creation of a new 
district.225 The second is that the leaders of tribes in Uganda have sought to gain 
recognition and power through the creation of an additional district. Each of these lines 
of argument will here be discussed in greater detail.  
 
 
222 For example, see Lule, ‘Uganda’. 
223 Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
224 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
225 For example, Green (Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’.) describes NRM’s use of 
district creation as a source of patronage, that generates electoral support.  
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District proliferation as a platform for elite dominance and patronage  
 
Several authors226 maintain that the primary motivation for the rapid 
proliferation of additional districts since 1986, and particularly since the mid-2000s, is 
NRM’s desire to maintain strong patronage networks throughout Uganda. In this 
framing of district proliferation, new districts are created in order to be ‘given’ to the 
allies of NRM at the district level.227 This is because the creation of an additional district 
generates employment opportunities for sub-national elites, in areas where 
opportunities for formal, salaried employment may otherwise be rare.228  
 
Furthermore, as explained by Eaton at al.229, if the creation of a new district 
results in a guaranteed transfer of revenue to the sub-national government, there will 
be significant political pressure on the central government to establish additional 
sub-national units. NRM and central-level elites are able to generate popularity and 
support by themselves by ‘giving’ a new district – with its corresponding opportunities 
and resources – to district-level elites in specific electorates.230  
 
As explained by Lewis,231 the decision to award a new district to a particular 
region can be made in recognition of a particular sub-national elite’s demonstrated 
support for NRM, or to reward areas that vote consistently for NRM. Conversely, the 
decision to award a district can be withheld from areas whose elites have 
demonstrated that they are not supportive of NRM, or to areas that tend to vote for 
opposition political candidates. As Green232 explains: the creation of a new district, in 
 
226 See for example: Janet I. Lewis, ‘When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational 
State Transformation in Uganda’, Regional & Federal Studies 24, no. 5 (2014): 571–88; Elliott Green, 
‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 4 (2008a): 427–50; 
and Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’, American Political Science 
Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 196–217, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000567. 
227 Sjögren, ‘Battles over Boundaries: The Politics of Territory, Identity and Authority in Three 
Ugandan Regions’; Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
228 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World. 
229 Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid 
Effectiveness. 
230 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
231 Lewis, ‘When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in 
Uganda’. 
232 Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
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which political opponents are then offered employment, has the effect of neutralising 
these critics of government, and brings them within the NRM movement. 
 
An additional line of argument in the existing literature theorises a link between 
district proliferation and the introduction of multi-party elections in 2006. As described 
in section 1.2, following international pressure, the ‘no-party rule’ system ended in 
2006, and authors233 have linked the rapid creation of new districts to the need for 
NRM to compete in elections. NRM is able to give new administrative units to allies at 
the sub-national level, in order to gain their support in elections. Green234 expands this 
argument to add that the introduction of political opposition parties in 2005 had the 
effect of weakening the dominance of NRM. The creation of new districts, which are 
then ‘given’ to allies or withheld from opponents, allows some of this power to be 
regained, through the creation of sub-national patronage networks.235  
 
In addition, authors such as Green236 and Lewis237 argue that through the 
creation of new districts, sub-national elites are in turn able to offer employment 
opportunities to their own patronage network. For example, Mwenda238 argues that 
district-level elites are able to establish sub-county-level bureaucracies. Service 
delivery can also be manipulated to reward allies of district-level elites, such as funding 
for a healthcare centre. In this way, rather than decentralisation reducing patronage 
as described by authors discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2, patronage networks can 
be said to have themselves been decentralised.239  
 
Overall, a number of authors in the existing literature argue that district 
proliferation results from central elites’ desire to maintain a sub-national patronage 
network, in which access to the resources of an additional district are exchanged for 
electoral support. From here, it is argued that the continued creation of additional 
districts occurs because of strong incentives for the central government’s politicians 
 
233 For example, see Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’, and Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s 
Economic Reforms. 
234 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
235 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
236 Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’. 
237 Lewis, ‘When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in 
Uganda’. 
238 Mwenda, ‘Personalizing Power in Uganda’. 
239 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
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to behave in this manner, with few checks or restrictions to prevent the fast creation 
of a large number of districts.240 Actors at the sub-national level are incentivised to 
actively and visibly support NRM, in the hope of being granted a district for themselves, 
and to have the opportunity to grant employment opportunities to their own patronage 
network.  
 
District creation and tribal recognition  
 
Another major line of argument that emerges in the body of literature on 
decentralisation and the political economy in Uganda is that there is a connection 
between ethnic identities and the way decentralisation is implemented. Specifically, 
incentives exist for leaders of tribes in Uganda to lobby for the creation of an additional 
district, in order to gain access to resources and employment opportunities. The 
creation of an additional district that has borders coinciding with the boundaries of the 
tribal group means that that tribe has gained self-determination, as well as access to 
a transfer of revenue from the central government.241 This is particularly significant 
where a smaller tribe is able to separate itself from a larger and more prominent tribe, 
on the basis of the group’s self-identification as being culturally or linguistically distinct 
from the larger group.242 As described by Schelnberger,243 the creation of an additional 
district can transform a minority-ethnicity in a larger district into a majority ethnicity in 
a smaller one, elevating the status and power of that tribal group over resources. 
 
In this sense, the way new districts are created in Ugandan has introduced an 
incentive for individuals to align themselves along ethnicity lines, even where this is 
not normally a characteristic with which they would normally self-identify. As Eaton244 
describes this situation, where sub-national elites have lost power and access to 
resources due to a governance reform such as decentralisation, they may seek other 
avenues for laying claim to resources, such as trying to gain control of a specific sub-
 
240 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
241 Sjögren, ‘Battles over Boundaries: The Politics of Territory, Identity and Authority in Three 
Ugandan Regions’. 
242 Green, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Uganda’. 
243 Schelnberger, A.K. ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in Kibaale, Uganda’, in Crawford and Hartmann, 
Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
244 Kent Eaton, ‘Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction Against Indigenous 
Mobilisation’, Politics and Society 35, no. 1 (2007): 71–102. 
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national region. Boone and Nyeme245 add that ethnic identities can be made to 
become politically relevant by political institutions, when self-identifying along with a 
particular ethnic identity becomes politically advantageous for an individual. In this 
way, ethnic self-identification presents an opportunity for sub-national elites to regain 
access to resources and other opportunities, based on creating a ‘club good’ of a 
defined ethnicity. 
 
In some cases, the establishment of a new district based on tribal distinctions 
within the community has emerged from practices during the colonial period. As 
described in section 2.3, the British administration in Uganda on occasion established 
district boundaries that collected together more than one tribal group within an 
administrative boundary. Members of the smaller groups or kingdoms were instructed 
to swear allegiance to the tribal leaders or kings of the largest group.246 Since then, 
these smaller tribes have remined subsumed under administrative units dominated by 
a different, larger tribe.247 By lobbying for the creation of a new district that recognises 
a smaller tribe that was subsumed in this way, tribal groups can reverse an 
administrative decision that was made during the colonial era that had effectively 
erased their tribal identity.248 Crawford and Hartmann249 extend this argument by 
adding that the introduction of decentralisation enables tribal groups to lobby for their 
own representation, at least at the sub-national level. This gives rise to lobbying for 
the creation of new districts that align with the borders of their tribal area, as will be 
discussed in later chapters of this thesis.  
 
Bates250 further describes the important economic and social role played by 
tribal connections. In the absence of formal employment and formal institutions for 
social welfare, tribal connections become the basis for employment, resource transfer 
and social security. Self-identifying as a member of a particular group, Bates argues, 
therefore holds economic and social advantages for an individual, and provides an 
 
245 Boone and Nyeme, ‘Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania’. 
246 This situation was in fact first described by the earliest British explorers in Uganda, in the mid-
1890s. For example, Captain Raymond Portal’s records from this time describe the Basoro people 
begrudgingly (and temporarily) accepting the rule of the Baganda kings over their land and people. 
British Mission to Uganda in 1893, The Diary of the Late Captain Sir General Raymond Portal. 
247 Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda. 
248 Thompson, Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and Its Legacy. 
249 Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
250 Bates, ‘Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal’. 
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incentive for this self-identification. Adding to this, Boone251 suggests that across sub-
Saharan Africa, ethnic identities are used as a way of gaining access to resources 
when competition for resources is intense, with ethnicity being used to delineate 
inclusion and exclusion from groups with resource access. Authors such as Cammack 
et al. 252 also describe perceptions that being ruled by one’s ‘own’ people results in 
lower levels of corruption, and higher levels of trust253 within the community. Díaz-
Cayeros et al.254 expand on this by arguing that the provision of public goods tends to 
be made easier where jurisdictional boundaries coincide with ethnocultural 
boundaries, due to higher levels of trust and cooperation within those communities.  
 
Extending this instrumentalist view of tribal identity, Glickman255 further argues 
that it can be advantageous for an individual to self-identify as being from the same 
tribe as someone in a powerful economic or political position. An individual can then 
use this common heritage to leverage advantages from that person. As explained by 
van de Walle256, while it is too simplistic to ascribe patterns of resource transfer in 
African countries to primordial factors such as tribal identity, the study of African 
political economies does suggest that patron-client links can be formed via a pre-
existing relationship between a patron and client based on a connection such as a 
person’s tribal identity. Cheeseman and Branch257 add that while ethnic identities may 
not always have political significance, they come to gain significance when they 
become emblematic of other grievances or barriers, such as access to resources.  
 
For authors such as Manyak and Katono,258 the creation of additional districts 
based on tribal groups can be an important mechanism for avoiding separatism or 
violence. By providing a tribal group with its own geographic space, and so its own 
resource stream, pressures for separatism can be lessened.259 In this sense, the 
 
251 Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. 
252 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’. 
253 Habyarimana et al., Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. 
254 Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Ruiz-Euler, ‘Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local 
Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico’. 
255 Glickman, Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa. 
256 van de Walle, ‘The Democratization of Political Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
257 Branch and Cheeseman, ‘Democratisation, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from 
Kenya’. 
258 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
259 Glickman, Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa. 
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creation of new administrative units that are based on tribal differences can be viewed 
as a peacekeeping and unifying mechanism. Asiimwe and Musisi260 expand on this by 
explaining that a disempowered tribe that is ‘given’ a new district is then able to offer 
employment opportunities to their community, known in Uganda as rewarding ‘sons of 
the soil’. Regions of Uganda that are leaning towards separatism, or otherwise arguing 
that they are under-resourced, can be placated by the central government, via 
awarding a new district to the group. These concepts are discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Seven. 
 
While Asiimwe and Musisi261 and Manyak and Katono262 argue that leaders of 
tribal groups seek the creation of an additional district in recognition of their tribal 
identity, this thesis will ask how these same leaders approach the use of district 
creation as a mechanism for accessing resources. It will be argued that forming a new 
district on the basis of ethnicity serves two purposes. Firstly, it allows a tribe to gain 
the official recognition of the distinct identity of their tribe from the national government, 
and a tribe can then be said to be distinct from its neighbours. Secondly, the creation 
of a new district for a tribal group also entitles that group to gain the resources that 
accrue to controllers of a new district. It will be further argued that for these leaders, 
the first of these goals can be leveraged in pursuit of the second. In other words, the 
group’s ethnic identity can be operationalised, in order to self-identify as a distinct tribal 
group, as a mechanism for obtaining a new district. As will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapters Six and Seven, the creation of additional districts has created an incentive 
for tribal groups to define themselves as different and distinct from their neighbours 




260 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
261 Asiimwe and Musisi. 
262 Manyak and Katono, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’. 
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2.5 Survival at the grassroot: Club goods, social inclusion and livelihoods 
 
A final thematic area of the literature that emerges relating to decentralisation 
in Uganda is the extent to which decentralisation can facilitate social inclusion, and 
enhanced rural livelihoods. The creation of new districts and sub-counties, as 
described in the preceding section, has been predominantly approached in the 
literature as an issue of elite dominance and control of sub-national areas. For non-
elite and grassroot actors, the creation of new sub-counties can present an opportunity 
or a strategy to gain access to the resources of the state, particularly where 
decentralisation has not yet delivered the benefits of development, such as the 
delivery of public services. This section presents a review of existing literature on 
techniques used by non-elite and village-level actors to gain access to resources and 
services, such as rural livelihoods strategies and the generation of social inclusion. 
The concept of a club good is analysed in the context of social inclusion and exclusion, 
and implications for distribution of resources. By approaching district proliferation 
within a framework of social inclusion and resource access, the incentives and 
motivations of those at the grassroot can be analysed.  
 
Rural and urban livelihoods approaches  
 
A number of authors discuss the nature of rural poverty and survival, and the 
strategies employed by rural residents in order to secure the survival of themselves 
and their households. Authors such as Bebbington263 describe rural livelihoods as 
being comprised of access to capital,264 that an individual is able to combine in ways 
that address their development needs. Scoones265 describes livelihoods for rural 
people as being comprised of the assets, capabilities and activities that are required 
for generating a sustainable means of living. For other authors, such as Chambers 
and Conway,266 livelihoods are comprised of capability, equity and sustainability, 
enabling an individual to access the resources they require to maximise their 
 
263 Anthony Bebbington, ‘Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, 
Rural Livelihoods and Poverty’, World Development 27, no. 12 (1999). 
264 Bebbington specifies these types of capital as social, produced, natural, human and cultural 
capital.  
265 Scoones, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
266 Conway and Chambers, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
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capabilities. For each of these authors, there are opportunities to expand or improve 
a person’s rural livelihood by expanding their access to capital and to enhance 
capabilities, through such mechanisms as cooperation with others, or leveraging the 
resources of the state. Individuals can improve the sustainability of their livelihoods by 
diversifying their income and capital sources, to be able to withstand shocks more 
easily. 
 
The literature thus describes the strategies that are implemented by residents 
of rural areas to maximise their own standard of living, based on the assets, 
capabilities and capital they have available to them. The literature also indicates the 
strategies that individuals can implement in order to improve their livelihoods, or to 
improve the sustainability of their livelihoods. There is a clear link made to cooperation 
with others, such as through lobbying or organised action, as well as to strategically 
maximising the benefits of service-delivery policies.267 In this sense, where individuals 
in rural areas work together to campaign for improved service delivery, they are acting 
to improve their capabilities, and so to enhance their rural livelihoods.  
 
Social inclusion and exclusion  
 
Secondly, there is a range of existing literature dedicated to exploring the 
concept of social exclusion, and the relationship between this concept and poverty. 
Authors such as Bhalla and Lapeyre268 argue that while there is some overlap between 
poverty and social exclusion, the notion of social exclusion allows for a more thorough 
understanding of the relational aspects of poverty, rather than only the distributional 
aspects. De Haan269 argues that the social exclusion concept captures the multi-
dimensional experience of poverty, as well as its social ramifications and causes. 
Sen270 adds that the social exclusion concept allows authors to identify both the 
causes and the consequences of poverty, and Kabeer271 argues that this concept 
allows researchers to more completely understand the experience of poverty for an 
 
267 Bebbington, ‘Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural 
Livelihoods and Poverty’. 
268 Bhalla and Lapeyre, ‘Social Exclusion: Towards an Analytical and Operational Framework’. 
269 Arjan de Haan, ‘Social Exclusion: Enriching the Understanding of Deprivation’, Social Exclusion, 
2001, 19. 
270 Sen, ‘Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny’. 
271 Kabeer, ‘Social Exclusion, Poverty and Discrimination Towards an Analytical Framework’. 
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individual. For authors on this topic, the concept of social exclusion relates to the ways 
in which social barriers can be both a cause and result of poverty, and provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the poverty experience than viewing poverty through the 
lens of a lack of resources.  
 
Relatedly, social inclusion is described as a policy goal, analogous to the notion 
of pro-poor economic growth. For example, Sen272 relates the concept of social 
inclusion to being able to access resources that allow an individual to reach and 
maximise their capabilities. Policies that use service delivery and social assistance to 
generate improved access to capital and resources are therefore beneficial for social 
inclusion. Here, there is a link to decentralisation, as it is argued that decentralisation 
can be used as a mechanism to transfer resources to the grassroot level, and so 
improve the social inclusion and capabilities of poorer individuals.273 Through the 
concept of social inclusion, decentralisation is framed by authors such as Keating274 
as a pro-poor reform that can assist governments to respond to the particular 
development needs of local communities.  
 
While decentralisation can be a mechanism for social inclusion, through 
improved targeting of public services to their areas of strongest need, decentralisation 
could also unintentionally generate social exclusion instead. For example, where a 
new district is created, this generates benefits for elites (who have had access to 
education) in terms of access to paid employment. However, this may have the 
unintended consequence of widening the gap between educated elites and non-elite 
actors, who are not able to derive as large a benefit from the creation of a new district. 
This idea will be explored in greater detail in section 7.4.  
 
The development of club goods and implications for social exclusion 
 
A third area of research relating to the survival and livelihoods strategies of 
those at the grassroots level is the model of a club good, and the ways in which this 
 
272 Sen, ‘Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny’. 
273 Craig and Porter, ‘The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion 
Strategies in the Rise of “Inclusive” Liberalism’. 
274 Keating, ‘Social Inclusion, Devolution and Policy Divergence’. 
 
 114 
model relates to public service delivery. A club good is a good that has a defined 
membership boundary, such that insiders and outsiders to the club are clearly 
demarcated, and outsiders can be excluded from the benefits of the club.275 The 
discussion of club goods offered by Cornes and Sandler276 describe a group of 
individuals who each derive a benefit from their membership if the group: a group from 
which non-members can be effectively excluded. Authors such as McNutt277 argue 
that the provision of public services in the form of a club good can be a mechanism for 
encouraging the supply of public services and utilities where these are under-provided. 
Helm and Smith278 add that a sub-national government is best-placed to construct 
such an arrangement, due to their greater familiarity with local development priorities. 
In this sense, decentralisation and the creation of a club good are linked: decentralised 
governance structures are able to address shortages of public services by facilitating 
service delivery via a club-good membership structure.  
 
This thesis will furthermore ask whether district proliferation itself can be 
considered analogous to a club good. When a new district is created, this generates 
an institution that is beneficial to its members, and from which non-members can be 
excluded. For example, citizens of a town that becomes the capital of a newly-created 
district are able to benefit from increased employment opportunities, and from new 
district-level public services.279 Citizens who are not resident in the district are not 
entitled to claim these benefits, and become ‘outsiders’ within the society.280 The 
creation of an additional district (or sub-county) thus creates a form of social exclusion, 
 
275 An example of this ‘excludability’ is the ability of golf clubs to exclude non-members – those who 
have not paid a membership fee – from utilising the golfing greens. The benefit of using the green is 
reserved for club members. Rivalry in consumption is also a feature of club goods, but only at high 
levels of consumers. While membership of the club is small, each member can utilise the resource as 
much as they desire; however, when membership becomes large, the good becomes crowded. In 
general, however, a club good is considered to be non-rival, but excludable, in consumption.  
276 Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
277 Patrick McNutt, ‘Public Goods and Club Goods’, Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, 1999, 25. 
278 Dieter Helm and Stephen Smith, ‘The Assessment: Decentralisation and the Economics of Local 
Government’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3, no. 2 (1987). 
279 The creation of an additional district may lead to the establishment of new public services, such a 
secondary school, as the service-delivery standards for each sector have established the minimum 
levels of service for a district that include such facilities. However, in many locations across Uganda, a 
lack of available resources means that districts and sub-counties (particularly those that are newly-
created) in practice do not see these new services being established. Nonetheless, the creation of a 
new district creates a justification for seeking these services from the central government.  




in which better-educated members of society are able to derive a benefit from the 
creation of a new district, while non-elite members of the society do not. The research 
undertaken for this thesis explores in greater depth the links between district 
proliferation and the notion of a club good, as will be described in Chapter Seven.  
 
Overall, a substantial body of literature addresses the techniques for survival 
implemented by residents of rural areas in developing countries. The development of 
the rural livelihoods framework has allowed for a more complete understanding of the 
range of assets, capabilities and forms of capital that are available to rural residents, 
moving beyond a focus on financial assets alone. The concept of social inclusion and 
exclusion has allowed researchers to develop a nuanced understanding of the multi-
dimensional nature of poverty, and the complexity of the creation of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ within the political economy. The concept of a club good further expands 
these formulations, arguing that formal institutions can have the effect of excluding 
non-members from a good, thus reserving its benefits for group members only. The 
research undertaken for this thesis proposes to apply these models and concepts to 
the phenomenon of district proliferation, and examine the ways in which the creation 
of new administrative units creates political and economic effects throughout society. 
As will be argued, the creation of new districts allows some actors to expand their rural 
livelihoods, while other actors remain socially and economically excluded from these 




2. 6  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has described the existing body of literature on decentralisation, 
the political economy and district proliferation, both overall and in the specific context 
of Uganda, and has identified several key themes that drive research in this field. Five 
principal lines of enquiry have been identified.  
 
Firstly, decentralisation is described in the literature as a key element of broader 
neoliberal economic and political reforms that have been put in place in many 
developing countries worldwide, from the 1980s onwards. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
neoliberal reforms focused on reducing government engagement in the economy and 
promoting the role of markets in allocating resources. Accordingly, the literature on 
decentralisation positions decentralisation as a tool for reducing the risk of government 
failure. In the 2000s and 2010s, as the broader neoliberal reforms shifted to poverty 
reduction and improving public service delivery, the decentralisation-specific literature 
too comes to regard decentralisation as a tool for achieving these goals. Key 
assumptions that exist today first emerged in this era, regarding the ability of 
decentralisation to deliver better-targeted public services, and improved democratic 
participation of communities in government decision-making.  
 
Second, literature has been reviewed relating to clientelism and patronage in 
political relationships in African contexts, and on how these aspects of political 
relationships are impacted by decentralisation. This literature highlights the ways in 
which political elites seek to develop informal networks with voters, particularly 
clientelist relationships, that are reciprocal, hierarchical and long-term, and have the 
goal of influencing voter behaviour. Voters, meanwhile, view these exchange-based 
relationships as opportunities to gain access to advantages and resources, particularly 
where programmatic service delivery and social supports are not in place. Authors 
within the literature present differing views on whether decentralisation hinders or 
increases the likelihood and the impact of these relationships emerging and being 
sustained. Arguments relate to the effect of decentralisation on information-gathering 
about voter behaviour, on the change of scale in the space between patrons and 
clients, and the incentives facing both voters and politicians in determining their 
strategies. Ultimately, the specific motivations and incentives facing specific actors in 
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a national political system will determine the impact of decentralisation on clientelistic 
and patronage-based relationships.  
 
A third theme that can be identified within the decentralisation literature is the 
question of whether the origins of decentralisation in Uganda are local or foreign. The 
origins of Ugandan decentralisation are important to consider, as these origins reveal 
the attitudes of NRM to decentralisation, both in the wake of the Bush War and as it 
seeks to remain in power today. If it is accepted that decentralisation is a local reform 
that grew out of existing conditions and contexts in Uganda from 1986 onwards, 
decentralisation can be positioned as a political tool used by NRM to gain public 
support. From there, it follows that NRM is currently also using decentralisation as a 
tool for gaining political favour, such as through creating additional districts as a way 
of expending its patronage and support networks. Conversely, if decentralisation is 
considered to have been introduced into Uganda at the recommendation of foreign 
donors, decentralisation is cast as a technical tool. If decentralisation is only viewed 
as an administrative tool,281 and one that was introduced into Uganda by external 
actors, there might be an underappreciation of the ways in which NRM views 
decentralisation as a mechanism for gaining the political support of the population. 
This research seeks to use a grassroot-focused analysis contribute to an improved 
understanding of the explicitly political advantages NRM might hope to leverage via 
decentralisation, including gaining the support of actors at the village level. 
 
A fourth theme that is observed in the literature on decentralisation is the factors 
that have driven the very-rapid creation of a large number of districts since the 1990s. 
While several authors282 have discussed the problem of district proliferation and noted 
the concerns it causes for public financial management, there has been a significant 
focus in the existing research on the motivations of elite actors in driving district 
 
281 For example, Hickey and Mohan (Hickey and Mohan, ‘Relocating Participation within a Radical 
Politics of Development’.) describe the World Bank’s framing of decentralisation as strengthening 
popular empowerment and the quality of service delivery. 
282 See for example Diana Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local 
Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006’, Advisory Board for Irish Aid: Working Paper 2, 2007, 67; 
Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’, American Political Science 
Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 196–217, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000567; Janet I. 
Lewis, ‘When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in 
Uganda’, Regional & Federal Studies 24, no. 5 (2014): 571–88; and Elliott Green, ‘District Creation 
and Decentralisation in Uganda’, Crisis States Working Papers Series 2 (2008b). 
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proliferation. Specifically, existing authors have analysed in detail what are the 
incentives driving central-government and district-level elites to push for more districts 
to be created, such as the creation and maintenance of patronage networks that 
extend into rural areas. While these authors have identified the motivations driving 
elites, there is comparatively less existing research explaining why those who are 
lower in the governance system, or not members of the elite, might push for new 
districts to be created. In addition, while several authors283 have discussed the 
phenomenon of leaders of tribal groups arguing for a new district to be created ‘for’ 
their tribe, explanations have more-commonly focused on the desire of tribal leaders 
to gain recognition for their tribe. A less-studied consideration is the way in which tribal 
leaders can leverage their tribe as the basis for the creation of a new district, as a way 
of gaining access to the resources of the state.  
 
Finally, a fifth theme that emerges in the overall body of literature relates to the 
mechanisms and strategies employed by actors at the village level to improve their 
own quality of life. Authors describe the rural livelihoods framework for analysis, in 
which a broad and inclusive approach is taken to evaluating the assets, capabilities 
and capital access of rural residents. These livelihoods can be improved via strategic 
actions to gain greater access to capital and capabilities, such as through collective 
action, or leveraging institutions and rules of the state. The awareness of the 
complexities of rural life that are promoted by the rural-livelihoods approach are in turn 
reflected in literature relating to social inclusion, which addresses the multi-
dimensional aspects of poverty. Social exclusion is described as both a cause and 
consequence of poverty, affecting relationships between members of society as well 
as the distribution of resources. A third area of literature describes links between social 
inclusion and the notion of a club good, in which benefits accrue to members of a 
group, but outsiders can be effectively excluded. The research undertaken for this 
thesis analyses the implications and effects of district proliferation for these three 
concepts, and seeks to relate district proliferation to its social and economic causes 
and effects.   
 
 




Chapter Three:  
 
Researching Decentralisation: 
Analytical Framework, Research Question and Methodologies 
 
 
As has been described in the literature review in the previous chapter, the 
existing literature relating to decentralisation in Uganda contains several key themes, 
and different perspectives exist through each theme. The research undertaken for this 
thesis will assess the phenomenon of district proliferation in Uganda, but will build on 
the existing literature in an important dimension: it will include an analysis of the 
incentives and perspectives driving the behaviour of non-elite actors, including those 
at the village level. The ways in which decentralisation is affected by its political and 
economic context will be analysed, as will the ways in which decentralisation in turn 
affects this context. This dual-directional approach generates insights into the 
incentives and goals of many actors within the decentralisation system in Uganda, and 
how their actions affect the implementation of this policy. 
 
3.1 Analytical Framework  
 
This research proposes to draw on the analysis of public financial management 
decisions, and locate these within a framework of the political economy context of 
Uganda. In so doing, this research asks how, by whom, and why decisions relating to 
decentralised public finance are made, and what is the effect of the political economy 
of these decisions. Rather than considering decentralisation to be a technical 
mechanism, this research will analyse the impact of decentralisation on the distribution 
of assets and resources. In this sense, the use of a public financial management 





This research will investigate which actors are engaged in the decentralisation 
system, in pursuit of which interests and goals, and how their engagement is reflected 
in PFM decisions. An examination will be made of the treatment of public resources 
and public services, and how these are utilised and regulated, by drawing on an 
analysis of the national budget and its outcomes. By engaging with actors at different 
levels of the PFM system, this research will move beyond the top-down analysis of 
decentralisation that is evident in the existing literature, and engage with the end-users 
of public services. Finally, this research will examine the ways in which the process of 
decentralisation affects the relationships between those at the expenditure decision-
making points and those who are the final beneficiaries of public expenditure.  
 
The analytical framework for the research is comprised of two elements. Firstly, 
it analyses the ability of decentralisation as a policy to deliver improved targeting of 
public services, and improved participation of local communities in governance. In so 
doing, the research analyses the effect of political-economy factors in the local context 
on decentralisation, and the extent to which these factors are disruptive to the 
execution of decentralisation policy. Secondly, it analyses the effect of decentralisation 
on local political economies. The research analyses efforts to transfer resources and 
public services from the central to regional areas, and examines the ways in which 
decentralisation contributes to the improved participation of local communities in 
governance. The research also analyses the ways in which decentralisation policy has 
been supportive of political objectives, at central, district, and sub-district levels.  
 
Together, these two elements analyse the internal dynamics of the interactions 
between decentralisation and local political and economic factors. In addressing this 
these variables’ interactions with one another, the research moves beyond an analysis 
of the effect of decentralisation on local political and economic conditions, and instead 
examines the multi-directional and multi-factoral interactions between decentralisation 
and the local political economy. In so doing, the research identifies the incentives and 
actions of actors at the central, district, and village levels. By recognising the 
dynamism of institutions, actors and incentives, the research assesses movements in 
decentralisation policy and its relationship to political-economy factors as they 
progress, from the origins of the NRM regime to a more recent focus on consolidation 




Furthermore, the research analyses the assumptions underpinning 
decentralisation policy and comments on the reliability of these assumptions in the 
context of three districts in Uganda. This research will include an analysis of the 
interactions between social, economic and political dynamics at the central 
government level, local government level, and between these two levels, as well as 
addressing the experiences of household members at the village level. Using the 
overarching concepts of public financial management as a framework, the research 
undertaken analyses how resources are allocated, and the criteria on which these 
allocation decisions are made. It will be asked how specific individuals and institutions 
are able to influence resource-allocation decisions, and the mechanisms through 
which this rent-seeking and capture of public resources takes place, and how this 
influence is affected by decentralisation.  
 
Overall, the research can be characterised in three key elements: those of 
domains, approaches and dimensions. ‘Domains’ relate to the frames of 
interconnected dynamics of society, including social, economic and political factors. 
By considering each of these domains in turn, the research considers the relationships 
between actors in each of these spaces. The research also considers the connections 
between different domains, such as links between economic growth and political 
machinations, and how these relationships have shifted dynamically.  
 
Secondly, ‘approaches’ are articulated in the research as having been drawn 
from a range of fields, including economics, political science and development studies. 
By utilising approaches from multiple disciplines, the research is able to draw on a 
range of methodologies and approaches in considering the material. Using 
multidisciplinary techniques to analyse decisions made in the public-finance realm 
allows the research to assess multiple standpoints and perspectives in the research, 
including the outcomes of fiscal decisions, the reported experiences of the end-users 
of public services, and the perspectives of actors in the political and bureaucratic 
spheres.  
 
Finally, the third element of the research is the ‘dimensions’ on which 
individuals in the studied groups diverge, such as their ability to influence decision-
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makers, identities, rights, and to leverage resources. For various participants in the 
research, variation along these dimensions will affect abilities to participate in the 
decentralisation process, and to derive benefits from its implementation. Those whose 
personal dimensions place them on a more influential and powerful plane are better 
placed to realise the advantages of decentralisation, such as access to employment 
within a decentralised structure, and are more likely to be able to agitate for changes 
to decentralised institutions that will operate in their favour. Those whose positionality 
in society place them on a lower plane will be less able to either agitate in favour of 
change that may be beneficial to themselves, or to leverage benefits from incidental 
changes to the decentralisation system. In this sense, the initial position of an 
individual in the socio-economic and political framing of Ugandan society will 
determine their points of interaction with the decentralisation process, and their ability 
to leverage benefits from it.  
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3.2 Research question 
 
This research will examine the relationship between decentralisation and the 
development of sub-national regions, examined through the lens of public financial 
management and public service delivery. As described in Chapter Two, the current 
literature relating to decentralisation features top-down research, focusing on the 
central government and upper-sub-national governments involved in decentralisation. 
Questions asked by the current literature focus on the role of decentralisation in 
improving governance, such as by reducing corruption or improving the 
responsiveness of government to the community. In this light, decentralisation is 
presented as an administrative solution or treatment to governance problems. By 
focusing only on the elites engaged in decentralisation, such as public servants and 
elected officials, the existing literature has engaged less with how the end-users of 
public services are affected by decentralisation. Questions of whether members of the 
public do indeed engage more with government following decentralisation, or whether 
local governments are indeed more responsive to local development priorities, are 
rarely asked of the people who would best be able to give a first-hand account of these 
issues. This research aims to address this gap, by including the perspectives of 
household-level citizens in an analysis of the decentralisation process.  
 
The research question posed operates in two directions, and asks:  
How does the political economy interact with decentralisation in Uganda? 
The research thus proposes to approach decentralisation from two standpoints: 
the first is to ask how the political-economy context in Uganda affects the 
implementation of decentralisation. The second is to ask in what ways decentralisation 
affects the political-economy context in which is it implemented. By posing this 
question in both directions, the intertwined nature of decentralisation and its context 
will be addressed. Questions will be raised regarding the ways in which 
decentralisation is complemented, or undermined, or enforced by the political, 
economic, legal and social variables operating in the Ugandan context, such as 
political objectives or patronage networks. Conversely, the research will ask how 
introducing decentralisation into this context will change relationships, power 
structures and incentives facing actors who are affected by the public financial 
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management system. This includes politicians, public servants, elites and the 
citizenry, each of whom has their resource base and claims to power slightly altered 
by the introduction of decentralisation.  
 
In answering this research question and its two-directional structure, each 
question is addressed in turn. The research firstly assesses how the context affects 
decentralisation: in what ways do actors in the Ugandan political-economy utilise and 
leverage the decentralisation system to achieve their political and economic goals? 
Then, in the other direction, how decentralisation affects the context: what effect has 
decentralisation had on political and economic relationships? In practice, these two 
questions are both intertwined, and compounding: the effects of decentralisation on 
the political economy generate political effects that in turn affect decentralisation, and 
so on. Since decentralisation was implemented in Uganda from the 1990s onwards, it 
has become an essential element of the Ugandan political economy, and an analysis 
of the Ugandan political and economic spheres would be incomplete without 
considering decentralisation. By posing the research question as a two-dimensional 
analysis, this research hopes to untangle the complexities of the relationship between 
these two areas, examined through the lens of public finance, to examine the effects 
of decentralisation in the Ugandan context.  
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3.3 Methodological framework  
 
In order to address the research question, field research has been undertaken 
using an combining qualitative and numerical-data based research methods. 
Qualitative approaches comprised a household-level survey in six villages across 
three districts, and interviews at different levels of government, public service and civil 
society. Numerical methods involved the collection and analysis of data from the 
national budget system of Uganda, including transfers of decentralised funds to the 
district and sub-county levels. 
 
The use of these different research techniques, drawing on both qualitative and 
quantitative data sources, supports the research approach described in the Analytical 
Framework in section 3.1. These techniques support a political economy approach to 
the research, by allowing the author to analyse the complexities of the political 
economy and PFM system in the Ugandan context. It becomes possible to address 
the multiple political and economic factors that affect decentralisation in Uganda, 
particularly regarding the issue of district proliferation. The approaches used in the 
research allow for an institutional analysis to be conducted of the public-finance 
institutions that are engaged in the decentralisation system, alongside the viewpoints 
of actors who are seeking to leverage decentralisation to maximise their own benefits 
and priorities.284 By undertaking this multi-scalar approach, the author has been able 
to investigate the perceptions of the decentralisation system through the lenses of a 
range of actors. These multiple scales of analysis highlight the outcomes of 
decentralisation as they appear to individuals affected by it. These perceptions have 
then been compared to the outcomes of the budget process, with areas of 
contradiction or agreement identified. This section will discuss the methods of data 
collection utilised in this research, as well as their respective contributions to the lines 
of enquiry presented in this thesis. 
 
Firstly, a household-level survey was conducted in 108 households, containing 
questions relating to villagers’ experiences of public service delivery, village-level 
governance, and interaction with higher levels of government. The household-level 
 
284 Kanbur and Shaffer, ‘Epistemology, Normative Theory and Poverty Analysis’. 
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survey examined the experiences of citizens at the grassroot level, and provided a 
mechanism for interrogating the claims and arguments made by government and 
public service elites. Capturing the voices of those at the village level who experience 
the final outcomes of decentralisation follows from the work of Chambers,285 who 
argued that the voices of the poorest should be acknowledged as crucial to 
understanding poverty’s dimensions. Including analysis of villagers’ experiences of 
decentralisation, using their own words and obtained in their own homes, 
authenticates the research by providing a platform for the full impact of 
decentralisation to be understood. The household as a unit of analysis recognises the 
household as both an economic and a social unit,286 in which economic decisions and 
activities are undertaken, as well as daily family life.  
 
Secondly, interviews with a range of expert informants were conducted. These 
were: public servants at the national, district and sub-county levels; elected 
representatives at the district, sub-county and village levels; and civil society experts 
working in fields related to decentralisation. By capturing the viewpoints of those who 
develop and implement decentralisation policy, as well as those who attempt to shape 
it, the research identifies a range of issues relating to decentralisation. Many interview 
participants identified the rapid proliferation of additional districts as an issue that 
caused them concern, while at the same time providing frank insight into the 
advantages for actors within the system that arise from the creation of new districts. 
By interviewing experts across different levels of the intergovernmental transfer 
system, the author was able to identify issues about which different levels of 
government report different opinions and experiences. That is, when viewing one 
issue from different angles, varying pictures emerge. For example, differing opinions 
have been revealed about the extent and nature of participation in village-level 
development planning. In addition, the research has identified issues on which the 
opinions of elected officials differ from those of public servants, or those of civil society 
representatives. Civil society actors, in particular, expressed dissatisfaction with the 
design and implementation of the transfer system of grants to sub-national 
governments, as well as with the rapid proliferation of new districts. Finally, by 
 
285 Chambers, ‘Poverty and Livelihoods’. 
286 Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
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comparing results from expert interviews with results from the household survey, the 
research identifies areas in which the intended effects of decentralisation policy are 
not necessarily reflected in the outcomes of the policy, as it is experienced by those 
at the village level.  
 
Thirdly, in order to provide a quantitative base for analysing the implementation 
of decentralisation in Uganda, the author collected budget data and other quantitative 
data such as demographic statistics. These data sources have enabled the author to 
compare arguments raised in interviews and in the household survey to the official 
record of what was put in place in the budget. This budget and numerical data, like 
quantitative data in general, can be said to hold subjective invariance; that another 
researcher utilising the same data sources would draw similar conclusions in their 
results. The results of the survey and interviews, as for qualitative data in general, is 
subject to interpretation by the researcher, and so the meaning ascribed to the results 
collected will be shaped by the researcher’s own experiences and understanding of 
the material.287 By combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, an objective 
base of quantitative results has been developed, to which qualitative results can be 
compared. 
 
287 Kanbur and Shaffer, ‘Epistemology, Normative Theory and Poverty Analysis’. 
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3.4 Research methods  
 
In addition to undertaking a review of the existing literature288 on topics relating 
to decentralisation and district proliferation in Uganda, fieldwork was conducted in 
order to ascertain the points of view of actors in the Ugandan political economy. 
Qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques were utilised to address the 
research question, and following from the methodologies described in the previous 
section, research was conducted as follows.  
 
Timescale of the research  
 
Qualitative and quantitative data was collected over a six-month period from 
January to June 2016, in Kampala and in three districts.289 This time period included 
the 2016 elections, which caused some interruption to the field research. These 
interruptions were twofold: firstly, public servants were generally not available for 
interview following the closure of the majority of public service offices in the fortnight 
surrounding the elections. Secondly, elected officials were engaged in campaigning 
and travelling, with the result that their office schedules were irregular. Universally, 
national-level elected officials who were sought for interview were not available 
throughout the election period. At the district levels and below, there was some 
variation in the availability of interview participants. Before the election, few elected 
representatives were available for interview, as they were engaged in campaigning. 
Following the election, elected officials who had lost office had stopped attending their 
offices and so were not available, and their replacements had not yet commenced in 
their roles. This caused some circumstances in which the author was unable to 
interview an elected candidate in some locations.  
 
Furthermore, in the period of time following the election, if the elected 
chairperson (LC5 or LC3 Chair) of the local council had not been re-elected, entire 
 
288 The literature review included archival research relating to the colonial period, as well as literature 
summarising results and findings by Ugandan and international researchers.  
289 Research authorisation from the Ugandan Government was obtained from Uganda National 
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST), in January 2016, following clearance from the 
research ethics process of University of Cambridge. Authorisations from higher-level authorities in 




councils and indeed entire public service offices were not attending their offices until 
the replacement official had been sworn in. In one sub-county that was visited,290 this 
meant that between the election and the swearing-in of new officials, a period 
amounting to three months, none of the elected officials or public servants of the sub-
county were reported to be attending their offices.  
 
Selection of field sites  
 
The three districts in which research was undertaken were selected to 
represent the three major regions of Uganda: the north, east and south regions. Within 
each region, specific districts were chosen randomly.291 The districts that were chosen 
in this manner were Pallisa (eastern), Lira292 (northern), and Ntungamo (southern). 
The regions of Uganda and the studied districts are depicted in the map on page 29. 
Within each of these three districts, two sub-counties were selected for further 
research (for a total of six sub-counties), which were randomly selected within the 
three districts. Finally, within the two sub-counties in each district, two villages were 
chosen in which to interview village-level officials, and to conduct the household 
survey. These villages were not selected at random. Instead, within a sub-county, 
villages were chosen that were in remote areas (remote from the sub-county 
headquarters). The purpose of selecting remote villages is to ascertain to what extent 
villagers who are located in remote locations are able to interact with government or 
to access social services. The theoretical basis for decentralisation is that the creation 
of sub-national units should make it possible for citizens at the village level to interact 
with government, and to have improved access to public services. By selecting villages 
that are not located close to the sub-county’s headquarters, it is possible to ascertain 
the extent to which this assumption is valid in these locations. If villages that had been 
selected that are located close to the sub-county’s headquarters, given that sub-
counties’ headquarters are generally pre-existing towns, the ability of decentralisation 
 
290 Petete sub-county, in Pallisa District  
291 Within the northern region, some districts had to be excluded from selection because they were at 
the time classified as ‘do not travel’ in the travel advisories of the UK Government. These were 
Koboko, Yumbe, Moyo, parts of Adjumani, parts of Amuru, Lamwo, Kitgum, Kaabong, Kotido, Napak, 
parts of Nakapiritpirit and parts of Moroto districts. These districts are those that are along Uganda’s 
international borders with the DRC, South Sudan and Kenya.  
292 As distinct from Lira Municipal Council 
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to have generated change in reaching remote, grassroots areas would not be 
adequately assessed.  
 
The villages chosen, with their district, county, sub-county and parish, are 
named in the following table 3.1 and are illustrated in the maps of the studied districts 
on pages 33-37. 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Name of 
village 
Kachocha Ogulia Chanpeciki Akwachkoli Mushasha Katooma 
Parish293 Petete Opwateta Akano Abongorwot Katojo Kiyaga 
Sub-
county 
Petete Opwateta Agur Amach-
Agila 
Itojo Nyabihoko 
County Butebo Kanyum Ogur Erute Ruhaama Kajara 
District Pallisa Pallisa Lira  Lira  Ntungamo Ntungamo 
3.1 Location details of studied villages 
 
Household survey: The grassroots perspective 
 
Within each village, eighteen houses294 were selected to conduct the household 
survey (for a total of 108 surveys).295 These houses were selected via choosing every 
third house as a person on foot passes as they progress through the village, which 
ensured that households closer to the centre of the village were not over-represented 
amongst the surveyed households. The advice of LC1 Chairs was used in choosing 
houses, to ensure that houses chosen were all contained within one village (some 
villages being located close to one another), but not otherwise; the choice of every 
third house was strictly followed.  
 
 
293 In Pallisa District, the sub-counties are comprised of a single Parish. 
294 In Lira District, the term ‘house’ is taken to refer to a housing compound, where clusters of huts 
belonging to different members of one family are clustered together. In these circumstances, one 
cluster of huts was classified as one house, with the interview being conducted at the first house 
approached geographically from the footpath.  
295 The choice of three districts, six villages and 108 surveys was made to maximise the range of 
locations studied and the number of survey responses obtained, within the timeframe available. 
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The time spent in each village was two days, with 18 surveys conducted in each 
village. (A further two days were spent in each district capital, in order to conduct 
interviews with district-level elected officials and public servants.) The household 
survey contained 97 questions, some of which were answered with a binary Yes/No 
response, some by selecting from a range of pre-determined responses (for example, 
“Sometimes”), and some with an open-ended free answer. Respondents were also 
given the opportunity to respond “I don’t know” or “I don’t want to answer” to each 
question. Participants were asked questions relating to their experiences of service 
delivery, consultation and participation in the planning process, and communication 
with elected leaders within and beyond the district.  
 
Use of research assistants for household survey 
 
Due to the language requirements of conducting research at the household 
level,296 research assistants were hired to support the research from Makerere 
University’s College of Business and Management Sciences. These research 
assistants originate from the selected districts, and so are able to speak both the 
relevant local languages and English fluently. Three research assistants were 
engaged to conduct the household survey in each district,297 with each research 
assistant conducing six surveys in per village.  
 
Before conducting fieldwork in the six villages chosen, a pilot of the household 
survey was conducted in Wakiso District, which is a semi-rural district adjoining 
Kampala, to ensure that the questions posed in the survey were relevant and 
understandable to household members, and that the responses received were of a 
high standard. Following the pilot survey, feedback from the research assistants on 
the relevance of the proposed questions to the lives of household members, as well 
as the best sequence of questions for the maximum ease of use of the survey, was 
incorporated into the final survey questionnaire. The list of questions used in the 
 
296 In the six villages included in the survey, five separate languages are spoken locally, and English 
is not in widespread use. The local languages are Luo/Lango (in Lira), Lugwere and Ateso (in Pallisa), 
and Kiga/Rukiga and Nkore/Runyankole (Ntungamo).  
297 The research assistants are: Nobert Aonu Okiror, Margaret Acen and Samson Ochen in Pallisa; 
Grace Akello, Carol Kay Achak and Sandra Ajok in Lira; and Pamella Eunice, Moureen Akatukunda 
and Martha Brenda in Ntungamo.  
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household survey used in the six studied villages is provided at Appendix B, and the 
fully-disaggregated (by field sites) results are given at Appendix D.  
 
Surveys were conducted in the home of the respondent, by a research 
assistant, with no one else in attendance (other than the respondent’s children, in 
some households). Surveys were read out loud to the respondent, with the research 
assistant translating the question from English to the relevant local language, and then 
recording the respondent’s answer (translated back from the local language to 
English). Before commencing the survey, research assistants were instructed to 
explain to the respondent (using a pre-prepared script written by the author) that the 
survey was being conducted for academic purposes, and that observable changes to 
the respondent’s circumstances were not likely to result from participating in the 
survey. Specifically, improvements to service delivery in the local area were not likely 
to be generated by the research. Participants were made aware that the research was 
being conducted by a foreign researcher, from a UK university, rather than someone 
with a role in Ugandan public policy or public finance. Participants in the survey were 
likely to be motivated to give the specific answers they gave to the survey by having 
the opportunity to express their opinions (either positively or negatively) about 
government services or the performance of government. Respondents were advised 
that they could at any stage decline to participate in the research, and in addition could 
answer any question with ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t want to answer’. In survey questions 
in which respondents were asked to choose their responses from a range of answers, 
these two possible options were read aloud along with other answers. Research 
assistants were also instructed to gain the verbal298 agreement of the participant that 
they were willing to participate in the research.  
 
The research assistants explained to survey participants that their names were 
not to be recorded (and were not sought), and it was explained to participants that the 
survey was marked only with a number which had been pre-filled on the survey form. 
The number on the form was not connected in any way to the household; for example, 
there is not a map of the village with the participating households identified. Thus, it 
 
298 Written permission was not considered to be appropriate in a context where literacy rates at the 
village level are not high.  
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was explained to research participants that there was no mechanism through which a 
particular response to a survey question could be connected to a specific individual or 
household. There was extremely minimal risk of any research participant experiencing 
negative ramifications for expressing their views, including for expressing criticism of 
the government.  
 
While the research assistants do originate from the same regions of Uganda as 
the studied communities (and thus are able to speak local languages), there was a 
minimal risk that the participants in the survey would be personally familiar with any of 
the research assistants. Each of the research assistants confirmed that they had never 
visited the studied sites before, and indeed many of the research assistants had lived 
mostly in nearby large towns rather than at the village level. While the surveys were 
being completed by the research assistants in the home of the participant, the author 
engaged the LC1 Chair and LC1 councillors (as available) in informal interviews to 
seek their views on local economic and service-delivery conditions. In addition to 
gaining insight and information from these interviews, this practice also removed the 
opportunity for officials to ‘sit in’ on the survey process being undertaken in the 
participant’s home. This further reduced the risk that participants might feel reluctant 
to criticise government at any level.  
 
Research assistants were instructed that the first adult member of the 
household they greeted was the ideal person to complete the survey. They were 
instructed not to select men in preference to women to complete the survey, and not 
to ask to speak to the head of the household. Of the 108 people to undertake the 
survey, 56 were female and 52 male. Of the households selected, there were none in 
which the first adult encountered was unwilling to participate in the research. Research 
assistants were also instructed that if there was no one in attendance at the household 
upon their arrival they were to wait for someone to return home, or to come back later 
in the day, rather than selecting a replacement household. This was to avoid 
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preferentially selecting households in which an adult was more likely to be at home 
during the day.299  
 
 
Image 4: Research assistant Sandra Ajok (L) with survey participant,  
Village 4, Lira District 
 
Interviews of expert informants  
 
Interviews with expert informants were conducted by the author at four300 levels 
of government: at the central-government level; with public servants within ministries; 
at the district and sub-county levels of both elected officials and public servants; and 
with elected officials at the village level.301 In addition, interviews were conducted with 
representatives from civil society organisations, and with multilateral donor agencies. 
The sequence of interviews was begun via a purposive sampling technique at 
MoFPED, allowing for specialised interviews about the budgeting and planning 
 
299 In practice, because the survey was conducted during the time of year in which crops are planted, 
household members were in their own fields at the time of the survey (and so within sight of their 
homes), and returned to their home upon seeing the research assistant approaching. The average 
time to administer one survey was 75 minutes. 
300 For reasons of time constraints, the parish/LC2 level was not included in the research.  




process. As will be discussed in section 3.6, research commenced at MoFPED 
because, as a former staff member, the author was already on familiar terms with a 
number of staff in this ministry. This reduced barriers to negotiating access to the 
research site and research participants. Interviews at MoFPED were conducted with 
key informants at a range of different levels, from junior technical staff (termed ‘desk 
officer’ or ‘economist’) to senior-management level (termed ‘commissioner’). Following 
these interviews, the choice of interviewee proceeded according to a snowball 
sampling technique, as expert informants who had already been interviewed 
recommended relevant officers to interview within other ministries, and arranged these 
interviews on the author’s behalf. This sampling technique was crucial to being able 
to conduct interviews, as once the author had been introduced by a MoFPED official, 
it became possible to gain access to technical and management staff in other 
ministries. The complete list of interview participants302 is given at Appendix C.  
 
At the sub-national level, initial contact was made with the CAOs of the three 
chosen districts via telephone, and the author then travelled to the district 
headquarters of each district. Access to the research site and permission to interview 
expert informants was granted by each CAO, and subsequently by the LC5 Chair or 
by an LC5 representative. Interviews were then conducted with senior public servants 
in each district’s government (including the DEO, DHO, District Planner, and DCDO), 
as well as elected officials where they were available (such as the LC5 Chair, Speaker, 
or Councillors). At the sub-county level, interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s 
office. LC1-level elected officials (such as LC1 Chair, LC1 Treasurer) were interviewed 
within their villages.  
 
Collection of budget and quantitative data  
 
Quantitative data was collected from a number of sources. Following a policy 
decision taken in 2011 to improve budget transparency,303 Uganda’s national budgets 
 
302 The author has elected to remove the names of research participants from this thesis, and has 
instead used job title (where this is non-identifying) and interview number only. The list of interview 
participants with corresponding interview number, job title and date of interview is contained in the 
Appendix C.  
303 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
 
 136 
from 2012/13 onwards are available online.304 Some district budgets are also available 
at this same site. Furthermore, key informants in the Budget Directory in MoFPED 
were willing to provide the author with electronic databases containing budget data 
from 2003/04 to 2015/16.305 It is worth noting that these electronic files contain data 
for both Estimates (the planned release of funding to votes306) and Releases (the 
actual release of funding to votes) for each financial year. This information is not 
contained in the Budget Framework Paper documents, which only contain Estimates 
figures. It was thus possible to compare the Releases and Estimates figures for the 
financial years 2003/04 to 2015/16,307 and so identify areas in which the planned 
funding indicated to a vote at the beginning of the financial year differed from the actual 
funding they subsequently received.  
 
Following on from this, the MoFPED Resource Centre contains historical 
records of national and district Budget Framework Papers, from which it was possible 
to add additional years of budget expenditure308 data to those supplied in electronic 
form. Other forms of quantitative data, such as poverty headcount data and election 
results, were obtained from the library of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in Kampala. 
At the sub-national level, district-level quantitative data (such as the number of primary 
schools in the district) was supplied in Pallisa and in Ntungamo by the District Planners 
of each district, and in Lira by the Deputy CAO. Village-level quantitative information, 




304 At www.budget.go.ug. Documents are in PDF format.  
305 The data provided in Excel format were the Estimates and Releases contained in the National 
Budget Framework Paper from 2003-04 to 2015-16. Note that this is not protected information; it is 
publicly available as a PDF or in hard-copy format at MoFPED.  
306 The term ‘vote’ is used in the Ugandan budget to refer to a sector’s budgetary line items. For 
example, the budget lines that fall under the healthcare budget are referred to as ‘Health Votes’. A 
distinction is also made in the budget between funding for centralised budget items (‘Central Votes’) 
and decentralised budget items (‘Local Government Votes’). To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
the use of the term ‘vote’ in this way is not intended as a link to the electoral system; the double 
meaning of the term is coincidental.  
307 The releases data for 2009-10 was missing. This implies that MoFPED does not have an 
electronic spreadsheet containing the releases from that year.  
308 The budget documents do not contain Releases (the actual releases to each vote) information for 
each financial year; only Estimates (the planned releases for each vote).  
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3.5 Limitations of the research 
 
While the research undertaken progressed generally in line with the research 
design, there were some aspects in which adjustments needed to be made to the 
research, or variables affected the research in ways that could not be mitigated. Most 
importantly, the overlap of field research with the 2016 national and sub-national 
elections posed greater difficulties than had been anticipated in gaining access to 
elected officials in order to conduct interviews. Two specific groups posed greater 
challenges than had been expected. Firstly, national-level election candidates309 
engaged in more ‘up-country’ campaigning than was expected, and thus were not 
available for interviews in Kampala. Following the election, successful candidates 
again travelled up-country in order to visit their new electorates, while candidates who 
were not re-elected were not inclined to be interviewed. Secondly, sub-national 
election candidates who were not successful in being re-elected essentially ceased 
attending to their duties in some locations, long before their successor had been sworn 
in, meaning that they were also unavailable for interviews. This was a particular issue 
at the sub-county level. In these circumstances, interviews were conducted with the 
nearest possible member of the community, such as an LC3 Councillor in place of an 
LC3 Chair. The imperfect substitution of this comprise must be acknowledged.  
 
Secondly, due to the many languages spoken at the sub-national level in 
Uganda (including five separate languages spoken across the six survey sites) it was 
necessary to conduct the household survey with the support of research assistants. 
The research assistants were graduates of Makerere University, and were 
experienced in conducting household-level research. Nonetheless, the research 
assistants were required to double-translate the survey: firstly to translate the survey 
questions from English to the relevant local language, and then secondly the 
respondent’s answers from their local language back to English. This was partly 
mitigated by making a large number of the questions ones that only required an 
answer from a set number of responses, such as ‘Often’ or ‘Never’. This minimised 
the need for the second translation, that from the local language to English. However, 
 
309 In all, attempts were made to interview five national MPs; three were not available to be 
interviewed in Kampala and two declined to be interviewed.  
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for survey questions that asked the respondent to give a full answer, the author is 
reliant on the accuracy of the translation, in both directions. In addition, a small number 
of minor errors occurred during the completion of the household survey, such as no 
answer being recorded for some questions. Given the research assistants’ experience 
with translating from their first languages to English on a daily basis, and their 
experience in conducting household-based surveys in the past, a high level of 
confidence can be held that the translations given are as accurate as can be 
reasonably expected.  
 
Thirdly, there is a risk associated with conducting qualitative research that the 
researcher wrongly understands the participants to be describing the studied 
phenomena themselves, rather than their perception and interpretation of them. That 
is, what is being recorded and analysed is not phenomenon ‘X’, but the research 
participants’ understanding and reporting of phenomenon ‘X’. Throughout this thesis, 
the author has been careful not to ascribe a sense of universality or truthfulness to the 
findings gained through qualitative research methods, and have instead reported 
results in terms of how interview and survey participants described the phenomenon 
themselves.  
 
Finally, an area of risk that arises from the research is that the researcher might 
inadvertently over-generalise from the research findings. That is, the author might 
move from describing and analysing the results of research in six field sites and 
Kampala, to concluding that the results are representative for the entirety of Uganda. 
Throughout the completion of this thesis, the author has been mindful of this risk. The 
author has noted where the obtained research results relate specifically to the six 
studied villages, or to fewer villages where relevant, and conversely stated where 
results relate to the national level. Budget results are taken to be representative for 
the Uganda-wide context, while the household survey is taken to be representative of 
their own contexts only. While the villages chosen were selected with a degree of 
randomness, they are nonetheless a small sample size of six villages out of (then) 112 
districts. Any suggestion that the results gained through the household survey are 
representative of all households has been avoided, in order to avoid excessive 
generalisation from this small sample size.  
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3.6 The author’s positionality regarding the studied community  
 
An important element of conducting research is for the researcher to examine 
their own positionality relative the studied community, and reflect on how this relative 
position may affect the collection and analysis of data. Literature relating to 
researchers’ positionalities relative to their studied communities often classify the 
researcher as an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ relative to their studied group. For example, 
Hellawell310 defines an insider as a researcher who has a priori knowledge of the 
studied community, as a result of personal knowledge of the community and its 
members. Hockey311 offers a further distinction: the researcher may be an insider in 
the sense of the setting of the research, or in the sense of the peers or individuals 
being researched. Outsiders, defined in the opposite, are those who are said to be 
approaching the community of study from beyond its borders, to share no attributes 
with the community, or have no previous experience of it. 
 
As a result of conducting this research in Uganda, the author offers an 
alternative positionality: that of the hybrid insider-outsider researcher. In this definition, 
a researcher shares fully some characteristics with the research group, but other 
characteristics not at all. Rather than sharing several aspects with the research group 
to some extent, the researcher shares some characteristics or aspects completely, but 
in other aspects is a complete outsider. As a result of this hybrid status, the 
positionality of the researcher relative to the studied community is mixed, and 
represents an evolving positionality relative to the insider-outsider dichotomy 
described in the earlier literature.  
 
The author’s experience as a hybrid researcher 
 
The author can be positioned using the model of a hybrid insider-outsider 
researcher, in the sense of clearly sharing some characteristics with the studied group, 
but being in other ways a clear outsider. In common with the studied group, the author 
has worked as a public servant, is Anglophone, holds a master’s degree, is an 
 
310 Hellawell, ‘Inside–Out’. 
311 Hockey, ‘Research Methods ‐‐ Researching Peers and Familiar Settings’. 
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economist, and is middle-class. Differently from the studied group, the author is an 
Australian national, a non-resident of Uganda, is not religious, is of European ethnicity, 
and is unable to converse fluently in any Indigenous Ugandan languages. 
Furthermore, the author’s status as an insider in the studied community contains a 
temporal aspect. This aspect is that several years prior to travelling to Uganda to 
conduct doctoral research, the author lived in Kampala, and worked as a Senior 
Economist at MoFPED. The author thus has some familiarity with the contexts of both 
Uganda and the Ministry, and some familiarity with the interviewees within that 
Ministry.  
 
The complex positionality of the author relative to the studied community in this 
case posed unique challenges in terms of the care needed in collecting, interpreting 
and presenting data. Aspects in which the author is a clear insider and a clear outsider 
required careful management, to ensure that none of the disadvantages of these 
positionalities affected the process of research. Secondly, the temporal aspect of 
having previously been, but no longer, a member of the studied community added a 
further layer of complexity to the author’s positionality relative to the studied group. 
Finally, the complexity of conducting research as a partial-insider within MoFPED itself 
posed challenges, as the author’s position relative to interviewees in other ministries 
could be affected by the relationship between those ministries and MoFPED.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of a hybrid ‘insider’ researcher  
 
Conducting fieldwork as a complete insider in some respects, and an outsider 
in other respects, generated certain benefits for conducting research. Firstly, the 
author was granted access to the research site at MoFPED upon arrival, on the basis 
of being familiar to the staff of the Ministry. As a result, the author was able to conduct 
interviews with former colleagues across the Ministry, and those contacts then referred 
the author on to other contacts in other Ministries and agencies. The author’s 
professional experience as a public servant, albeit in a different national context, 
proved to be a valuable source of prior knowledge. The similarities in the structure, 
function and mechanisms of the respective public services of Australia and Uganda 
allowed pre-existing contextual information. For example, the author is familiar with 
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the main tasks performed by public servants on a daily basis, such as preparing 
briefings for ministers, consulting with stakeholders within the community and the 
public service, and conducting data management and research.  
 
On the other hand, as an insider in respect of being a public servant, there was 
also the possible disadvantage that the author may bring pre-conceived ideas or 
assumptions into this research. One of these risks is that experience as a public 
servant may lead the researcher to believe that the experiences of all public servants 
are universal. The validity of assumptions made must therefore be identified and 
assessed.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of a hybrid ‘outsider’ researcher 
 
As an outsider to Ugandan society and nationality, the author had initially 
expected this separation from the studied community to pose barriers to the research, 
such as challenges in obtaining sensitive information from interviewees. However, in 
fact this was found to be advantageous in one important way. Specifically, the author’s 
status as a clear outsider to Uganda itself allowed research participants entrust the 
author with information, particularly when discussing issues that were politically 
sensitive. While this may seem counter-intuitive, being completely foreign appeared 
to generate trust successfully. This may be because interviewees felt more 
comfortable discussing sensitive topics with an outsider, because an outsider to 
Uganda is unable to cause or generate any repercussions for an interviewee who 
offers controversial information. For example, many interviewees reported to the 
author that they were not concerned whether the author recorded their name and job 
title,312 as they did not perceive that there would be any risk or consequence of the 
research being connected to themselves in the future. As a result, research 
participants seemed to be honest and forthright in their responses, including when 
discussing sensitive topics or information, and did not appear to hold any reservations 
about critiquing government institutions or decisions.  
 
312 Even so, the author has chosen to anonymise the research participants, and has not recorded 
identifying information about them in this thesis.  
 
 142 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented the research question, methodologies and 
analytical framework that guides the research, as well as the qualitative and numerical 
methods used to undertake fieldwork. Drawing on public financial management’s 
focus on the distribution of public resources, the research utilises an analysis of PFM 
in Uganda to reveal the interaction between decentralisation and the political economy 
of the local context. By analysing the budget process and results, as well as the 
perspectives of those involved in the distribution of public resources, the research 
focuses on the theory of resource distribution under decentralisation and compares it 
to the lived experiences of those affected by it. The use of research methods that 
combining both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, allows for 
adopting a multifaceted viewpoint to ascertain the outcomes of the decentralisation 
process.  
 
Field research involved collecting and analysing a combination of budgetary 
and other numerical data, interviews with a range of elite actors at different levels of 
government, and a household-level survey of those who are the end-users of public 
services. By including the viewpoint of the poorest and least powerful members of 
society, this research centres on decentralisation as a technique for drawing resources 
from the centre to the periphery, and asks how effectively it is achieving this goal. By 
seeing the very poorest as deliberate and conscious actors within the decentralisation 
system, rather than passive recipients of government policy, the research asks how 
villagers are able to exercise their own voice and agency under decentralised 
governance structures. By expanding the analysis of decentralisation beyond the 
experiences of elite actors, comparisons can be made of the lived reality of 
decentralisation at the village level to the assumptions underpinning decentralisation: 
that it encourages responsive governance, targeted service delivery, and democratic 
participation. By adopting this multi-level analytical structure, this thesis tracks the 
progression of decentralisation from the central level to the grassroot, to ask to what 





As well as designing and undertaking the research methods, the author has 
reflected on their positionality relative to the studied community, and the strengths and 
limitations of being a ‘hybrid’ insider-outsider researcher. As a former member of a 
part of the studied community, but as one who only ever shared some characteristics 
of the community and not others, the author has a complex and unique positionality 
relative to the researched community. The has benefited the author in ways such as 
being able to negotiate access to the fieldwork site more easily than would be possible 
for a complete outsider-researcher. Conversely, the author might more easily 
overestimate the accuracy or thoroughness of their understanding of the data, based 
on their prior familiarity with the context and content of the research. Other 
disadvantages, such as language barriers at the village level, have been reduced to 
the extent possible, for example with the engagement of research assistants. Overall, 
the design of the completed fieldwork attempted where possible to utilise the benefits 
of the author’s unique positionality as a hybrid researcher, while mitigating 




Chapter Four:  
 
Perspectives of elite actors and quantitative results:  
Driving the supply of new districts 
 
The question of districts is more driven by political needs than the 
service delivery needs. It’s driven more by the political need. 
Although, if this question of districts was matched with separate 
funding, then it would be very successful. The challenge is that 
these districts come with huge administrative costs, even they are 
already under-facilitated in the existing districts. So, it simply puts 
more pressures on the existing resources. 
- Senior Economist, MoES313 
 
The introduction of decentralisation creates a range of effects for actors working 
within the governance and financial system. Depending on the role and function of 
each actor, these effects will differ across society. For elite-level actors – those in 
elected or technical roles in the centre and districts, or within civil society – the 
decentralisation system creates opportunities to influence the resourcing of sub-
national units and public services. For some, decentralisation presents opportunities 
to gain employment or promotion into a role of influence; for others, decentralisation 
represents a technical and administrative challenge. Having discussed in Chapter 
Three the analytical framework and research methods that underpin and frame this 
thesis, this chapter presents the results of field research, with a focus on two 
categories of data. Firstly, the results of elite interviews are presented, detailing the 
results of semi-structured interviews with elected and technical officials at various 
levels of government, and within civil-society organisations. Secondly, quantitative 
results are presented relating to the national budget process, illuminating the public 
financial management outcomes of the decentralised system.  
 




Following this chapter, Chapter Five presents results from a household-level 
survey undertaken in six villages across Uganda. The results presented in Chapters 
Four and Five provide the basis for the analysis in Chapter Six, and discussion and 
theoretical framing in Chapter Seven. By including results from a household-level 
survey, interviews with expert informants, and data and documents produced through 
the national budget process, the research hopes to analyse key lines of enquiry from 
multiple perspectives. There are several integral themes that emerge from the data, 
and are repeated throughout different data sources. The consistency with which these 
themes emerge suggests their centrality in the interaction between decentralisation 
and the political economy in the Ugandan context. These themes include the 
persistent low quality of public service delivery, the challenge of providing finance for 
sub-national governments in order to implement service delivery, and the emergent 
issue of the proliferation of new districts. This latter issue was central to interviews, 
with many key informants raising the issue on several occasions. Central-government 
officials, in particular, were concerned about the cost burden for the budget created 
by the establishment of new districts. Quantitative data drawn from the budget process 
allows an analysis of the magnitude and scale of the issues discussed.  
 
Results collected for this thesis indicate that the factors driving the rapid 
creation of additional districts are complex, may be explicitly political,314 and involve a 
greater range of actors than those of the political and economic elite alone.  
 
314 As argued by Hyden (Hyden, ‘Institutions, Power and Policy Outcomes in Africa’.), these results 
require engaging with informal as well as formal institutions, in the analysis of Ugandan 
decentralisation – particularly regarding the outcome of district proliferation. 
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4.1 Results from expert interviews: Financing, staffing and implementing 
decentralisation  
 
This section describes the results that were obtained from conducting 
interviews with a range of elite informants, located in Kampala and in three districts 
across Uganda. The interview participants are comprised of elected and technical staff 
of several levels of government. This includes staff of central-government agencies, 
district- and sub-county level administrative and elected officials, and members of civil 
society. By comparing and contrasting the responses of actors at different levels of 
the administrative, financial and political systems of decentralisation, it is possible to 
identify areas where national and sub-national leaders and officials experience 
decentralisation differently from one another. This section presents summarised 
commentary from the participating elite interviewees, arranged according to the six 
most prominent and frequent topics that were raised during the interviews. These 
topics are: local economic development; the prioritisation of fiscal expenditure; 
financing and staffing of sub-national governments; political interests in sub-national 
governance; the quality of service delivery; and the proliferation of new districts. Each 
of these issues is discussed in turn.  
 
Local economic development and the grassroot: Improving rural incomes  
 
Expert informants at the central government level provided a range of 
viewpoints relating to local economic development, and the process of transferring 
economic resources from the centre to the grassroot. A key theme that emerged 
relates to the importance to the central government of generating improved incomes315 
for those working in rural areas, who are primarily working in subsistence farming. 
Informants argued that farming will need to progress from subsistence to commercial 
farming, and for agricultural modernisation to take place, in order to improve the 
incomes of rural farmers. In order to achieve this modernisation of agriculture and 
movement to commercial farming, investments are needed in areas such as 
 
315 NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress. 
https://www.nrm.ug/sites/default/files/manifestoes/NRM%20Manifesto%202016.pdf. Page 22. 
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processing and packaging of agricultural outputs. For example, as described316 by a 
Senior Economist in MoFPED: 
… because the majority of Ugandans depend on agriculture. Every 
year we talk about it, it’s going to be a priority, but it’s not working 
out – we don’t see modern farmers, we don’t see agriculture that 
includes the modern techniques. We don’t see extension services 
reaching the common farmer. We don’t see agro-processing getting 
through. .... I think some of the interventions we are implementing 
are not impacting enough, because – like in agriculture – we must 
address the entire value chain, that process, right from – maybe a 
question of agricultural land, it is the inputs, it is the post-harvest 
handling, it’s agro-processing, it’s marketing, the research.... An 
aspect of these. 
 
At the district and sub-county levels, key interlocutors expressed a number of 
concerns. Interviewees explained that most households have only a small plot of land 
with which to undertake agriculture, meaning that their economies of scale are low. As 
a result, farmers’ mindset is of providing sufficient food to meet their daily survival 
needs only, without considering the possibility of expanding production with a view to 
selling their outputs at a market. Once provided with farming inputs and with 
agricultural extension services, farmers can consider commercial opportunities as well 
as meeting their basic consumption needs. A District Production Officer (DPO) 
explained:317  
When their [farmers’] capacity develops, that’s when they will do 
things the right way. They will think positively towards producing for 
the market, not producing for the stomach only. We work for the 
day, not for the market. That is how I look at it. So if somebody is to 
be given something, it should be given after he has underdone 
proper training, and he is able to take care of such things, and his 
mindset has been changed. 
 
316 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 11. 05 February 2016. 




Interview participants raised their concerns with the direction of the GoU’s 
primary program for agricultural development, the National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAADS) program. This program was modified in 2013 to include a new 
element, Operation Wealth Creation (OWC),318 to deliver farming inputs to rural areas 
via the UPDF. However, interviewees argued that this new program is both inferior to 
NAADS, and highly politicised. A Principal Economist in the World Bank’s Kampala 
office explains:319  
So for example there is the extension services by the National 
Agricultural Advisory Services, NAADS. The first thing government 
did was to disband all extension services at the districts. Eh? And 
they tried to privatise provision of extension services. …. So some 
of us were saying that the extension service officers in the district 
governments should have been maintained, to oversee the private 
extension workers and see that they were providing a good service 
to farmers. But the government did not do that – they dismantled 
the entire infrastructure at the district government. And then the 
private infrastructure completely failed. Now they have handed over 
the provision of extension services to the military [in Operation 
Wealth Creation]. Now I don’t know whether the military is going to 
use guns and bullets to shoot extension services to farmers, eh? 
[laughs] So the idea of – or the need to – increase productivity at 
the household is a good idea, but the vehicle for doing it... I think 
that is the challenge. 
 
Key informants at the sub-national level of government also raised a complaint 
about the central government: that the resources that are provided for improvements 
in the agricultural sector, such as seeds and farming equipment, are provided in too-
small quantities. As a result, there are insufficient resources to be able to cover the 
entire population. District and sub-county governments are then forced to choose 
 
318 OWC will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.5. 
319 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016. 
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which households will be the recipients of farming inputs, which generates tension and 
conflict.320 A DPO describes321 his views:  
Because if you bring, like, animals and only for sub-county, only 
three people get, where do the others get. It will take long for the 
whole district to be covered. So it needs resources, to realise our 
intentions.  
 
Central-government dominance of prioritising development needs 
 
One of the core rationales of decentralisation policy is that sub-national 
governments are better-placed to be aware of, and respond to, local development 
needs than is the more-remote central government.322 For this to be the outcome of 
decentralisation, it is necessary that the development needs and priorities of local 
communities are recognised in the national planning and budgeting process, so that 
resources from the national budget can be allocated to these needs. In order to 
analyse the extent to which the system of bottom-up priority-setting is functioning 
successfully in Uganda, interview participants were asked for their viewpoints on how 
well local-level priorities are considered in the Ugandan context.  
 
Dominance of the central government’s planning documents 
 
Interview participants from the central government described the dominance in 
the planning process of the three major economic planning and policy documents: the 
NDP, Vision 2040, and the NRM Manifesto. Key informants argue that the priorities in 
the budget will always be a reflection of the priorities set out in these three documents. 
This means that the local-level consultation processes that are conducted at the village 
level will have a smaller influence on the budget than will these overarching planning 
 
320 Pers.comm. Speaker of a Sub-County, in an interview with the author, number 39. 21 April 2016.  
321 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 10. 04 February 2016. 
322 Bardhan, ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’. 
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documents.323 This scenario is described324 by an Assistant Commissioner at MoH as 
follows:  
These [district-level] priorities are arrived at in a participatory 
manner, but as I told you, there is also the top-bottom. There are 
certain strategic issues which are agreed on, from the national level, 
and the districts are just notified that this is where we need to move. 
The priorities that are expressed by local communities are only likely to be fully 
addressed where they coincide with the priorities expressed in the national planning 
documents. As explained325 by an Assistant Commissioner at MoFPED: 
The budget process starts with consulting local governments. We 
do consult them. We hold meetings with them through these 
regional workshops, and we get all of their priorities. We get their 
priorities and fit within the available resources. …. Of course they 
must fit within the umbrella of the NDP – they must set their budget 
priorities to be that and that, in line with the NDP.  
 
Importance of senior leaders’ views in priority-setting  
 
Relatedly, central government officials also described the ways in which the 
priorities of the senior members of the elected government, such as the President and 
Cabinet, were important determinants of the priorities that were then actioned in the 
budget process. This includes sectors other than those included in the national 
planning documents. A number of respondents326 identified security and policing as a 
particular area of interest for the President, and so a priority for budgetary funding. As 
described327 by a Principal Economist in MoFPED:  
 
323 This is in contrast to the theoretical rationales underpinning decentralisation, under which the 
priorities and development needs of local communities are highly influential in determining 
expenditure priorities.  
324 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 67. 09 May 2016. 
325 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 63. 06 May 2016. 
326 A Senior Economist at MoFPED explained that security has become a high priority for budget 
allocations, as administered by MoFPED, due to the President considering this sector to be a high 
priority. Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 1. 29 January 2016. 
327 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 14. 08 February 2016. 
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Of course, we have six sectors that are considered as priority 
sectors, but they are priority in that they are developmental, or they 
are human-related. OK the six sectors are works, energy, health, 
education, agriculture and water. But then, there are also other 
sectors like security, which is now considered a priority. And JLOS 
[the justice, law and order sector]. But these other sectors are 
security, they are not treated as priority sectors, but they are priority 
in a way, like you always hear the President talk about security, so 
security issues are always prioritised when they are allocating 
resources.  
These comments suggest that the decisions made by Parliament regarding which 
sectors to be prioritised for budgetary funding are guided both by the national planning 
documents, and by the stated priorities of the President and Cabinet members. An 
Economist at MoFPED explained328 that once Parliament had identified a particular 
sector as a priority, MoFPED is “directed” to “find” funding for that sector within the 
draft budget, and return this draft to Parliament for approval. For this to be achieved, 
funding to another area may need to be reduced.  
 
Bottom-up planning process: Theoretical dimensions  
 
Key informants at the sub-national government level (districts and sub-
counties) highlighted the ways in which they are able to learn of the development 
priorities and needs of the communities within their constituencies. As a part of the 
budget process, priorities of villagers are sought through village planning meetings, 
and then communicated upwards through the councils of the parish and sub-county, 
to the district. This process is described329 by a District Senior Finance Officer:  
Under the bottom-up planning, sub-counties organise budget 
consultative meetings, where the community will participate in 
giving them their priorities. Then, the district also organise where 
we invite … those sub-counties management, hoping they have 
picked information from the people around them, so we sit in that 
 
328 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 15. 08 February 2016. 
329 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 3. 03 February 2016. 
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meeting, and then we get the views from them. That’s participatory 
planning. We invite them, they come and participate with us. 
At each stage, the lists of priorities of each area is combined with those of its 
neighbours, and then amalgamated into a single list. Where the priorities of a particular 
area can be addressed by the sub-county using its own fiscal resources, this is 
undertaken; otherwise, the list of priorities of each parish is referred upwards to the 
district council (LC5). As explained330 by a District Planner:  
Basically the lower local governments, they may have some 
suggestions on the projects that they want to include from their 
areas. But sometimes we ... we measure the priorities. Those that 
they can finance with their small resources are put – are fixed into 
their development plans. Those that require heavy investments, like 
provision of boreholes, which require overhead capital which is 
much more, and where the skills are at this level, they communicate 
to us – so we are able to factor in, into the development plan.  
 
Citizen disengagement with bottom-up planning  
 
However, some key informants raised concerns about the ways in which 
citizens in their constituencies have become disengaged from local planning 
processes. After participating in planning meetings but not seeing their priorities 
addressed in subsequent budgets, citizens have become unwilling to participate 
further. As described by the Chair of an LC3 Council,331 villagers in his sub-county 
have become reluctant to attend village planning meetings, due to their perception that 
the meetings have become repetitive. The same planning issues have been raised 
repeatedly but not addressed, with the result that participants have lost faith in 
government processes, and attendance at meetings has fallen.  
 
 
330 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 22. 12 February 2016. 
331 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 55. 29 April 2016. 
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Sub-national government financing, capacity and staffing 
 
A major theme throughout interviews with key elite interlocutors at each level 
of the governance process is the arrangements relating to the financing and staffing 
of sub-national governments. A range of issues were raised by expert informants, 
including the appropriateness of the level of funding received by sub-national 
governments from the centre, the level of conditionality in this funding, and problems 
caused by low staffing levels in sub-national governments.  
 
Local revenue-raising outcomes are poor  
 
Firstly, a majority of key informants at the central level of government gave the 
opinion that sub-national governments’ ability to raise local revenue is poor, and that 
the quantities of revenues raised at the sub-national level is generally low. 
Interviewees explained that this is problematic, because locally-raised revenue is able 
to be spent by sub-national governments on the development priorities of the local 
community. Some interviewees explained that the reason for this low level of locally-
raised revenue is that the list of sources of local revenue is small. A Senior Economist 
in the FINMAP program argues:332  
For the districts the main revenue sources are markets, for example. 
In the sub-counties they have markets. The local service tax, which 
is mainly got from civil servants themselves. [laughs] Trading 
licence is very small in most districts – very, very small – because 
they are overall, the majority of them.... In the municipal council yes, 
but in the district councils no – it is very small, not very big. So the 
markets are what is helping them a lot.  
 
Due to this low level of local revenue raising, most sub-national governments 
are, in practice, dependent on the central government for financial resources. A 
Principal Economist in MoLG explains:333  
 
332 PersComm. Interview with author, number 73. 16 May 2016. 
333 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 77. 23 May 2016. 
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Basically, over 90 per cent of the funds to any district comes from 
the central government. They are dependent on the transfers. Over 
90 per cent of their budgets is provided by the central government.  
 
High conditionality in districts’ funding  
 
A second issue raised by experts in the central government relates to the high 
levels of conditionality in the funding that is transferred to sub-national governments 
from the centre. High levels of conditionality are problematic for sub-national 
governments, as conditionality pre-determines how the transferred funds can be 
spent.334 This limits the ability of sub-national governments to be responsive to local 
development priorities, and instead effectively renders them agencies of the central 
government, implementing its priorities instead. Furthermore, the division of transfers 
from the central government into many sectors and activities causes each pocket of 
funding to be reduced to a small amount. A Senior Economist at OPM describes335 
this situation:  
I think they receive enough funding. The issue was that the 
conditions were simply too many; every grant had this and that 
condition, so they had small, small, small pockets of balances, that 
they could not put to good use, because a sector said 5 per cent of 
ten per cent of eight per cent.... but if you get those politicians out 
of the way, they can contract easily, and spend that money and get 
quality.  
 
Key interlocutors from civil society organisations expanded on the complex 
question of whether sub-national governments’ role is to implement the national 
development priorities, or to respond to the development needs of the local 
community. In particular, informants discussed the ways in which the funding 
mechanisms in place, with a heavy emphasis on conditional grants, alter the role of 
 
334 A new series of reforms at MoFPED is attempting to consolidate some of the grants that are 
transferred to districts, in order to reduce the level of conditionality in funding. These reforms had not 
been fully completed at the time of this research.  
335 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 74. 17 May 2016.  
 
 155 
sub-national governments. While sub-national governments are tasked with seeking 
the development priorities of their constituent communities and including these in their 
district’s annual workplan, the high percentage of conditionality in the funding they 
then receive renders this process effectively moot. This point is explained336 by a 
Director in the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC):  
Currently, about 95 per cent of the money going to local 
governments are conditional grants. And there is that saying that – 
is it, who pays the piper, calls for the tune. [laughs] So the money 
come with conditions – do this, do this – so if the needs are not, eh? 
they have not coincided, that they are the same, you may not get 
them. So local governments may be implementing what the centre 
has told them to implement, not what the people have generated. 
 
High vacancy rates in sub-national staffing structures  
 
Finally, central-government informants argue that part of the explanation for the 
poor performance of some local governments is that their levels of staffing are too low; 
that is, there are many vacancies in the public administrations of districts and sub-
counties. A Senior Economist at OPM explains337 the link between understaffing and 
poor performance at the sub-national level:  
Now, why are you a poor performer? So we carry that out – a bit of 
a study to find out why are you performing poorly? So we got, we 
brought, unspent balances, and then one of the first reasons that 
came up was, the reason why you are performing poorly is because 
you are under-staffed, because we say a district is acutely under-
staffed – so that was the main reason.  
An Economist at MoFPED describes338 the scale of the issue:  
An acceptable level [of staffing] is currently 75 per cent [ie. 25 per 
cent of the roles in the staffing structure are vacant in that district], 
 
336 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 69. 10 May 2016.  
337 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 74. 17 May 2016.  
338 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 62. 05 May 2016.  
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but there are some local governments who are working at 35 per 
cent.  
An Assistant Commissioner for MoH explains339 the compounding factors that 
contribute to poor staffing levels among local governments:  
Especially the ones [districts] that were newly created, maybe some 
five, six years ago – you find that their staffing levels are still very 
poor, and even attracting staff to those local governments is a 
challenge. And even those who are attracted – to retain them is a 
challenge; there is high attrition. …. So there are very many gaps.  
 
Poor capacity of councillors  
 
For sub-national government officials, a number of issues were raised in 
interviews. Firstly, sub-national government interviewees discussed the areas of 
conflict they experience within their governments, between the elected officials in the 
local councils (LC5 and LC3) and the employees of the district and sub-county public 
services. A major driver of conflict is the differences in educational requirements for 
employment in the public service, compared to public office. There are no education-
attainment requirements for councillors at any LC level; a person who is elected to 
such a role is able to take up this role even if they have received no formal education. 
Conversely, roles in the public service require a minimum level of Senior Four (eleven 
years of formal education), and some roles have a higher standard again. As a result, 
interlocutors in the public service administrations at the district and sub-county level 
in the three studied districts described the challenge of working with elected officials 
with low levels of literacy and numeracy. A District Planner describes340 the tension 
that can build up in working relationships between the two branches as a result of this 
capacity difference:  
They say that role is open to everybody as long as the people have 
chosen him or her. Someone may come and be poorly educated, 
and cannot conceive of things which are written by officials from the 
 
339 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 67. 09 May 2016. 
340 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 5, 03 February 2016. 
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Ministries. So you must again – like this [holds up a document] is 
finalisation of wage payments and gratuities estimates for this 
financial year – if someone has not, has less than O-level, may not 
be able to comprehend this. We try to explain, someone doesn’t 
understand, in the end he may think you are undermining him. So, 
they replace those things, they might think ... We might reach 
conflict with the government guidelines, he might think you mislead 
him, you might do wrong things... and then the auditors come to 
verify and they say you have a problem. You are the technical 
person, you are supposed to have guided, but the people you are 
guiding are refusing to be guided.  
 
In civil society organisations, key informants also discussed the manner in 
which the low education levels of elected officials generates problematic outcomes in 
decision-making. Interviewees from this group offered political explanations for why 
this situation persists of not requiring a minimum education level for councillors. A 
Professor of Makerere University explains341 two reasons this situation persists, 
namely the loyalty of under-educated councillors and their acceptance of low salaries:  
It is being maintained because of two major reasons. One major 
reason is that the majority of these mediocre fellows, or the non-
elite, they are the majority and they can easily give support to the 
ruling government. So in other words, they are not a headache, OK? 
to the party in power. .… They are easier to manage, and they can 
easily play a yes-yes-yes supportive role to the government, and 
especially to the party in power. But also the other reason is that in 
some areas, basically because of the low pay, the low facilitation, 
which is deliberate, you cannot get technical and well-experienced 
people to take up councillorship, especially in those rural local 
governments. They run away to get more lucrative engagements, a 
consultancy or private business, in town – instead of being in a 
council where they are paid 10 thousand [Shillings; around GBP 3] 
 
341 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76, 20 May 2016. 
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allowances... So you maintain the mediocre, you can easily manage 
them, and give them peanuts. 
 
A number of interviewees raised concerns with the risk of poor-quality decision-
making arising from the low education levels of councillors. Interlocutors argued that 
councillors with low literacy and numeracy levels were unable to adequately assess 
the proposals and bills that were put to them for decisions. In addition, councillors’ 
motivations for holding office were called into question, in a reflection of the frustration 
and tensions that interviewees described in their local areas. For example, an LC5 
Speaker describes342 his fellow councillors:  
Do you know that there is no academic qualifications for anyone to 
be a councillor at LC5? There isn’t. Even if you stopped in nursery. 
Provided that you are a proper demagogue in your constituency, 
eh? So long as people know you are around; as long as you can 
talk. .… So they [Councillors] get these documents, they open them, 
then in the meetings we go sector by sector. …. Then the Speaker 
says, Yes, after arguing this cost, we discussed – yet, no one has 
discussed – but then we go to the vote, you say, those in favour say 
Hi [yes] to the vote, and those people just know how to say Hi. 
Someone is saying Hi on something they have not read. Someone 
is just interested in the remuneration we pay to them at the end of 
the month.  
 
Councillors interfere in local revenue-raising  
 
In addition to tensions between public servants and councillors caused by the 
skill levels and performance of councillors, interlocutors at the sub-national level raised 
concerns relating to councillors’ interference in local revenue-raising processes. In the 
three studied districts, public servants complained that local councillors attempted to 
improve their popularity and political standing by advising local citizens not to pay 
taxes and levies. However, councillors then reportedly become angry when revenue-
 
342 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 45, 25 April 2016. 
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raising activities have generated low revenue levels. From the perspective of local 
public servants, this situation causes frustration, because they are unable to persuade 
citizens to pay taxation where local politicians have advised them that it is not required. 
An LC5 Council Speaker complains343 of this practice amongst his colleagues:  
Say we want to collect revenue from quarrying the rock. Hmm? You 
find a district councillor comes from the place where that rock is 
located. He will go and tell his voters, and say, You know what? The 
district has plans to sell the rock! So that he remains popular and 
relevant for the next election. Yet he is the same district councillor 
who wants to be paid. So if we don’t tax for acquiring the rock, and 
you say you are not being paid! There are instances where certain 
councillors go and even stop people from collecting revenue, 
because they want their voters to know that they are working for 
them. Yet they would be working against the voters, really. Because 
this local revenue would have helped to repair a borehole. This local 
revenue would have helped to sink a pit latrine. This local revenue 
would have done something. 
 
Administration and wage costs of districts are high 
 
A final issue raised by interview participants at the sub-national level is the 
problem of expenditure on service delivery being undermined by the cost of the sub-
national unit’s own administration. Referring specifically to the unconditional grant 
from the central government, for which no pre-earmarked purpose has been 
determined, key interlocutors explained that after addressing the wage344 bill of 
district’s own staff, insufficient funding remained to support service delivery. This is an 
especially important issue as the unconditional grant and locally-raised revenue are 
the only revenue sources over which district governments hold fiscal autonomy. A 
District CAO explains:345  
 
343 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 45, 25 April 2016. 
344 The wage bill of a district or sub-county includes only the wages of the public administration 
officials of the district, such as the District Health Officer. The broader public service (such as 
teachers and nurses) are employed by their respective central-government Ministries and Service 
Commissions, and are not included in the wage bill of the district to which they are posted.  
345 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 6, 03 February 2016. 
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Now as I talk it could be between 15 and 20 per cent of the budget 
comes down [is transferred to the districts]. And then from that more 
than 80 per cent goes on salaries and wages. So service delivery is 
left with little money. So you can’t see the impact. You can’t deliver. 
.... The government, much as it is decentralisation, but according to 
the money which is being sent to us, for instance, this year my 
budget is 30 billion.346 30 billion Shillings. But you have to look at 
that... Almost 24 billion is going on salaries and pensions of the staff. 
 
Political interests of elite actors: Manipulation of resource-allocation 
 
Interview participants in the central government articulated viewpoints relating 
to the political interests that influence the resource-allocation processes. Specifically, 
participants’ viewpoints centred on two main themes. Interlocutors noted that there are 
political factors that are considered in the process of making resource-allocation 
decisions. Elected officials argue for resource-allocation decisions that favour their 
electorate or sub-county, regardless of the outcomes of needs assessments. For 
example, an Economist at MoFPED describes:347  
But basically it is supposed to be a needs assessment, and you 
carry out all that, see what is feasible, to put a school here, does it 
make economic sense. But basically it was really politically-driven; 
you find a minister wants a school in their district, and they say, 
basically, we need a school in this certain district. 
An Assistant Commissioner at MoFPED raises348 an example from the healthcare 
sector:  
But of course, sometimes of course some funds are allocated based 
on political directives. There are times when funds are allocated so 
that for this area, because of this special interest, we need this funds 
for handling this kind of intervention. So, in spite of the formula being 
there, sometimes there are other directives. …. Sometimes there 
 
346 Approximately GBP 6 million. 
347 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 58, 02 May 2016. 
348 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 60, 04 May 2016. 
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may be – there are certain projects like we have rehabilitation of 
hospitals, eh? …. Technically for us we would say, probably this 
hospital ‘A’ should come first, should be rehabilitated first. But there 
may be a political intervention, where they say No, we should start 
with hospital ‘C’, eh? Yet, A is top on our technical assessment, but 
now, they say No, we start with C. And it may be because of political 
reasons. So that’s why sometimes you find that kind of thing. 
 
At the sub-national level, too, respondents within the public service described 
their concerns regarding political engagement with the funding-allocation process. For 
these interlocutors, concerns related to the interference of elected officials in the 
decision-making of administrative officials. Respondents described the ways in which 
elected leaders and senior political officials use their positions to divert the allocation 
of financial resources in ways that are beneficial to themselves. Respondents reported 
that political leaders seek to ensure that funding allocations are directed towards 
elected officials’ constituencies, or even towards the officials themselves. A District 
Principal Finance Officer explains:349  
So the implication is that we try to suffocate [cut expenditure from] 
some departments, in order to top up for the council. So that they 
get their 100 per cent [of their allowances]. …. It is a must. So for 
now, we have a council which is expiring. And now they are saying, 
what has been provided for in terms of transport allowance, sitting 
allowance, all should be paid, before [their term expires]. And you 
know for them they are waiting at the time of passing the budget. 
And they are saying, unless you are providing what we are asking 
for, we are not going to pass the budget. So we try to look around 
and make sure that their allowances is paid in full. 
A Speaker of a District Council adds350 (speaking of their fellow Councillors) that local 
officials attempt to distribute public services throughout the geographical space of the 
district, in order to ensure that their entire patronage network has received a benefit: 
 
349 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 48, 28 April 2016. 
350 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 45, 25 April 2016. 
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There is this program that has come from the central government; 
there is re-stocking [gifting cattle to households in conflict-affected 
regions]. …. I have my five members of council who are the bosses: 
how can [I] make them benefit? You don’t have to use their names, 
but you can give the names of their relatives. Yes. So you give them 
one, one, one, one – they also take milk! [The councillors] say, can 
you organise monitoring for my people – quarterly? You organise 
quarterly monitoring, you pay them 400 thousand each person – it 
is something! Because, this budget is passed for the technocrats to 
implement; in the course of implementation, they have something 
to go back home with [they derive a benefit]!  
 
For key interlocutors in civil society organisations, a principal concern about 
political engagement in the resource-allocation process is that the PFM system can 
be used to support patronage networks. As a result, policymaking can be ad hoc and 
responsive to demands, rather than being based on coherent and consistent policy 
frameworks. A Principal Economist at the World Bank’s Kampala office explains:351 
I think, this also may be one of the challenges or gaps in our 
decentralisation policy, in the sense that politicians tend to go and 
make policy pronouncements without stopping and first asking the 
question, What is the financial implication of this policy decision? .... 
And for me, I think the Uganda decentralisation policy has been 
hijacked by politicians, or by politics – by political considerations. It 
is no longer well-aligned to the philosophy or the taking of – the 
providing of service delivery. 
 
Quality of service delivery is poor 
 
A number of negative comments regarding the quality of service delivery were 
raised in interviews, regardless of whether they were members of the central 
government, civil society or a sub-national unit. Elite respondents described the ways 
 
351 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016. 
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in which public service delivery was continually of poor quality, including in core 
services such as healthcare and education. From the central government, 
respondents described the flaws in public service delivery they have observed. Staff 
in sectoral ministries, and MoFPED economists engaged in the funding of service-
delivery portfolios, were particularly critical. For example, a Senior Economist at 
MoFPED explains:352  
Even after so many years, you don’t see improvement. We realise, 
we don’t see any kind of improvement in the service delivery 
parameters. There are areas where we definitely have made 
progress. We have made progress in increasing enrolment in 
schools, in the areas which, much as we talk about there, we have 
failed to effect improvement. 
A Senior Economist at MoES adds:353  
We will find that a teacher in a government school is paid, but they 
are teaching students, pupils, who have no classroom. Who have 
no – nothing to eat. Who have to walk five miles, you know? to 
attend. Or who have no materials for class. So even instructional 
materials need to be there, to be better funded. 
 
From the perspective of interview participants at the sub-national level, the 
quality of service delivery is poor in many sectors, and monitoring systems are failing 
to generate improvements. A District RDC noted354 that some schools have more than 
100 children in one classroom, with a single teacher. A District Education Officer 
described355 the lack of basic equipment, such as desks, at local schools:  
And when it comes to desks, all the schools are needy, because 
over 50 per cent of the children are sitting on the floor. 
 
 
352 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 25. 05 April 2016.  
353 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 65. 06 May 2016. 
354 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 35. 21 April 2016.  
355 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 7, 04 February 2016. 
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Finally, a District Health Officer describes356 situations in which a patient in the 
healthcare system is unable to afford the treatment that has been recommended to 
them, and so is forced to compromise on their treatment:  
In most cases, somebody will – in an attempt to avoid those costs 
– will say, just give me enough [treatment] for my money. So they 
treat according to the size of their money, not necessarily according 
to the magnitude of the disease they are suffering from.  
 
District proliferation: Official explanations and political realities  
 
 The topic of the rapid proliferation of new districts in Uganda was frequently 
raised by elite interview participants, across each level of government and 
administration that participated in the research. Participants expressed strongly-held 
opinions on this topic, and suggested that there are strong motivations from multiple 
actors driving the creation of new districts. Participants pointed to two main rationales 
for creating additional districts: that new districts are created where existing districts 
are large, or have a large population; and districts are created for politically-motivated 
reasons. Key informants also drew a link between the push for new districts’ creation, 
and tribal heterogeneity and tensions amongst tribes. These issues are here 
discussed in turn.  
 
District creation based on population and land size 
 
Regarding the rationales for the creation of additional districts that are stated 
by elected officials, key informants explained that new districts are created to respond 
to population pressures. That is, where the population or land area of a particular 
district is thought to be too large for residents to be able to access public services, the 
district is divided into smaller districts. It is noteworthy that this is the same rationale 
as for decentralisation itself: that is, that the creation of districts brings service delivery 
nearer to the people. This indicates that there is not a specific rationale for creating an 
additional district, compared to the rationale for decentralisation itself: in both cases, 
 
356 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 52. 28 April 2016. 
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improved access to service delivery is the principal explanation. It is also important to 
note that there is not a recommended or benchmarked size for the population or land 
area of a district; a district is deemed to be ‘too large’ by its residents or by its leaders 
without reference to a standard.  
 
An LC3 Chair at the sub-county level explains357 that his sub-county has 
recently been created; it was previously a parish, and was ‘elevated’ to the status of a 
sub-county. This was because the parish had become, in his words, too large. The 
leaders of the parish requested an elevation from their district and from MoLG. He 
reports that they received no resistance to their request. A Senior Economist from 
MoFPED explains358 his perspective on district creation:  
The main reason [for the creation of a new district) is to make sure 
that services are brought nearer to the population. OK? The thinking 
is, if I have a district in my own locality, OK, then, issues to do with 
the transport network, issues to do with the health facilities and 
services, the education services, will be looked at more closely. 
A District CAO describes359 his viewpoint on district creation, describing the way in 
which a smaller district yields the opportunity to provide better-monitored services:  
For me here, I have 242 primary schools. Over 30 health facilities. 
About 17 secondary schools. And so on. So managing those ones 
is not easy. But you find in another districts has 60, 80 primary 
schools. So then you are able to reach all of them. 
From civil society, a Principal Economist in the World Bank’s Kampala office 
describes360 the link between popular demands for a district and the acquiescence of 
political leaders:  
People say, Oh this district has too many [people], so the politicians 
say, Do you want a district, and they say, Yes we want a district. 
But they do not appreciate that a district is not just a name.  
 
 
357 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 41. 22 April 2016. 
358 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 11. 05 February 2016. 
359 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 47. 27 April 2016. 
360 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016.  
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The political drivers of district creation: Beyond the façade?  
 
Secondly, interview participants described the politically-motivated drives of the 
creation of additional districts. To these expert informants, the creation of a new district 
based on land area or population size is a façade, and the more genuine rationale for 
district creation comes from the political sphere. The DEO and Assistant DEO of a 
district explain361 that districts are granted to communities by political leaders who are 
seeking re-election:  
DEO: It is political. It is political. Simple. 
Assistant DEO: That is why when you move to communities they 
tell you – for us to get more, we need a district. So if you want to go 
back to power you have to give. 
DEO: Give us a district. And you know, the local community does 
not know the dynamics involved in running a district. They don’t 
know. For them they think that if you have a district then you are a 
very big people, big community, or something like this. It is not true.  
A professor at Makerere University argues362 that political leaders agree to the creation 
of additional districts because this allows them to reward allies, and to increase the 
dominance of NRM in Parliament:  
The only reason, and the only logical explanation for the creation of 
new districts in Uganda is political expediency. Basically, gathering 
more support, for rallying more support, for the ruling government, 
for the party in power. And that’s all. Because any new district 
means that you are going to get, one, there’s the few elites to be 
employed. OK? And then [secondly] you are also going to get more 
cadres for the NRM government, and that is a fact – because most 
of them are created in those areas where the current government 
has support. … they go to the rural areas, that’s where the current 
NRM party has a lot of support – that’s where they split the districts.  
 
361 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 51. 28 April 2016. 
362 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76. 20 May 2016. 
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A Senior Economist in the World Bank’s Kampala office argues363 that the creation of 
additional districts serves to make districts smaller, and so reduces their power and 
scale relative to their local MP:  
When Uganda had, like, 69 districts, most of these districts were 
very big. …. So a district chairman who was elected through 
universal adult suffrage would be controlling 4 or 5 parliamentary 
constituencies. And, he or she would have a large revenue base, 
and a large population he is managing. And politically, he was very 
powerful, compared to a national member of parliament who 
legislates. OK? Now. I think … this in a way ruffled the feathers of 
people in the central government. …. The central government could 
not give directives to districts, because the districts were large, the 
districts had the financial muscles, to finance a substantial 
percentage of its budget. …. So for me, one of the views I am putting 
forward is that parliament deliberately went for the proliferation of 
districts to undermine the political and financial strength of hitherto 
big districts. Now, we have reached a situation where these districts 
are too small, financially not viable, highly dependent on central-
government transfers, the district chairman cannot stand or pose a 
question of either directives from the central government ministries 
or from a member of parliament.  
 
District proliferation linked to tribal differences 
  
 A final point relating to district proliferation that was raised by key informants at 
each of the studied levels of government is the connection between district 
proliferation, and tribal identities. Interviewed experts raised examples of situations in 
which a community has successfully lobbied for the creation of an additional district or 
sub-county in their local area, using the basis of their tribal identity. As a result of the 
cultural and linguistic heterogeneity within Uganda, and of the historical context of the 
formation of districts during the colonial period,364 there are several examples of 
 
363 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016. 
364 As discussed in section 1.2. 
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districts that contain more than one tribal group within its borders. Where one tribal 
group dominates the local government, this can cause members of the other group to 
feel that their needs are not being adequately addressed. Regardless of the accuracy 
of this claim, it can be used as the basis for arguing for the creation of a new district, 
so that the under-represented tribal group can become a tribal majority in the new 
district.  
 
A common argument is that language barriers between tribal groups 
necessitate the creation of separate districts, so that council members will share a 
common language (other than English). A Director at the LGFC explains:365  
They say, Now, we don’t speak the same language with those 
people. Because, since there is no education requirement to be a 
councillor, when some councils convene they speak in the local 
language. So they don’t speak in English. It is only the clerk to 
council who will keep the minutes in English. …. In the district, if it 
is a big one, you may find that those who manage the district may 
not be the more powerful maybe from somewhere, in one corner of 
the district. So one part of the district may feel marginalised. And 
that’s when they ask for, We want to vote by our feet. They cut off 
themselves. 
An LC3 Chair at the sub-county level also raised366 the possibility that new districts 
are created along tribal lines where this conflict between two tribes, as a way of 
maintaining peace. He describes the context in his own district, and predicted that 
conflict between two major tribal groups would lead to an additional district being 
created in the coming years. The notion of districts being created to mitigate conflict 





365 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 79. 26 May 2016. 
366 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 41. 22 April 2016.  
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Section conclusion: Experts’ views on decentralisation, participation and district 
creation 
 
This section has discussed the results of interviews conducted with experts at 
the central, district, and sub-county level, as well as with leaders from LC1 and LC3 
councils. These interviews reveal that decentralisation in the Ugandan context is 
showing signs of failing to deliver on its two central goals: the responsiveness of sub-
national governments to local development needs, and the improved participation of 
local communities in governance. Key informants describe the ways in which local 
economic development has become a key policy goal of government, including the 
provision of public services, in part because this has not already been delivered 
through the decentralisation system. Respondents describe the political manipulation 
of the resource allocation decision by central-government elected leaders, and the 
continued dominance of the central government over sub-national governments in 
planning and budgeting. The pre-eminence of central-government planning 
documents, and the predominance of conditionality in transfers to sub-national 
governments, combine to reduce the responsive capacity of district and sub-county 
governments to local development priorities. As a result, citizens are becoming 
disengaged from local planning and budgeting processes, and are turning away from 
participatory governance mechanisms such as village planning meetings. The value 
of participation, and the ability of decentralisation to achieve it, are called into question 
by key informants.  
 
Furthermore, interviewees report that service delivery remains poor-quality, 
and sub-national governments continue to be hindered by staffing shortages and low 
capacity. The high administrative costs of sub-national governments, relative to the 
scale of the funds over which they hold discretionary authority, suggests that the 
proliferation of new districts risks increasing the transaction costs of service delivery. 
The following section presents quantitative analysis of data from the national budget 




4.2 Results from budget data: Low authority and high conditionality  
 
Quantitative data contributes to an analysis of the issues raised in elite 
interviews and the household survey in two ways.367 Firstly, it allows for these issues 
to be triangulated: the opinions and viewpoints of actors interviewed and surveyed can 
be compared to the actual outcomes of the budget and other data sources. Secondly, 
the examination of numerical data can facilitate an analysis of the scale of the issues 
raised, and a comparison of the scale of these issues over time. For example, where 
key informants argue that a decreasing share of the budget is being decentralised, 
this claim can be verified through an analysis of budget figures, and the percentage 
change over time can be identified. Key issues that can be identified by analysing 
quantitative data derived from budget sources include trends in budget allocations to 
sub-national units, the regularity and uniformity of budget allocations to sectors and 
districts, and any irregularities or discrepancies in financial flows to different regions 
in Uganda. Budget data also reveals the extent to which sub-national governments 
are able to generate locally-raised revenue, and their relative expenditures on 
administrative costs and wage bills within their local areas.  
 
This section presents results gathered from a range of documents that are 
produced in order to operationalise the national budget in Uganda368 at both the 
national and sub-national levels. This data is used to situate the arguments made by 
research participants within the broader public finance context of Uganda, and to 
identify trends in fiscal outcomes over time. In particular, trends emerge relating to: 
the overall balances and priorities expressed in the budget; transfers to districts; 
districts’ ability to raise local revenues; and equalisation attempts between regions in 
Uganda. This section discusses each of these in turn.  
 
 
367 Quantitative data was collated into single databases for each line of inquiry (such as releases or 
estimates), and then analysed for trends and frequencies. Data is presented in the form of descriptive 
statistics.  
368 Specifically, from the National Budget Framework Papers, from Medium-Term Expenditure 




Overall trends in the national budget: Increasing expenditure in centralised sectors  
 
Examining the national budget data highlights a number of trends that reveal 
decision-making outcomes in public financial management. Trade-offs are made 
transparent where they have been made between expenditures in public service 
sectors compared to administrative sectors, and between different regional areas. As 
depicted in graph 4.1 below, the overall budget369 has demonstrated an upward trend 
since 1997/98, in both local government votes and central government votes. Central 
government votes, in particular, have increased substantially, with some fluctuation 
around 2015/16. Local government votes’ budgets have increased, but not to as great 
an extent as central government votes.  
 
 
4.1 Approved budget estimates for central government and local government 
votes 1997/98 to 2016/17 
 
While the budgets of central-government ministries overall has been 
increasing, there has been some variation from one sectoral ministry to the next. 
Comparing trends in budgets (approved estimates) of key sectoral ministries between 
2003/04 and 2015/16 reveals that some areas of government expenditure have 
received substantial increases in funding over time. In other cases, while the overall 
budgets have not increased or decreased substantially, the value of estimates and 
releases has been similar, allowing agencies to undertake successful project 
management during the course of a financial year. For example, the budget of State 
House has increased over this time period. Between 2013/13 and 2015/15, the budget 
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of State House rose from UGX 63 billion to UGX 258 billion, a percentage increase of 
308 per cent. In addition to this overall increase in the approved estimates, it is striking 
to note that the approved estimates have risen to better reflect releases; that is, 
releases had been higher than estimates, and estimates rose to meet them. This 
indicates that for a number of years, the funding received370 by State House over the 
course of a financial year in fact exceeded what had been committed to it at the 
beginning of the financial year. These trends are illustrated in graph 4.2 below.  
 
  
4.2 The budget (approved estimates) issued at the beginning of each financial year, 
compared to the ‘actual’ funding (releases) issued throughout the same year, for 
State House, 2003/04 to 2015/16  
 
In contrast, the budget (approved estimates) for the Ministry of Health over this 
same time period has fluctuated, and releases (the ‘actual’ level of funding) have failed 
to match the estimates that were announced at the beginning of each financial year. 
This is illustrated below in graph 4.3.371 The fluctuations in approved estimates over 
time presents challenges for the Ministry’s long-term economic planning, as senior 
officials and economists in the Ministry are unable to obtain forward estimates of their 
sector’s funding, upon which to base medium-term planning. In addition, the low levels 
of releases compared to estimates is challenging for meeting contracted project 
commitments within one financial year. This is because financial commitments that 
 
370 Source: National Budget Framework Papers, annual. Graph author’s own. 
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were put in place at the beginning of the financial year (such as contracts with 
suppliers and construction agents) may not be adequately financed over the course of 
the financial year.  
 
 
4.3 Approved estimates compared to releases for the Ministry of Health, 2003/04 to 
2015/16  
 
Likewise, a comparison of approved estimates compared to releases for the 
Ministry of Education and Sports over this same time period reveals that while the 
approved estimates for the sector increase over time, and releases for each financial 
year fall well below the approved estimates. Graph 4.4 illustrates the Ministry’s 
estimates and releases.372 373  
  
 
372 Source: National Budget Framework Papers, annual. Graph author’s own. 






2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
U
GX
Ministry of Health - Estimates vs Releases - 2003/04 to 
2015/16





4.4 Approved estimates compared to releases for the Ministry of Education and 
Sports, 2003/04 to 2015/16 
 
Transfers to districts: Variation, fluctuations, and falling over time  
 
Four principal areas of importance are examined in this sub-section. Firstly, the 
extent to which district governments receive predictable transfers based on budget 
estimates is examined. Secondly, results are presented illustrating the balance 
between conditional and unconditional grants that are received by districts from the 
central government, which speaks to the level of discretionary authority districts hold 
over the finances they receive. Thirdly, results are presented illustrating the 
percentage of the budget that is decentralised, and therefore transferred to districts, 
over time. Finally, the extent to which district governments expend unconditional 
budgets on wages and allowances for staff, compared to other expenditures, will be 
examined.  
 
Estimates versus releases: Budget changes within a financial year 
 
Firstly, results from the budget indicate the extent to which the actual transfers 
to districts per financial quarter (‘releases’) are an accurate reflection of the 
commitments that were made to each district in the annual budget documents 
(‘estimates’). Estimates are approved by Parliament at the outset of each financial 
year, and releases ought to be the same amount (divided over four financial quarters). 
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are able to rely on the estimates that are presented at the beginning of the financial 
year, as they go forward with projects and activities during the year. If the releases 
and estimates are close to one another throughout the year – if the funding promised 
to districts is close to what they then receive – this facilitates smooth financial 
management and project delivery by districts. However, if there are large 
discrepancies between the releases and estimates (particularly if releases fall below 
estimates), district governments may find that they are unable to meet their financial 
commitments to contractors and suppliers at the conclusion of the financial year. This 
can jeopardise the successful completion of public services such as schools and 
healthcare posts.  
 
The results from budget data collected during fieldwork indicate that district 
governments are challenged by differences between the budget estimates that are 
approved by parliament at the beginning of the financial year, and the transfers they 
in fact receive. An analysis of the estimates and releases received by the three districts 
that were the focus of this thesis is illustrative of the challenges that can be caused by 
differences between these two figures. For example, the case of Lira is depicted in 
graph 4.5 below, showing the comparison of estimates and releases received374 by 
the District between 2003/04 and 2015/16.  
 
 
4.5 Releases compared to estimates for Lira District, 2003/04 to 2015/16.  
 
 



















Graphs illustrating the releases and estimates375 for Ntungamo District depict 




4.6 Approved estimates compared to releases, Ntungamo District, 2003/04 to 
2015/16 
 
In Ntungamo District, in addition to the instability in estimates across financial 
years, it can be observed that in some financial years releases exceeded estimates, 
while in other financial years the opposite was the case. While receiving greater 
funding than was advised at the beginning of the financial year may be preferable to 
receiving less funding than advised, it is nonetheless the case that unpredictable 
releases compared to estimates is challenging for project management by district 
governments.  
 
On the other hand, in Pallisa District, other than in 2006, estimates and releases 
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4.7 Releases compared to estimates, Pallisa District, 2003/04 to 2015/16 
 
Conditional versus unconditional grants: High levels of central-government control  
 
Secondly, in addition to facing discrepancies between releases and estimates, 
and variance in the estimates themselves, districts must also manage a balance 
between conditional and unconditional funds in the transfers they receive from the 
central government. An analysis of the quantitative data collected during fieldwork 
reveals the balance between conditional and unconditional grants that are transferred 
to sub-national governments. Where the majority of the transfers that are sent from 
the central government to the district government are conditional, that indicates that 
the central government’s sectoral ministries have pre-determined the activities on 
which transferred funds can be spent. This affects the ability of local governments to 
be responsive to locally-raised development priorities, and instead reduces their role 
to that of implementing the priorities and programs of the central government. 
Conversely, where a large proportion of the transfer to district governments is 
unconditional, districts are entitled to utilise this funding on any program or activity 
they deem to be important for addressing local development needs.  
 
Analysing the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks for the financial years 
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transferred376 to all districts was 13 per cent of the total transfer of funds. This data is 
summarised in graph 4.8 below.  
 
 
4.8 Percentage of the total transfer to district governments that is conditional 
funding (blue) compared to unconditional funding (yellow), 2011/12-2015/16 
 
Percentage of the national budget that is transferred to districts: Falling over time  
 
Thirdly relating to district-government financing, budget data377 reveals trends 
in the percentage of the budget that is transferred to decentralised governments. 
Where this percentage is high, it indicates a high level of expenditure on public 
services such as healthcare and education (as these are decentralised sectors) 
compared to energy, defence, highways, and other sectors that remain centralised. A 
high percentage of funds that are transferred to sub-national governments would also 
indicate a strong preference from the central government that local governments 
should be responsible for delivering public services, rather than having the relevant 
central-government sectoral ministries maintaining control over the delivery of these 
services. Where the percentage of the budget that is transferred to sub-national 
governments is low, it suggests that either the central sectoral ministries have 
 
376 Source: Medium-Term Expenditure Framework; annual. Graph author’s own. 
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maintained control over the delivery of decentralised services, or the government’s 
focus is on non-decentralised spending areas, or a combination of each of these.  
 
The results from the National Budget Framework Paper reveal that the transfer 
of resources from the central government’s annual national budget to district and lower 
local governments has fallen to 9.85 per cent of the national budget in 2015/16. Its 
peak was 20.93 per cent in 2003/4, immediately prior to the commencement of multi-
party elections in 2006. This result is depicted in graph 4.9 below.  
 
 
4.9 The percentage of the overall annual national budget that is decentralised (is 
transferred to district governments), 1997/98 to 2015/16 
 
 Overall, while the annual transfers378 to local government votes rose in absolute 
terms over the course of 1997/98 to 201/18 (as illustrated in graph 4.10 below), the 
percentage of the national budget that these transfers represent has fallen from its 
peak of 21 per cent in 2003/04.  
 



















































































4.10 Transfers to local government votes in shilling terms, 1997/98 to 2017/18 
 
Expenditure on the wage bill crowds out expenditure on public services 
 
Finally relating to financing of districts, analysing budget data from the districts’ 
own annual budgets379 allows for an analysis of the extent to which the wage costs380 
of the district itself absorb the unconditional grant. The unconditional grant is the pool 
of funds from which district governments must meet their administration costs, 
including equipment, offices and other recurrent expenditures. For the three studied 
districts, expenditure on wages for the district’s public-administration officials and the 
allowances paid to councillors absorbs a substantial fraction of the overall 
unconditional grant. In Pallisa, the wage bill absorbs an average of 62 per cent of the 
district’s unconditional grant over the financial years 2012/13 to 2015/16. Over the 
same time period in Lira, the wage bill absorbs an average of 58 per cent of the annual 
unconditional grant. In Ntungamo, expenditure on the wage bill over the same time 
period absorbs 71 per cent on average of the annual unconditional budget. The high 
proportion of wage to non-wage expenditure in the unconditional grant in these three 
districts indicates that the cost of payments of salaries for staff represents a substantial 
proportion of the overall unconditional grant. This has the effect of reducing the amount 
 
379 Source: Local Government Budget Framework Paper (LGBFP) produced annually by each district 
and approved by a specific sitting of the district (LC5) council. Graph author’s own. 
380 The wages that are the responsibility of district governments are for the administrative staff of the 
district itself, such as the District Education Officer (though not the CAO, who is an employee of 
MoPS). The wages of other civil servants, such as teachers, remain the responsibility of the relevant 
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of funding that is available for district governments to respond to the development 
needs of the community. This situation as it affects the three studied districts of this 
thesis is illustrated in graph 4.11 below.  
 
 
4.11 Percentage of the unconditional grant that is earmarked for the wage bill, 
in three studied districts  
 
Locally-raised revenue: A small percentage of district and sub-county budgets 
 
An analysis of quantitative data from the national budget reveals the extent to 
which district governments are able to generate locally-raised revenue. As discussed 
in section 4.1, while district governments have been granted the authority to charge 
levies, dues and taxes under the terms of the Local Government Act 1997, their ability 
to enact this authority is limited. These limitations are caused by a low viable tax base 
at the sub-national level (particularly where most residents of a district are engaged in 
subsistence farming), low rates of tax compliance, and a lack of records of taxpayers 
to determine which citizens may have failed to pay tax. An analysis of the locally-raised 
revenue381 in the three districts studied for this thesis supports the arguments made 
by district-government officials, in that they are able to generate only small amounts 
of local revenue. For Pallisa District, local revenue between 2013/14 and 2016/17 
contributed an average of 1.09 per cent to the overall revenue of the district, as 
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illustrated in graph 4.12 below. In Lira over the same time period, locally-raised 
revenue comprised an average of 0.92 per cent of the overall annual revenue for the 
district. In Ntungamo District, data was only available for the financial year 2013/14, in 
which the percentage of annual revenue that was generated by locally raised revenue 
was 0.88 per cent.  
 
 
4.12 Locally-raised revenue as a percentage of the overall annual revenue of 
Pallisa District 
 
Where districts are relatively unable to raise substantial levels of revenue 
locally, they remain dependent on the central government for transfers of funds. Given 
that the majority of these transfers are in the form of conditional grants, local 
governments are hindered in their ability to be responsive to local development 
priorities in their area.  
  
Inter-regional equalisation: Little evidence of implementation  
 
A common rationale for decentralisation that is described in the literature382 is 
that it can be used to target areas of more severe poverty within a country’s borders. 
By being able to direct greater levels of resources to regions that face greater 
development challenges, central governments can attempt to improve equality 
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between regions of a country. In the Ugandan case, equalisation grants are frequently 
cited by officials at the national level383 as a mechanism for transferring greater 
resources to areas of Uganda that have higher levels of headcount poverty. In the 
Ugandan context, areas that are poorer are the areas in northern Uganda, due to a 
combination of economic, political and environmental factors, in addition to a lengthy 
period of insurgency between 1987 and 2006 that caused high levels of population 
displacement and conflict.  
 
Budget data was therefore examined to assess two potential ways in which 
decentralisation could be used in the Ugandan context to promote equalisation among 
regions. Firstly, results were collected on the equalisation grant, and the level of 
utilisation of this grant for transferring resources to poorer regions (particularly to 
districts in the north).384 Secondly, budget data was collected to facilitate analysing the 
extent to which northern districts receive higher levels of conditional or unconditional 
funding than southern districts, as a way of generating equalisation through budget 
transfers themselves.  
 
Regarding the equalisation grant, the budget results collected indicate that the 
equalisation grant comprises an extremely small percentage of the funds that are 
transferred to local governments. Across all districts, the equalisation grant 
represented 0.15 per cent of the transfers from the central government to district 
governments in the years 2014/15 and 2015/16. As a percentage of the overall 
national budget in the same years, equalisation grants represented 0.02 per cent of 
the entire national annual budget.  
 
Secondly, when assessing whether northern districts receive larger transfers of 
conditional and unconditional grants in recognition of their higher levels of poverty, 
data from the budget385 suggested that the opposite is the case. For the budget years 
2010/11 to 2017/18, districts in southern Uganda received higher transfers than those 
 
383 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Politics and Local Government in Uganda’, in Saito, ‘Politics and Local 
Government in Uganda’. 
384 A GoU and multi-donor fund for support specifically for the north, the PRDP, was not considered 
as its support is largely in the form of infrastructure, and it was not decentralised (projects were 
managed from Kampala by the Office of the Prime Minister).  
385 Source: National Budget Framework Papers, annual, and MTEFs, annual. Data combination and 
graph by author.  
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in northern Uganda, as illustrated in graph 4.13 below. The average level of transfer 
to southern districts over this time period was UGX126,034,541,914 per year, while 
the average transfer to northern districts was UGX107,633,628,498 – which 
represents 85 per cent of the transfers to southern districts.  
 
4.13 Transfers from the central government to all northern districts (average) 
compared to all southern districts (average) 
 
This finding suggests that generating improved equality between northern and 
southern districts is not currently being attempted through the regular budget system, 
which is often cited as a rationale for the implementation of decentralisation.  
 
Section conclusion: Budget results as the fiscal outcomes of decentralisation  
 
The analysis presented in this section of the national budget outcomes over a 
two-decade period demonstrates the challenges to public financial management that 
must be managed if decentralisation is to be fully implemented. While the rationales 
for implementing decentralisation, particularly fiscal decentralisation, require that sub-
national governments obtain a degree of financial independence, analysis of the 
Ugandan budget indicates that this is not the case in practice. From the perspective 
of district governments, funding flows from the central government are highly variable, 
both across and within financial years. High levels of conditionality in these transfers 
is also evident in the data, and a large proportion of districts’ expenditure that is 
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proportion of sub-national budgets that is comprised of locally-raised revenue is also 
revealed, demonstrating the heavy reliance of districts and sub-counties for funding 
from the central government for their annual expenditures.  
 
When compared to the results of interviews, budget data conveys similar 
narratives: of highly-dependent districts, constrained by conditional grants, and so 
lacking the genuine ability to be responsive to local development priorities. As a result, 
the benefits of decentralisation (such as public services that are targeted to local 
development priorities) becomes a challenge for local governments to achieve. By 
including quantitative results from the national budget process and comparing these 
results to the outcomes of elite interviews, this section indicates that the viewpoints 
expressed by expert witnesses go beyond simple perceptions. Rather, these 




4.3 Contrasting and comparing results from elite interviews and budget data 
 
Interviews were conducted with elite respondents across two binaries: central 
and sub-national, and elected and administrative officials. Respondents represent 
several levels of government within the Ugandan public service and government, 
ranging from the central government to sub-counties, in Kampala and in three districts. 
Accordingly, where specific viewpoints or arguments were raised repeatedly by 
individual actors within each group, areas of agreement and disagreement can be 
identified between these groups.  
 
Areas of agreement centre on the phenomenon of district proliferation. Across 
the interviewed cohort, actors expressed consistently that they feel that Uganda has 
too many districts, leading to crowding-out of expenditure on public services compared 
to the administrative cost of districts. The high administrative costs of sub-national 
governments suggests that the continued proliferation of new districts increases the 
transaction costs of service delivery at the sub-national level. Key informants in the 
studied sub-national locations also consistently argued that the driving forces behind 
the creation of these new districts emerges from the political economy. Data obtained 
from the national budget system indicates that the issue of administrative funding 
crowding out funding for services is a genuine concern, and likely to be worsened by 
the creation of additional districts. Likewise, the low revenue-raising capacity of sub-
national governments is evident in the quantitative results.  
 
There is also widespread agreement on the under-staffing of district 
governments, with many interviewees mentioning districts in which staffing numbers 
were below fifty per cent of the full complement of staff. A number of consistent 
arguments were raised relating to the financing of sub-national governments: 
interviewees argue that the capacity of districts to raise funds through local revenue-
raising is low, and that as a result, districts are reliant on the central government for 
funding. Interview participants consistently argued that the level of conditionality of 
transfers from the centre to the districts has the effect of altering the bottom-up 
consultation system to a top-down implementation system. That is, rather than 
responding to development priorities that are identified by citizens at the village level, 
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sub-national governments are restricted to implementing priorities and activities that 
are formulated at the central level.  
 
Two main areas of disagreement can also be identified across the respective 
groups of elite interviewees. The first is whether the funding that is transferred to sub-
national governments from the centre is sufficient, in the sense of being an adequate 
level of financing to enable the delivery of high-quality public services. From the 
perspective of actors at the sub-national level in the three locations studied, the 
percentage of the budget that is transferred from the central government to district 
governments is insufficient, low, and falling. Sub-national government representatives 
argue that too little funding is received in order for high-quality public services to be 
achieved. This is particularly in light of the rapid creation of new districts, in which 
budget transfers are divided amongst an increasing number of districts. However, key 
informants at the central level argued instead that sub-national governments would be 
able to achieve a higher standard of public services if they were able to improve their 
capacity, and look for more innovative solutions to this funding shortfall. That is, district 
government officials in the three studied districts tend to blame low levels of central-
government funding for the poor standard of public services at the sub-national level. 
Conversely, central government interviewees argue that sub-national governments 
would improve their performance through higher skills and better use of available 
resources. When combined with the low levels of locally-raised revenue districts have 
been able to generate, and the continued proliferation of new districts, this point of 
disagreement between levels of government appears to be intractable.  
 
Secondly, there is disagreement between groups of interviewees regarding the 
level of consultation that takes place at the sub-national level, throughout the budget 
process. At the central government level, key informants repeatedly emphasised that 
the budget includes extensive consultation of household-level villagers, via village 
meetings conducted by the LC1 Council. The development priorities that are 
discussed in these meetings are then argued to be channelled upwards through each 
level of sub-national government, until they are communicated to the central 





However, district and sub-county interviewees in the three studied districts 
contradicted this viewpoint. In their argument, village meetings are infrequent and 
poorly-attended, with only a small percentage of village populations attending. In some 
cases, poor attendance rates are explained by the low education levels of villagers in 
rural areas, who subsequently do not feel entitled or able to attend a planning meeting. 
Furthermore, interview participants at the sub-national level argued that the priorities 
that are identified by communities themselves are rarely addressed, leading to 
frustration and disengagement amongst citizens. The disagreement over whether 
villagers participate in village planning meetings relates directly to the core goals of 
decentralisation: creating public services that are responsive to local development 
needs, and participatory, inclusive governance. While the interview responses given 
by central-level elites suggest that decentralisation is successfully delivering bottom-
up, participatory planning, the responses of sub-national actors potentially call this 




4.4 Chapter conclusion: Questioning the implementation of decentralisation  
 
Results from interviews with elite actors at different levels of government, as 
well as data collected from the national budget outcomes, allow for an analysis of the 
way in which decentralisation is being implemented in the Ugandan context. In 
particular, these results suggest that there are questions to be asked about the extent 
to which decentralisation is achieving its policy goals in Uganda. Specifically, the 
improved responsiveness of service delivery to local development needs, and the 
improved participation of communities in governance and decision-making may not be 
being achieved. Interview participants, particularly at the sub-national level, argue that 
districts are faced with conditional funding, low revenue-raising capacity and low 
staffing levels, contributing to the ongoing dominance of the central government in 
planning and budgeting. In other words, district governments may not be realising the 
fiscal and policy independence that is necessary for the goals of decentralisation to 
be achieved. The emergence of new institutional solutions to the problem of 
transferring resources to the grassroot – such as Operation Wealth Creation and 
programs aimed at local economic development – suggest that the failure of 
decentralisation to achieve sub-national service-delivery improvements is tacitly 
acknowledged. 
  
The following chapter explores the viewpoints of non-elite actors in greater 





Chapter Five:  
 
Perspectives from the grassroot:  
Demand for new districts, service delivery and access to resources 
 
 
There are many problems of people at the grassroot and no one 
helps them: poor roads, schools, no water, hospitals. No one 
addresses their concerns. Government is only helping a few people. 
- Household survey participant, Lira District 
 
The existing literature on the rationales of decentralisation describe outcomes 
that are expected to be generated at the village level, such as improved government 
consultation, participation and responsiveness. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, a substantial majority of the literature relating to decentralisation in Uganda 
focuses on the experiences of elite actors, such as district- and central-level elected 
officials. The inclusion of a household survey in this thesis sought to explore the 
experiences of citizens at the village level in Uganda, to ascertain their experiences in 
relation to these outcomes. In particular, the survey sought to examine two factors. 
Firstly, the survey investigates the extent and types of participation that takes place 
between household members and elected representatives in the six studied sites. 
Secondly, the survey examines the extent to which villagers in these sites feel that 
they are able to hold local government officials to account for high-standard service 
delivery, and in turn, how responsive local governments are to local demands.  
 
Results from the household survey are disaggregated according to the six field 
sites in which they were collected. As described in Chapter Three, the six field sites of 
the household survey (two villages in each of in three districts), were selected in order 
to represent the three major rural regions of Uganda (East, North and West). These 
regions each have different levels of development and political interconnectedness, 
arising from their differences of geography, tribal composition, economies and 
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histories. This chapter describes these differences in detail, and expands on how 
these differences might be expected to affect the outcomes and results of the 
household survey. Furthermore, the chapter reflects on the survey results per site, and 
discusses whether the results of the household survey accord with the expectations 
of how results from each site might differ from one another. Where the results of the 
household survey indicate different outcomes from one location to another, reference 
is made to the differences in the political economies of different regions in Uganda, 
and how these differences may be reflected in the results of the survey.  
 
As described in Chapter Three, the six studied sites were as follows:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Name of 
village 
Kachocha Ogulia Chanpeciki Akwachkoli Mushasha Katooma 
Parish Petete Opwatete Akano Abongorwot Katojo Kiyaga 
Sub-
county 
Petete Opwatete Ogur Amach-
Agila 
Ruhaama Nyabihoko 
District Pallisa Pallisa Lira Lira Ntungamo Ntungamo 
Region East East North North West West 
 
 
The survey results revealed several key lines of argument that illustrate the 
perspective of those who live at the grassroot. Arguments that were raised consistently 
by respondents include: the poor quality of public services in their villages; the lack of 
adequate responses to complaints made about those same services; and the 
tendency of election candidates to promise to bring key services to the village, but 
without in fact generating positive change.  
 
Results suggest that basic public services may not be being adequately 
provided in the studied villages. For example, in response to the question What do you 
think are the most important development priorities for this village?, respondents 
nominated basic services, such as healthcare, education, water services, agricultural 
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extension services, and roads. These results are summarised in images 5.1 to 5.3 
below.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Roads 7 9 7 6 3 2 
Schools 10 11 6 11 3 2 
Healthcare 9 10 10 10 7 5 
Agriculture 5 4 9 7 9 8 
Livestock 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Water 3 6 4 5 0 1 
Electricity 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Governance 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Credit/Savings 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Income 
generation 
0 1 2 2 0 4 
IDK386 1 0 1 0 1 0 
5.1 Development priorities for the district, as nominated by villagers in each 
studied site 
 
5.2 Development priorities for the district, as nominated by villagers in each 
studied site 
 
386 ‘IDK’ denotes ‘I don’t know’. For each question in the household survey, participants were given 
the option to answer ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t want to answer’, if that was their preference. For some 



























































Development priorities for district - responses per priority





5.3 Development priorities per studied site   
 
In response to this question (What do you think are the most important 
development priorities for this village?), respondents in Pallisa and Lira Districts 
reported that their greatest development priorities for their districts related to public 
services and amenities, in particular roads, water supply, schools and healthcare, with 
at least half of the respondents in each district nominating these as priorities. In 
contrast, respondents in the two villages in Ntungamo District were less likely to 
nominate these as priorities. For respondents in Ntungamo, the development of 
agriculture is the most important development priority for their district, with half of the 
respondents in each village in Ntungamo nominating this as a priority. Income-
generating activities were also nominated as a priority by respondents in Village 6 in 
Ntungamo District, where there was visible evidence of commercially-oriented crops 
being grown (such as coffee), suggesting that some residents of this village have been 
able to move beyond subsistence agriculture and into more commercially-oriented 
farming. These findings accord with the comparative levels of development in these 
locations, with Ntungamo located within Uganda’s better-developed and more-
prosperous western region, while Pallisa and Lira are located in the less-developed 
eastern and northern regions. These differences and their possible effects on survey 



















Development priorities for district - responses per village
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Questions asked in the household survey were a mix of open-ended and 
closed-ended questions.387 The survey questions used in conducting the household 
survey is presented at Appendix B, and the complete disaggregated results of the 
survey is at Attachment D. This Chapter Five presents a summary of the results of the 
household survey, arranged according to key topics that were discussed. Section 5.1 
contextualises the survey, and analyses the developmental differences between the 
studied sites, analysing how these differences might be expected to influence 
participants’ responses. Section 5.2 presents results relating to questions of village-
level consultation, participation and government responsiveness. Section 5.3 presents 
results from survey questions relating to village-level perceptions of the quality of 
service delivery in their local area. Section 5.4 presents survey responses relating to 
participants’ strategies to gain access to services, where state-provided systems have 
not generated adequate provision. In Section 5.5, results are presented to questions 
relating to ethnic and tribal identities, and the perceived implications of these for 
accessing services and employment opportunities. A summary of opinions relating to 
the creation of additional sub-county units, viewed from the perspectives of villagers 
who participated in the survey, is discussed at section 5.7, while Section 5.8 compares 
the survey responses of participants in different studied sites, and analyses to what 
extent these differences might be explained by regional differences amongst the 




387 The household survey was conducted in April 2016, in the period immediately following the 
Presidential, parliamentary and sub-national council elections of that year. At the time of the survey, 
the successful candidates had not yet been sworn in to commence their new term of office, so 
comments made by survey respondents are to be taken to refer to elected officials of the previous 
parliamentary term (2011-16). 
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5.1 Contextualising the study: Uganda’s regions and the six studied sites  
 
This section will describe some of the differences between the regions of 
Uganda, including arguments put forward in the existing literature, and will describe 
how these differences might be expect to affect the outcomes of the household survey. 
The regions of Uganda each face a unique set of development opportunities and 
challenges. These are generated by both endogenous factors such as geographical 
factors, and exogenous factors such as differences in the extent of government 
intervention and contact in different regions. In terms of climate, the Northern region 
of Uganda has a more arid climate than other regions of Uganda, generating different 
agricultural outcomes from other regions. The North has also been subjected to 
different labour practices from the rest of the country, and has received different 
treatment by governments, both during the colonial era and since independence.388 
The North receives a smaller share of public expenditure relative to other regions, and 
has a greater level of support and engagement from NGOs and other international 
actors.389 Analysis by Boone390 tells us that national rulers will adopt different political 
strategies for different regions, depending on their goals for that region – so even 
within one country, we see different political strategies in place in different locations: 
multiple ‘political topographies’, in Boone’s terminology, can be observed. When 
combined with climactic and geographic factors, these political-strategy differences 
may generate profoundly different outcomes at the district level. However, at the level 
of the village (the level at which the household survey was conducted), differences 
may be more subtle, with the majority of populations engaged in similar livelihoods 
and facing similar challenges regarding service delivery and local governance. This 
section sets out these differences of context for the research, and analyses the extent 
to which these differences might be expected to affect the results of the household 




388 Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s 
Uganda’. 
389 Appleton, ‘Regional or National Poverty Lines? The Case of Uganda in the 1990s’. 
390 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. 
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Western Uganda  
 
Western Uganda’s hilly terrain, cool climate, regular rainfall patterns and fertile 
soil have made it a region that is well-suited to agricultural production. The production 
of commercial agricultural products such as coffee is concentrated in Western 
Uganda, and this region has also attracted a greater number of tourists than other 
regions. Western Ugandan households are more likely to be involved in commercial 
as well as subsistence farming, and so are less likely to live in poverty than households 
in other Ugandan regions. Indeed, poverty rates in Western Uganda are markedly 
lower than those in Eastern, and especially Northern, Uganda. Analysis conducted by 
Appleton391 highlights the differences in household consumption levels of households 
in different regions, with households in Western Uganda consuming 25 per cent more 
on average than households in Northern Uganda throughout the 1990s. Then, in 2012, 
Ssewanyana and Kasirye392 found that household consumption in Western Uganda 
was twice as high as in Northern Uganda. This increase from a 25 per cent household-
consumption gap in the 1990s to a 50 per cent gap in 2012 suggests that consumption 
inequality between the North and the West is worsening over time, rather than 
improving.  
 
Further analysis from Appleton393 also suggests that between 1992 and 2000, 
regions in which household income was higher in 1992 show higher growth rates over 
time, suggesting that inequality in household incomes is also increasing rather than 
decreasing. Appleton finds that households in Western Uganda had a 4.5 per cent 
increase in income levels over this time period, compared to 0.5 per cent (near 
stagnation) in Northern Uganda. Likewise, Deininger and Okidi find that the poverty 
reduction rate for Northern Uganda was zero per cent between 1992 and 2000, 
compared to -22.8 per cent in Western Uganda and -20.9 per cent for Eastern Uganda. 
As well as reflecting the different economic and agricultural conditions facing 
households in Northern Uganda, these statistics also reflect the impact of civil conflict 
in the North, as will be discussed below.  
 
391 Appleton, ‘Regional or National Poverty Lines? The Case of Uganda in the 1990s’. 
392 Ssewanyana and Kasirye, ‘Poverty and Inequality Dynamics in Uganda: Insights from the Uganda 
National Panel Surveys 2005/6 and 2009/10’. 




In addition to the economic factors described in the preceding paragraph, the 
extent of interaction between national leaders and local elites in Western Uganda has 
unique attributes relative to the other Ugandan regions. In Western Uganda, from 
which many senior leaders of the NRM (including Museveni) originate, there is a 
degree of connectedness between national elites and local elites. This relationship 
includes both kinship networks and close-family ties between the communities of 
Western Uganda and national-level leaders. As a result of these patronage-type 
connections,394 elites in the Western region have been accommodated by national 
leaders in accumulating political and economic power. Green argues that “… the 
formerly broad base of the NRM government has given way to an increasingly obvious 
bias towards Western Ugandans, evident militarily, politically and economically.”395 
This bias is reflected in the greater number of people from Western Uganda who are 
members of the political and economic elite in Kampala, such as senior members of 
the Cabinet and of the Army. Analysis by Lindemann396 suggests that between 1986 
and 2008, 40.3 per cent of Cabinet members originated from Western Uganda, 
compared to 15.4 per cent from Eastern Uganda, and 10.5 per cent from Northern 
Uganda. Lindemann concludes397 that Western ethnic groups have benefited from the 
distribution of state power to a greater extent than ethnicities from other regions since 
1995.  
 
The different levels of economic and political power of those who originate from 
Western Uganda is also reflected in patterns of new-district creation in this region. 
Unlike other regions, where there have been a large number of small districts created 
under NRM rule, some districts in Western Uganda remain undivided. The district of 
study in the western region, Ntungamo District, is an example of this phenomenon. 
Conversely, districts in Central and Eastern Uganda in particular have been regularly 
divided into increasingly small districts. Green398 draws a connection between the 
creation of new districts in Central Uganda with the political dominance of Westerners: 
 
394 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
395 Green, ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central Uganda’. Page 381. 
396 Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s 
Uganda’. Page 396.  
397 Lindemann. Page 395. 
398 Green, ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central Uganda’. 
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Central Uganda has seen a large number of new districts created, in order to reduce 
the power of Central (Buganda) leaders, or even in an attempt to bring these districts 
under the control of Western elites.  
 
The ‘political topography’ model developed by Boone399 also suggests that 
districts in Western Uganda are unlikely to be divided into smaller districts, though for 
a different reason from that suggested by Green. Using Boone’s model, it is possible 
to argue that in a context like Western Uganda, in which local elites depend on the 
centre for their power, the state is likely to seek to undertake ‘power sharing’ with local 
elites. The maintenance of large districts in Western Uganda reflects the devolution of 
power to local elites, who then remain dependent on the central government for their 
power and wealth. The interconnections between these two groups underline the 




Economic development in Eastern Uganda has included the establishment of 
commercial farming, particularly of sugar and cotton, and average household 
consumption levels for the region fall below the levels seen in Western Uganda and 
above those of the North. However, authors such as Fan and Zhang400 note that the 
concentration of economic activity in Jinja Town distorts economic statistics relating to 
Eastern Uganda, and maintain that the rural poverty rate is as high as it is in Northern 
Uganda.  
 
In Eastern Uganda, Boone’s analysis suggests a model for the political 
strategies that have been implemented by national rulers in relation to this region. In 
comparison to the situation in Western Uganda, local elites in the East have not been 
able to become politically or economically powerful. This is illustrated by the low 
representation of the Eastern Region in high-status political and military positions in 
 
399 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. 
400 Fan and Zhang, ‘Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Rural Uganda’. 
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Kampala, such as holding fewer than 10 per cent of senior ministerial positions 
between 1986 and 2008.401 
 
This political strategy is also reflected in the rapid creation of additional districts 
in the Eastern Region. Compared to Northern Uganda, there is a relatively high level 
of for-market economic activity in Eastern Uganda, such as the growing and selling of 
sugar. These economic activities could potentially create a cadre of local leaders who 
can become sufficiently powerful to rival source of power to those in the capital.402 
There is a high concentration of districts in Eastern Uganda, compared to other areas 
within Uganda. By creating additional districts in this region, resulting in the creation 
of a large number of small districts, the economic and political power of the leaders of 
Eastern districts is reduced.  
 
Northern Uganda  
 
While Northern Uganda was amongst the wealthiest regions of Uganda in the 
1950s, with wealth derived from cattle rearing, a range of political, economic and 
conflict-based changes since this time have made the North the poorest region in 
Uganda in the early 21st century.403 Due to the different climate and agricultural 
conditions in Northern Uganda, this area has traditionally been one in which settled 
agriculture has been pursued less than in other parts of the country. Instead, residents 
undertake cattle-rearing, a practice that has been undermined by periods of cattle-
raiding from groups in North-Western Uganda.404 Particularly since the end of the Amin 
regime at the end of the 1970s, the raiding parties have been heavily armed with 
weapons abandoned by retreating soldiers loyal to Amin.405 As a result, economic 
activity in the northern region has been constrained.  
 
 
401 Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s 
Uganda’. 
402 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. 
403 Oleke, Blystad, and Rekdal, ‘“‘When the Obvious Brother Is Not There’”:Political and Cultural 
Contexts of the Orphan Challenge in Northern Uganda’. 
404 Okidi and Mugambe, ‘An Overview of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in Uganda’. 
405 Oleke, Blystad, and Rekdal, ‘“‘When the Obvious Brother Is Not There’”: Political and Cultural 
Contexts of the Orphan Challenge in Northern Uganda’. 
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Furthermore, Northern Uganda experienced severe civil conflict from 1987 until 
2006, due to conflict between the UPDF and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
Districts and towns such as Gulu, Pader and Kitgum were especially badly affected by 
the conflict, with substantial numbers of residents fleeing to neighbouring areas.406 
The brutality with which civilians were treated during the conflict resulted in an 
estimated 1.3 million people becoming internally displaced during the conflict, many 
of whom were temporarily housed in IDP camps across Northern Uganda.407 As well 
as the impacts on the residents themselves, the conflict resulted in severe constraints 
to security, service delivery, economic activity and livelihoods development, the effects 
of which continue to be experienced today.408 
 
The combined effects of civil conflict, cattle raids and a climate that does not 
reliably support large-scale commercial farming has meant that this region has the 
highest rates of poverty and lowest rates of economic growth within Uganda. The 
poverty rates of households in Northern Uganda have been found by a number of 
authors to be the highest in the country; for example, Fan and Zhang409 found in 2008 
that 67 per cent of the rural population of the North lives below the poverty line. 
Appleton et al.410 note that even amongst households across Uganda that the authors 
have classified as ‘poor’ based on household income levels, those in the North have 
the lowest levels of household income. Furthermore, Okidi and Mugambe411 argue 
that economic statistics for Northern Uganda are made to look more favourable by the 
relatively high levels of economic activity in towns such as Gulu; poverty levels in rural 
Northern Uganda are worse than these figures suggest.  
 
In Northern Uganda, Boone’s analysis points to a third political strategy 
compared to those in use in Eastern and Western Uganda. The engagement of the 
most senior levels of the Ugandan government with this region has been minimal: 
while many members of the armed forces corps are drawn from Northern Uganda,412 
 
406 Oleke, Blystad, and Rekdal. 
407 Okidi and Mugambe, ‘An Overview of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in Uganda’. 
408 Higgins, ‘Regional Inequality and Primary Education in Northern Uganda’. 
409 Fan and Zhang, ‘Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Rural Uganda’. 
410 Simon Appleton et al., Changes in Poverty in Uganda, 1992-1997 (Oxford, UK: Centre for the 
Study of African Economies, 1999). 
411 Okidi and Mugambe, ‘An Overview of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in Uganda’. 
412 Okidi and Mugambe. 
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comparatively few leaders are from this region. The Northern region is also under-
represented in Cabinet and in other senior governance institutions.413 Uganda’s recent 
history of high rates of economic growth have delivered lower, or even zero, reductions 
in poverty rates in Northern Uganda compared to Western and Eastern Uganda,414 
meaning that residents of the North have derived less economic benefit from NRM’s 
rule than other regions of Uganda.415 Public-finance expenditures are also lower in the 
North than in other regions, with recurrent transfers to the North lower than those to 
all other regions.416 Referring to Boone’s analysis, the national government’s approach 
in the North has been one of non-incorporation. Local leaders in the North have been 
essentially left to obtain local power, with national leaders remaining secure in the 
knowledge that Northerners’ lower political and economic circumstances are unlikely 
to enable Northern leaders to become sufficiently locally powerful to become rivals of 
the state.  
 
Regional differences: Expected implications for household survey  
 
This section has raised some of the economic, political and power disparities 
between the three regions of Uganda. Residents of Western Uganda hold greater 
wealth, economic activity and political power than other regions, while residents of the 
North hold the least of these. The North also continues to be affected by the long-term 
consequences of civil conflict, and with different climate conditions from other regions 
of Uganda. These differences amongst Uganda’s regions may be expected to be 
reflected in the results of the household survey that was conducted for this thesis; 
districts were chosen from each of Uganda’s regions in anticipation of these 
differences. The responses of survey participants in Lira District, in Northern Uganda, 
may be expected to reflect higher levels of poverty, lower levels of engagement with 
the central government, and lower levels of satisfaction with service delivery. For 
participants in Ntungamo District, in Western Uganda, survey results may be expected 
to show a greater level of political engagement or familiarity with national-level 
governance, greater levels of economic activity and interests in commercial farming, 
 
413 Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s 
Uganda’. 
414 Deininger and Okidi, ‘Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda, 1999-2000’. 
415 Okidi and Mugambe, ‘An Overview of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in Uganda’. 
416 Appleton et al., Changes in Poverty in Uganda, 1992-1997. 
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and higher levels of satisfaction with governance and service delivery. Residents of 
Pallisa District, in Eastern Uganda, may generate results that are more mixed, as this 
region experiences some economic activity, receives a moderate level of expenditure 
on service delivery, and has some engagement with national-level political power, but 
this may not be widely distributed.  
 
As a result of these different levels of satisfaction with governance and service 
delivery, responses to questions regarding the desirability of a new district may also 
be expected to vary. Respondents in Western Uganda may be expected to 
demonstrate lower levels of support for the creation of a new district in this region, as 
existing levels of expenditure on service delivery and engagement with governance 
may be high. For respondents in Northern Uganda, the reverse may be expected to 
be reflected in survey results: frustration and disappointment with governance and 
service delivery may result in higher demand for more, smaller, districts. Respondents 
in Eastern Uganda may express a preference for more districts to be created, in 
particular due to the greater cultural and linguistic diversity in this region, as well as 
lower levels of service delivery and inclusive governance.  
 
This chapter presents the results of the household survey that was undertaken 
for this thesis, disaggregated to the level of the village. Core questions are presented 
in this chapter, with the complete results of the survey provided in Appendix D. Both 
the numerical responses and the free-answer responses of participants are provided, 
as well as graphical summaries of responses. The chapter conclusion discusses 
whether the participants’ responses to the household survey did in fact accord with 
the expected results that are described in this introductory section. 
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5.2 Village level consultation, participation and responsiveness: Gaps identified  
 
Questions in the household survey ask whether elected representatives are 
familiar to the community, whether community members participate in village planning 
meetings, and whether community members feel that the government has responded 
adequately to their expressed priorities. The responses described in this section 
highlight the disparities between the priorities that are identified at the village level, 
and the pre-allocated funding that is received through the top-down budget process.417 
Results are presented in detail below.  
 
Participation: Rates of attendance at village meetings is low  
 
The first theme that was addressed in the survey was the extent to which 
villagers in the studied communities feel that they are able to, or do, participate in the 
processes of deciding on key priorities for their village. An important mechanism in the 
planning and budgeting process is the village meeting, in which the opinions of 
villagers relating to their perceptions of the development needs of the village are 
sought. However, in the six studied communities, villagers reported that they did not 
always attend village planning meetings. When asked Do you attend village meetings 
to decide on the development priorities for the village for the next year?, 65/108 
respondents (60 per cent) answered Yes, and 39/108 (36 per cent) answered No. Of 
respondents who answered No to this question, 17/39 (44 per cent of those who 
responded No) added that they did not participate because they were not invited to 
the meeting, and a further 13/39 (33 per cent of those who responded No) added that 
they did not participate because they did not believe that such meetings were held in 
their village.  
 
V1, HH5418 No, because "we are not informed." 
V2, HH8 No, because “no opportunity to be invited.” 
V4, HH6 Yes, every time, because "the whole village participates." 
 
 
417 The contrast between the top-down financing system and bottom-up planning system is illustrated 
in figure 1.2, on page 45. 




This result suggests that village planning meetings, that are theoretically held 
regularly and are open to the whole community, may not be occurring or may not be 
fully inclusive within the studied communities. images 5.4 and 5.5 below summarises 
these results.  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, every 
time 
4 1 10 5 10 6 
Yes, 
sometimes 
2 5 4 5 6 7 
No, Not 
invited  
6 4 0 3 1 3 
No, no 
meeting held 
3 3 2 4 0 1 
No, [nothing 
added] 
2 1 2 1 0 0 
No, Too busy 1 0 0 0 0 0 
No, Too old 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No, Not paid 0 1 0 0 0 0 
IDK 0 3 0 0 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 6 6 14 10 16 13 
No 12 9 4 8 1 5 
Other 
response 
0 3 0 0 1 0 
5.4 Summary of responses to question, ‘Do you attend village meetings to decide on 





 5.5 Responses per field site regarding attendance at village meetings  
 
Responses to this question varied slightly across the studied field sites. 
Respondents in Pallisa district suggested that they are not likely to attend the village 
meeting, with 21/36 respondents answering that they do not attend. Respondents in 
Village 1 were especially unlikely to attend, with 12/18 respondents answering ‘No’ to 
this question. Of these respondents in Village 1, some reported that their 
understanding was that the meetings were not held at all. For other respondents, their 
non-attendance is because they are not invited to the meeting, suggesting that rather 
than being an open and village-wide meeting, village meetings are instead only open 
to selected individuals. This suggests that the resolutions and priorities that are 
determined within these meetings may not be fully representative of the entire 
community.  
 
Respondents in Lira District and Ntungamo were more likely to report that they 
attend the village meeting, particularly in Village 5. The reasons for this variation 
between the two studied villages in Pallisa and the four studied villages in Lira and 
Ntungamo is difficult to discern from these answers alone, though responses to other 
questions in the survey (such as that asking whether a respondent had ever met their 
local LC5 Chair) suggest a lower level of engagement between elected leaders and 






















Do you attend village meetings to discuss 




Consultation: Questioning villager engagement in choosing village priorities 
 
The second area that was studied in the survey relates to consultation: the 
extent to which villagers in the studied communities feel that they were asked for their 
opinions during the priority-development process, for the village’s development. 
Firstly, villagers in the six studied communities responded that they thought that the 
development priorities of their village were determined by the district government 
(67/108 respondents, or 67 per cent), or by the national government (54/108 
respondents, or 50 per cent). A further 28 (26 per cent) of 108 respondents felt that 
the village council determines the development priorities of their village. Only 10/108 
(9 per cent) of respondents described the villagers themselves as having a role in the 
priority-determination process, responding ‘the people and government decide 
together’ on village priorities. Responses to this question suggest that a majority of 
respondents conclude that the development priorities of their village are chosen by 
officials higher-placed than the village level, rather than by villagers themselves. 
Responses are summarised in images 5.6 and 5.7 below. 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
The people 
decide 
1 4 7 9 10 5 
District 13 12 15 10 9 8 
National 
government   
7 9 9 13 7 9 
People and 
government   
1 4 0 3 2 0 
Another 2 4 2 3 4 0 
None of these 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Village 
council  
3 2 9 6 7 1 
I don’t know  2 3 0 0 0 0 
 5.6 Responses to question ‘How are the development priorities chosen for this 





5.7 Responses to question ‘How are the development priorities chosen for this 
district?’, per field site 
Responses to this question suggest a mixed set of impressions and opinions 
on who is responsible for identifying development priorities for the district. In Village 1 
and 2, in Pallisa, most respondents were of the view that either the district or the 
national government determines the district’s development priorities. Respondents in 
Lira District were also of the view that the people themselves are able to contribute to 
identifying the development priorities of the district. However, residents of Lira District 
were also likely to nominate the national government as the source of district 
development priorities. This is perhaps a reflection of the leadership by the national 
government of post-war reconstruction efforts in northern Uganda. Programs such as 
the PRDP are driven by the national government, rather than being fully decentralised 
to district-level governments, and this perhaps influences the opinion of villagers that 
this is the source of the development priorities of the district.  
 
In Village 5, in Ntungamo District, respondents suggested a stronger role for 
the village council, with 7/18 respondents nominating this level as having a role in 
determining local development priorities; 10/18 also suggested that the community 
itself plays a role. On the other hand, respondents in Village 6 (also in Ntungamo 
District) echoed the perspectives of respondents in Pallisa, in suggesting that the 
district and national governments have the most important roles in determining district 
















Who decides on development priorities - responses per 
village
The people decide The district gov decides
The national gov decides The village council decides
The people and govt decide together Another
None of these I don’t know 
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Village 5 may play an important and active role in development planning, that is not 
the case in Village 6, where the organisation level and skill of the village council may 
be lower.  
 
Relatively few respondents (10/108) nominated cooperation between the 
community and government as being the source of development priorities for the 
district, even though this scenario is the closest reflection of the purported officially-
sanctioned prioritisation process. While the official bottom-up planning process 
suggests that communities and councils together determine development priorities, 
particularly at the village level, this is not reflected in the answers given by survey 
respondents across the studied sites.  
 
Consultation: Questions regarding villager engagement in village meetings 
 
Secondly regarding consultation, villagers noted that where village 
development meetings do take place, the discussions at the meetings tend to centre 
on smaller and village-specific issues, rather than larger concepts like the village’s 
development needs. Comments from respondents in response to the question What 
issues are discussed at village meetings? included "Conflict between neighbours 
especially concerning witchcraft. Land conflicts",419 and "How to develop through 
agriculture, how to fight against poverty through hard work, through cultivation and 
livestock rearing".420 These results suggest that topics discussed at village meetings 
relate to small, locally-resolvable issues, rather than longer-term development 
planning. Another respondent answered, “Family income improvement. Government 
programs [that are] currently available”,421 suggesting that the meetings are an 
opportunity for the LC1 to inform villagers about the services that are available to them, 
rather than requesting their input on services they would prefer to have delivered to 




419 Response to household survey question 27. Household 8, village 3 (Lira District).  
420 Response to household survey question 27. Household 10, village 6 (Ntungamo District). 
421 Response to household survey question 27. Household 10, village 1 (Pallisa District). 
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 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Development 
issues 
3 4 6 2 6 3 
Education 3 1 4 0 0 0 
Healthcare 2 3 3 2 4 4 
Security 3 1 1 0 1 7 
Agriculture 1 2 4 3 8 6 
Income 
generation 
1 0 0 2 4 5 
Food security 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Conflict 
resolution 
0 2 5 3 1 2 
Water 0 2 5 5 5 2 
Roads 0 1 2 2 3 0 
Other 
response 
11 8 1 8 2 3 
5.8 Responses to question, ‘What issues are discussed at village meetings?’, per 
studied site  
 
In Ntungamo, the most commonly-discussed topics relate to income generation 
and agriculture. This is reflective of the higher importance of income-generating 
agriculture in this location, with commercial farming being undertaken at the studied 
sites (rather than only subsistence agriculture). This is in accordance with western 
Uganda’s higher level of agricultural and economic development. This result is also 
reflective of respondents’ answer to question 21 (What do you think are the most 
important development priorities for this district?), in which respondents were asked 
for their opinion on the most important development priorities for the village: 
respondents in these two sites also answered that agriculture and income generation 
were their principal priorities. Taken together, these two results suggest that the 
development priorities that are articulated by the villagers in these sites are also 




Respondents in Pallisa were more likely to suggest that the main topics 
discussed in village meetings are more general, relating to development overall, and 
education provision. When compared to the results of question 21, in which 
respondents nominated roads, healthcare, and agriculture as the development 
priorities of the district (in addition to education), this response suggests that the village 
planning meetings are not felt to be addressing the community’s own development 
priorities. In Lira District, the greater emphasis on conflict resolution points to the 
recent conflict history of northern Uganda, and also suggests that efforts to reduce 
local conflict have been decentralised to the village level.  
 
Consultation: Questioning villager engagement in budget preparations 
 
Finally, relating to the issue of consultation, villagers in the studied community 
reported that, in particular, they did not feel consulted in the preparation of the national 
annual budget. In answering the question Do you feel that you are involved in the 
budget process?, 10/108 respondents (11 per cent) answered Yes, while 80/108 (74 
per cent) responded No. Those who gave the answer No went on to add that the 
reason they gave this answer was that they were “Not consulted” 43/80 (54 per cent 
of respondents who answered No), or that their only engagement with the budget was 
that it was read aloud over the radio (16/80, or 20 per cent of respondents who 
answered No). The results are summarised in images 5.9 and 5.10 below. 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Leaders 
listen 
1 0 1 1 2 2 
Yes - I pay 
taxes 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
Yes - Budget is 
read out 
0 0 2 0 0 0 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
TSE 0 1 2 1 1 0 
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 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
No - No meeting 
occurs 
5 4 0 0 0 0 
No - Not 
asked/consulted 
10 7 9 3 8 4 
No - Budget is 
read only 
0 0 3 11 1 1 
No - [nothing 
added] 
0 1 0 0 4 7 
IDK 2 4 0 2 1 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 1 1 4 1 3 2 
To some extent 0 1 2 1 1 0 
No 15 12 12 14 13 12 
I don’t know 2 4 0 2 1 4 
5.9 Responses per studied village in response to the question,  




5.10 Responses per studied village in response to the question,  





















Do you feel involved in the budget-creation 
process? - responses per village 
Yes TSE No IDK
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The responses to these questions raise the question of what are the theoretical 
and actual benefits that accrue to household members, from the introduction of 
participatory, ‘bottom-up’ planning. Under the rationales of decentralisation, 
participatory budgeting and planning theoretically contribute to democratisation, by 
encouraging villagers to demand high governance standards from their leaders, and 
by feeling included in decision-making processes.422 The experiences of respondents 
to the household survey suggest that this is not the case for the studied communities. 
Across each of the studied field sites, respondents report that they do not feel that 
they are involved in the process of formulating the national budget, even though this 
is one of the stated goals of the bottom-up planning process. Respondents report that 
only some individuals participate, that village meetings focus on locally-solvable 
issues rather than longer-term plans, and that overall, few feel involved in the budget 
process. The argument for deepening democracy via decentralisation, in the studied 
communities, does not appear strong.  
 
Complaint-making: Mobilising a government response to service delivery flaws  
 
A third rationale that underpins the introduction of decentralisation into a society 
is that by bringing the location of government representatives nearer to the population, 
service end-users will be more easily able to complain to government in the case of 
poor-quality services. That is, there can be better information provided to government 
agents by citizens regarding service-delivery standards, compared to that provided to 
a national government by citizens. Questions in the survey relating to responsiveness 
build on the concept of ‘voice’ as described by Hirschman,423 in the sense of making 
a complaint with the goal of gaining improvement to a service. Accordingly, the 
household survey included questions relating to complaint-making behaviour by 
citizens in the six studied communities. When asked, Have you ever made a complaint 
about a service that was not provided, or was of poor quality?, 32/108 (30 per cent) 
answered Yes, while 73/108 respondents (68 per cent) answered No.424 Respondents 
who answered No to this question added comments such as:  
 
422 Ahikire, ‘Localised or Localising Democracy’. 
423 Hischman, ‘Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual 
History’. 




V3, HH1 No, never. “People are taken like they are at fault so most times they 
keep quiet.” 
V3, HH4 No, never. “It is useless, no one listens.” 
V4, HH13 No, never. "Fear raising their complaint because you can be taken as 
someone who is against government services." 
V5, HH2 Yes, more than once, "but the complaint never helped." 
 
These responses suggest that villagers may fear reprisals from complaint-
making, or perceive that the responsiveness of government to complaints may not 
warrant the effort or transaction cost required to make the complaint. The responses 





 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 2 3 0 0 2 0 
Yes, more 3 10 4 2 3 3 
No, never 13 5 14 16 11 14 
No response  0 0 0 0 2 1 
5.11 Responses per field site regarding complaint-making behaviour 
 
 
5.12 Responses per field site regarding complaint-making behaviour  
 
A majority of respondents in Villages 1 and 3-6 suggested that they have not 
undertaken a formal complaint about service delivery quality or absences. Only in 
Village 2, in Pallisa, did a small majority of respondents (10/18) answer that they have 
done so on more than one occasion.  
 
Responsiveness: The extent of government response to villagers’ complaints  
 
A fourth topic that was explored in the household survey is the extent to which 
villagers feel that government is responsive to their development priorities, or to their 
complaints about the quality of local service delivery. Questions in the household 
survey sought to investigate the extent to which citizens in the studied sites felt that 





















Made a complaint about a poor service -




services. Following the question Have you ever made a complaint about a service that 
was not provided, or was of poor quality?, villagers were then asked, If yes, what was 
the result of your complaint? In answer to this second question, of the 37 respondents 
who had reported a complaint, only one respondent answered that they thought their 
complaint had been fully resolved. Seven of these 37 respondents (19 per cent) 
answered that they thought their complaint had been partly resolved, while 29/37 (78 
per cent) responded that their complaint had not been resolved.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Resolved 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Partly 
resolved 
2 3 0 1 1 0 
Not resolved 6 12 4 1 3 3 
n/a 9 1 14 16 13 15 
IDK 1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
The majority of respondents in Village 2 who had complained about a service 
reported that their complaint was not addressed. Only one respondent across all 
villages (1/108), in Village 5 (Ntungamo), reported that they felt their complaint had 
been fully addressed. 
 
Villagers’ comments further explained:  
 
V2, HH1 “Nothing has been done about it.” 
V2, HH7 “They promised to forward our complaints but no change happened 
afterwards.” 
V5, HH13 "Nothing changed, the leaders never did anything to address the 
problem." 
V2, HH11 "Was told to be patient and wait." 
V3, HH12 "No result. Things remained the same." 




Overall, participants indicated that in the majority of cases, the responsiveness 
of government agencies and individuals to citizens’ complaints had not generated 
improvements to public services in the studied sites, despite this being one of the 
goals of implementing decentralisation in Uganda.  
 
Responsiveness: Government response to village development priorities  
 
Secondly, regarding the responsiveness of government to the expressed 
development priorities of the community, survey participants were asked Overall, in 
your opinion, does the government address the development priorities from this 
village? 20/108 (19 per cent) of respondents answered Yes, 30/108 (28 per cent) 
answered To some extent and 43/108 (40 per cent) answered No.425 Of the 20 
respondents who answered Yes to this question, the explanatory comment offered by 
17 of that 20 (85 per cent) was that “Services exist”. For the 30 respondents who 
answered To some extent, the explanatory comment offered by 18 (60 per cent) was 
“Some services exist”. However, of the 43 respondents who answered No, 26 (61 per 
cent) added the explanatory comment “Services are poor”, and 15 (35 per cent) 
explained “Concerns are unaddressed”. Images 5.13 and 5.14 below present the 
results of this question.426  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, Services exist 0 0 2 4 7 4 
Yes, Nothing added 0 0 0 0 2 1 
TSE, Some 
services exist 
2 3 5 3 2 3 
TSE, 
Inefficiencies/delays 
2 5 0 0 1 0 
TSE, Nothing 
added 
1 0 0 0 2 1 
No, Services are 
poor 
8 8 5 3 1 1 
 
425 A further 6/108 responded I Don’t Know, and 9/108 gave nil response to this question.  
426 The response TSE denotes ‘To some extent’. 
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 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
No, Concerns 
unaddressed 
0 0 3 5 2 5 
No, Nothing added 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Other response 4 2 3 3 1 3 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 0 0 2 4 9 5 
TSE 5 8 5 3 5 4 
No 9 8 8 8 3 6 
Other response 4 2 3 3 1 3 
5.13 Responses per village on the extent of government responsiveness to 
village development priorities 
 
 
5.14 Responses per village on the extent of government responsiveness to 
village development priorities  
 
The open-ended comments offered by respondents in answer to this question 
















Does the government address development priorities in 
this village? Breakdown of responses per opinion
Yes, Services exist Yes, Nothing added TSE, Some services exist
TSE, Inefficiencies/delays TSE, Nothing added No, Services are poor




the respondents who answered Yes to this question – they feel that government had 
addressed the development priorities of the village – then explained in the free-
comments that they felt this way because their household had received goods from 
the government. For example, responses included:  
 
V5, HH16 Yes, because "They [the respondents] were given NAADS, cows, 
goats, hens, beans and pigs, and sometimes money, hoes and 
pangas" 
V4, HH14 Yes, because "When people go for meetings at the subcounty, they 
come back with seeds for plants" 
 
Conversely, respondents who did not feel that government was adequately 
addressing the development priorities of the village (and had answered No to this 
question) explained:  
 
V5, HH1 No, because “They have never solved our problems like extending 
electricity to our village" 
V4, HH1 No, because "I am yet to see development priorities being fulfilled 
here" 
V4, HH6 No, because "it’s over 7 years that we share our development 
priorities but nothing beneficial is being seen." 
V5, HH18 No, because "the needs are still unmet, government promises but 
never gives" 
V5, HH2 No, because “Poor roads, there are no drugs in the health centre and 
no medical personnels [sic], few teachers in schools and yet pupils 
are so many” 
V3, HH5 No, because "Government does not address issues concerning 
education, agriculture" 
 
Responses to this question suggest that respondents in the different studied 
sites had different levels of satisfaction with the service delivery and responsiveness 
offered by the government. (For the purposes of this question, ‘government’ was not 
defined according to a specific level; the respondent instead answered the question 
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with their impression of the entire government structure.) In Pallisa, around half of the 
respondents did not think that government was addressing the development needs of 
the village. In Village 2, some respondents answered that they did feel that 
government partly addressed the development needs of the village, but only partially, 
or with inefficiencies or delays. In Lira, nearly half of the respondents in each village 
thought that government was addressing the development needs of the village, with 
other responses balanced between approval of government (answering ‘Yes’), partial 
satisfaction (answering ‘To some extent’, with some services in existence) or 
uncertainty (answering ‘I don’t know’).  
 
In Ntungamo, responses were different between the two studied sites. In Village 
5, where previous responses suggest that the village council is more active in local 
development planning and consultation, 14/18 respondents answered that they felt 
government was at least partially addressing local development needs (answering 
‘Yes’ or ‘To some extent’). However, in Village 6, responses were divided between full 
approval, partial approval, disapproval, and uncertainty. This suggests that 
respondents have had different experiences or hold different views on the extent of 
government success in addressing local development priorities in this location. 
 
These results suggest that villagers in the studied sites who do perceive that 
the government has addressed their development needs hold this view because they 
have been given individual assets or goods to facilitate their own income generation, 
at the level of the household. On the other hand, those who argue that government 
has not responded to the development needs of the community explain that 
government has not provided adequate levels of public services to the community as 
a whole. This contrast reveals differences among respondents in the survey sites as 
to their expectations of what government will provide to them. For those who expect 
small assets or goods to be provided, government is more likely to seem responsive 
where it delivers these small things.427 However, respondents who understand and 
expect that government is to provide a higher level of services and utilities, are less 
likely to report that they feel the government has responded to these needs. 
 
427 Smith et al., ‘Livelihood Diversification in Uganda’. 
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5.3 Village-level perceptions of the poor quality and reach of service delivery 
 
According to the rationales underpinning decentralisation, the introduction of 
sub-national governments should improve the quality and targeting of service delivery, 
as citizens can more easily hold a local government to account for service delivery 
than they can hold a more remote central government to account. This is because 
(according to the theory428 of decentralisation) citizens have better access to 
information about the performance of a local government, through direct observation 
and direct interaction. This section presents results from the household survey that 
asked questions regarding the quality and accessibility of services, and the extent to 
which villagers in the studied sites feel that service delivery will tend to improve over 
time. It is suggested by the results that the institutional shortcomings of 
decentralisation have contributed to poor-quality and high-cost services, according to 
the village-level respondents in the six studied field sites. As discussed in section 5.2, 
given the greater level of development of Western Uganda, it could be expected that 
field sites from this region (sites Village 5 and Village 6) reflect a greater level of 
satisfaction with the standard of service delivery. Respondents in Village 5 and 
Village 6 were indeed slightly less likely to report that there were medicine stock-outs 
at their local healthcare post, and slightly less likely to report that their child had missed 
school for more than one week. However, other than in answer to these two questions, 
the responses given by household members across the six studied sites did not vary 
significantly from one region to another. 
 
Service quality and availability: Shortages in supply are frequent 
 
A number of respondents to the household survey reported that there are 
services in their local area that are either of a low standard, or are entirely absent. 
When asked, Has there ever been a time you needed a medicine, but there was no 
stock/supplies?, 99/108 respondents (92 per cent) answered Yes. This result is 
illustrated in images 5.15 and 5.16 below. 
  
 





 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 7 6 3 1 4 4 
Yes, more 10 10 15 16 11 11 
No, never 1 1 0 1 3 3 
I don’t 
know 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.15 Responses per village regarding medicine stock-outs 
 
 
5.16 Responses per village regarding medicine stock-outs  
 
Responses to this question suggest that medical stock-outs are a consistent 
problem across each of the studied sites. This includes in Ntungamo District (Village 5 
and Village 6), where the higher levels of development in this region might have been 
expected to show a higher level of respondent satisfaction with the quality of service 
delivery, such as in fewer instances of drug stock-outs.  
 
When then asked how villagers responded to this situation, 81/99 (82 per cent) 
of those who had answered Yes explained that they travel to another healthcare 
service post to seek the medication there. The transaction cost of obtaining healthcare 
treatment increases as a result, and the time and resources of villagers in the studied 





















answered that there has been a stock-out when they needed medication answered 
that when this stock-out occurred, they went without the medicine they required. 7/99 
(7 per cent) reported that they used a different medicine from the one that had been 
recommended to them; this solution was reported most frequently in Village 1. 
Otherwise, responses to this question were broadly consistent across the studied 
sites. Image 5.17 below presents the range of responses to this question.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Assistance – 
leader 
1 1 0 2 0 0 
Assistance - 
relative 




11 11 16 14 14 15 
Did nothing / 
not get 
2 2 1 3 2 1 
Different 
medicine  
6 0 0 0 0 1 
Used local 
herbs 
2 1 0 1 0 0 
Other 
response 
2 6 1 1 3 2 
5.17 Responses to the question, ‘If there was a stock-out, what did you do?’, per 
studied site  
 
Service affordability: The burden of healthcare fees  
 
In addition to being of a low standard, participants reported that user fees for 
public services can render the service inaccessible in practice. When asked If you 
need to use a health service, do you have to pay fees (in cash)?, 63/108 respondents 
(58 per cent) responded Yes. In response to a follow-up question, Have you ever had 
to miss medical treatment because the fees were too expensive?, 70/108 respondents 
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(65 per cent) responded Yes. The following images 5.18 and 5.19 summarises these 
results.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 0 3 2 1 3 7 
Yes, more 8 10 5 13 7 10 
No 10 4 11 4 8 1 
I don’t 
know 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
5.18 Responses per village regarding exclusion from healthcare services due 
to user fees 
 
 
5.19 Responses per village regarding exclusion from healthcare services due 
to user fees 
 
Responses to this question suggest that when respondents are required to pay 
fees for medical treatment, these fees are problematically expensive, and represent a 
barrier to accessing medical care. However, the answers given by respondents to this 
question were varied, even within one district. For example, within Village 1, 
respondents were almost as likely to answer “yes, more than once” than “no” in 
response to this question. Likewise, the two studied sites in Lira District reported very 



















Have you had to miss medical treatment because the 
fees were too expensive? - Responses per village
Yes, once Yes, more No IDK NR
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While the reasons for these local inconsistencies are difficult to discern from the survey 
alone, it is possible that different healthcare posts have adopted different fee 
structures or fee-charging practices, resulting in inconsistent and inequitable 
outcomes for villagers even within the same community.  
 
Service affordability: The burden of school fees  
 
Regarding education access, school fees were reported to be particularly 
problematic for a number of households. In response to the question, Do you have to 
pay school fees (in cash)?, 93/108 (86 per cent) of respondents answered Yes. When 
then asked, Is it hard to find money to pay for school fees?, 81/93 (87 per cent) of 
those respondents again answered Yes.  
 
When then asked, What do you do if you can’t find the money to pay school 
fees?, 29/93 (31 per cent) of respondents reported that they remove their child from 
school until they can afford to pay the fees. 22/93 (24 per cent) answered that they 
undertake extra labour to save money for the fees, 19/93 (20 per cent) report that they 
negotiate an extension for payment with the school, 12/93 (13 per cent) report that 
they borrow money in order to finance school fees, and 8/93 (9 per cent) report that 
they sell an asset in order to finance the payment of school fees. These responses 
are summarised in images 5.20 to 5.22 below.  
 




9 4 3 10 2 1 
Do extra 
labour/agric 
1 9 2 2 4 4 
Ask for 
extension 
2 1 5 2 6 3 
Borrow 
money 
1 1 6 1 1 2 
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Sell an asset 1 1 2 2 1 1 
n/a 4 0 1 4 4 8 
IDK 0 2 0 0 0 0 
5.20 Responses to the question ‘What do you do if you cannot find money for school 
fees?’ per studied site  
 
5.21 Responses to the question ‘What do you do if you cannot find money for school 
fees?’ per studied site  
 
 
5.22 Responses per survival strategies when school fees are unaffordable 
 
Respondents to this question reported a range of different strategies to manage 


















Responses to non-ability to pay school fees, 
by studied site
Remove children from school Do extra labour/agric Ask for extension
























Responses to non-ability to pay school fees, by frequency of 
response
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
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some strategies are more prevalent in some of the studied locations than in others – 
though notably, there are not necessarily clear patterns between studied districts. In 
some locations, particularly in Village 1 and Village 4 (in Pallisa and Lira Districts, 
respectively), parents remove their children from school until the fees can be paid 
(even though this may be a substantial time period). Some parents, particularly in 
Village 3 and Village 5 (in Lira and Ntungamo, respectively), attempt to negotiate with 
school leaders to accept their children the funds are sought.  
 
Other parents undertake additional labour, or produce an agricultural surplus 
that is then sold in order to raise money for fees; this appears to be a particularly 
common strategy in Village 2 (in Pallisa District). In Village 6, respondents were more 
likely to respond that they are not often troubled by the need to raise money for school 
fees. For those who are, the main strategy involved was to undertake additional labour 
or agricultural production. These responses in Village 6 reflect the higher level of 
economic activity in place in this village (in Ntungamo District), with respondents able 
to use commercial farming to increase their access to the cash needed for payments 
of school fees. 
 
For still others, strategies involve either the acquisition of debt or the liquidation 
of an asset, suggesting that parents are willing to undertake financial hardship in order 
to ensure that their children are able to attend school. The selling of household assets, 
such as livestock, in order to raise funds for school-fee payments raises the possibility 
that households may be made worse off financially from the burden of paying school 
fees. In particular, the GoU policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE) has 
generated circumstances in which households are liquidating their assets in order to 
finance school fees for their children. However, if the quality of the education that is 
then provided is of a low standard, a family may arguably be made worse-off by the 
children attending school, if challenging financial circumstances are entered into but 
the education received in return is poor. Free-text responses to this question revealed 




V2, HH1 “I sell part of my land and livestock” 
V3, HH1 "Send the child to school and ask the headmaster to give you 
some time to pay" 
V1, HH3 "Children have to drop out of school." 
V3, HH5 and 
HH6 
"Get a loan" 
V2, HH7 “Child misses exams and I can’t do much” 
V3, HH8 "They stay at home, I don't do anything" 
V5, HH9 "Plead with teachers as they look for the money" 
V1, HH10 “Children miss lunch” 
Responses to the question ‘What do you do if you cannot find money for school fees?’ 
 
Of the 56 respondents who reported that at least one of their children had 
missed school for at least one week on at least one occasion, 37 (66 per cent) reported 
that the reason for this absence was that school fees had not been paid for that child, 
so they had been removed from school until fees were paid. This result suggests that 
for a number of households in the studied sites, school fees are sufficiently 
burdensome that children’s educational access is being impaired. This result is 
presented in image 5.23 below:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Child was ill  8 9 4 2 3 6 
Fees not 
paid 
6 6 4 12 5 4 
Teacher not 
attended  




9 5 10 6 10 11 
5.23 Responses to the question, ‘If your child has missed more than one week of 




In Village 4 (Lira District) in particular, school fees are difficult to afford; when 
fees cannot be paid, the child is removed from school; and that this outcome has 
caused children to miss more than one week of school on at least one occasion. The 
higher number of respondents who reported these outcomes from Village 4 suggests 
that holding cash on hand is a particular problem in this location, perhaps suggesting 
an elevated level of poverty. The lower proportion of respondents who reported these 
outcomes in Village 5 and Village 6 suggest that higher levels of commercial-
agriculture activity in these locations has had a positive impact on parents’ access to 
cash, and thus on children’s attendance at school. 
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5.4 Villagers’ techniques to obtain services in the absence of formal delivery  
 
Where public services have not been adequately provided, household 
members in the studied communities are able to enact alternative strategies to access 
services and resources. These include financial survival techniques, locational 
techniques, and alternative service delivery techniques. For villagers, maintaining 
financial stability and sustainability is challenging, in the context of working in 
subsistence farming and with low levels of access to formal or informal banking 
institutions. These results suggest that villagers seek alternative market solutions and 
social capital strategies to manage the shortcomings of the decentralisation system. 
Respondents in Village 3 and Village 4 (in Lira District) reported a level of economic 
activity that is lower than in other studied sites, such as lower trading of household 
assets, potentially reflecting the greater levels of poverty in Lira District. However, 
other than in response to questions about trading household assets, responses in this 
section were broadly comparable across the six studied field sites.  
 
Financial sustainability: Strategies for coping with formal financial exclusion 
 
Participants in the household survey reported that their most common method 
for ensuring financial sustainability under these circumstances is to purchase and sell 
livestock, particularly small livestock such as goats and chickens, as a store of wealth 
that can be easily converted into liquidity when needed. Of all 108 respondents, 56 
(52 per cent) reported having ever sold a goat for reasons of needing financial 
resources, 55 (51 per cent) reported having sold a cow, and 51 (47 per cent) reported 
having sold a chicken. 29/108 (27 per cent) reported not having sold any of these 
items. Respondents in Village 3 and Village 4 (Lira District) were less likely to report 
that they had traded a household asset. Images 5.24 to 5.26 below illustrate these 
responses.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Stove/cooker 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cow(s) 12 10 7 5 8 13 
Chicken(s) 15 10 3 5 5 13 
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Lanterns  1 0 0 0 1 0 
Television 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goat(s) 12 9 4 4 13 14 
Mattress 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Cell phone 4 1 0 0 2 3 
None of these 1 1 9 12 3 3 
Other 
response 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
5.24 Responses to the question, ‘Have you ever owned these assets in the past, but 
have had to sell them?’, per studied site  
 
 
5.25 Responses to the question, ‘Have you ever owned these assets in the past, but 





















Assets sold - Number of responses per asset, 
per studied site 
Stove/cooker Cow(s) Chicken(s) Lanterns Television Refrigerator




5.26 Responses per response relating to trading assets as a financial survival 
strategy  
 
Responses to this question illustrate the tradability of livestock, reflecting their 
use as a store of value. In the absence of formal banking services, livestock assets 
can be liquidated at times of hardship in order to provide a financial resource. The 
higher number of respondents who reported this outcome from Ntungamo perhaps 
reflects the higher level of economic activity in the West, with the opposite being true 
of respondents in Lira District.  
 
Financial sustainability: Local poverty indicators  
 
In addition to responses relating to their own household’s financial strategies, 
respondents were asked whether there were households in the village that they 
thought were living in poverty, and if so, how this state of poverty could be identified. 
Responses to this question are given as follows in image 5.27:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Absence of:       
- Land / 
Tools 































































Assets sold - Number of responses per asset
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
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- Housing  9 6 3 2 10 4 
- Clothing 4 5 2 1 0 1 
- Education / 
Fees 
5 4 5 8 2 1 
- Food 7 10 7 11 8 5 
- Livestock 3 4 4 7 4 3 
- Health 4 3 1 3 0 0 
- Income 5 6 5 9 7 6 
- Water 0 1 0 2 0 0 
- Transport 0 0 1 2 0 0 
- Radio 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Widows / 
orphans 
1 1 5 2 1 1 
Disabled / ill 
/ elderly 
0 0 3 0 1 0 
Other 
response 
0 0 0 0 1 3 
5.27 Responses to the question, ‘How do you know which households are poor?’ per 
studied site 
 
Responses to this question give an insight into the ways in which households 
(other than the respondent’s own household) enact survival strategies to manage their 
financial needs. For example, respondents answered that a household could be 
considered to be living in poverty if its members engaged in practices such as:  
V3, HH4 "Sleeps hungry (no meals). No equipment for farming. Such people go 
to other homes to do donkey work in order to get something" 
V3, HH1 "Most households have to sell their property, especially livestock, to 
acquire basic needs eg if someone is a widow" 
V3, HH7 "A single mother household when the whole burden of raising up the 
children falls on her (separated marriage). Widowers who have no one 
to support them (they do all the household chores). Widows who have 
all the burden of raising children i.e. from school fees to feeding" 




Responses to this question reflect the importance of a household’s social and 
economic context in determining the poverty level of its inhabitants. Households 
containing individuals whose personal circumstances will contribute to 
impoverishment, such as an illness, are known within their own community to be 
vulnerable to poverty. That is, attributes of individual household members determine 
the vulnerability of that household to poverty.  
 
In addition, these answers indicate that households that are experiencing a 
period of financial stress will engage in strategies like selling an asset or undertaking 
additional work to generate income. This might be in response to a financial shock, 
such as an illness or divorce. Where these strategies cannot be enacted, households 
are not able to rely on basic service delivery or social protection provided by the state, 
and so are forced to remain living in severe poverty.  
 
Across the three studied districts, commonalities are observed to some extent 
in the variables that suggest a risk of poverty for a particular household, with a number 
of responses being observed across all six of the studied districts. In Lira district, in 
Uganda’s conflict-affected northern region, households that are comprised of widows 
or orphans are thought to be especially disadvantaged, as well as those without an 
income, and this is reflected in problematically-low levels of access to food. In Village 
5 in Ntungamo district, and in Village 1 in Pallisa district, poor-quality housing is 
thought by respondents to be an especially powerful indicator of poverty. For 
respondents in all three districts, a lack of access to food as an indicator of a household 
experiencing poverty. A lack of access to land or farming tools is also nominated by 
around one-third of respondents across all sites as indicating a risk of impoverishment 
for households.  
 
Information access strategies: Villagers’ reliance on others for information  
 
Secondly, villagers in the studied locations described strategies for gaining 
access to the information they require in order to advocate for their rights and 
development needs, without moving from their home village or nearby locations. In 
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theory, the introduction of decentralisation should result in citizens having greater 
access to information about the performance of government, through being able to 
observe the activities of nearby governments, and through communication with 
representatives of those governments. However, where the system of village meetings 
has not been successful in providing this information to households, citizens engage 
in alternative strategies to gain access to information. Citizens must also negotiate the 
possibility of having low levels of literacy, owing to their low levels of educational 
access (noting that a minority of respondents to the survey had been able to attend 
school beyond primary level). To manage this context, respondents to the household 
survey indicated that their primary source of information for news, for political 
information, and for information relating to public services was the radio. 94/108 
respondents (87 per cent) reported that this was their primary information source. A 
further 65/108 (60 per cent)429 reported that their main information source was 
“another person”, about whom they further specified the LC1 Chair as their information 
source. These results are summarised in image 5.28 below:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Newspapers 0 0 1 3 5 3 
Radio 15 16 14 10 17 15 
TV 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Noticeboards 1 0 0 0 3 2 
Internet  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Govt office 9 4 0 0 1 0 
Another 
person  
10 9 13 15 12 11 
Other 0 0 2 0 2 0 
5.28 Response to question, ‘Where do you find out information about political 
issues?’, per studied site  
 
Responses point to the importance of radio communications for conveying 
information regarding available public services, and information about political issues, 
 
429 Respondents were asked to give as many answers to this question as were relevant for their 
circumstances, so the total number of responses exceeds 108.  
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with a large proportion of respondents nominating this is a principal information source. 
This was a consistent outcome across all six of the studied sites. Furthermore, a 
majority of respondents reported that they obtain information about services and 
political issues from another person. In Pallisa District, respondents in Village 1 and 
Village 2 report that they seek information about political issues and available services 
from the local government office, which was not reported by respondents in other 
areas. This suggests a greater level of familiarity with local government as a source of 
information in this area than in other regions.  
 
It is noteworthy that the main information sources for most respondents – radio, 
and another person – are each sources that do not require any level of literacy to be 
accessed. In the context of rural areas where education access is not high, this may 
be an important factor in determining which information sources are chosen. However, 
these are also communication channels that can easily be influenced by government 
leaders if they should choose to do so, such as through campaigns regarding NRM-
affiliated election candidates.   
 
Villagers’ strategies for survival in the absence of public services and utilities 
 
Where government-provided services were of low quality or were not 
accessible to household members, individuals and households were in some 
circumstances able to develop private or community-based solutions to address these 
needs. For example, as noted above in section 5.3, 94/108 (87 per cent) of survey 
respondents reported that they do not have electricity available at their home. 12/108 
respondents (11 per cent) report that they have been able to gain access to electricity, 
via self-purchasing a simple solar panel as a private solution to this lack of public 
services. In addition, 72/108 households (67 per cent) reported that they owned a 
lantern, to access a light source. In terms of housing construction, 104/108 
respondents (96 per cent) reported that they either constructed their home 
themselves, or their relative constructed it, generally using locally-available natural 




Walls V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Bricks 17 18 15 15 7 6 
Mud 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Cement 0 0 3 0 1 5 
Earth 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Reeds 0 0 0 0 4 6 
Dung 0 0 0 0 5 1 
 
Roof V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Iron 15 12 11 3 18 18 
Grass/ 
Thatch 
3 6 7 15 0 0 
 
Floor V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Cement 5 4 3 0 4 5 
Ground/mud/earth 12 13 15 18 8 9 
Sand 0 0 0 0 5 4 
Tiles 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Other response 1 1 0 0 0 0 
5.29 Material used in the construction of respondents’ home, per studied site 
 
Differences in the construction materials of the homes of respondents reflect 
differences in both naturally-available materials in the studied districts, and in the 
respective poverty levels of the studied districts. In Ntungamo district, in Uganda’s 
wealthier western region, homes of participants are more likely to be constructed using 
at least some artificial materials, such as cement and iron. In Lira and Pallisa, homes 
are constructed using materials that can be collected from the local natural 
environment, such as thatch. Particularly in Lira district, in Uganda’s conflict-affected 
northern region, houses of participants are constructed using thatching for rooves, and 




Villagers’ strategies for dispute resolution 
 
When discussing the resolution of disputes within the community (such as land-
ownership disputes), in the absence of formal dispute-resolution services or systems, 
55/108 respondents (51 per cent) responded that they ask the clan chiefs of the local 
area to adjudicate disputes. Only 14/108 (13 per cent) of respondents reported that 
they request assistance from the police, the formal agency of the state, in these cases. 
Through mechanisms such as these, respondents to the household survey report that 
they are in some ways able to develop private solutions to the absence of public 
services, either individually or as a community. However, with larger and more 
complex services such as healthcare and education, such improvisation cannot be 




5.5 Villagers’ views on tribal relationships: Building networks, gaining 
advantages  
 
In addition to questions relating to participants’ relationships with local 
governments, the household survey included questions about how participants 
interact with others in their community, and to what extent personal connections 
influence the political economy. This included questions relating to tribes and clans, 
and whether participants felt that they are able to form stronger relationships with 
people who share their tribal or tribal identity, than those who do not. Responses to 
these questions suggest the social networks and social capitals villagers are able to 
leverage, in order to seek solutions to the shortcomings of the services and 
governance structures that are provided by the decentralisation system.  
 
Tribes generating advantages: Economic advantages accruing to some tribal groups  
 
A number of participants in expert interviews conducted for this thesis, as 
described in Chapter Four, expressed the belief that members of particular tribes, 
especially those from southwestern Uganda, are more able to access high-status 
employment opportunities due to their connections to elites within the national and 
district administrations. Accordingly, participants in the household survey were asked 
whether, in their opinion, members of specific tribes gain advantages over other tribes 
in the Ugandan political-economy context. When asked In your opinion, are some tribal 
groups in Uganda more likely to benefit from economic opportunities than others?, 
74/108 participants (68 per cent) answered Yes, with 19/108 (18 per cent) answering 
in the negative. Of those who answered Yes, 35 (32 per cent) felt that some tribes are 
favoured over others, 17 (16 per cent) argued that some tribes are better led or work 
harder than others, and 10 (9 per cent) argued that members of some tribes are better 





 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Some tribes 
favoured 
6 8 6 9 6 0 
Yes - More 
educated 
5 2 1 2 0 0 
Yes - Corruption 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Yes - Work/led 
better 
1 7 4 2 2 1 
Yes - nothing 
added 
1 0 2 1 5 1 
To some extent 0 0 0 0 0 4 
No - All are equal 0 0 2 1 1 2 
No - Depends on 
leadership 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
No - Depends on 
effort 
0 0 2 3 0 3 
No - nothing added 0 0 0 0 0 4 
IDK 4 1 0 0 4 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes  14 17 13 15 13 2 
To some extent 0 0 0 0 0 4 
No  0 0 5 4 1 9 
I don’t know 4 1 0 0 4 4 
5.30 Responses to the question ‘In your opinion, are some tribal groups in Uganda 




5.31 Responses to the question ‘In your opinion, are some tribal groups in 
Uganda more likely to benefit from economic opportunities than others?, per studied 
site 
 
Free-response comments in answer to this question argued that some tribes 
were better-connected than others:  
 
V2, HH1 Yes, because “They are from the same ethnic group as the president 
and top leadership” 
V1, H1 Yes, because "the top government is dominated by their tribe" 
V4, HH4 Yes, because "Employers of particular ethnicity give such opportunities 
to people of their same ethnicity" 
 
Other respondents argued that some tribes have better-developed work habits 
than others, and it is from here that their greater economic opportunities arise: "They 
have better work/economic habits that benefit them".430 Others argue that rather than 
better economic opportunities accruing to some tribal groups, better opportunities are 
held by those with superior levels of productivity: "All ethnic tribes face same problems. 
Those who get better economic opportunities work hard".431 
 
 
430 Response to household survey question 80. Household 2, Village 4 (Lira District). 
















Are some tribes more likely than others to benefit from 
economic opportunities? - responses per village
Yes TSE No IDK
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In answering this question, respondents tended to point to the greater favour 
that some tribes are looked upon than others, with one third of respondents nominating 
this as the reason they feel some tribes are more likely to benefit from economic 
opportunity for others. In Pallisa (Villages 1 and 2), respondents also expressed the 
opinion that some tribes are more educated, or better led, than others, and that this 
contributes to their economic advantages. Only in Village 6 (Ntungamo) did 
respondents disagree that some tribes are advantaged over others, arguing that all 
tribes are equal, or that those who benefit from economic opportunities do so because 
of their greater effort, rather than because of their tribe. The greater level of economic 
opportunity of people from western Uganda (including Ntungamo) represents an 
important context to this question, as those from Village 6 may be less inclined to 
acknowledge any role for tribal favouritism as contributing to their region’s greater 
levels of economic success. 
 
Tribes generating advantages: Political advantages accruing to some tribal groups  
 
Furthermore, when asked whether some tribal groups have superior access to 
political opportunities compared to others, respondents were more likely to respond 
that they believed that tribe does affect access to political positions. In response to the 
question, In your opinion, are some tribal groups more likely to hold important political 
roles than other groups?, 90/108 respondents (83 per cent) responded Yes, and 
15/108 (14 per cent) responded No. These responses are summarised in images 5.32 
and 5.33 below:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Some 
tribes 
favoured 
6 12 10 12 18 4 
Yes - More 
educated 
4 1 1 0 0 0 
Yes – Better 
led 






5 2 2 2 6 1 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 1 5 
No - All have 
an equal 
chance  
0 0 3 3 1 5 
No - Better 
educated  
0 0 1 1 0 0 
No - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
IDK 2 3 0 0 2 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 17432 15 15 14 24 5 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 1 5 
No 0 0 4 4 1 6 
I don’t 
know 
2 3 0 0 2 4 
5.32 Responses to the question, In your opinion, are some tribal groups more likely 
to hold important political roles than other groups?, per studied site 
 
 
432 Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total responses 




5.33 Responses to the question, In your opinion, are some tribal groups more likely 
to hold important political roles than other groups?, per studied site 
 
When invited to expand on these answers, 62 of those respondents who had 
answered Yes (57 per cent of all respondents) explained that they feel that some tribes 
are favoured over others: 
 
V3, HH4 “They are favoured because of the President" 
V2, HH5 "There’s a lot of tribalism in that only western region is favoured" 
V3, HH8 "It's about who you know not your qualification" 
V2, HH1 “They have political connections with the ruling government” 
Responses to the question, In your opinion, are some tribal groups more likely 
to hold important political roles than other groups? 
 
10 respondents (9 per cent) answered in response to this question that they felt 
some tribes were more able to access high-status political positions because they 
worked harder than others or were better-educated or better-led. This is in comparison 
with the 27 respondents who felt this explained the differences between tribe 
members’ access to economic opportunities, in answer to the previous question. 
These findings suggest that while participants in the household survey felt that some 
tribes have better access to economic opportunities than others, they were also 
mindful of other causal factors than tribe that might contribute to this difference. On 


















Are some ethnic groups more likely to hold important 
political roles? - responses per village
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positions, participants were more likely to isolate tribe alone as the main contributing 
factor to this disparity, suggesting that they feel that some tribes are unfairly able to 
access political positions.  
 
Responses to this question were markedly different in Village 6 (in Ntungamo) 
than in the other five field sites. In Village 6, 5/18 respondents argued that some tribes 
are not more able to hold political roles than other tribes, because all tribes have an 
equal chance to lead. 5/18 argued that it is accurate to some extent, though not fully, 
to argue that some tribes have more access to political roles than others. A further 
four argued that some tribes are favoured, while four responded ‘I don’t know’. The 
comparatively greater level of political power of people from western Uganda, 
including Ntungamo, may perhaps contribute to a reluctance amongst some 
respondents to acknowledge any possible role for favouritism in the levels of political 
access and power of their tribes over others.  
 
In contrast, respondents in Villages 1-5 argued that it is the case that some 
tribes are more able to access important political roles than other tribes, with the most 
common comment being that some tribes are favoured for these roles over others. 
Four respondents in Village 1 also suggested that some tribes have had better access 
to education, and so are better able to access political roles for this reason.  
 
On balance, responses to this question suggest that survey participants 
perceive that some tribes have greater levels of access to political opportunities and 
roles than others, and that this access is based on tribal identity, rather than on other 
criteria. This result corresponds with literature described in section 5.1 that suggests 
than in the Museveni era, political leadership roles have disproportionately accrued to 
members of tribes from western Uganda. 
 
Tribes as connections: Easier communication, shared goals  
 
As well as establishing connections to opportunities, a shared tribe with a 
person in a powerful position may facilitate working well with that person. When asked, 
Is it important to you that the national MPs for this area are from the same tribe as 
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you?, 79/108 (73 per cent) responded that they did think this was important. Reasons 
for this importance centred on easier communication (47 respondents), and a sense 
that one of ‘their own’ would better represent them (29 respondents). Images 5.34 and 
5.35 below illustrate the range of responses:  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Better 
communication 
6 11 4 8 10 8 
Yes – Better 
representation 
4 7 7 6 3 2 
Yes - nothing added 0 0 0 0 3 0 
No - service more 
important 
6 2 7 4 0 2 
No - tribes work 
together  
1 0 0 0 0 7 
No - Nothing added 0 0 0 0 1 0 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 10 18433 11 14 16 10 
No 7 2 7 4 1 9 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 0 
5.34 Range of responses to the question, ‘Is it important to you that the national MPs 
for this area are from the same tribe as you?, per studied site 
 
 
433 Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total responses 





5.35 Responses to the question, ‘Is it important to you that the national MPs for this 
area are from the same tribe as you?, per studied site 
 
The free-response comments given in answer to this question elaborate on 
these views: 
 
V2, HH4 Yes, because "He is our own and we hope he might deliver" 
V2, HH6 Yes, because "We can easily approach and talk to him using our local 
language for some of us who are not educated [and so don’t speak 
English]" 
V1, HH5 Yes, because "He will also favour us / address out problems since we 
are of the same ethnic tribe as him" 
Responses to the question, ‘Is it important to you that the national MPs for this area 
are from the same tribe as you? 
 
Respondents who had answered No to this question explained that the 
performance of the individual MP was more important than their shared tribe: “As long 
as he/she can meet the interest of the people at the grassroot".434  
 
The responses given by survey participants in response to this question varied 
from location to location. For most respondents, other than in Village 3, being from the 
 


























same ethnic tribe is important because it makes communication easier (including in a 
common language). For respondents in Village 3, it is more important to be from the 
same tribal group as the local MP because it improves representation, and suggests 
that the tribe’s needs will be better represented in parliament than would be the case 
if the MP was from a different tribe. However, for just as many respondents in Village 
3, and for some respondents in Village 1, it is more important to respondents that their 
local MP represent their interests successfully, rather than being from the same tribe.  
 
In Village 6 (Ntungamo), respondents were evenly divided between wanting 
their MP to be from the same tribe as them because this eases communication, and 
being of the view that people from all tribes can work together successfully. 
Respondents from Village 6 were virtually the only respondents to put forward this 
view. Given that Ntungamo is located in western Uganda, the region that tends to 
dominate in senior parliamentary appointments, respondents may be seeking to argue 
that the national parliament represents all tribes equally, rather than favouring their 
community and region. However, this viewpoint was not shared by respondents in 
Village 5, who argued that it was important for MPs to be from their same tribe in order 
to facilitate better communication, and to a lesser extent, greater representation. 
 
At first glance, these results would appear to suggest that participants in the 
household survey prefer in general to engage with members of their own tribe. 
However, responses to a subsequent question indicate that this outcome may be 
dependent on context or circumstances. When asked, When you are working at your 
job, do you prefer to work with people who are from the same tribe as you?, 38/108 
respondents (35 per cent) answered Yes, while 62/108 respondents (57 per cent) 
answered No. While those who answered in the affirmative again cited easier 
communication and stronger allegiances as reasons for wanting to work with those 
from the same tribe, those who answered No argued that performance and skill is 
more important. A number of respondents (16/108, or 15 per cent) added that they 
welcome the opportunity to learn from people who come from different tribal 





 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Easier 
communication 
5* 5 1 2 7 6 
Yes – We 
share culture 
1 6 0 0 5 0 




4 0 9 7 0 1 
No - Tribes are 
equal 
2 2 5 5 0 2 
No - Want to 
work w others 
3 4 2 2 0 5 
No - nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 5 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 6 11 1 2 12 6 
Sometimes  3 1 1 2 1 0 
No 9 6 18 14 5 12 
5.36 Responses to the question ‘When you are working at your job, do you prefer to 
work with people who are from the same tribe as you?’, per studied site 
 
When contrasted against earlier results, responses to this question suggest that 
respondents to the household survey prefer that their elected representatives be from 
the same tribal background as themselves, but in daily life are happy to work with 
those from other tribal groups. This implies that participants in the household survey 
perceive that elected leaders will prefer to direct resources or to communicate with 
people from their own tribal group. Villagers will be able to leverage this shared 
background as a method for influencing their elected leaders, and in so doing, gain 




The responses that were given in answer to this question varied from one 
location to the next, with villages even within the same district yielding different 
responses. In Villages 2 and 5, in Pallisa and in Ntungamo districts respectively, 
respondents indicate that they prefer to work with others who are from the same ethnic 
tribe as themselves, because communication is easier and because they share the 
same culture. However, in the remaining villages, respondents suggested that they 
not necessarily prefer to work with members of their same tribe, because: tribes are 
equal; they like to have the experience of working with others; and in particular 





5.6 Community members’ views on new districts: Bringing services (even) 
nearer to the people 
 
Questions were asked of participants in the household survey relating to their 
opinions on the creation of additional districts in Uganda. These questions revealed a 
number of results that were apparently contradictory, but nonetheless reveal the ways 
in which villagers in the studied sites conceptualise the creation of additional districts 
as an important part of their survival strategies. This sub-section will present results 
that illustrate the ways in which villagers in the studied households hold complex 
opinions about the creation of new administrative units, and are able to situate this 
phenomenon within a broader context relating to gaining access to public services and 
resources. This sub-section will identify an apparent mechanism that has emerged in 
the perspective of household-survey respondents: that the creation of additional 
districts leads to the delivery of improved public services (services are “brought” with 
a new district), and improved communication between communities and the 
government. In addition, this section reveals that respondents in the studied sites 
observe that candidates who promise to deliver newly-created districts are able to 
achieve this, while electoral candidates who promise improved service delivery are 
less likely to be believed. The responses presented in this sub-section are consistent 
across the studied sites, suggesting that respondents in the different regions of 
Uganda have developed similar conclusions about the role of new-district creation in 
bringing service delivery ‘nearer’.  
 
Participants’ reservations regarding new-district creation 
 
Initially, participants in the household survey were asked whether they felt that 
the number of districts in Uganda ‘today’435 was the correct number of districts. While 
it is not expected that participants in the household survey would be in possession of 
a technical or objective answer to this question, this question sought to ascertain the 
perception of village-level citizens about the rapid proliferation of new districts in 
Uganda. The goal of this question was not to seek a ‘correct’ response from 
participants about the number of districts in Uganda, given the complexities of district 
 
435 In April 2016 
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proliferation as a public policy issue. Instead, this question sought to understand 
respondents’ perceptions of whether the phenomenon of creating additional districts 
should continue, or whether the rapid creation of new districts had resulted in there 
being too many districts at present – in the perception of the respondent.  
 
In response to the question In your opinion, do you think there are the correct 
number of districts in Uganda?, 41/108 (38 per cent) answered No – there are too 
many, 32/108 respondents (30 per cent) responded Yes (i.e. the correct number), and 
16/108 (15 per cent) responded I don’t know. Only 18/108 (17 per cent) answered that 
they perceived the number of districts in Uganda at present to be too low.436 These 
results are summarised in images 5.37 to 5.39 below.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 8 7 4 6 5 
No – too 
many 
10 6 6 5 6 8 
No – not 
enough 
3 1 4 4 5 1 
IDK 3 3 1 5 1 4 
5.37 Responses per village of answer to survey participants’ perception of the 
appropriate number of districts in Uganda 
  
 





5.38 Responses per village of answer to survey participants’ perception of the 
appropriate number of districts in Uganda 
 
5.39 Responses per category of answer to survey participants’ perception of 
the appropriate number of districts in Uganda  
 
This result suggests that only a minority (17 per cent) of household survey 
participants feel that there are too few districts in Uganda at present, and so are of the 
view that additional districts should be created. Responses to this question varied 
across locations, with a majority of respondents suggesting that they felt Uganda has 
either the right number of districts now (30 per cent of respondents), or too many (40 
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that they feel there are already too many districts in Uganda, the responses given were 
consistent across the studied districts.  
 
When asked to explain the rationale for their response, free-text responses 
suggested that some respondents perceive that too many districts are too poorly 
resourced to be effective, rather than their overall number being too high. That is, 
respondents were not concerned that the raw number of districts was either sufficient 
or too high, but that the districts that have been created more recently are too poorly-
resourced to be effective. For example, respondents argued:  
 
V1, HH6 "The more they create more districts, the more the government 
has to spend on MPs who are doing nothing but are paid highly" 
V2, HH17 "Many districts created cannot still give services to people" 
V5, HH13 "Too many districts also delay service delivery." 
 
These responses were expressed consistently across all districts, including in 





Advantages of district proliferation: New districts and bringing services to the village  
 
In contrast to the results described above, when directly questioned about 
whether they perceive benefits to accrue from creating additional districts, 
respondents answered that they would respond favourably to a new district being 
created nearby to where they live. In response to the question, Would you be happy if 
another district was created in this area?, 74/108 respondents, or 69 per cent, 
responded Yes, and 27/108 (25 per cent) answered No. These responses are 
summarised below in image 5.40 and 5.41.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Current 
district is far  
2 2 2 0 0 1 
Yes - Brings 
services/devt  
5 7 6 8 3 5 
Yes - Creates 
jobs 
4 4 4 5 2 2 
Yes - Other 
areas have 
one 




0 0 1 2 0 0 
Yes - Better 
market access 




0 0 1 1 0 0 
Yes - No 
longer 
oppressed 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
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Yes - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 2 
TSE: Depends 
on population 
1 0 4 1 1 1 
No - Districts 
are expensive 
1 2 0 0 1 0 
No - Services 
not improve 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
No - Not too 
large now 
0 0 0 0 5 5 
No - I do not 
benefit  
2 0 1 1 0 0 
No - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 4 1 
IDK 3 0 0 1 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 11 15 15 17 6 10 
To some 
extent 
1 0 2 0 1 1 
No 4 3 1 1 11 7 
I don’t know 2 0 0 0 0 0 





5.41 Responses per field site regarding perceptions of new-village creation 
 
When invited to expand upon their answer, respondents who had answered 
Yes further explained that they would welcome a new district as it brings new services 
and development (34/108 respondents, 31 per cent), creates jobs (21/108 
respondents, 19 per cent) or because the current district’s headquarters are located 
far away (7/108 respondents, 6 per cent). In free-text answers, respondents added:  
 
V6, HH1 Yes, because "It can lead to development to our village" 
V2, HH5 Yes, because "I can foot [walk] up to there because right now, it’s so 
distance [sic] from us" 
V3, HH8 Yes, because "For adequate distribution of resources to the grassroot 
people" 
V1, HH7 Yes, because "there will be employment opportunities" 
V1, HH1 Yes, because "services will be brought nearer to people" 
V2, HH9 Yes, because "we have limited services provided by the district" 
 
Those who answered No did not feel that the creation of new districts would be 
successful in drawing benefits or resources downwards to the grassroot level: "The 
more they create more districts, the more the government has to spend on MPs who 
are doing nothing but are paid highly".437  
 





















Would you be happy if another district were 
created in this area? - per frequency of responses




These results suggest that when respondents to the household survey are 
asked about the creation of hypothetical additional districts, they do not feel that 
Uganda needs more districts, or already has too many. However, when asked about 
the creation of a new district specifically in the area in which they live, respondents 
are more likely to argue that the creation of a new district brings with it new services 
and new employment opportunities to their own area, and are therefore more likely to 
support the creation of a new district specifically where they live. It is important to note 
that households have a clear expectation that the creation of a new district leads to 
the establishment of new public services (“services will be brought”) closer to where 
they live. This suggests that respondents in the studied sites perceive (though this 
perception may not be accurate) that the creation of new districts can potentially 
generate the supply of new public services. 
 
The responses to this question suggest that in the studied sites, villagers do 
not perceive current levels of service delivery and employment opportunities to be 
sufficient, and perceive that they would be improved by the creation of a new, smaller, 
nearer district. This outcome is significant, as it implies that decentralisation has not 
yet succeeded in bringing improved services and development to the studied sites. 
Furthermore, according to the survey participants, this situation would be improved 
through the intensification of decentralisation: the creation of additional districts. The 
implications of this perception – that the creation of a new district leads to new services 
being established – are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Responses to this question were reasonably consistent across the studied 
sites, with the exception of Village 5 (in Ntungamo District). For Villages 1-4 and 6, 
respondents tended to suggest that they would be happy if a new district were 
established in their area. Explanatory comments focused on respondents’ belief that 
the creation of additional districts brings with it improved services and development, 
and improved access to jobs. Notably, in the free comments, many villagers expressed 
the view that the creation of a new district brings development itself nearer to the 
village.  However, in Village 5 in Ntungamo District, respondents in the studied site 
held differing views. In this village, respondents commented that they did not feel their 
district is too large at the moment, despite Ntungamo in fact being one of Uganda’s 
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largest districts (partly due to the rapid proliferation of districts in other areas). This 
potentially relates to the higher levels of economic activity and service delivery that 
tend to be present in western Uganda, where Village 5 is located, meaning that there 
is less demand for the services and development that new districts are perceived to 
bring.  
 
New districts and service delivery  
 
When asked, Do you think the creation of new districts makes service delivery 
better?, 74/108 (69 per cent) of respondents answered Yes, of whom 50 added that 
the creation of additional districts makes services better and/or brings services nearer. 
These answers are summarised in images 5.42 and 5.53 below.  
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Services 
nearer/better 
4 10 10 10 8 8 
Yes - Creates 
jobs 




2 1 0 0 0 1 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 




1 0 5 1 0 1 
No - Districts 
perform poorly 
2 1 1 2 2 1 
No - Services 
not improve 
2 0 0 2 1 0 
No - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
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IDK 4 6 0 1 1 2 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 8 12 12 13 13 16 
To some 
extent 
1 0 5 1 0 1 
No 5 1 1 4 4 1 
I don’t know 4 6 0 1 1 2 
5.42 Responses per village regarding whether service delivery is improved following 




5.43 Responses per village regarding whether service delivery is improved 
following the creation of an additional district  
 
Free-text answers to this same question included: 
 
V6, HH1 Yes, because "There will [be] creation of more services like 
hospitals, school and many others" 





















Does service delivery improve with the creation 
of additional districts? - responses per village
Yes TSE No IDK
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V1, HH4 Yes, because "When a district is created, there's a possibility that a 




Yes, because "services are brought nearer." 
V4, HH5 Yes, because "sufficient services which were previously lacking are 
brought closer to the people" 
V6, HH8 Yes, because "People get more leaders who are closer to them, 
new hospitals, schools are put in place." 
Responses to question, ‘Do you think the creation of new districts makes 
service delivery better?’ 
 
In Villages 1 and 2 (Pallisa District) some respondents expressed more 
uncertainty about whether the creation of a new district generates improved service 
delivery, with 10/36 respondents answering “I don’t know”. In Village 3, in Lira District, 
5/18 respondents were not confident that services would definitely improve following 
the creation of an additional district, with 5/18 respondents answering “To some extent; 
services may improve”. 16/108 respondents (15 per cent) were of the opinion that the 
creation of an additional district would not improve service delivery, with several 
respondents highlighting the poor performance of districts as being a cause of poor 
services, rather than the number or size of districts.  
 




No, because "Some districts may not [have] resources to extend services 
to people" 
V1, HH3 No, because "If they cannot provide for the available districts, how can 
they provide for the many they will create?" 
V2, 
HH17 
No, because "Districts can be created but may not be functioning well" 
Responses to question, ‘Do you think the creation of new districts makes 




Responses to this question, among both those who answered in the affirmative 
and in the negative, indicate that villagers have accepted and have begun to use for 
themselves the argument that the creation of an additional district should lead to 
improved service delivery. In response to this question, survey participants reported 
that in general, and across each studied site, they are of the opinion that the creation 
of a new district makes service delivery better. For a majority of respondents, the 
creation of an additional district improves service delivery by bringing services nearer 
to the village, or improving the quality of services. Those who answered No to this 
question did so not because they do not accept this argument, but because they do 
not believe districts are always sufficiently well-resourced to achieve this goal; they do 
nonetheless accept that improved service delivery is the goal of creating additional 
districts.  
 
This result is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that respondents to 
the household-level survey have absorbed and accepted the national government’s 
rationale for decentralisation: that transferring service delivery to the district level 
brings services and government ‘nearer to the people’. This should result in 
improvements to the quality of services and the accessibility and responsiveness of 
government. But furthermore, a second rationale also emerges from these results. Not 
only do respondents to the survey agree that decentralisation brings resources nearer 
to them, but the creation of new districts brings resources even nearer to them. That 
is, as well as accepting the rationale for decentralisation itself, household-survey 
respondents suggest that they would welcome the creation of additional districts in 
their area. Their perception is that the creation of a new district will be effective in 
improving the quality of public services and the responsiveness of government.438 
Moving beyond simply accepting decentralisation as a process of governance, 
household-survey respondents have come to identify the creation of new districts as 




438 This perception held by respondents – that the creation of a new district will “bring” services nearer 
to the population – may not be an accurate perception. New districts may not in fact achieve 
improvements to service delivery, due to the higher administrative cost of creating a new district. For 
example, expenditure on the wage bill of new officials may crowd out expenditure on new service. 
The implications of this result are discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 262 
New districts and government communication 
 
A second question sought to investigate whether respondents to the household 
survey also accept the second rationale made in favour of creating additional districts: 
that it improves communication between citizens and the government. When asked, 
Do you think the creation of more districts makes it easier for you to communicate with 
government?, 69/108 (64 per cent) of respondents answered Yes, and 11/108 (10 per 
cent) answered No. A further 21/108 (19 per cent) responded I don’t know. These 
results are summarised in images 5.44 and 5.45 below.  
 




7 10 7 7 8 5 
Yes - Leaders 
will be locals 








0 0 1 0 0 0 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 5 6 
TSE – 
Effort/capacity 
2 0 2 2 0 0 
TSE - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
No - Leaders 
never 
communicate 
0 1 3 3 2 2 
No - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
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IDK 6 7 1 1 2 5 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 9 10 14* 12 13 11 
To some 
extent 
2 0 2 2 1 0 
No 1 1 4 3 2 2 
I don’t know  6 7 1 1 2 5 
5.44 Responses per field site regarding whether the creation of an additional 
district facilitates communication between government and citizens 
 
 
5.45 Responses per field site regarding whether the creation of an additional 
district facilitates communication between government and citizens  
 
In free-text responses in answer to this question, respondents who answered 
Yes explained:  
 
V6, HH8 Yes, because "People can easily access their leader for 
communication, since MPs, LCs now come from nearer them" 




















Does creating new districts make communicating 
with government easier? - responses per village
Yes TSE No IDK
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V3, HH12 Yes, because "The voice of the people can be heard quickly because 
the fewer the people the easier to decide on their pressing needs" 
Responses to question, ‘Do you think the creation of more districts makes it easier 
for you to communicate with government?’ 
 
On the other hand, of the 11 respondents who answered No, 10 indicated that 
this was because they thought leaders would not communicate with them regardless 
of their proximity:  
 
V4, HH16 No, because "People's complaints at the grass root don't reach the 
government" 
V4, HH6 No, because "People's voices are not heard even when districts are 
few" 
V5, HH1 No, because "I have never communicated to the government through 
the districts" 
Responses to question, ‘Do you think the creation of more districts makes it easier 
for you to communicate with government?’ 
 
For these respondents, issues that cause poor communication and consultation 
between the government and citizens are due to factors other than the proximity or 
nearness of government offices, such as poor responsiveness of districts. For this 
reason, the creation of an additional district will not mitigate these communication 
barriers.  
 
Overall, for the majority of respondents, across each of the studied sites, the 
creation of additional districts is thought to make communication with government 
officials easier, with respondents answering that accessing and communicating with 
officials is easier with the creation of new districts. In Villages 3 and 4 (Lira District), 
respondents also reported that the creation of an additional district means that leaders 
are more likely to be members of the local community, making communication easier. 
However, in Villages 1 and 2 (Pallisa), 13/36 respondents (36 per cent) were unsure 
whether the creation of a new district makes communicating with leaders easier, 




District proliferation as a mechanism for achieving services and governance  
 
The results described in this sub-section indicate that for respondents to the 
household survey, the rationales that are generally said to underpin decentralisation 
itself – that decentralisation brings services and resources nearer to the population, 
and facilitates interaction with government – is made more powerful by the creation of 
additional districts. The creation of additional, smaller districts is perceived to result in 
services being brought yet nearer to the village level, with household-survey 
respondents accordingly reporting that they perceive that the creation of new districts 
‘brings’ development to the village level. Respondents to the survey have adopted and 
internalised the same rationales for creating new districts as those rationales that are 
given by the central government. Those are: that the creation of a new district brings 
services even nearer to the village than their current district does, and makes 
communication with government easier by further reducing the geographical space 
between citizens and officers of the government. There is not a separate rationale 
given to explain creating an additional district compared to implementing 
decentralisation itself, other than the description of a particular district as ‘too large’; it 
is then necessary for it to be divided into smaller districts for the benefits of 
decentralisation to be captured by a specific population.  
 
Furthermore, the responses given by household-survey participants suggest 
that they have taken this rationale further than simply accepting the rationale of the 
central government, relating to the benefits of decentralisation. Instead, household-
survey respondents suggested that their rationale has extended further, and they now 
view the creation of an additional district as being a mechanism for improving service 
delivery and improving communication with government. The rationale revealed by 
responses to the household survey suggest that respondents have drawn a 
connection between the creation of a new district and the improvement of services 
and government responsiveness. By actively seeking the creation of an additional 
district,439 therefore, voters can elect leaders who commit to delivering additional 
 
439 Examples of communities that have lobbied their District Council or MP for the creation of a new 
sub-national unit are given in section 6.6.  
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districts, in the belief that this will improve the quality and reach of services in their 
local area.   
 
In addition, responses to this question indicate a third outcome. That is, 
according to the responses given by participants in the survey, district creation has 
become something of a proxy for development itself: the creation of a new district 
means that services and development will be brought nearer to the village. Responses 
state that a new district “brings development” to a particular village, suggesting that 
respondents have come to view the creation of a new district as analogous to 
development itself. By ‘bringing’ services and resources to a new location, the creation 
of additional districts contributes to development itself at the village level. The creation 
of an additional district as means for bringing services and resources nearer to their 
location, is indistinguishable to the process of development. The significance of this 




New districts and political objectives: Election candidates promise to create districts  
 
Given that the majority of participants in the household survey reported that 
they would welcome the creation of a new district in their area, questions were included 
in the household survey to ascertain the extent to which election candidates attempt 
to leverage this preference for their own political advantage. As described in section 
5.3, in response to the question, Did the election candidates promise that they would 
being anything to the village if they were elected?, respondents nominated a range of 
public services, such as healthcare and water. These results are presented in table 
5.25 below. 
 
In the two studied sites in Pallisa District, 6/36 (17 per cent in those two sites) 
of respondents also noted that election candidates had committed to delivering a new 
district in the area. This is significant in light of the subsequent creation of a new district 
in Pallisa, to be called Butebo District.440 Parliament convened to vote on the creation 
of new districts in 2015 (in the lead-up to the 2016 election), confirming the creation of 
Butebo District, which came into effect on 1 July 2017.  
 
In addition to committing to creating new districts, respondents described 
election candidates who committed to delivering a range of public services in the 
studied sites if they were subsequently elected. This could be argued to represent a 
tacit acknowledgement by election candidates that these services are not currently 
being adequately provided, either in number or in quality. By committing to increase 
the quality and reach of services, knowing that this is a continuing development priority 
of the community, election candidates hope to gain the support of voters in a given 




440 In 2010 Museveni had announced that Butebo County would be elevated to a district (in effect 
removing it from Pallisa), in accordance with popular demand; however, by the time of the 2011 
election, the district had not been created. See: ‘President Grants Butebo County a District Status’. 
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 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, namely:       
Electricity 3 0 0 2 8 7 
Services 
(general) 
5 2 2 5 2 2 
Agriculture 1 0 5 7 1 1 
Water 1 6 3 6 3 7 
Roads 4 8 7 7 5 5 
School 3 4 2 11 3 0 
Healthcare  3 9 2 5 1 4 
District/sub-
county 
4 2 0 0 0 0 
“Yes” 0 0 1 0 6 6 
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n/a 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IDK 0 1 5 1 0 0 
5.46 Responses to the question, ‘Did the election candidates promise that they 
would being anything to the village if they were elected?’, per studied site 
 
This question reveals that electoral candidates promise to communities that 
they will bring specific new amenities to specific locations, depending on the major 
concerns of voters in these locations. In Pallisa, candidates suggested they would 
deliver a new district, as well as improved services such as education and healthcare. 
In Lira, candidates focus on agriculture, water and roads. In Ntungamo, where 
households are engaged in commercial farming to a greater degree than in other 
locations in Uganda, candidates commit to providing electricity services, and to 
improving roads. 
 
However, when then asked, Do you expect that they will deliver these things?, 
72/108 respondents (66 per cent) responded either No or I don’t know. The responses 






 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 1 2 0 4 6 2 
To some 
extent 
2 4 2 4 2 2 
No  6 8 10 4 4 4 
n/a 1 0 3 1 0 0 
IDK 8 4 3 5 6 10 
5.47 Responses to question ‘Do you expect that they will deliver these things?’, per 
studied site  
 
As noted in section 5.3, respondents did not expect that electoral candidates 
would meet the commitments they had made, explaining:  
 
V3, HH1 No, because "They just talk but they don't implement" 
V3, HH9 No, because "Campaign is just for getting in position of leadership. They 
promise but do not deliver" 
V4, HH16 No, because "They just talk because they want votes" 
 
 
These results suggest that villagers in the studied communities do not expect 
that improved public services will be delivered by election candidates. Responses to 
this question suggest that survey respondents are wary of election candidates’ ability 
or genuine intention to deliver the changes they promise, with a majority of 
respondents answering that they do not think, or do not know whether, candidates will 
deliver on their commitments. This result was broadly consistent across each of the 
six studied sites.  
 
However, when election candidates committed to delivering a new district in 
Pallisa, this commitment was in fact delivered, with Butebo District being created and 
split from Pallisa. That is, when election candidates committed to delivering a new 
district, this was delivered in reality. When combined with villagers’ understanding that 
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the delivery of a new district will mean that improvements to public services will be 
generated or “brought”, as described in the preceding section 5.5, these results 
suggest that villagers are likely to associate improvements to public services with the 
creation of additional districts. In short, when politicians promise to deliver new 
services, households are disbelieving; but there is evidence that a promised new 
district will in fact be created, and that services may be created (“brought”) to the area 
afterwards.  
 
These results help to explain the comments of respondents as reported in the 
previous section, that the creation of additional districts “brings development” to the 
community. From the perspective of villagers in the studied site, the commitment of 
government that is most likely to be delivered by elected officials is a new district, and 
then after a new district is created, survey participants believe that this will in turn 
generate improvements to public service delivery. Survey participants remain 
sceptical about election candidates’ commitments to deliver improved public services, 
but when a district is promised, villagers can observe that it is then delivered. Survey 
respondents further perceive that once a new district is created, they believe that new 
services will be “brought” to the community afterwards. We therefore see a mechanism 
emerge from the perspective of survey participants: election candidates promise to 
deliver a new district, which is then in fact delivered, which is then assumed or 
perceived by villagers in the studied sites to bring new employment opportunities and 
new services to the area. This is a striking comparison to election candidates who 
commit to delivering improved public services, but then following an election, little 
perceptible change takes place – with the result that survey participants report 
disbelief and scepticism of candidates who make these commitments. The 





5.7 Summary of survey outcomes: Poor services, low participation, new districts 
 
The results from the household survey from six villages in Uganda draw 
attention to some of the weaknesses of the delivery of decentralisation in the Ugandan 
context. For these 108 households, their daily experience of decentralised governance 
differs from the theoretical rationales of decentralised governance in several important 
ways, particularly relating to participation, consultation, complaint-making, and 
responsiveness. Participants in the survey report that they are reluctant to draw 
attention to faults or flaws in public service delivery, as doing so does not generate a 
possible response from government agents – and can draw negative attention to 
themselves. Participants report that planning meetings in the studied villages are not 
always open to all members of the village: instead, specific villagers are invited to 
participate, or social barriers such as illiteracy prevent active participation. Relatedly, 
the perception of survey respondents is that the development priorities of the village 
are determined at higher levels of governance than the village. Villagers in the studied 
sites report that they do not always feel consulted on the development of village 
workplans or budgets; in particular, they do not feel that the national budget has been 
inclusive of their views.  
 
Importantly, participants raised a number of concerns about the quality and 
accessibility of public services in their village, and also revealed households’ 
preferences regarding service delivery. Participants reported frequent instances of 
drug stock-outs, reported that medical care was sometimes unaffordable, and reported 
that school fees are frequently burdensome – to the extent that children are held back 
from school until fees can be paid. Few households were observed to have access to 
a water point, and none was seen to have access to government-provided electricity. 
Villagers reported a range of strategies for adapting to the absence of public utilities, 
such as obtaining private, household-level solar panels. Households also trade in 
valuable assets, such as goats, as a store of wealth that can be converted to liquidity 
when needed, as a strategy for managing their exclusion from formal financial 
markets. In small ways, villagers in the studied sites are able to find private solutions 
to the failures in public services, though they recognise that there are flaws in the 




Complexities were also revealed regarding participants’ perceptions of the 
responsiveness of government. For those households who view the role of 
government as providing small items, such as livestock or a solar panel, their answers 
to questions regarding the responsiveness of government to local development 
priorities was more likely to be positive. Others, who see a role for government in the 
provision of sector-level services (and where these services are poor-quality), are less 
likely to report that government has been responsive to the village’s development 
needs. Regarding tribal groups, participants in the survey feel that on balance, some 
tribes are able to access political and economic advantages to a greater extent than 
others. While participants felt it was important that their elected representatives were 
from the same tribe as them, in daily life, they are less concerned about the tribal 
identity of trading partners or other business relationships. This suggests that villagers 
in the studied sites perceive that elected leaders tend to favour their own tribal group 
in the allocation of resources, or that there are ways in which this tribal connection can 
be leveraged by villagers in an advantageous manner.  
 
Responses to survey questions relating to district proliferation revealed a 
degree of complexity in villagers’ opinions. Initially, respondents generally argued that 
there are a sufficient, or even excessive, number of districts in Uganda at present. 
However, participants then agreed that they would be happy if a new district were 
created in their immediate area. In free-text answers that expanded on these 
responses, villagers in the studied sites explained that the creation of new districts 
near to them would bring public services nearer, and facilitate communication with 
government. In this sense, the rationales for creating new districts are the same as 
those for decentralisation itself; there is not a distinct rationale for the creation of 
additional districts. These findings suggest that villagers would prefer decentralisation 
to be implemented with greater intensity than is currently the case, with and expansion 
in the number of districts in respondents’ own communities. That is, decentralisation 
has not yet succeeded in delivering high-quality services to the studied communities; 




preference is for decentralisation to be implemented more intensively: for an additional 
district to be created where they live.441  
 
Relatedly, villagers explained the ways in which candidates for election to 
political roles promise to deliver improved services to the village, but these promises 
are regarded with scepticism. Villagers in the studied sites argue that these promises 
are simply made in exchange for votes, but are not delivered after the election. In 
contrast, participants instead perceive that the creation of an additional district or lower 
administrative unit will “bring” services nearer to them, and is a more reliable 
mechanism that formal channels in delivering improvements in service delivery and 
governance.  
 
These issues illustrate the ways in which the interaction between 
decentralisation and the political economy in Uganda have generated results that 
diverge from the theories and rationales underpinning decentralisation. Rather than 
being able to participate in the governance process, villagers in the six field sites report 
that their elected leaders rarely communicate with them, other than in the lead-up to 
elections. Rather than the results of planning processes being based on the views of 
the grassroot, high-level planning priorities dominate, and the outcomes of planning 
are in fact top-down. Results from the collected data also reveal that from the 
perspective of the grassroot, despite the promise of decentralisation delivering 
improved service delivery and more responsive governments, in fact little in daily life 
has changed. Villagers in the studied sites have developed a range of private survival 
strategies in an attempt to mitigate the effects of poor service delivery, and at other 
times are forced to go without adequate services.  
  
 
441 The intersection of these preferences with those of elected leaders and elites will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven.  
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5.8 Comparing and contrasting the experiences of different field sites 
 
The household survey was conducted in six field sites in three districts, and the 
results of the survey generate insights into the different challenges and priorities facing 
respondents in these three districts. These different priorities are in turn reflected in 
respondents’ statements on which public policy changes they would prefer to be 
enacted, including regarding the creation of additional districts. Given the substantial 
economic, political, social and geographical differences between Uganda’s three 
regions, as discussed in section 5.1 of this chapter, the results of the household survey 
might have been expected to vary widely across the three represented regions. 
However, the results from the household survey in fact contain some striking 
similarities across the three studied districts. The differences in the societies, 
economies and geographies of the three studied districts have had a smaller impact 
than was expected on the survey results at the village level, other than the differences 
that are described in this section.  
 
Respondents in each site reported that they experience problems in accessing 
public services (either due to the cost of the service or its absence), that they do not 
feel fully engaged with local-level planning and budgeting, and that they utilise a 
number of strategies for managing the absence of public services. In addition, 
respondents across the six studied sites broadly agreed that they would be happy if a 
new district were created in the region in which they live, that they perceive that the 
creation of a new district would “bring” service delivery and employment opportunities 
nearer to where they live, and that they prefer that their elected representatives be 
members of their own tribe. Furthermore, responses from the household survey 
highlight that respondents feel sceptical about claims made by election candidates 
that they will deliver improved services to the village if they are elected; on the other 
hand, after politicians commit to creating a new district in a particular location, a new 
district is then delivered.  
 
These results are significant because they point to the underlying motivations 




districts. Having experienced poor-quality, absent, or unaffordable services, and faced 
with politicians who commit to improvements but do not deliver them, respondents 
describe the creation of additional districts as a potential avenue or strategy for 
pursuing the delivery of new services, employment opportunities, and even improved 
development itself. The implications of these findings will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Summary of findings from Pallisa District  
 
The survey outcomes from Village 1 and Village 2, located in Pallisa District in 
eastern Uganda, reflect the ethnic diversity in this district, and a lower level of 
engagement between participants and local-level planning and participation 
mechanisms. Participants in the household survey were the least likely of all 
respondents to report that they regularly attend the village’s planning meetings, and 
the least likely to report that they have ever met an MP. This suggests an elevated 
level of disengagement from communication with government agents, from both the 
respondents and from their elected representatives. In addition, these two sites 
recorded higher cultural diversity than the other four sites, with not all respondents 
being from one tribal group. Some Village 1 and Village 2 respondents also stated that 
their local MPs and their LC5 councillors were not from the same tribal background as 
themselves, though conversely, they were also more likely than other respondents to 
report that they placed a high level of importance on their representatives being from 
their same tribal group. That is, participants in the household survey reported that they 
currently are not represented by people from their own tribe, even though this is 
something they would prefer. This suggests implications for the creation of districts 
that coincide with social delineations, as will be discussed in more detail in chapters 7 
and 8.  
 
Survey participants from Pallisa District, and in particular from Village 1, were 
the least likely to be persuaded that the creation of a new district will necessarily 
improve service delivery or communication with government, with 4/18 and 6/18 
respondents answering ‘I don’t know’ to these questions, respectively, in Village 1. 
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Nonetheless, respondents in Village 1 and Village 2 responded that they would be 
‘happy’ if a new district were created near to where they live, with 26/36 respondents 
answering in the affirmative to this question across the two studied villages. Finally, 
some Village 1 and Village 2 respondents also reported that electoral candidates who 
visited their villages in the lead-up to the 2016 elections promised that if elected they 
would implement the creation of a new district in Pallisa. This was indeed 
implemented, with Butebo District splitting from Pallisa following the 2016 election.  
 
Summary of findings from Lira District  
 
Responses to the household survey from participants in Village 3 and Village 
4, located in Lira District, reflect the greater level of poverty affecting residents of 
northern Uganda. Respondents in this district were the most likely respondents to 
report that there were households in their village that were living in poverty, and that 
this poverty could be identified by household members lacking adequate food. One 
respondent reported that their household owns no assets at all, including a mattress 
or a kerosene lantern. Participants in the survey from these two districts were also 
most likely to respond that their home was constructed from naturally-occurring 
materials, such as mud and sticks, compared to metal or bricks. Most respondents in 
Village 4 reported that the village does not have access to a primary school, which 
was reflected in their reports that visiting electoral candidates promised to deliver a 
school to the village if elected. Respondents in this village were also the most likely of 
all participants to report that they have in the past been unable to afford medical 
treatment, or that they have been unable to afford to pay their children’s school fees.  
 
In addition, respondents in these two villages were the least likely of all 
participants to answer that they believe the government has addressed the 
development needs of their village, and the most likely to report that they believe that 
public services in their village are provided by NGOs. The higher level of poverty and 
poorer standard of service delivery in northern regions is reflected in respondents’ 
answers to questions regarding service affordability, accessibility and quality, as well 




of respondents in these two villages reported that they would be ‘happy’ if a new district 
were created in the area in which they live. A majority of respondents also responded 
that they perceive that a new district would generate improved service delivery and 
improved communication with government if it were created.  
 
Summary of findings from Ntungamo District  
 
Village 5 and Village 6 are located in Ntungamo District, in the west of Uganda, 
an area which tends to experience greater levels of economic activity and more 
developed agriculture than other regions. As might be expected given the higher levels 
of economic development in this region, responses given by survey participants in 
these villages suggest that villagers experience lower poverty levels than respondents 
in Pallisa or Lira Districts. Villagers in the two Ntungamo sites were the most likely to 
nominate the main development priorities of the village as income-generating 
agricultural activity, such as growing cash crops. These participants reported with the 
greatest frequency that their homes are constructed from non-natural materials, such 
as corrugated iron. Respondents in these two sites were the most likely to expect that 
election candidates would implement the services they had promised to deliver if they 
were elected, and the most likely to perceive that the government had addressed the 
development priorities of their community.  
 
Respondents in these two sites reported with the greatest frequency that they 
are personally acquainted with someone who works in the national public service or 
national parliament, and are the most likely to state that they believe that public 
services in their village are delivered by the national government (rather than the 
district government). In spite of this, respondents in these two sites were the least 
likely to answer that they believe some tribal groups are favoured over others in terms 
of access to economic or political opportunities. 
 
However, even though the survey responses given by participants in Village 5 
and 6 point to a greater level of economic opportunity and lower level of poverty in 
Ntungamo, participants nonetheless expressed concerns with the quality and 
availability of public services, and reported that government representatives were not 
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responsive to complaints or feedback from community members. Furthermore, survey 
participants in these two villages expressed strong preferences regarding the creation 
of additional districts. A majority of respondents in both villages reported that they 
perceive that service delivery and communication with government would both 
improve if a new district were created in the area in which they live. In Village 5, 
uniquely amongst all the studied villages, did participants express ambivalence about 
the creation of new districts, with 11/18 indicating that they would not be happy if a 
new district were created locally. In expanding on this answer, respondents suggested 
that their local area was sparsely populated, and so a new district was not required. A 
majority of respondents in Village 6, however, reported that they would be ‘happy’ if a 
new district were created in the area in which they live, arguing that the creation of a 









This chapter has discussed the viewpoints of some village-level residents of six 
studied field sites within three regions of Uganda, and has revealed the perspectives 
of these household members on service delivery, governance, decentralisation and 
district proliferation. The survey sought to examine the alignment between the 
assumptions underpinning decentralisation policy – that it is able to generate improved 
service delivery and more responsive, communicative government – and the 
experience of residents of the village level. Questions examined the extent to which 
village members in the six studied sites feel that they are indeed able to hold local-
government officials to account for the delivery of high-quality services, and how 
responsive and communicative local governments are to their communities.  
 
The results of the survey suggest that for survey participants across the six 
sites, the promise of decentralisation has not as yet been realised. Services remain of 
poor quality, sometimes inaccessible due to service fees, and sometimes not available 
at all. Participation in decision-making and bottom-up planning is inconsistent, 
including within some villages, and government representatives have not responded 
adequately to community members’ complaints about the standard of services. 
Furthermore, participants in the household survey described their strategies for 
gaining access to resources in the absence of well-performing state systems and 
institutions, which involve the strategic use of institutions, markets and social capital. 
Firstly, villagers describe the market-based solutions they attempt to undertake to 
address the shortcomings of decentralised service delivery. Where possible, villagers 
seek private, individual solutions to the absence of services and utilities, such as using 
solar panels in the absence of an electricity network. However, these household-level 
strategies cannot extend to finding private market solutions to address the absence of 
larger-scale services, such as education. Secondly, villagers seek solutions to poorly-
performing decentralisation institutions through the use of social capital and 
interpersonal relationships. These include the leveraging of personal connections to 




In this context, the creation of additional districts is revealed to be consistent 
with these household-level strategies for gaining access to services and networks. 
While households in the studied sites report that they have already become adept at 
drawing on social capital and networks to obtain improved employment opportunities 
or to lobby for improved services, the creation of additional districts transforms these 
strategies from the household level to the community level. The establishment of a 
new district, which brings the site of government decision-making even nearer to the 
community, further enables respondents’ existing strategies for obtaining services and 
leveraging networks. When the physical distance between communities and the site 
of government are reduced, villagers are able to create and leverage networks with 
local leaders more easily, and there is a greater probability that the leaders of a new 
district will be from their same tribal group (and may even be personally known to an 
individual villager). Survey respondents perceive that the establishment of a new, 
nearer district could potentially open further opportunities to seek employment 
opportunities in government, and the creation of a new district could bring with it the 
establishment of new services. The creation of an additional district is thus reframed 
as an opportunity for communities to realise improvement and development in their 
local area.  
 
Finally, as described in Chapter 3, the household survey was conducted in sites 
that span the three major regions of Uganda. As discussed in section 5.1, it was 
expected that the economic, political, cultural and geographical/agricultural 
differences between these regions would be reflected in the results of the household 
survey. However, while the results of the survey do to some extent reflect the 
differences between the studied regions (for example, with participants’ responses 
from Lira District pointing to the higher levels of poverty in northern Uganda), overall 
the survey results are relatively consistent across the six studied sites for a majority of 
the survey’s questions. In each location, participants’ survey responses convey 
consistently poor outcomes from decentralisation, with poor-quality service delivery 
and non-responsive governments being reported across the studied sites. Participants 
consistently report low levels of engagement in planning and budgeting processes, 
challenges in affording school fees, and absent medical supplies when healthcare was 
needed. Dissatisfaction with the standard of governance at the sub-national level is 




economic activity might have been expected to translate into greater levels of 
satisfaction with governance standards. Participants also reported consistently that 
they prefer that their elected representatives are from the same tribal group as 
themselves, as this leads to easier communication and higher standards of 
representation. Furthermore, there is widespread support for the creation of additional 
districts, in each of the studied sites other than Village 5. In Villages 1-4 and Village 6, 
survey participants argued that they perceive that the creation of additional districts 
may create improved service delivery and may generate increased employment 
opportunities. Even in Village 5, survey participants agreed that the creation of new 
districts brings these same opportunities, even though they felt that their own region 
is too sparsely-populated to make an additional district necessary; there was not 
disagreement with the benefits that are created from a new district being established. 
In the following chapters, the implications and theoretical connections of these results 













Drivers of district proliferation:  
The political and economic incentives of multiple actors 
 
I think [district creation] is largely political. The President has been 
in campaigns and gets to speak to these people. They are always 
asking him for districts, for ministers, for.... Everyone wants to have 
a separate power base, and their own ministry, their own, their own, 
their own... So I am sure he doesn’t say no, he keeps saying yes to 
all these requests, and this is how we have 112 districts. And that is 
why that swearing in [of new MPs] is going to last for four days. 
Because we have 443 MPs, up from 375. So. We are stuck in this 
bad way. 
- Senior Economist, OPM, Kampala442  
 
6.1 Introduction: Strategies for access and survival under decentralisation  
 
As described in the literature in section 2.1, theoretical models of 
decentralisation argue that the introduction of sub-national governments generates 
more-responsive governance, better targeting and quality of public services, and 
greater participation of communities in governance. By moving the site of government 
closer to the served populations, local governments can be more cognisant of the 
development needs of the local community. In turn, greater proximity between citizens 
and governments means that citizens can monitor the performance of local 
governments, and exercise choice at elections to exclude from office those who have 








However, Chapters Four and Five presented the results from research and data 
collection undertaken for this thesis, in Kampala and in three rural districts spread 
across Uganda’s three regions. Results were collected that incorporate the viewpoints 
of both elite and non-elite actors, to analyse decentralisation from both the elite and 
the grassroot perspective. The results collected suggest that in Uganda, the 
implementation of decentralisation has generated a range of issues, relating to the 
financing, performance and independence of sub-national governments. Expert 
informants in interviews, village-level participants in the household survey, and 
quantitative data from the budget process each point to a range of challenges and 
issues in the operation of decentralised governance. In turn, these decentralisation 
outcomes have implications for the quality of service delivery, the participation of 
communities in governance, and the performance of sub-national governments.  
 
This chapter draws together the three sets of results from the elements of 
fieldwork undertaken for this thesis: quantitative data, interviews of elite actors, and a 
household-level survey, as have been fully presented in Chapters Four and Five. The 
relationship between the research results and the existing literature is also compared 
and contrasted. In drawing together these sets of results, this chapter analyses the 
overall fieldwork outcomes, and situates the research undertaken for the thesis within 
the broader literature. The analysis sets out where the research supports the findings 
in the relevant literature, and where the thesis qualifies or extends the existing 
literature. Furthermore, this chapter analyses the implications of district proliferation 
by drawing on the primary research conducted for this thesis, and articulates where 
this research qualifies or supports the existing research on this topic.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter raises the suggestion that the poor 
performance of decentralisation and of sub-national governments has resulted in poor 
service delivery, and dissatisfaction among the studied communities with the 
outcomes of decentralisation. From this point, it is argued that different actors within 
the public policy space hope to pursue different strategies in improving the outcomes 
of decentralisation. For some, decentralisation has not yet been implemented 
completely or deeply enough, so that decentralisation’s contribution to sub-national 
service delivery and community participation can be improved through the creation of 
new districts. For others, improvements in the quality of local governance hold the key 
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to improving decentralisation, and the creation of additional districts draws much-
needed resources away from expenditure priorities in other areas. It is then suggested 
that the motivations and incentives of a range actors across the Ugandan political 
economy – from elite levels to the village – create a common drive towards the 
continual creation of additional districts and sub-counties.  
 
By bringing together the three elements of field research undertaken for this 
thesis, and comparing and contrasting these findings against the existing literature, 
this chapter adopts both a top-down and bottom-up approach to addressing the 
research question: the viewpoints of both elites and village-level participants are 
included. This analysis thus contributes to addressing the two-directional nature of the 
research question, by asking how the political and economic context of Uganda both 
affects, and is affected by, decentralisation. The emergence of district proliferation is 







6.2 Issues in the current decentralisation system: Consistent results 
 
This section draws together the results of research undertaken for this thesis, 
of both qualitative methods and quantitative data, and undertakes analysis that draws 
comparisons between these results and the existing literature. The fieldwork results of 
this thesis highlight the challenges for PFM and sub-national governance that have 
been generated by decentralisation in Uganda. This section presents fieldwork results 
that support the arguments made in the existing literature,443 regarding the 
weaknesses of the decentralisation system in Uganda. It is argued that the current 
model of decentralisation in Uganda results in: a high level of dependence of sub-
national governments on the central government; low levels of responsiveness of sub-
national governments to the development needs of local communities; continued 
dominance of the central government in priority-setting processes; and poor-quality 
public services. In short, the current decentralisation system in Uganda is not 
delivering responsive and participatory governance to the grassroot, and has not 
improved the targeting of services to local development needs. The implications of 
these outcomes will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
Sub-national government financing and staffing: Insufficient and problematic 
 
The results of fieldwork undertaken for this thesis have revealed a number of 
concerns relating to sub-national governments’ financing, performance, independence 
and capacity, in support of existing literature444 relating to this topic. In particular, 
qualitative and quantitative data point to issues in four key areas: low local-revenue 
collection; high levels of conditionality in the funding transferred to sub-national 
governments; a high absorption of funding by administrative costs at the district level; 
and poor performance and capacity of local councils and sub-national governments.  
 
Locally-raised revenue is inadequate 
  
 
443 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda; Jean et al., 
‘Local Government Fiscal Discretion in Uganda’. 
444 Jean et al., ‘Local Government Fiscal Discretion in Uganda’. 
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There is a substantial challenge in Uganda in seeking tax payments from 
members of the community, particularly in rural areas that do not have high levels of 
participation in a market economy. As reported by key interlocutors, firstly in Kampala 
and then at lower-government levels across the three districts studied for this thesis, 
it is relatively common in rural Uganda for citizens to pay no tax, or to pay some form 
of tax only rarely. As described by interview participants, district and sub-county 
governments are permitted under the Local Government Act 1997 to collect revenue 
in the form of taxes and levies on specific economic activities.445 However, interview 
participants in Lira, Pallisa and Ntungamo explained that in their districts, the level of 
economic activity within these categories is so low that little revenue can be derived in 
this way. As described446 by the CAO of one of the studied districts:  
But the challenge with it is the sources are small. We have like, 
property tax. We have local service tax. Local hotel tax. Market fees, 
trading licences, money from bids, through government 
procurement processes that are fundable – applications for those 
who are applying for a survey of land and registration, and so on. 
Those fees are normally collected, but they are – they are a bit 
small. 
  
These reports from key informants are supported by budget data447 indicating 
that for most districts, the percentage of the district annual budget that is made up of 
locally-raised revenue is around 2 to 3 per cent. These results support what is found 
in the literature from other authors’ research in Uganda.448  
 
As explained by interview participants, the importance of locally-raised revenue 
in the funding envelope of sub-national governments is that this revenue may be spent 
at the discretion of that district or sub-county, without the approval of the central 
government. Where local revenue collection is low, and districts become dependent 
on conditional transfers from the central government, the ability of sub-national 
 
445 Income taxes are also levied on public-servant employees of the district and sub-county. 
446 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 6. 03 February 2016.  
447 National Budget Framework Papers statements of accounts, 2003/04 to 2015/16. Analysis by 
author. 
448 For example Steven Jean et al., “Local Government Fiscal Discretion in Uganda.” NYU Advanced 




governments to respond to local development priorities is hindered.449 A Senior 
Economist at OPM explains:450  
Ideally, it’s a bottom-up approach that the district should focus on. 
Unfortunately it’s top-bottom, because the district will come up with 
very good plans, from the village all the way up to the top. …. 
Unfortunately the funds will not permit them to implement even a 
third of it, because the centre determines what you get, the centre 
has its conditions, and that kills the entire bottom-up. 
Thus, low levels of local revenue collection undermine a core rationale for the 
implementation of decentralisation: that local-level governments are better able than 
the central government to respond to local development issues. Because levels of 
locally-raised revenue are low, sub-national governments remain dependent in 
practice on funding delivered by the central government, a large majority of which is 
conditional, as discussed below.  
 
Conditionality in transfers: hinders sub-national government responsiveness 
 
According to both central and sub-national government interviewees,451 a 
substantial majority of the funding that is transferred from the central government to 
lower governments is in the form of conditional grants. Sub-national governments are 
not entitled to direct conditional funds towards any activities other than those that are 
specified in the guidelines accompanying each grant. Data from the national budget452 
supports this concern, and indicates that the percentage of transfers to sub-national 
governments that is in the form of conditional grants is approximately 87 per cent 
across all districts between 2011/12 and 2015/16. These findings from fieldwork 
results are in accordance with and support of those of authors in the existing literature, 
such as Asiimwe and Musisi,453 and Kuteesa et al.,454 who argue that the high 
 
449 This result is echoed in the findings of Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of 
Governance in Uganda. 
450 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 74. 17 May 2016.  
451 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 12. 05 May 2016. 
452 From the annual MTEFs, 2011/12 to 2015/16.  
453 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
454 Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s Economic Reforms. 
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proportion of conditional grants in transfers to sub-national governments reduces the 
responsiveness of these governments to local priorities and needs.  
 
Substantial wage bill and administrative costs crowd out development expenditure 
 
A third issue identified during research and data collection is the high proportion 
of discretionary district-level funding that is absorbed by expenditure on wages and 
other administrative funds. As shown by an analysis of the MTEF,455 of the resource 
envelope that is available to sub-national governments, a small percentage (around 
15 per cent for most districts) is comprised of the unconditional grant, which is funding 
that can be committed to the priorities of that sub-national unit itself.456 However, as 
explained by key informants in the three studied districts, recurrent expenses include 
the wages of staff of the district itself, as well as administrative costs such as office 
equipment, computers and vehicles that are required to operate the district.457 As a 
result, expenditure on the administration of the district itself and on salary payments 
of staff tends to crowd out discretionary, unconditional expenditure on service delivery. 
This is substantiated by budget data458 indicating that the wage bill of the three studied 
districts comprises half of the annual unconditional grant of the district itself, as 
illustrated in figure 4.11. In the three studied districts, the wage bill and other recurrent 
expenses comprise more than half of the expenditure funded by the unconditional 
grant, with only the remainder (approximately 8 per cent of the annual district budget) 
remaining for development expenditure (to address the community’s nominated 
development priorities). These results supports research conducted by authors such 
as Asiimwe and Musisi,459 and Jean et al.,460 who describe high levels of conditionality 
and fiscal burden caused by the wage bill in districts across Uganda.  
 
 
455 For the financial years 2011/12 to 2015/16, for all districts.  
456 This unallocated funding is comprised of revenue that the sub-national government is able to raise 
locally (2 to 3 per cent), and transfers of funds from the central government that are unconditional (10 
to 12 per cent). The remaining 85 to 87 per cent of funding is conditional, and is earmarked by the 
central government for expenditures on specific projects. 
457 Pers.Comm. Interviews with author, numbers 3 (03 February 2016), 19 (11 February 2016) and 48 
(28 April 2016).  
458 Source: Local Government Budget Framework Papers of the three studied districts, 2012/13 to 
2015/16. Analysis author’s own.  
459 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 




Local governments’ performance and capacity are poor 
 
A final issue relating to local governments’ operations and performance that 
emerges from the research is the issue of poor performance and capacity of sub-
national governments. In interviews, key informants at the central government level 
explained that many districts are operating with less than their full complement of staff, 
with negative implications for their performance. These issues are particularly acute 
for remote areas, which can be challenging for both attraction of qualified staff, and 
retention of those staff who are hired.461 A Senior Economist in OPM summarises462 
their view of the situation:  
For us, we have poor pay, so you get the worst people, and then we 
expect a lot from them, but they can’t deliver much.  
 
These findings from this research are reflected in research described in the 
existing literature. Authors such as Onyach-Olaa463 and Golooba-Mutebi464 similarly 
argue that the low capacity and staffing levels of sub-national governments in Uganda 
represents a flaw in decentralisation, as these governments are poorly equipped to 
manage the complexities of delivering public services.  
 
Priority-setting process and local-level consultation: The centre continues to dominate  
 
The theories underpinning decentralisation, as discussed in section 2.1, 
suggest that bringing the site of government decision-making ‘nearer to the people’ 
will facilitate improved participation of communities in governance, via mechanisms 
such as bottom-up planning and budgeting. However, the research undertaken for this 
thesis, collected through interviews and a household-level survey, suggest that while 
these mechanisms may indeed take place, in the three studied districts, the realities 
of the political economy context change the outcomes of decentralisation such that 
genuine participation may not be achieved. In this sense, the research conducted for 
 
461 Kakumba and Fennell, ‘Human Resources Retention in Local Government: Review of Uganda’s 
Policy and Institutional Mechanisms for Performance’. 
462 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 74. 17 May 2016. 
463 Onyach-Olaa, ‘The Challenges of Implementing Decentralisation: Recent Experiences in Uganda’. 




this thesis supports arguments made in the existing literature465: that while the systems 
of participation are in place, the outcome of participation may not be realised. While 
the budget process has inbuilt goals of participation and consultation, the realities of 
the Ugandan political-economy context mean that these are currently being disrupted, 
in the studied field sites. 
 
Consultation in priority-setting process: How genuine is community participation?  
 
Theoretically, the Ugandan budget formulation process contains a number of 
elements that are designed to generate consultation at the sub-national level. As 
described in section 1.1, communication between levels of LCs is designed to flow 
upwards, from LC1 to LC5, due to the inclusion of consultation stages in the budget 
process. The district’s annual budget and workplan, therefore, are theoretically 
comprised of the most pressing development priorities of the villages contained within 
the district.466 This sub-section draws on results from interviews with key actors in the 
PFM system as well results from the household-level survey, to argue that in the 
studied districts, community participation may not be realised to the extent described 
in these theoretical frameworks.   
 
However, interviews conducted with key informants at two levels of government 
– the central government level and in three districts – call into question whether the 
development priorities of the community are genuinely addressed by the national 
budget. While the bottom-up planning process may be faithfully followed, the 
dominance of the top-down weight of prioritisation effectively cancels out the bottom-
up plans. As discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2, the funding that is received by district 
and sub-county governments and administrative arms is largely conditional funding. 
The purpose of these funds has already been determined by sectoral ministries at the 
central level, and communicated downwards to the district level via the IPFs and 
 
465 Balunywa et al., ‘An Analysis of Fiscal Decentralization as a Strategy for Improving Revenue 
Performance in Ugandan Local Governments’; Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid 
Regime. 
466 This process is described by Francis and James (Paul Francis and Robert James, ‘Balancing 
Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization 
Program’, World Development 31, no. 2 (1 February 2003): 325–37), who then argue that in practice, 
most sub-national governments in Uganda receive insufficient funding for these bottom-up 




Guidelines contained within the budget process. That is, after receiving from the 
central government the conditional grants and the guidelines that explain the purpose 
for which the grants are earmarked, district governments are required to develop a list 
of activities to make use of these funds. According to respondents in the three studied 
districts and at the national level of government, the priorities expressed by the 
community are only utilised for the purpose of distributing activities amongst villages, 
rather than determining which sectors will be prioritised for funding. Priorities that are 
generated at the village level but that do not accord with the national development 
priorities will not be included in the budget, as explained467 by an Economist from 
MoFPED:  
Sometimes a district wants to construct a building, we tell them to 
phase it out, because it will not be possible to cover it. We advise 
them to take it out. 
 
Furthermore, findings from the household survey undertaken in six villages 
suggest that villagers do not feel that they are included in the budget process as it is 
conducted in their local area. 75 per cent of respondents answered No to the question 
of whether they feel that they are involved and consulted in the process of formulating 
the national budget. 75 per cent of respondents also indicated that they were not 
aware that the budget process is intended to be consultative. For many survey 
respondents, their experience of the budget is limited to listening to a radio broadcast 
of the budget speech. A mere 9 per cent of respondents believed that the community 
has a role in determining the development priorities of their village, with the remainder 
nominating the district or central governments as the chief determinants of village-
level priorities.  
 
Overall, in support of findings by authors in the existing literature,468 the results 
from the household-level survey and from interviews with participants across multiple 
levels of government suggest that the central assumptions of decentralisation may not 
hold in practice, in the three studied districts. Specifically, the theoretical principles of 
consultation and participation in the national budget process, that are central to the 
 
467 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 29. 11 April 2016. 
468 Lambright, Decentralization in Uganda. 
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theoretical assumptions underpinning decentralisation policy, may not be being 
realised in the ways that the theories suggest they will.  
 
Community engagement with government: Grassroot actors contradict elites  
 
A guiding theory of decentralisation is that the creation of local governments 
allows villagers to participate in resource-allocation and service delivery processes.469 
For example, the creation of government units that are in close proximity to 
communities theoretically allows villagers to complain to local leaders in the event of 
poor-quality service delivery, or to be consulted on their opinions of local development 
needs. However, as discussed above, the high percentage of the budget that is 
comprised of conditional grants means that central-government development priorities 
dominate locally-generated priorities in the outcomes of the budget.  
 
Two principal areas of concern can be identified regarding participation of 
citizens in local-level governance. Firstly, respondents to the household survey 
explained that they rarely succeed in seeking redress for poor-quality public services. 
Of the 32 participants in the household survey that had reported concerns about a 
public service to an elected local representative, only one reported that the issue that 
been fully resolved. Furthermore, some participants explained that they feared 
reprisals or other negative outcomes if they were to make a complaint about a poor-
quality service.470 In addition, for those respondents to the survey who had made a 
complaint but did not feel their concern was addressed, comments explained that 
those who received their complaint did nothing to resolve the issue.471 These findings 
are supported by fieldwork conducted with government officials. In an interview, a 
District’s CAO explained that one of the main challenges he faces in his role is 
managing the expectations of the community, and explaining to them that resource 
limitations mean their complaints are unlikely to be addressed.472  
 
 
469 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
470 Pers.Comm. Comments made to research assistant, and then recorded in writing, during the 
household survey. 20 April 2016.  
471 Pers.Comm. Comments made to research assistant, and then recorded in writing, during the 
household survey. 24 April 2016. 




Secondly, household-survey respondents explained that they do not feel 
consulted on their development priorities, and that they do not place great value in 
village consultative meetings. Of respondents to the survey, almost 40 per cent of 
respondents reported that they never attend a village meeting. Explanatory 
comments473 relating to this question described barriers to participation in village 
meetings such as not feeling sufficiently educated or literate to attend, or not having 
been invited to attend the village meeting.474 These results point to barriers to 
participation in governance processes that are more complex than proximity alone, 
implying that creating sub-national governments nearer to the community may not 
have been sufficient in the studied sites to drive participation in governance.475 
Respondents reported that their participation in the budget process was limited to 
listening to the budget speech on radio; in this sense, the ‘consultative’ budget process 
is reduced to simply informing citizens of the budget outcomes, for respondents in the 
studied sites.  
 
Participants in interviews with more senior members of government supported 
these village-level views. A Senior Economist from MoLG explains476 that villagers 
have become disengaged from participation in village meetings, as a result of being 
supplied with services that are different from their own preferences:  
The citizens are not demanding for services. That participation is 
still not quite.... We were talking about bottom-up earlier, but 
sometimes when you call a village meeting, you have about 20 
people making a decision for about 100 or 200. They are the few 
who come for the meeting; the rest don’t want to know what’s going 
on. So, those challenges – the citizens themselves participating in, 




473 Comments made to research assistant, and then recorded in writing, during the household survey. 
20 April 2016.  
474 Village meetings are theoretically open to all adult members of the village.  
475 Cooke and Kothari, Participation. 
476 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 77. 23 May 2016. 
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Service delivery at the sub-national level: Poor quality, expensive, poorly financed  
 
 One of the foundational principles of decentralisation is that its introduction can 
generate improvements in public services, as the greater proximity of sub-national 
governments facilitates greater awareness of local development needs. Services are 
then better able to be targeted to these needs, generating improvements in allocative 
efficiency.477 However, results obtained through fieldwork undertaken for this thesis 
suggest that a number of persistent barriers exist to the delivery of high-quality public 
services, despite the introduction of decentralisation. This section presents an analysis 
of fieldwork results relating to continuing poor-quality services, funding support for 
service delivery, and strategies for obtaining services for citizens at the grassroot.  
 
Firstly, respondents to the household-level survey undertaken in six villages 
report that from their perspective, the quality of service delivery in their local area 
remains poor. Respondents reported that medicines are frequently unavailable at their 
village’s health post, with 92 per cent reporting that they had experienced a drug stock-
out on at least one occasion. Respondents report that the fees charged for medical 
care represent a barrier to accessing the service, and that they are frequently 
challenged by the need to pay school fees. Almost one in three households with 
school-aged children report that their children have been removed from school on at 
least one occasion over non-payment of school fees. At the district level, likewise, 
interview participants in three districts reported that the quality of education is often 
lacking. An RDC reports478 that children are becoming demoralised after arriving at 
school and finding one hundred other students in their classroom, with one teacher. A 
DEO describes479 schools in his district in which half of the students are forced to sit 
on the classroom floor due to a shortage of desks. An LC1 Chair at the village level 
explained480 that there is no healthcare centre in their local sub-county, despite 
legislation setting out requirements for an HC3 at the sub-county level (and indeed an 
HC2 at the parish level). 
 
 
477 Craig and Porter, ‘The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion 
Strategies in the Rise of “Inclusive” Liberalism’. 
478 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 35. 21 April2016.  
479 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 7. 04 February 2016. 




In the absence of government responses to their priorities and needs, village 
members report seeking their own, individual, solutions to development problems. For 
example, households have overcome a lack of government-implemented electricity 
supply by buying solar panels for their households. However, the capacity of 
households to address development needs directly is limited; more complex services 
such as healthcare and education cannot be provided by the community alone. 
Villagers in the studied site therefore seek alternative to paths to addressing their 
development needs. As will be discussed in the following section 6.3, this includes 
agitation for the intensification and expansion of the decentralisation system itself.  
 
In addition to these responses from the household survey, interview 
respondents also indicate that in their view, the funding that is transferred to districts 
from the central government is too low to be able to finance high-quality public 
services. When asked, When you receive the transfers from the central government, 
do you find that they are sufficient to cover the activities that are in the workplan?, a 
DEO responded:481 
They are never sufficient. Never! Never, never. I have for example 
– government usually sends us funds for particularly primary 
schools. And I have 93 of them. I wish you had time to visit a few, 
sample and visit a few. You will find us having problems in those 
schools. The facilities, infrastructure and what have you, are not 
adequate. So that money is never enough. 
From civil society, a Senior Economist at the World Bank’s Kampala office concurs:482  
CvH: Do you think that, overall, the districts receive enough finances 
to be able to deliver good-quality services? 
No. No. That is a very resounding no. 
 
In addition to these results from interviews at the district level and from within 
civil society, quantitative data from the national budget suggests additional factors in 
the poor-quality delivery of public services. Data collected from the NBFPs reveals that 
 
481 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 17. 10 February 2016.  
482 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016. 
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the funding received by district governments fluctuates over time, with large changes 
in the estimates for each district from one year to the next. In addition, a comparison 
of estimates and releases for the three studied districts reveals that the funding that is 
in fact transferred to district governments regularly differs from the funding 
commitment that was made at the beginning of that financial year.483 As a result of 
fluctuations within these two variables, districts face challenges in developing plans 
for service delivery.  
 
These findings support those made by authors within the existing literature. For 
example, authors such as Crook and Sverrisson484 argue that the stability and 
predictability of funding flows to local governments are important for their ability to 
deliver public services effectively. Where these funding flows are unpredictable or 
irregular, challenges can arise for medium- or long-term planning processes.  
 
Section conclusion: Service-delivery and participation weaknesses  
 
In summary, the results generated for this thesis support evidence developed 
by authors in the existing literature, such as those made by Jean et al.485 and Asiimwe 
and Musisi.486 Public services at the sub-national level are persistently of poor quality, 
with low and unreliable funding, over-stretched services, and failures of the supply 
chain for key inputs. The results gathered for this thesis suggest that decentralisation 
has not been successful in generating high-quality and targeted services, or 
heightened community engagement with the service-delivery system. Instead, 
interview and survey participants report frustration and disengagement with the 
planning and budgeting system, and report low levels of confidence in the performance 
of sub-national governments. Government officials themselves, including across 
multiple levels of government, report being aware of the failures of service delivery at 
the sub-national level, arguing that high levels of conditionality in financial flows 
prevent greater responsiveness of government to the community’s development 
needs. In the absence of policy change at the central level that allows greater 
 
483 This is illustrated in figures 4.5 to 4.7 in Chapter Four.  
484 Crook and Sverrisson, ‘Decentralisation and Poverty-Alleviation in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis, or, Is West Bengal Unique?’ 
485 Jean et al., ‘Local Government Fiscal Discretion in Uganda’. 




discretionary authority for districts, district governments are relatively unable to 
exercise control over fiscal expenditures. The image that emerges from research 
undertaken at the grassroot level is of significant unmet demand for public services in 
the six studied sites, and for greater responsiveness of government to the needs of 
the village. The current decentralisation framework appears to be failing to respond to 
these demands for improved public service delivery and improved consultation of local 
communities in governance processes.  
 
 298 
6.3 Improving decentralisation: By creating more? Or aiming for better? 
 
 The previous sections in this chapter have described the ways in which the 
central rationales of implementing decentralisation are not being realised in the studied 
sites. Despite the promise of improved quality and targeting of public services and 
enhanced democratic participation, both the results of fieldwork undertaken for this 
thesis and the existing literature point to disappointing outcomes. At the household 
level, villagers report little communication or interaction with government; at the district 
level, expert informants indicate that their priorities are determined by the central 
government; and at the centre, elite actors describe the poor capacity and 
performance of sub-national governments. Consequently, service delivery remains 
poor at the sub-national level; villagers report a degree of disengagement and 
cynicism about governments; and relationships between central and sub-national 
governments are strained.  
 
While these issues are widely acknowledged in the literature487 from the 
perspectives of central and district elites, the fieldwork conducted for this thesis extend 
the analytical framework to the grassroot level, finding that household-level 
respondents in the studied sites are actively seeking improvements to their livelihoods 
and strategies for accessing resources. Fieldwork results suggest that actors at each 
level of the political economy, from the elite to the grassroot, look to the 
decentralisation system to identify how it can be leveraged and utilised for their own 
benefit and advantage. Where opinions differ is at the question of how this 
improvement can be achieved: whether that is through more decentralisation, or better 
decentralisation. 
 
The research conducted in Kampala and in three districts across Uganda 
reveals that different actors within the political economy have different perspectives 
on this question. For some, the question of how decentralisation can be made more 
effective in terms of delivering good-quality public services is answered by generating 
additional districts. For these actors, decentralisation is currently unsuccessful at 
 





delivering improved services or participatory governance because it has not been 
implemented to a sufficient extent, and the best mechanism for improving 
decentralisation is to ‘decentralise more’ – by creating additional sub-national units. 
That is, to bring sites of government still nearer to the population, and to advance still 
further the s of making service delivery more responsive to local development needs.  
 
For others, the creation of additional districts cannot achieve improvements to 
decentralisation, and rather creates a burden on public financial management. 
Instead, these actors would prefer to improve the current systems of decentralisation, 
rather than creating additional systems, through such techniques as improving 
monitoring and inspections at the sub-national level. For these actors, creating better-
performing districts is a preferable policy outcome compared to creating additional, but 
still poorly-performing, districts. The following section discusses these two positions in 
more detail.  
 
Better decentralisation? Monitoring, oversight and performance improvements  
 
For many key informants, particularly those in senior levels of government, the 
decision to decentralise public service delivery in Uganda was a valid decision, and 
decentralisation promises to deliver on the Government’s goals of improved 
participatory governance, improved targeting of service delivery, and bringing 
resources ‘nearer’ to the population. The barrier between the current outcomes of 
decentralisation and these policy goals relates to the way in which decentralisation is 
implemented. For these interviewees, decentralisation would perform well if it were 
implemented more completely and carefully, and with better accountability. From this 
perspective, decentralisation would improve if monitoring were undertaken of service 
delivery, and if local governments’ leaders were held to account for poor performance.  
 
Research participants who hold this view tended to be employees of the central 
government, and from their perspective, greater involvement of central-government 
officials in the implementation of decentralisation would naturally improve its 
outcomes. In their argument, the current decentralisation arrangements contain 
insufficient resources for central-government public servants to undertake travel to 
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monitor service delivery at the village level, leaving them without the time or the 
financial resources to be able to achieve this. If central-government public servants 
were able to travel with more frequency to villages to monitor the delivery of services, 
and to hold district public servants and elected officials to account for service delivery, 
the implementation of decentralised services would improve. An Assistant 
Commissioner at MoFPED summarises488 this view:  
CvH: And do you think – on the districts – do you think there are the 
right number of districts in Uganda, or too many, or -  
Too many. That is my answer. I think there are too many, because 
one thing they say is that creating more districts is taking services 
closer to the people, but for me I don’t think that’s the right thing, 
because, one, even if we have fewer districts, but had the right 
number of health centres, the right number of schools, within the 
required distances, and we had all these community sensitisation 
programs, I really think it would work. Because right now, you find 
that, for a district, you are increasing the administrative costs. 
 
Crucially, these respondents argue that an improvement in the delivery of public 
services under decentralisation would remove the impetus to create additional 
districts. Actors argue that the creation of additional districts is expensive, and is 
approaching the point of being financially inviable. For example, a Team Leader from 
UNICEF in Kampala argues489 that the number of districts has already moved beyond 
a level that is financially sustainable in the long term. The Permanent Secretary of 
MoFPED has appealed490 for a cessation in the creation of new districts, arguing that 
their proliferation is unduly burdening the budget. If the current group of districts could 
be made to perform more effectively and efficiently, the delivery of services at the 
village level could be made to improve without the creation of further districts. Having 
seen this improvement, there would be less argument made by villagers and 
communities that their area requires a district in order for public services to be 
provided. In short, in order to improve the performance of decentralised service 
 
488 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 24. 5 April 2016. 
489 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 80. 26 May 2016. 




delivery, the decentralisation system should be made to perform better, rather than 
being increased in scale through creating more districts.  
 
More decentralisation? Improving decentralisation by creating districts  
 
A second position on how decentralisation can be improved in Uganda argues 
that its current poor performance arises because decentralisation has not been 
implemented to a sufficient degree. In this line of argument, which tends to have been 
put forward by sub-national public servants in interviews, districts have not been able 
to become responsive to local development priorities because they are not yet located 
near enough to the populations they are representing. That is, the physical distance 
between the population and their representatives has not been reduced enough in 
order for communication between these two groups to occur. According to those who 
hold this view, the performance of decentralisation can be improved by creating 
additional districts, as dividing one district into two or more smaller districts makes the 
average size of the new districts smaller, and so reduces the distance between the 
district’s headquarters and the local populations.  
 
As well as being articulated in interviews with district-level civil servants, these 
views emerge strongly in the household survey, in which villagers in the studied sites 
argue that the creation of additional districts will bring service-delivery nearer. Free-
response answers from those who answered Yes to the question Do you think the 
creation of more districts makes service delivery better? included “sufficient services 
which were previously lacking are brought closer to the people”;491 "at least there every 
district will be with a good hospital, schools, making services delivery better";492 and 
"services will reach everybody at the grassroot".493  
 
During the interviews conducted for this research, this position was put forward 
more commonly by staff working at the district, sub-county and village level than by 
staff working at the national level. Staff at the sub-national level who argued in favour 
of more districts being created, and so expanding decentralised structures in Uganda, 
 
491 Response to household survey question 92. Household 5, village 4 (Lira District).  
492 Response to household survey question 92. Household 3, village 5 (Ntungamo District). 
493 Response to household survey question 92. Household 8, village 3 (Lira District).  
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argue that the creation of more districts brings benefits to the grassroot. These benefits 
include the creation of additional jobs, and bringing additional resources to sub-
national levels, which otherwise are under-resourced and have few employment 
opportunities. For example, an LC1 Chair argued494 that a new district should be 
created near to his village, as the district headquarters are too far away to be 
accessible to his community. An LC3 Chair describes495 the creation of his sub-county, 
five years prior to the interview, which was created on the grounds that demand for 
local services had grown too high. In this sense, ‘more’ decentralisation is preferable 
to ‘better’ decentralisation.  
 
In addition, creating new, smaller districts means that each service delivery 
point will then be serving a smaller population, reducing the demand on each service 
delivery point and contributing to an improvement in the quality of services.496 That is, 
if schools are overcrowded with pupils, creating an additional district (which would then 
necessitate497 constructing an additional primary school) will reduce the number of 
students attending the original district’s school, and so reduce pressure on class sizes. 
A Senior Economist from MoLG explains498 this view:  
The smaller the local government is, the more closer the services 
are to the people. Because you would imagine that a very poor 
person, travelling about 30 or 40 kilometres to get a service from 
the centre – it may be expensive, so by breaking them smaller, it 
helps those who can’t afford, to get closer to the administrative 
units.  
 
It is noteworthy that these arguments – that a new district is required because 
current districts are too large, and should be sub-divided – is effectively an argument 
that decentralisation should be imposed more intensively. That is, this argument is an 
extension of the rationale of decentralisation itself: that drawing the site of government 
 
494 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 43. 22 April 2016. 
495 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 41. 21 April 2016. 
496 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’. 
497 According to the minimum service standards for the education sector, as specified in the Education 
Sector Strategic Plan 2015-2019. 




nearer to the population will improve the accessibility of government and the provision 
of public services. There is no separate rationale for the creation of a new district, 
other than to argue for decentralisation to be concentrated further: for ‘more’ 
decentralisation.499 It is also noteworthy that there is not a lower bound for this 
argument, in the sense of nominating an ideal size for a district, in terms of either land 
area or population size. The division of a district into smaller districts does not mean 
that those child districts will not themselves be subdivided in future. The argument that 
a current district is too large or too populous is a subjective one, and thus can be easily 
manipulated by those with an interest in the creation of additional, smaller districts. 
 
As discussed in section 5.5, for villagers in the six studied field sites, the 
creation of an additional district has therefore become a proxy or a strategy for 
accessing public services. Rather than requesting the creation of an additional school 
to ease over-crowding, citizens lobby for the creation of an additional district, in the 
understanding that this will subsequently generate the supply of an additional school. 
The creation of an additional district has become a survival strategy from the point of 
view of those at the grassroot, as will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Section conclusion: The political economy of ‘more’ or ‘better’ decentralisation  
 
As this discussion as highlighted, while many of the key informants of this 
research identified the need for reform of the decentralisation system to improve its 
current performance, there are differing opinions as to how this is to be achieved. 
While some research participants, especially at the sub-national and village levels, 
argue for additional districts to be created in order to further implement 
decentralisation, others argue for improvements to be made to the implementation of 
decentralisation within its existing structures and scale.  
 
A strong counter-argument to the creation of additional districts in Uganda that 
emerges in the existing literature and in the research conducted for this thesis is that 
the practice of district proliferation generates substantial cost, and requires a 
 
499 This finding supports arguments made in the existing literature by Kuteesa et al., Uganda’s 
Economic Reforms. and by Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
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substantial proportion of resources to be committed to the administration of districts, 
rather than to the provision of public services.500 As will be discussed in section 6.4, in 
this economic-oriented argument, the opportunity cost of creating additional districts 
is excessively high, compared to committing that same funding to improving the quality 
of public services that are delivered by existing districts. From a fiscal point of view, 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of public goods by district and sub-
county governments can be improved without undertaking the burdensome cost of 
creating additional districts.501  
 
However, in the trade-off between economic arguments against ‘more’ 
decentralisation and the creation of additional districts, and political arguments in 
favour of creating new districts, political arguments appear to be the dominant force. 
It was widely agreed in this research by both key informants in interviews and 
household survey participants that the principal motivation behind the rapid creation 
of additional districts is political expediency. From the level of the village to the central 
government, research participants noted that politicians’ motivation to be elected or 
re-elected was a central driving force for the creation of new districts. As President 
Museveni remarked502 at a function to celebrate the commencement of a newly-
created district:  
Although a new district takes a lot of money, this is the democracy 





500 Francis and James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation’. 
501 ‘Is It Still Economical to Create More Districts?’ 







Image 5: Announcement503 of new districts, proposed in 2011 
 
Political leaders across government, but most commonly at the district and 
national levels, claim in the lead-up to elections (such as the 2016 election) that, if 
elected, they will create additional districts. As depicted in image 5 above, these 
announcements are widely publicised, such as in the Daily Monitor national daily 
newspaper. In Pallisa District, household survey respondents504 reported that in the 
lead-up to the 2016 election, candidates for election to the LC5 Council committed to 
delivering a new district in the area.505 As promised, Butebo District came into 
operation on 1 July 2017, reducing Pallisa to two counties, and to a land area of 
approximately 140 square kilometres.  
 
503 Mercy Nalugo. 2011. ‘Government proposes 21 new districts’. Daily Monitor. Accessed 13 August 
2018. http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/2466686-1224472-format-xhtml-mycr13z/index.html  
504 18 per cent of respondents in the two studied villages in Pallisa reported that an election candidate 
promised to deliver a new district if they were elected.  
505 This was to be achieved by splitting Butebo County from Pallisa and elevating Butebo to the level 




Overall, research conducted for this thesis suggests that in the process of 
balancing political against economic concerns in Uganda, the political interests of 
multiple actors in favour of creating ‘more’ decentralisation has tended to outweigh the 
economic argument in favour of improving decentralisation in its existing form. The 
following section discusses the consequences for public financial management of this 
outcome of the interaction between the Ugandan political economy and 





6.4 District proliferation: Worsening local government financing and staffing 
shortages  
 
The phenomenon of district proliferation in Uganda emerged in the late 1990s, 
with the number of districts in Uganda almost quadrupling in the contemporary era. 
Uganda contained 33 districts when NRM took power in 1986, compared to 135 by 
2019.506 This section analyses the complications of district proliferation, by detailing 
the challenges that are caused by creating a large number of new districts. In doing 
so, this section supports, and then extends, arguments that are made in the existing 
literature. It will be argued that the challenges for public financial management and 
administration that are generated by the creation of new districts are well-known and 
acknowledged by a wide range of actors. 
 
Fiscal pressures caused by new districts: Research and literature in agreement  
 
Firstly, relating to financial management, a growing body of literature argues 
that the creation of additional districts in Uganda, especially at the fast rate of recent 
years, has placed further strain on an already burdened financial system.507 The 
research undertaken for this thesis is in accord with this literature, and public 
statements from prominent members of civil society and government. Criticisms of the 
proliferation of additional districts include an argument that the wage bill of new 
districts is creating an unacceptably large burden for public financial management. 
Analysis from the World Bank508 calculated that the cost of establishing each new 
district reaches two billion Shillings per annum (approximately GBP 404,000) on 
wages and salaries alone. These critiques have been echoed by senior officials within 
the Ugandan public service, including from the most senior MoFPED official, the 
Permanent Secretary.509  
 
 
506 Nicholas Awortwi and A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing, ‘In the Name of Bringing Services Closer to the 
People? Explaining the Creation of New Local Government Districts in Uganda                          ,                               
In the Name of Bringing Services Closer to the People? Explaining the Creation of New Local 
Government Districts in Uganda’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 80, no. 4 (2014): 
766–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852314533455. 
507 Francis and James, ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation’. 
508 ‘Op-Ed’. 





Fiscal pressures of new districts: Moratorium announced, then abandoned 
 
In 2012 and 2013, widespread criticism510 of the financial burden created by the 
rapid creation of a new districts led to a moratorium on new-district creation being 
announced by the President in 2013.511 However, by 2015 and with new elections on 
the horizon, a series of new districts was announced, with an explicit connection to the 
re-election of the NRM government.512 The correlation between competitive, multi-
party elections from 2006 onwards, and the creation of additional districts, is depicted 
below in diagram 6.1. This finding is supportive of literature regarding political 
clientelism in a sub-Saharan African context more broadly,513 arguing a clear 
connection between the introduction or intensification of decentralisation, and 




6.1 Correlation between national elections and the creation of new districts 
 
 
510 These criticisms were widely publicised in major media outlets. See for example: Sadab Kitata 
Kaaya, ‘New district runs under muvuke tree’, The Observer, 2 January 2013.  
https://observer.ug/component/content/article?id=22909:new-district-runs-under-muvule-tree 
511 ‘Gov’t Drops Proposal on Creation of New Districts’. 
512 ‘Museveni Pledges New Districts’. 
513 Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict?; 

















Fiscal constraints of newer districts  
 
Key informants in interviews at the central level argue that the existing issues 
in the financing of sub-national governments are further exacerbated by the creation 
of new districts. Interview respondents explained that newer, smaller districts face 
even greater constraints in collecting locally-raised revenue than larger districts, as 
there are fewer citizens and less economic activity in a small district. A Chief Financial 
Officer in one of the studied districts explains514 the financial challenges facing newly-
created districts:  
Having many districts does not add much, because if you look at 
our unconditional grant, nationally, it has not increased. So 
whenever they create a new district, they would just get the money 
from the mother [original] district and give to the other one. So that 
means that you find that a district is there, but it cannot put up a 
main building, it cannot facilitate its employees, although people can 
move now from the village and reach the district, but still you cannot 
have enough to have the services increased in their areas. 
 
In addition to these comments made by interviewees at the central level, 
research participants at the sub-national level also described the fiscal constraints they 
face. Interview respondents in the three studied districts described the local 
situation,515 where local revenue is low, and sub-national governments are dependent 
on the conditional grants sent by the central government for funding. In this context, 
the expense of the wage bill crowds out development expenditure that can be used on 
local public services. The creation of new districts exacerbates this problem, as the 
proportion of the wage bill remains fixed relative to the district budget, which will be 
smaller in the case of a newly-created district. In an interview, a MoFPED Economist 
explains516 the trade-off of district proliferation. While an increased number of districts 
 
514 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 48. 28 April 2016.  
515 Notably, the fiscal problems that are generated by the creation of additional districts are well-
known and understood by many of the participants in this research, including officials at both the 
central and district levels. The frustration expressed by research participants when explaining the 
well-known nature of these flaws suggests that respondents do not feel that they possess the political 
power or capital to be able to address this situation; that without changes being made by central-
government elected officials, this situation is likely to continue.   
516 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 28. 11 April 2016. 
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places pressure on the wage bill, and thus places pressure on the national budget, it 
is perceived as bringing services nearer to the district – and thus, it is politically 
popular.517 A Senior Economist at MoFPED argues:518  
The districts increase the costs of administration, but they do not 
achieve a lot of change. They are created for political reasons, to 
give work to LC5s and create MPs, and then the MPs that are added 
are all on the ruling party side, so it increases the number of ruling-
party seats in the Parliament. 
 
A MoFPED Economist explains519 that the creation of an additional district does 
not necessarily generate an increase in the funding that will be decentralised to sub-
national governments; the decentralised funding envelope is simply divided between 
a greater number of districts. An additional Economist at MoFPED goes on to 
explain520 that if new districts are created without a concurrent increase in funding 
transferred to them, a greater proportion of decentralised funding is then absorbed by 
the administration costs of new districts. This outcome has potentially negative 
implications for expenditure directed to service delivery. This Economist further argues 
that these outcomes are well-known, suggesting that where a new district is created, 
this is a decision to prioritise the creation of a new district over resources for service 
delivery. 
 
Furthermore, a Principal Economist at the World Bank’s Kampala office 
describes521 the cancellation of the 2013-2015 moratorium on creating additional 
districts:  
Once you create a district, there are other associated indirect costs 
that come with running a district. So the Ministry [of Local 
Government] came up with 59 billion shillings, and that in a way, 
sort of, made the President say, OK, I didn’t know about this, we are 
going to put a freeze, a moratorium, on the creation of new districts. 
 
517 van de Walle, ‘The Democratization of Political Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
518 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 26. 8 April 2016.  
519 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 15. 08 February 2016.  
520 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 29. 11 April 2016. 




But last year, when the [election] campaign started, another 23 
districts were announced. So it shows very clearly that it is purely 
driven by political considerations.  
 
New districts are yet more dependent on the central government  
 
As discussed in section 4.1, where districts are unable to generate a large 
volume of locally-raised revenue, they become heavily dependent on the conditional 
grants from the central government for financial support. In turn, this reduces their 
capacity to be responsive to local development priorities.522 A Senior Economist from 
ULGA explains523 that the dependence of sub-national governments on the central 
government for financial support creates an imbalance in the power relationship 
between the two groups:  
Because a local government, before you do anything, you need to 
consult the centre. And the centre looks at itself as the big brother. 
And yet we should be working as partners, we should be working 
as supportive entities.  
 
Overall, both the results of research undertaken for this thesis and findings in 
the wider literature are in agreement that the creation of additional districts worsens 
the fiscal burdens already faced by sub-national governments. Sub-national 
governments become increasingly dependent on the central government for financial 
resources, and so less able to respond to the development needs and priorities of the 
community. The research undertaken for this thesis, and the broader literature relating 
to political clientelism,524 both suggest that the continued creation of additional districts 
in the Ugandan context appears to be motivated by political concerns, with fiscal 
considerations relegated to a secondary concern.  
 
 
522 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
523 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76. 18 May 2016.  
524 Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’; 




District proliferation worsens staffing shortages  
 
Secondly, the research conducted for this thesis supports arguments in the 
existing literature525 that the rapid proliferation of districts creates pressures on the 
adequacy of staffing numbers at the sub-national level. Interview respondents noted 
that the creation of new districts, particularly a large number of new districts, further 
exacerbates issues relating to the under-funding and under-staffing of districts.  
 
A number of interview respondents pointed to the challenges created by the 
formation of a new district, in terms of staffing shortages at the district level. According 
to an analyst526 at ACODE, the under-staffing of districts is worsened by the creation 
of a new district, as the ‘parent’ (original) district is required to contribute staff members 
to the ‘child’ (new) district. A Senior Economist from Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) 
explains527 this outcome:  
It has had a lot of effect, because the little that have been there – 
you divide the staff between the mother district and the other district 
that has been created. So it reduces the staff levels that would 
otherwise have been adequate. You see, if you have one district 
that has 40 per cent and then a new district is created, you go to a 
state around 22 per cent, as you must support the other district to 
come up. So when the wage is provided, yes, then you recruit, but 
also creating a district without giving additional resources just 
increases the public expenditure in terms of wage. 
 
These statements from central-level government and civil society are echoed 
by public servants at the sub-national level. As described528 by a District Human 
Resource Officer, when a new district is created, the ‘parent’ district is required to 
provide 50 per cent of its own staff numbers to support the new district, worsening its 
own insufficient staffing. Particularly in remote regions, both newly-created ‘child’ 
 
525 For example, Asiimwe and Musisi (Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of 
Governance in Uganda.) describe the challenges for new districts of attracting and retaining staff, 
particularly for districts in remote or rural areas.  
526 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 79. 26 May 2016.  
527 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 72. 13 May 2016. 




districts and their parent district can experience challenges in recruiting sufficient staff 
numbers, and these shortages drastically affect the performance of a sub-national 
government. However, as described in broader literature relating to patrimonialism and 
political clientelism,529 the political opportunities that are generated by the rapid 
creation of new districts (such as being able to ‘give’ public-sector employment to 
allies) dominates these concerns about public administration.  
 
District creation worsens elite/non-elite divide 
 
Finally, a number of data points raise the possibility that the creation of 
additional districts contributes to worsening inequality between elite and non-elite 
actors at the sub-national level. For some interview participants, the creation of a new 
district allows district- and sub-county level elite actors to capture the benefits that are 
made available from the creation of an additional district, such as employment 
opportunities.530 Non-elite actors, on the other hand, are not able to leverage a benefit 
from the creation of additional districts, with the consequence that the economic and 
political space between elite and non-elite actors grows wider. A Professor at 
Makerere University explains531 this view:  
The elites in a rural setting… are cognisant to the opportunities of 
decentralisation. Either they have participated as councillors, or 
they are the relatives of local leaders, or they are associated with, 
they have knowledge of, the works of local authorities, they are part 
of the contracts that are delivered to local firms. Now that is the 
category of people who has largely benefited from decentralisation. 
…. But the ordinary citizens?.... They have their land, they can grow 
their food, especially food that is, you know, hand to mouth earning. 
And they also grow food for their eating, and the little that remains, 
probably they can just sell on the roadside, or take to that market, 
basically to buy the basics – sugar, soap. And that’s all. Now those 
people talking about decentralisation – they don’t see that. 
 
529 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the 
Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda’. 
530 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
531 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76. 20 May 2016. 
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In other words, district proliferation may worsen inequality between elites and non-
elites at the sub-national level, as only the former group are able to capitalise on the 
benefits and opportunities that a new district brings. As will be discussed in section 
6.6, the creation of a new district is analogous to the creation of a club good, from 
which members can derive benefits, but from which non-members are excluded. That 
is, some clients are able to benefit from patronage opportunities to a greater extent 
than others.  
 
Section conclusion: District creation worsens decentralisation’s existing challenges 
 
Overall, participants in the research conducted for this thesis argued that district 
proliferation worsens the existing issues of decentralisation: that the creation of new 
districts generates worse fiscal pressure, worse understaffing, and worse over-
burdening by administrative and wage costs. This finding supports the existing 
literature on district proliferation in the Ugandan context. Furthermore, the rapid 
creation of additional districts increases the transaction costs of service delivery at the 
sub-national level. The disadvantages to district proliferation are well-known, being 
discussed freely by both central- and sub-national interview participants and by 
representatives of civil society. Senior officials at central agencies such as MoFPED 
readily critique the rapid creation of additional districts – to the extent that a moratorium 
on the creation of new districts was announced in 2013. Nonetheless, since 2015 with 
the end of the moratorium on the creation of new districts, 22 new districts have been 
announced for commencement in 2016 to 2019. The correlation between the creation 
of new districts and the national election cycle points to the patronage and clientelism 
opportunities that elected leaders have come to associate with the creation of new 
districts.532  
 
As described in section 4.1, the creation of new districts is justified by elected 
leaders and administrative officials alike via claims of too-large population sizes; of 
inaccessible services; and via claims of insurmountable differences between tribal 
identities within one district. Unofficial, though widely acknowledged, additional drivers 
 
532 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 




are political motivations and the desire of elite actors to establish and maintain 
patronage networks. In this sense, the results of the fieldwork for this thesis are in 
accordance with broader literature regarding the use of decentralisation for achieving 
political clientelism goals in sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. This thesis explores a 
further question regarding the specific context of Uganda: why the creation of 
additional districts continues, despite the widely-acknowledged problems for public 
financial management that are generated by district proliferation. The following section 
6.5 addresses this question.   
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6.5 Multi-actor motivations for district proliferation: Moving beyond elite 
perspectives  
 
The continual creation of additional districts has been a noteworthy feature of 
the Ugandan political economy, in particular since multi-party elections began in 2006. 
While current explanations for the proliferation of new districts have focused on the 
incentives driving and motivating elite actors to seek additional districts, such as 
establishing patronage networks, less attention has been paid to the incentives of 
other actors. The results of the household survey conducted in six villages, as 
described in Chapter Five, draw attention to the challenges faced by villagers at the 
household level, relating to low-quality or absent public services and utilities. Results 
from the household survey also suggest ways in which community members seek to 
find solutions and strategies to overcome these challenges, including through 
establishing private, individual solutions. Key strategies that emerge from the survey 
results include households developing private solutions to shortfalls in public utilities, 
and groups beginning to identify closely with those of their own tribe and differentiating 
from neighbours of different tribal identities. Furthermore, the results obtained for this 
thesis suggest that the rapid creation of new districts can be viewed through the prism 
of a strategy for attempting to gain access to the resources of the state. 
 
 This section presents an analysis of the factors driving actors from the highest 
levels to the grassroot of the Ugandan political economy: from senior central-
government political leaders, to villagers in remote rural areas. By including the 
viewpoints of those at the grassroot, this research identifies the incentives of a broader 
range of actors in seeking the creation of additional districts, in a way that extends the 
research in the existing literature. It will be argued that there are other explanations 
for district proliferation that are not identified in the existing body of literature. 
Specifically, beginning with the political elite at the central level, this section describes 
the incentives of elites through the prism of political survival. Turning then to the 
incentives driving those at the sub-district and household levels, this section 
introduces the concept of an access strategy: the strategies non-elite actors put into 
place to gain access to resources. District proliferation is then framed through these 




strategies of non-elite actors, to create a multifaceted examination of this 
phenomenon. 
 
Elite drivers of district proliferation: Political actors and political survival  
 
Beginning with a top-down analysis of the drivers of district proliferation, this 
section examines the incentives and motivations driving political elites: those for whom 
district proliferation is a crucial element of their political survival.533  The motivations of 
senior government leaders are analysed, utilising the results of elite interviews 
undertaken in Kampala, as well as viewpoints in the existing literature. Secondly, the 
motivations of district-level elites are identified, utilising commentary from interviews 
conducted with this group themselves, as well as in interviews with central-level public 
servants. It will be highlighted that the interaction between political factors and 
decentralisation generates new-district creation, despite the financial issues this 
causes. This is because political survival is prioritised over avoiding the financial 
burdens created by new districts.  
 
Incentives of senior leadership: Political survival through control of sub-national areas  
 
The senior political leadership in Uganda – the President, Cabinet, Members of 
Parliament, and NRM representatives – utilise the creation of additional districts in 
order to generate and maintain political power. Through the strategic creation of 
additional districts – strategic in terms of both timing and location – political leaders 
are able to improve the likelihood of their own political survival. District proliferation 
assists elected leaders to: gain favour from the electorate; expand the number of seats 
they hold in Parliament; disempower their political rivals; and ensure that sub-national 
level politicians are not able to become sufficiently powerful to pose a challenge to 
their rule. This discussion reflects broader literature on political clientelism and 
decentralisation throughout countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in which political leaders 
are described as implementing decentralisation in ways that suit and support their own 
political objectives.534 This section discusses each of these methods in turn.  
 
533 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 
‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda’. 




Firstly, for the President, the creation of additional districts provides the 
opportunity to be seen to ‘give’ a district to a community. As depicted below in Image 
6, the announcements of additional districts are generally made by the President 
personally, rather than by a parliamentary spokesperson or Minister for Local 
Government. As a result, the decision to create an additional district in a specific 
location is one that the President is seen to personally control and announce. 
 
 
Image 6: President Museveni speaking at an NRM campaign rally and announcing 
the creation of an additional 19 districts, 16 December 2016 
 
In this sense, the President is able to generate the greatest patronage 
advantage from the creation of new districts and sub-counties. By being seen to be 




of this patronage mechanism.535 As described by Eaton,536 the President is 
incentivised to deliver additional districts as a form of patronage, even despite the 
fiscal damage caused by district proliferation, as a way of developing a political 
advantage in the short term.  
 
In a similar vein, for MPs – particularly those seeking to be re-elected – there 
is a strong incentive for them to agree to demands from their electorates for the 
creation of an additional district. In this regard, the findings of the fieldwork undertaken 
for this thesis are in accord with the existing literature relating to political clientelism.537 
As described in Chapters Four and Five, a common demand from households is for 
the creation of an additional district, as a perceived path to gaining access to public 
services, and as a potential mechanism for drawing resources ‘nearer to the people’. 
In the lead-up to national parliamentary elections, in particular, members of the 
Parliament and Cabinet may feel especially tempted to agree to ‘giving’ additional sub-
national administrative units in a particular location538 – or even to offer the creation of 
a new district voluntarily, as described by respondents to the household survey.539 In 
these circumstances, members of parliament who are seeking re-election may travel 
to regions within their electorate and indicate that, if elected, they will arrange for the 
creation of new administrative units in that area. There is therefore a tacit 
understanding of the mutual benefits – the clientelist exchange – underpinning district 
creation.540 A senior official in the LGFC described541 this situation as follows:  
The law, the constitution, has a provision which says that when the 
people demand, their demand should be considered. But now when 
it becomes very political, then it depends on those who are in power 
 
535 Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
536 Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’. 
537 Boone, ‘Decentralization As Political Strategy In West Africa’; Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to 
Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’; Crawford and Hartmann, 
Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
538 Stokes, Political Clientelism; Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic 
Polities’; Scott, ‘Decentralisation, Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical Review’. 
539 This was especially commonly reported among respondents in Pallisa, where a new district was 
created and commenced in 2017. 
540 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
541 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 69. 10 May 2016. 
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– whether they want political survival. When they want survival, they 
will give a district. 
 
For NRM, the ruling party, the creation of additional districts also represents an 
opportunity to generate political capital. Analysis by Green542 indicates that electorates 
in newly-created districts are more likely to vote for NRM; the creation of new districts 
can thus act as a mechanism for gaining or retaining seats in forthcoming elections.543 
In addition, district proliferation contributes to the large number of MPs in the Ugandan 
Parliament: at 426 seats, one of Africa’s largest per-capita.544 The creation of an 
additional district does not generate an additional seat for a ‘regular’ member of 
parliament, because the borders of electorates for regular MPs do not coincide with 
district boundaries. However, the electorates for seats that are designated for female 
candidates (referred to as “Woman MPs”) coincide with district boundaries. Thus, the 
creation of an additional district generates an additional electorate for a Woman MP, 
and an additional seat in the national parliament.545 There is thus a substantial 
incentive in place for the NRM government, which already holds a commanding 
majority in parliament, to welcome the creation of additional districts in areas of strong 
NRM support – that is, areas where NRM can be reasonably confident that the creation 
of an additional seat for a Woman MP will result in an NRM candidate being elected 
to that seat.  
 
Thus, the creation of a new district in an area that traditionally shows strong 
support for NRM can generate two benefits for the ruling party. Firstly, the popular 
decision to create a new district is likely to guarantee the re-election of the ‘regular’ 
MP. Secondly, an additional Woman MP seat will be created that is likely to then be 
won by an NRM candidate. This will generate an additional NRM-held seat in the 
national parliament. A professor at Makerere University explains546 this process:  
The only reason, and the only logical explanation for the creation of 
new districts in Uganda is political expediency. Basically, gathering 
 
542 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
543 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism; Schmidt et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions. 
544 Oluka, ‘How Ugandan MPs’ Pay Compares with Counterparts’ Worldwide’. 
545 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 




more support, for rallying more support, for the ruling government, 
for the party in power. And that’s all. Because any new district 
means that you are going to get, one, there’s the few elites to be 
employed. OK? And then you are also going to get more cadres for 
the NRM government, and that is a fact – because most of them are 
created in those areas where the current government has support. 
… they go to the rural areas, that’s where the current NRM party 
has a lot of support – that’s where they split the districts.  
 
In addition to advantages created for NRM overall, MPs may see personal 
advantages in awarding a new district to their constituency. The creation of an 
additional district will necessarily involve reducing the size of existing districts within 
an MP’s constituency, as a new district will be ‘carved out’ from the land area of 
existing districts. From the point of view of the MP for that region, this means that each 
district within their constituency is now smaller – meaning that the powerful local elites 
within those districts have a smaller power base from which to draw authority and 
resources. An MP who is concerned about the power bases of local elites within their 
electorate, therefore, may be likely to support the creation of a larger number of weaker 
districts within their electorate, in order to face less competition for power, or 
contestation of decisions, from these elites. In other words, as described by Eaton,547 
an MP might be tempted to support the creation of new districts because they identify 
short-term benefits for themselves from supporting a clientelist policy of this nature. 
The creation of additional districts can in fact empower a national MP relative to senior 
leaders at the district level. This is explained548 by a Principal Economist at the World 
Bank’s Kampala headquarters:  
When Uganda had, like, 69 districts, most of these districts were 
very big. …. So a district chairman who was elected through 
universal adult suffrage would be controlling 4 or 5 parliamentary 
constituencies. And, he or she would have a large revenue base, 
and a large population he is managing. And politically, he was very 
powerful, compared to a national member of parliament who 
 
547 Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’. 
548 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016.  
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legislates. OK? Now. I think … this in a way ruffled the feathers of 
people in the central government. Because a member of parliament 
could not go in his constituency and do anything without going 
through a district chairman. The central government could not give 
directives to districts, because the districts were large, the districts 
had the financial muscles, to finance a substantial percentage of its 
budget. So, I think the move by parliament to deliberately create 
smaller districts – most of Uganda’s districts now are one 
parliamentary constituency per district. …. So for me, one of the 
views I am putting forward is that parliament deliberately went for 
the proliferation of districts to undermine the political and financial 
strength of hitherto big districts.  
 
Overall, the incentives of national elites in supporting decentralisation in 
general, and district proliferation specifically, depend on their understanding of their 
role in a clientelist and patronage-based system. When national elite politicians are 
able to discern an political advantage for themselves in supporting these policies, they 
are likely to do so, even if they may change their strategy later if these policies no 
longer generate a benefit for them.549 In other words, rather than support the creation 
of new districts on the basis of this being the best policy outcome for achieving service 
delivery or community participation (as decentralisation is aiming to achieve), 
politicians act primarily in their own political interests.550  
 
District elites: Maintaining political power and resisting rivals through the creation of 
new districts  
 
From the perspective of local elites, there are strong incentives in place to lobby 
for the creation of additional districts in their local area. Firstly, for members of the elite 
who are not yet a part of the political or administrative leadership of the district, there 
are potential benefits to be captured from the creation of a new district, as they may 
 
549 Eaton, ‘Political Obstacles to Decentralisation: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines’. 
550 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 




themselves then be able to become part of the leadership of the new district. This may 
be particularly the case from a patronage perspective if they are known to be 
supportive of, or affiliated with, the NRM.551 This means that these individuals will be 
able to benefit from permanent and secure employment with a reliable wage, a position 
with high social status within society, and access to resources such as an office, 
vehicle, fuel, computers and reliable electricity. Once employed in a district 
government, local elites are able to use this position to offer resources and 
employment opportunities to their own kinship networks, and in so doing, create their 
own patronage network at the sub-national level.552 A Senior Economist at MoFPED 
describes553 this situation:  
Politically, we see these small, small groups, and the leaders, those 
leaders who want to gain their political base, and they think that 
once you have a district, then I can be chairman LC5, I will have 
autonomy, things like that. 
 
Secondly, for members of the leadership of an existing district, particularly 
those in elected roles such as councillors, there are also significant incentives in place 
to lobby for the creation of additional districts. For elected leaders who fear that they 
are losing political support and may lose their council seat at a forthcoming election, 
there are substantial incentives to lobby for their district to be split into two. An 
Assistant Commissioner at MoFPED describes554 his perspective that district elites 
campaign for the creation of districts in areas where they can be confident of gaining 
political support:  
That is in line with those districts which are politically – politically 
created. Because, some members might feel that if they stood in 
one district they would lose, because a certain sub-county does not 
support them. So they agitate for an independent district, so that 
they stay on the side where they can be elected. That is not the best 
way of how to allocate districts!  
 
551 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
552 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
553 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 59. 03 May 2016. 




Section conclusion: Gaining and maintaining political control 
 
This section has discussed the ways in which elite actors at the central and 
district levels utilise district proliferation in order to increase, and then maintain, their 
levels of power and control. In this sense, the results of research conducted for this 
thesis broadly aligns with those views found in the existing literature:555 that district 
proliferation is undertaken by elites in order to create and maintain patronage 
networks. New districts are created in order to reward allies of the NRM, as an 
employment strategy for an aspiring politician, or to generate support for the NRM 
amongst the population.556 In addition to this perspective, this research contends that 
in the context of a hybrid regime, the politicisation of district proliferation extends to a 
political survival mechanism. For central-government elites, the creation of an 
additional district allows for the extension of patronage networks to the district level, 
but also allows the central government to divide political rivals from one another and 
so limit their access to resources. The creation of a new district allows the central 
government to be seen by the voting population as gifting new districts to them, as an 
act of both generosity and control.557 Finally, the creation of a new district creates 
additional parliamentary seats, and increases the probability of retaining both new and 
existing seats for NRM. District elites are able to gain power in a newly-created district, 
or to maintain their existing power base as the creation of new districts reduces 
competition for these powerful roles.  
 
Overall, the top-down supply of new districts by elite politicians is motivated by 
goals of political survival, as well as of access to economic resources. The following 
section describes the perspectives of those at the grassroot, and examines the 
implications of the creation of new districts from their demand-side perspective.  
 
 
555 For example, in Elliott Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 45, no. 1 (1 March 2010): 83–103, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9058-8; and Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative 
Unit Proliferation’, American Political Science Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 196–217, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000567. 
556 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the 
Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda’. 




6.6 The perspective of the grassroot: District proliferation as an access strategy 
for rural livelihoods  
 
Amongst authors558 who have researched the creation of additional districts, a 
common framing of the issue is that it is undertaken by elite actors in order to create 
and maintain patronage networks at the sub-national level. The research undertaken 
for this thesis sought to contribute to this literature by addressing the demand-side of 
district creation, and include the perspectives of citizens at the household level. This 
research asked which goals, priorities and incentives might drive those at the village 
level in the studied sites to seek the creation of additional districts. In this section, it 
will be argued that villagers who participated in the household survey seek the creation 
of new districts in order to improve their rural livelihoods strategies, to gain visibility in 
the public-finance system, and to create a claim on the delivery of public services.  
 
New districts as a claim on service delivery 
 
At the level of the village, respondents to the household-level survey conducted 
for this thesis indicated that even though they may acknowledge that there are 
potentially too many districts in Uganda at present, they would nevertheless be 
pleased if a new district were to be created where they reside. Sixty-nine per cent of 
respondents to the household survey responded that they would be happy if a district 
were created in the area in which they live, even though in answer to an earlier 
question, 38 per cent answered that they feel that Uganda has too many districts at 
present. At first glance, this result appears to be contradictory. However, the 
explanatory comments made by respondents indicate that respondents feel that the 
creation of an additional district is the most successful strategy for them to be able to 
obtain additional services in their district. That is, respondents argue that in order to 
 
558 Examples authors who emphasise this framing include: Elliott Green, ‘District Creation and 
Decentralisation in Uganda’, Crisis States Working Papers Series 2 (2008b); Diana Cammack et al., 
‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006’, 
Advisory Board for Irish Aid: Working Paper 2, 2007, 67; Janet I. Lewis, ‘When Decentralization Leads 
to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in Uganda’, Regional & Federal Studies 24, no. 
5 (2014): 571–88; Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’, American 
Political Science Review 108, no. 1 (February 2014): 196–217; and R Vokes and S Wilkins, ‘Party, 
Patronage and Coercion in NRM’s 2016 Re Election in Uganda: Imposed or Embedded?’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 10, no. 4 (2016): 581–600. 
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obtain services such as a healthcare post or primary school near to their home, a 
district must be created first, and then services “will be brought”. Respondents argued 
that when a new district is created, "There will [be] creation of more services like 
hospitals, school and many others"559; "They lead to developmental activities"560; and 
"When a district is created, there's a possibility that a referral hospital will be built and 
good roads will be constructed"561. 
 
The basis for this belief is that politicians describe the process of creating 
additional districts, and of decentralisation itself, as bringing resources and services 
‘nearer to the people’. For example, when explaining the need for a new Namisindwa 
District562 to be split from Manafwa District, the LC5 Chair and local MP described the 
local hilly terrain that causes challenges for residents to access services. A new district 
is therefore necessary for new districts to be created that are nearer to the 
population.563 Because politicians frame the creation of new districts in this manner, 
members of the villages in the studied districts in turn perceive that the creation of new 
districts will deliver improved services. A Senior Economist at MoFPED here 
explains564 the rationale behind villagers’ campaigns for the creation of an additional 
district in their area:  
The main reason [for the creation of a new district] is to make sure 
that services are brought nearer to the population. OK? The thinking 
is, if I have a district in my own locality, OK, then, issues to do with 
the transport network, issues to do with the health facilities and 
services, the education services, will be looked at more closely. 
 
 
559 Response to household survey question 92. Household 1, Village 6 (Ntungamo District).  
560 Response to household survey question 92. Household 2, Village 4 (Lira District). 
561 Response to household survey question 92. Household 4, Village 1 (Pallisa District). 
562 Namisindwa District was subsequently created, and came into effect on 1 July 2017. 
563 Anon. ‘Manafwa Leaders Want District Approved’. New Vision, 6 May 2010. 
https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1290781/manafwa-leaders-district-approved 




In fact, the perception of participants in the survey is in accordance with formal 
governance regulations regarding service delivery standards.565 The minimum 
standards for public service delivery in Uganda prescribe that there should be one 
Health Centre 2 (HC2)566 and one primary school for each parish. For sub-counties, 
there is to be one secondary school and Health Centre Three (HC3)567 per sub-county, 
that can provide emergency, maternity and diagnostic medical care.568 A senior officer 
in the LGFC adds569 his views on the benefits that can be derived at the grassroot 
level from the creation of additional districts:  
We have created standards – some sector standards – and many 
of them would favour local governments splitting. For example, if 
you are a district of, like, 500,000 people, and getting bigger every 
year, and then there is a small district of, like, 100,000 people, when 
it is being given some resources like road equipment, there is no 
consideration of, like, that this one has more people and more roads 
– you should give it more graders. They give one grader per district. 
Then, this is said, We should balance, ah, if we split we will get five 
graders, you see? If we split into five-five. 
 
There are numerous examples presented in national media reporting of new 
districts being created in Uganda following demands made by local communities. 
Often, these demands are explicitly linked to arguments about poor-quality service 
delivery in the residents’ current district. Community members undertake this lobbying 
for a new district in a number of ways, including delivering petitions to Parliament, or 
requesting a new district directly from the District Council of their current district. In 
other cases, local MPs argue on the floor of parliament that a new district or sub-county 
 
565 The author is not meaning to suggest that villagers in the household survey are necessarily aware 
of these regulations (though some Council members may be). Rather, the perception held by villagers 
that the creation of a new districts causes new services to be provided would be accurate, if the 
practice of service delivery and public finance did follow the formal regulations that stipulate that 
specific services will be provided by specific levels of government.  
566 An HC2 is able to provide preventive, promotive, outpatient and curative health services, and 
emergency maternity delivery.  
567 An HC3 is able to provide the same health services as an HC2, with the addition of maternity, 
inpatient and laboratory services. 
568 ‘Service Standards and Service Delivery Standards for the Health Sector 2016 | Knowledge 
Management Portal’. 
569 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 69. 10 May 2016. 
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should be created within their constituency.570 Some examples are as follows. Kagadi 
and Kakumiro Districts were split from Kibaale District in 2016, following a period of 
sustained campaigning by the local community to the District Council, and then by the 
Council to the community’s local Members of Parliament. In Bughendera District, 
residents repeatedly presented petitions to the Speaker of Parliament before being 
granted a district in 2016. In Bududa District, residents argued for several years that 
poor service delivery was provided by Mbale District, and that this could only be 
remedied by a new district being created for them; they further pointed to the then-
recent creation of Manafwa District (also splitting form Mbale) in 2005 as evidence of 
the poor services provided by Mbale District. The creation of  Bududa District was 
announced in 2010, at a campaign rally in the lead-up to the 2011 election. In each of 
these cases, the decision by the central government to grant these new districts was 
announced by President Museveni personally, at a campaign rally in that location, in 
the lead-up to a national election.  
 
Furthermore, respondents to interviews and to the household survey reveal that 
villagers have come to think of the creation of a new district or lower local government 
near to where they live, as being synonymous with development itself. Viewed from 
the point of view of the citizen, the creation of new districts has become the way in 
which sub-national development is operationalised. Because the creation of an 
additional district implies the eventual creation of new service-delivery points for that 
community, and the potential for new employment opportunities, district creation and 
local-level development appear to be identical when viewed from the perspective of 
the citizen. For example, a respondent to the household survey described Uganda as 
follows: “We are more developed now. We are over 100 districts now; we used to be 
only 30.” Of the sixty-nine percent of respondents who answered Yes when asked, 
Would you be happy if a new district were created in this area?, 36 per cent of 
respondents answered that their reason for giving this answer was that public services 
would then be brought to the area. In expanded answers, reasons given included 
“because it brings development”, “because there is a chance of development with a 
 
570 An example of this practice is the advocacy of Tororo County MP, Geoffrey Ekanya, for Tororo 
County to be elevated to the status of a district. Uganda Radio Network, ‘Tororo Residents Threaten 





new district”, and “a new district may mean development for us”. This concept is 
discussed in more detail in section 7.3. 
 
However, a key respondent at the World Bank’s Kampala office explains571 his 
frustration with this argument, describing the way in which villagers have come to 
believe that obtaining a new district will automatically generate benefits for their village:  
I know of certain districts which have only nine percent staffing. 
What can you do with that? You know? It is there in name, and for 
me it would be much better if government says, OK, instead of 
creating this district, let us do a health centre in this locality, or let 
us construct a primary or secondary school, which is fully funded, 
which has staff houses, which has facilities to make sure that the 
people there get education services. So, for me, I think the policy is 
twisted, and it is being turned like that because there are political 
dividends, rather than service dividends, which people can get. 
While villagers in the studied sites may perceive that the creation of an additional 
district will lead to new resources and services being provided to their community, in 
line with what has been suggested to them by elected leaders, some authors572 have 
found that in fact, new districts perform more poorly in terms of service delivery than 
established districts. The belief that villagers in the studied locations have placed in 
the creation of new districts, that this will lead to the improvement of services and 
communication with government, is perhaps a greater reflection of the arguments 
made by elected leaders (including by the President) than representative of fiscal 
reality. However, this is not necessarily a barrier to the use of district proliferation for 
clientelist purposes by national leaders. Leaders’ clientelist goals can be achieved, 
regardless of whether the perceptions of community members about the benefits that 
will accrue to them from supporting the ruling party are accurate; only that they support 
the ruling party is important.573  
 
 
571 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016.  
572 Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
573 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 
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Overall, the creation of a new district is thought by community members to 
make a community more visible within the public finance system,574 which will then 
generate the delivery of public services. Residents have observed that requests for 
the creation of a new district are frequently acted upon, as the creation of new districts 
is often widely publicised by political leaders. These results suggest that the 
proliferation of new districts is driven by the failure of decentralisation to deliver 
improved service delivery to a particular location. In the absence of good-quality 
services, villagers seek the creation of a new district in order to ‘intensify’ 
decentralisation. The creation of additional districts, it is believed, will draw resources 
and services nearer to the grassroot, and so improve development at the village level. 
However, as will be discussed in the following section, the creation of new districts can 
also worsen social divisions and inequalities.  
 
Club goods and common goods: A model for explaining household preferences  
 
An analogy for understanding the puzzle of why actors throughout the Ugandan 
political economy continue to argue for the creation of additional districts and sub-
counties, despite the known disadvantages of district proliferation, can be found in the 
economic concept of ‘club goods’. Club goods are identified where groups of 
individuals come together to derive a mutual benefit, on the basis of shared 
characteristics.575 Members may be able to access a resource, or a patronage 
opportunity, based on their membership of the group.576 A club good is excludable,577 
but only becomes rival578 in the case of large numbers of members; greater benefits 
accrue to members of a club with a small number of fellow members. Viewed in this 
way, the creation of a new district creates benefits to members who are members of 
the club, such as being resident in the district. Accordingly, given that greater benefits 
 
574 For example, each district is represented by a funding line in the National Budget Framework 
Paper. As a result, MoFPED will allocate funding to new districts as part of the Local Government 
Votes.  
575 Cornes and Sandler (1996) – The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, page 5. 
576 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
577 Individuals who are not members of the club can be excluded from realising its benefits. 
578 A good is rivalrous when consumption of the good by one individual reduces the quantity of the 
good that can be utilised by other individuals. For club goods, resources only become rivalrous when 




accrue to the group when membership is small, members realise greater benefits from 
smaller districts.  
 
Conversely, the total of resources that are available in the national budget 
process are analogous to a common good, in that they are rival but non-excludable. 
That is, the creation of additional districts through the budget process draws on the 
resources of the national budget, through increased demand for wages, office space 
and equipment, and vehicles and fuel. It may also necessitate the delivery of additional 
public services, in line with national service standards. The continual creation of 
additional districts, despite the financial challenges and pressures this practice is 
known to create, demonstrates that there are insufficient controls on access to the 
resources of the national budget process. Access to resources is granted based on 
persuasion or personal connection, in a patronage-based system,579 rather than on a 
cost-benefit analysis.580 In the absence of strict controls on the creation of new 
districts, and so limits to budgetary pressures this causes, the national budget 
envelope effectively becomes non-excludable. However, these resources remain rival, 
in that their use for one purpose prevents their use for another purpose. As a non-
excludable but rival good, the budget envelope is at risk of over-consumption and 
depletion.  
 
This comparison of the process of district creation to the ideas of club and 
common goods suggests why district proliferation may continue, despite its widely-
acknowledged worsening of fiscal pressures. The common pool of the national budget 
process is over-consumed as a result of the establishment of many club goods, in the 
form of districts. From the perspective of those who derive a benefit from the creation 
of a new district, there is an incentive to be a member of a group that has access to a 
resource, even where the large number of these same club goods is in turn depleting 
that same common resource. For those who are unable to gain membership of the 
club, it may be difficult to capture the benefits generated by the creation of a new 
district. That is, there is the risk of inequality worsening between insiders (elites) and 
outsiders (non-elites) of the club good of a new district; social exclusion may worsen 
 
579 Riedl and Dickovick, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’. 
580 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
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following the creation of new districts. Section 7.4 discusses these concepts in greater 
detail.  
 
Section conclusion: Drivers of new districts at the grassroot 
 
From the perspective of citizens living at the household level in six studied 
villages, the creation of an additional district can bring the promise of development. In 
locations where services have not been successfully delivered, and governments are 
not responsive to the complaints of households, the creation of a new district can be 
a step towards gaining resources from the state. Far from being passive recipients of 
governance institutions, villagers have understood the claim by politicians that new 
districts bring services nearer to the people, and have observed that when elected 
leaders commit to delivering a new district, this promise is frequently fulfilled. In 
seeking the intensification of decentralisation – the creation of a new district – villagers 
have the expectation that this district can form the basis for future service delivery. 
Villagers see the delivery of public services as a way of improving their rural 
livelihoods, and gaining access to resources, but have become frustrated by the 
unfulfilled promises of politicians to deliver these services. Accordingly, villagers at the 
grassroot level have begun to leverage the political aspirations of election candidates 
to seek the creation of new districts, in order to improve villagers’ economic and 
livelihood strategies. In this manner, the political economy of village-level actors has 




6.7 Chapter conclusion: Improving decentralisation through additional districts, 
and the pursuit of personal interest 
 
The benefits that are thought to be generated by the implementation of 
decentralisation, such as greater responsiveness of government to community 
priorities, and greater participation of communities in governance, require careful 
implementation. However, the results obtained through this research suggest that 
poor-quality services, low levels of participation in governance at the sub-national 
level, and poor responsiveness of governments to local development priorities persist. 
Given these limitations, a policy challenge is to determine whether decentralisation in 
the Ugandan context would be improved through implementing decentralisation to a 
greater extent, or improving its current implementation processes.581  
 
Those who advocate for decentralisation to be implemented in its current form 
but with greater attention to quality (‘better’ decentralisation) argue for modifications 
such as improved monitoring and supervision of local governments. Primarily central-
government actors, these key informants argue that the challenge for decentralisation 
is not its current form, but the performance and capacity of those who implement it. 
Conversely, those who argue for decentralisation to be implemented more intensively 
(‘more’ decentralisation) argue that decentralisation is not yet delivering on its core 
rationales because it has not been implemented with sufficient intensity. According to 
this argument, districts are currently still too large for improvements in participation, 
responsiveness and the quality of service delivery to have been delivered. The 
appropriate manner to improve decentralisation, then, is to continue to create 
additional districts, and in so doing to bring the site of government activity yet nearer 
to the population. When combined with the political motivations of elected officials and 
the resource-access motivations of non-elite actors, the drive towards new districts 
becomes a compelling force.  
 
 
581 Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’. 
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However, the problems caused by district proliferation are widely 
acknowledged within this research and within the wider literature582 – to the extent that 
a moratorium on the creation of new districts was put in place between 2013 and 2015. 
Nonetheless, the creation of additional districts continues; the argument for ‘more’ 
decentralisation dominates the argument for ‘better’ decentralisation. In other words, 
the research conducted for this thesis reveals that where there is a necessary trade-
off between political benefits of district proliferation, and the economic cost of new 
districts, the achievement of political goals is outweighing economic goals. The 
following chapter discusses a framework for how these incentives of different actors 




582 Diana Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda 
and Malawi in 2006’, Advisory Board for Irish Aid: Working Paper 2, 2007; Green, ‘District Creation 





Chapter Seven:  
 
District proliferation:  
Coinciding incentives for political survival, resources access and livelihoods 
 
Until someone puts their foot down [against district proliferation], it’s 
a proven vote-winner, so I don’t see any change until .... You know, 
until there’s demand for a new settlement. So, it’s, you know, that’s 
the reality you’ve got to live with.  
- Civil society economist,583 Kampala 
 
7.1 Introduction: Multi-actor strategies in pursuit of district proliferation  
 
The creation of new districts and sub-counties in Uganda has significantly 
changed the scale of decentralised governance since decentralisation was introduced 
in the late 1980s. There are now nearly four times the number of districts in Uganda 
as in 1986, and there appears to be no reduction in new-district creation in the near 
future. As described in section 6.4, the rapid creation of additional districts brings with 
it a range of challenges in public financial management, and has been criticised by a 
range of actors. Interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that these criticisms are 
widely acknowledged, and in some cases shared, by senior officials within central 
government.584 Concerns amongst senior officials about the cost of new districts 
reached the extent that a moratorium on the creation of additional districts was 
established in 2013 (before being abandoned in 2015). As described in Chapter One, 
this generates a puzzle: what explains thee continued proliferation of new 
administrative units, despite the widely-acknowledged issues this causes?  
 
 
583 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 78. 26 May 2016. 




As described in section 6.5, there are a range of motivations and incentives 
driving the actions of individuals across the Ugandan political economy. While a 
number of previous studies of the phenomenon of district proliferation in Uganda have 
focused on the motivations of elite actors, particularly in relation to maintaining sub-
national patronage networks,585 the research conducted for this thesis was inclusive 
of the perspectives of individuals at the household level, and other non-elite actors. 
Accordingly, this research reveals that the impetus for the creation of new districts 
comes from a wide range of actors in Ugandan society, beyond central-government 
elites. Both non-elite and elite actors in the Ugandan context perceive that they will 
benefit from the creation of new districts, and accordingly, act in pursuit of maximising 
these benefits.  
 
It was argued in Chapter Six that the creation of additional districts is driven by 
two types of strategies being pursued by actors in the political economy. Firstly, 
elected officials are implementing a strategy to ensure their political survival. By 
lobbying for, and implementing, the supply of new districts and sub-counties, elected 
leaders have utilised the decentralisation process in order to maximise their political 
survival. That is, the creation of new districts is being used to support the clientelist 
strategies of the state.586 Secondly, for non-elite actors, including those at the village 
level, the creation of additional districts contributes to these actors’ perceived ability to 
access resources of the state. That is, household-level and non-elite actors seek the 
creation of a new district in order to enact their own access and livelihoods strategies. 
In this way, decentralisation is intensified (via the creation of additional districts), in 
order to support the economic goals of non-elite actors in the community.  
 
This Chapter will discuss the ways in which the varying incentives of a wide 
range of actors coincide and intersect with one another, and how this intersection 
drives the creation of new districts. Overall, both the supply of new districts by political 
actors, and demand for new districts from community members, drive the 
phenomenon of district proliferation. The creation of new districts is thus framed as the 
outcome of the interaction between decentralisation and the political economy in 
 
585 See for example: Elliott Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’, 2008, 442. 




Uganda: the coinciding incentives and motivations of a range of actors generate both 





7.2 Coincidence of incentives: When political and economic interests coincide  
 
For elite actors in high-status positions and for members of households at the 
village level, and for a range of actors in between these poles, the creation of new 
districts is perceived to deliver benefits and advantages. As described in section 6.5, 
actors at varying levels of the political-economic hierarchy in Uganda have individual 
incentives to seek the creation of new administrative units. This section discusses the 
process by which these individual priorities generate change in the way 
decentralisation is implemented, in a manner that generates the rapid creation of new 
sub-national units.  
 
The individuals whose interests are advanced by the creation of new districts 
are disparate, and not easily categorised. Indeed, the actions of these actors cannot 
be said to be collective, in the sense of forming a group with a common goal, and 
advocating collectively for the achievement of that goal. Individuals in this context are 
acting for their own benefit, but since this benefit is best served by a single outcome – 
the creation of a new sub-national unit – the individual actions of many actors form a 
common movement. Demands for new districts come from household-level actors, 
who perceive this to be an opportunity to them to access service delivery. Demand is 
also driven by district elites, for whom the creation of new districts may bring 
patronage-based opportunities for formal employment.587 The supply of new districts 
is driven by central-government political actors, who see in new districts the 
opportunity to capture votes, and to expand a patronage network. In this sense, 
individuals’ actions are in cooperation with one another, even though this may be 
coincidental.588 By seeking to advance their own goals and motivations, actors’ 
overlapping and coinciding incentives lead to advocacy for the same outcome. Given 




587 Muno, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism’. 
588 Grossman and Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’. These authors discuss the way in which a 
confluence of interests between central-government elites and district-level elites in marginalised 





Indeed, these coinciding incentives are powerful enough to generate changes 
in national public policies regarding decentralisation and district proliferation. 
Specifically, the national government decided in 2015 to overturn its own moratorium 
on the creation of additional districts, which had been established in 2013.589 Having 
at first been persuaded that the fiscal cost of creating new districts was excessive, the 
new-district creation should cease, the government was in 2015 persuaded that the 
benefits of the creation of new districts outweigh these costs. As explained in an 
article590 in the Daily Monitor newspaper on 17 December 2015: 
President Museveni yesterday promised his government will lift the 
moratorium on the creation of new districts, pledging that there is a 
“long list” of districts to be created in 2017. The announcement 
marks a change of heart by the President who announced a freeze 
on the creation of new districts in 2013, arguing that they were too 
expensive to bankroll amid a flurry of demands for the new 
administrative units around the country. Campaigning in Bubulo 
West, Manafwa District, Mr Museveni assured residents, who are 
demanding a district be carved out of Manafwa and named 
Namisindwa,591 that their request will be granted if he secures a fifth 
term next year. 
 
Policies relating to new-district creation thus shifted from a policy against the 
creation of new districts, to one in which new districts are being created at a rapid rate, 
as a result of the coinciding economic and political interests of a wide range of actors. 
These incentives, once combined, have become sufficiently powerful that they 
outweigh widespread criticisms and complaints about the problems caused by district 
proliferation. The interaction between political-economy forces and decentralisation 
has resulted in district proliferation, despite the well-known disadvantages this poses 
for fiscal control. This argument will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
section 7.3. 
 
589 ‘Districts: Moratorium Ordered!’, www.newvision.co.ug, accessed 13 July 2018, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1315640/districts-moratorium. 
590 ‘Museveni Pledges New Districts’. 
591 Namisindwa District was created, and came into effect on 1 July 2017. 
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7.3 District proliferation at the grassroot: Access, livelihood and development 
 
This section presents a detailed analysis of the incentives of actors described 
in section 7.2, and illustrates that while these incentives are disparate and 
heterogeneous in nature, their shared outcome is the creation of additional districts. 
Throughout the Ugandan political and economic hierarchy – from the village to the 
most senior levels of political leadership – incentives are in place that generate the 
demand for, and supply of, new districts. This section contextualises the results of 
fieldwork undertaken for this thesis within the existing body of literature and theory. It 
introduces a theoretical model of an access strategy for the household level; argues 
that increased hierarchisation is being generated at the district level; and relates senior 
politicians’ behaviour to models of political survival.  
 
Villagers: district proliferation as an access strategy  
 
From the point of view of villagers – those who are the end-users of public 
services, and whose livelihoods chiefly derive from rural agricultural production – the 
overarching concepts and theories of decentralisation may seem very remote. As 
analysed by the household survey, for members of rural households in the studied 
sites, the ideals of participatory democracy or engagement with district governments 
are rendered relatively meaningless. For the households that participated in the 
survey, concerns at the village level centre on elements of survival: gaining access to 
farming assets and expertise; affording school fees; the future employment options 
available to children; whether healthcare services are available and affordable. 
Respondents to the household survey undertaken in three districts responded to the 
question What do you think are the most important development priorities for this 
district? with answers including: "Health services and promoting people's welfare. 
People can be given livestock to improve their livelihood";592 "Agriculture. Health, 
providing mosquito nets and spraying insecticide, immunisation";593 and "Government 
projects should focus on agriculture".594 For these villagers, questions of access to 
resources and obtaining the basic elements of survival are fundamental, and dominate 
 
592 Survey participant in Village 2 (Pallisa District). 
593 Survey participant in Village 2 (Pallisa District). 




concerns of engaging with government for the purposes of improving the quality of 
decision-making. These comments and viewpoints were broadly consistent across the 
studied sites, despite the broader economic and social differences in the contexts of 
northern, western and eastern Uganda.  
 
Village-level approaches to accessing resources and generating livelihoods 
 
Areas of the existing literature595 on decentralisation focus on the importance 
of local governments engaging with local communities in decision-making, such as in 
undertaking participatory budgeting. This thesis builds on this literature to ask what 
advantages villagers see for themselves from the decentralisation process, and how 
they perceive their role in this engagement with government. In order to address this 
issue, the research undertaken for this thesis asks whether communities in fact see 
other ways that they can derive benefits from decentralisation, that might be more 
important or valuable to them than participation in village-level budgeting. Villagers 
might perceive that there are ways that they can leverage the decentralisation system 
to improve their access to financial resources, or access to public services:596 that is, 
whether villagers can enact what will be called an ‘access strategy’. These elements 
may be of greater relevance to them than being nearer to their local government 
officials, even though this will also be the case following the creation of an additional 
sub-national unit. This section analyses the ways in which individuals at the village 
level perceive that they may be able to capture the benefits of decentralisation in ways 
that are relevant and important to them, and use the creation of an additional 
administrative unit to implement an ‘access strategy’. From the perspective of those 
at the village level in the studied sites, the creation of an additional district suggests to 
villagers that they might be being brought closer to things they need to access to 




595 Such as Lídia Cabral, ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Scope, Motivations and Impact on Service 
Delivery and Poverty’, 2011; Celina Souza, ‘Political and Financial Decentralisation in Democratic 
Brazil’, Local Government Studies 20, no. 4 (1994): 588–609; and Sandrine Perrot et al., Elections in 
a Hybrid Regime, (Fountain Publishers, 2014). 
596 However, as previously noted in Chapter Six, this perception by villagers may not be accurate. 




Barriers to participation 
 
For those living at the grassroot level of the political economy, engaging with 
branches of the formal state can be challenging. Villagers, in particular those who work 
predominantly in subsistence agriculture, may lack the confidence, education 
background or social capital to engage with government directly. This lack of 
interaction may arise from actual disadvantage, such as a lack of literacy, or perceived 
disadvantage, such as the perception that those who have not attended school do not 
have the authority to engage with those in powerful positions. Participants in the 
household survey explain that they do not attend village meetings because they are 
“not informed” or “not called” for the meeting; "only some participate (only those whose 
names are written)".597 Survey respondents report that participation in decision-
making by government may not take place at all, or may not be influential over the 
outcomes of decision-making. In particular, voicing a critical opinion on the quality of 
governance, such as critiquing the performance of local healthcare facilities, may be 
difficult for someone who perceives their socio-economic status to be lower than the 
person with whom they seek to engage, or may attract negative consequences. In 
addition, household survey participants report frustration when their communications 
with government do not generate substantive change: “They promised to forward our 
complaints but no change happened afterwards”598; "Nothing changed, the leaders 
never did anything to address the problem".599  
 
As a result of these barriers to consultation and participation, villagers in the 
studied field sites might not, in practice, seek to engage with government officials or 
leaders to agitate for improvements to the quality or quantity of services in their local 
area. Instead, villagers may seek out alternative channels to obtain from government 
the assets, resources and services they would seek to obtain. Rather than engage 
directly with governments over the question of service delivery, villagers in these 
locations see an opportunity to engage with leaders over an alternative question: that 
of the administrative units in place in their local area. Citizens may feel more 
comfortable discussing, or feel that they have more right to discuss, the creation of 
 
597 Response to household survey, question 24. Household 14, village 4 (Lira District). 
598 Response to household survey, question 41. Household 7, village 2 (Pallisa District). 




additional districts or sub-counties in their region than discussing issues to do with 
service delivery directly.600  
 
Through this channel, it becomes possible for citizens and politicians to argue 
that there are insufficient services in a particular region – but without being seen to 
criticise government – by arguing that the region is too big.601 Discussions about 
creating an additional district in order to increase the quantity of local services can be 
framed in terms of ‘objective’ measures, such as the population per district, or the 
number of patients per healthcare centre, that remove the critical element of arguing 
that there are insufficient services being provided by government.  
 
Linking district creation to service delivery: An access strategy 
 
The causal path between the creation of additional districts and improved 
access to public services was well-recognised by participants in this research, at both 
the level of the household and amongst elite respondents. For some research 
participants, the two factors have become ‘merged’: references to creating a new 
district have become an approximation of improving the reach of public services. For 
example, respondents to the household survey conducted for this thesis answered the 
question Would you be happy if another district was created in this area? with 
responses including "Yes, because services will be brought nearer to people"; "Yes, 
because some districts are too big to receive government programs adequately"; and 
"Yes, because the distance will be shorter compared to now".602 These responses 
indicate that participants in the household survey discern a connection between the 
creation of new districts and new services being ‘brought’ to the community.603 
 
 
600 This is implied by respondents to the household survey, who report fears of being persecuted if 
they raise concerns or complaints about service delivery: "People are taken like they are at fault so 
most times they keep quiet"; "Fear raising their complaint because you can be taken as someone who 
is against government services." 
601 This was described in interviews with district-level elected and administrative staff. Pers.Comm. 
Interviews with author, 4 03 February 2016; number 36, 21 April 2016; and number 46, 25 April 2016.  
602 Respondents to the household survey located respectively in: Village 3 (Lira); Village 2 (Pallisa); 
and Village 2 (Pallisa). 
603 As noted in Chapter 6, this perception may not in fact be accurate: new districts may perform more 
poorly than older districts in delivering services to the community.  
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The clear link between these two outcomes in the minds of survey participants 
has meant that villagers in the studied field sites now perceive that in order to gain 
access to improved services, a path to achieving this is to gain a new district. District 
creation has become perceived as an access strategy for gaining access to the 
provision of public services, because a newly-created district becomes a ‘visible’ entity 
in the public finance system. Having become visible, the residents of a district perceive 
that they may be then able to demand new public services, on the basis of being a 
district.604 A new district is perceived as the basis for leveraging resources, such as a 
district budget, and the right to demand the provision of public services in the future. 
Having drawn a link between the creation of a new district and the delivery of new 
public services, villagers are then incentivised to seek the delivery of new sub-national 
units from politicians, and in particular from election candidates. A Senior Economist 
from MoFPED explains605 that when he visits towns for planning meetings with elected 
leaders, he witnesses community members asking their elected leaders for the 
creation of a new district.  
It [establishing a new district] is not the best way of improving 
service delivery. But it is mainly driven by... By other strategic 
objectives of government; mainly political objectives. Because we 
know the electorate... Whenever you go there, with politicians, the 
people demand for district status. 
For election candidates and political leaders, the opportunity for a clientelist exchange 
with rural voters is clear: the announcement of a new administrative unit, which is 
potentially easier to deliver than new public services, can be made in exchange for 
electoral support.606  
 
Furthermore, villagers in the studied sites observe that when politicians and 
electoral candidates commit to delivering new districts and sub-counties, these sub-
national units are in fact created, as has been widely publicised by elected leaders via 
 
604 An example of this logical process can be seen in Arua District, where residents demanded the 
creation of a new district, known as Madi-Okollo, in order to obtain the services they feel they have 
been denied. Uganda Radio Network, ‘Arua Council Approves Creation of Madi Okollo District’, 15 
February 2011. https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/arua-council-approves-creation-of-madi-okollo-
district 
605 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 11. 15 February 2016.  
606 Stokes, Political Clientelism; Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic 




radio and print media. In contrast, when politicians commit to improving the quality and 
quantity of public services, these improvements are often not provided.607 This 
outcome is reflected in the household survey, in which villagers in the studied sites 
argue that elected leaders are unlikely to deliver the improvements in services that 
they promise to bring. Villagers therefore focus their attention on obtaining a new 
administrative unit, which they perceive as being a strategy for accessing additional 
public services. The lack of delivery of public services themselves, compared to the 
successful delivery of new sub-national units, explains why village-level actors adopt 
a strategy of attempting to gain new administrative units instead of attempting to gain 
new services more directly. Based on their observations about the delivery of public 
services, participants in the household survey do not perceive a high likelihood of 
improvements to services themselves. Instead, they identify the link between new 
districts and the perception of new services, and pursue this strategy.  
 
This access strategy is analogous to the concept of a rural livelihood strategy, 
in that seeking the creation of additional administrative units enables villagers to 
improve their levels of skill and productivity, and thus diversify and make more 
sustainable their rural livelihoods options. If the creation of an additional sub-national 
unit is successful in generating improved supply of public services, households may 
be able to improve their access to healthcare, sanitation and education services. 608 
This has the effect of improving their own human capital, in terms of their health, ability 
and skill levels, as described by authors such as Chambers and Conway.609 With 
higher capabilities and greater human capital, such as higher skill levels and standards 
of health, citizens are able to undertake more efficient and productive forms of 
employment. Citizens may also be able to diversify their income sources, such as 
establishing a home-based business as well as undertaking farming, if they are able 
to access a marketplace. This greater productivity and greater diversity in income 
sources can assist citizens in reducing their household’s level of poverty, as improved 
productivity in employment generally results in a higher wage being earned. The 
access strategy of gaining access to public services can potentially be an effective 
 
607 As summarised by one respondent to the household survey, “I would be happy if the elected 
persons fulfilled their promises.” (Village 1, Pallisa District) 
608 Scoones, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
609 Conway and Chambers, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
 
 346 
path for citizens to improve their levels of household productivity and income, and 
undertake positive action to improve their own livelihoods and wellbeing.  
 
 
Image 7: Village 3, Lira District 
 
Grassroot perspective: Decentralisation as the appearance of development 
 
This research raises the important question of how decentralisation is perceived 
by those at the grassroot: those who experience service delivery and participatory 
governance first-hand. The viewpoints of these actors, expressed through the 
household survey as described in sections 5.5 and 6.6, highlight how decentralisation 
appears from their perspective. Decentralisation, where it performs well, is a 
mechanism for bringing development itself to sub-national areas, so that citizens 
located outside the national capital are also able to realise the benefits of economic 
growth and change.610 Accordingly, this research asks: how successful has 
 
610 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 




decentralisation been in delivering these outcomes, from the perspective of villagers 
in the six studied sites? What are the visible, or tangible, changes that have been 
generated by decentralisation in the lives of villagers? To what extent have these 
theories of decentralisation been realised, in the six studied communities? 
 
Respondents to the household survey describe life in their village as one of 
poor service delivery, low responsiveness from government, and difficulties in meeting 
costs for school fees and medical services. As reported one respondent: 
Service delivery is there though not sufficient, people are poor, they 
have no income sources, and most people in power use money for 
their personal uses.611  
Another respondent added:  
The politicians should come down here and address our problems 
and should fulfil whatever they promise. More schools, roads, 
hospitals should be constructed. We should be informed, because 
we have a right to access of information, and our opinions should 
also be taken into consideration when making decisions about the 
development priorities of the districts.612 
Image 7 above illustrates the experience of grassroot-level life in the studied villages. 
Overall in the studied communities, roads remain ungraded, water sources in poor 
repair, standards of housing poor, and electricity unavailable. As argued within the 
existing literature on decentralisation in Uganda,613 the introduction of decentralised 
governance has not been effective in expanding the reach and quality of services at 
the sub-national level.  
 
Furthermore, the results suggest an additional important point. From the 
perspective of those at the grassroot in the studied sites, the outcomes of 
decentralisation that would be realised if it were performing well, such as high service 
standards and responsive governance, are analogous to the process of development 
 
611 Survey respondent in Village 5 (Ntungamo District).  
612 Survey respondent in Village 1 (Pallisa District). 
613 Balunywa et al., ‘An Analysis of Fiscal Decentralization as a Strategy for Improving Revenue 
Performance in Ugandan Local Governments’. 
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itself. If decentralisation could be successful in bringing public services and responsive 
government to the village level, this would appear from the village perspective to be 
the achievement of development.614 Where decentralisation is not succeeding in 
delivering on its policy objectives of improved service delivery and community 
participation, villagers will not see high-quality public services being provided, 
particularly at the nearer sub-county level, and will not see public utilities such as 
electricity being made available. In addition, they will not perceive that their 
relationship with elected leaders has improved.615 As a result, communities observe 
little difference in either: their community’s level of development; the standards of 
governance in their community; or their personal standards of living. That is, it is not 
only decentralisation that has not succeeded, but their overall level of development 
will not have changed. In the absence of tangible or visible improvements to 
development in their community, villagers in the studied sites report that they then 
resort to seeking ‘more’ decentralisation: the creation of additional districts, with 
headquarters yet closer to their homes.  
 
By viewing decentralisation from the perspective of the grassroot, and 
recognising the goal of decentralisation of bringing tangible and visible development 
improvements to the village level, it becomes easier to appreciate the lobbying of sub-
national communities for the creation of new districts. Where decentralisation has not 
succeeded in delivering on its core goals of improved service delivery in a specific 
location, from the perspective of that community, the visible and tangible effects of 
decentralisation have not been realised. As described in Chapter Five, villagers in the 
studied communities perceive that the creation of additional sub-national units will 
generate improvements in service delivery at the village level, where this has failed to 
be delivered previously. The demand for district creation that arises from the village 
level, in other words, is generated by the failure of decentralisation to bring the benefits 
of development itself – such as service delivery and public consultation in planning 
and budgeting – to the level of the village.  
 
 
614 Lambright, Decentralization in Uganda. 




Overall, when viewed from the perspective of households at the grassroot in 
the studied sites, district proliferation is reframed as a strategy for communities to 
attempt to gain access to development itself: to improved standards of living, service 
delivery, and economic opportunities. In locations where decentralisation has failed to 
achieve its central objectives, such as improved service delivery and participatory 
governance, the pursuit of economic goals of community members leads to demand 
for the intensification of decentralisation (in the form of the creation of additional 
districts). As a result of these demands, pressure is created for the creation of 
additional administrative units, in the hope that nearer, smaller districts and sub-
counties will bring improved development to the grassroot level. The creation of new 
districts is an example of the access strategies implemented by residents of sub-
national communities, as they seek to expand their economic opportunities. In this 
sense, district proliferation is the outcome of the interaction between decentralisation 
and the local economies of sub-national areas.  
 
Section conclusion: District proliferation as survival, access and development  
 
This section has discussed the ways in which the establishment of additional 
sub-national units in Uganda is driven by the coinciding access and survival strategies 
of actors, ranging from the grassroot to the national parliament. Following the work of 
Chambers,616 this section has argued that the lives and motivations of citizens at the 
village level are complex and multi-faceted, and underpinned by the careful analysis 
of individual households’ own needs and priorities. The introduction of decentralisation 
has resulted in the transfer of public funds and other resources to sub-national areas. 
However, the continued poor performance of decentralised structures in terms of 
service delivery and public participation in governance has frustrated citizens at the 
grassroot level, in the studied field sites. Instead, participants in the household survey 
perceive that the most successful strategy for accessing these resources is to work 
within the decentralisation system itself, and seek its expansion in the form of 
additional districts. This strategy is based on a perception held by households in the 
studied sites that the creation of new districts is then followed by services being 
 
616 Robert Chambers, ‘Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts?                          ,                               
Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts?’, Environment and Urbanization 7, no. 1 (1 April 
1995): 173–204, https://doi.org/10.1177/095624789500700106. 
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‘brought nearer’ to the community: new services are created, closer to the village. 
While this perception may not be realised in practice as the creation of additional 
districts has created burdens for the public financial management system,617 
participants in the household survey have drawn this link between new districts and 
improved development outcomes. Furthermore, villagers in the six studied sites report 
that they do not perceive that politicians are likely to deliver improved public services 
directly, even when they make this commitment in the lead-up to elections. Instead, 
villagers observe that the creation of new sub-national units is in fact delivered when 
it is promised, as can be readily seen from the widespread national media reporting of 
the announcement of new districts in response to citizens’ demands. The act of 
citizens’ lobbying for additional districts (rather than for public services themselves) is 
evidence of a perception on the part of citizens that their development needs can be 
addressed through the creation of new districts. Villagers look to the creation of 
additional districts as a mechanism for expanding their access strategies for 
resources, and improving their rural livelihood strategies, in ways that they perceive 
may mean that development is brought ‘nearer’ to their village.  
 
 
617 However, Green (Green, ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda’.) argues that in fact, 
newer districts perform less well than more established districts at financing service delivery and 
meeting the minimum service standards for public services. That is, while villagers may perceive that 
gaining a new district will lead to improvements in public service delivery, in fact there is less chance 




7.4 District proliferation at the district and sub-county: Club goods and 
livelihoods 
 
This section details the advantages that can be captured by elite actors at the 
sub-county and district levels, following the creation of an additional sub-county or 
district. The formation of a new administrative unit is described in terms of the creation 
of a club good: elite actors are able to become ‘insiders’ to the membership of the club 
good, and so derive benefits from it. The creation of additional hierarchies within the 
public service and council structures thus offers a diversified livelihood for actors who 
would otherwise not have an alternative to agricultural employment. Non-elite actors, 
who lack the education background or status to be able to benefit from new 
employment opportunities arising from new districts and sub-counties, are at risk of 
being excluded from the club good.  
 
Livelihoods and survival at the sub-county and district levels: On the rural margin  
 
From the perspective of community members at the sub-county level, the 
creation of additional administrative units (in particular, a new sub-county) has different 
effects for different citizens, and as a result, can potentially contribute to social 
exclusion. The level of the sub-county occupies a marginal space in the Ugandan 
political economy: the sub-county headquarters is neither entirely rural nor entirely 
urban, with a cluster of office buildings for the sub-county government and council, 
and a small marketplace. The sub-county functions as a ‘corridor’ between rural and 
urban areas. Some houses may be clustered nearby. Otherwise, these remain 
essentially rural areas, and staff of sub-county government structures are likely to live 
primarily in agricultural contexts, travelling a short distance to the sub-county 
headquarters each day.  
 
In this sense, residents and staff of a sub-county headquarters are able to 
combine several livelihoods and access strategies; a single individual may be both 
employed in the sub-county council and maintain a plot for farming. These diverse 
income sources represent a more sustainable livelihood than for households whose 
 
 352 
income derives from a narrower range of sources.618 Depending on the social and 
economic status of individuals at the sub-county, officials at this level may or may not 
constitute an elite.  
 
This section discusses the benefits of sub-county proliferation for elite actors at 
the sub-county level, followed by non-elite actors at this level. It is argued that 
residents of the sub-county who have higher education levels and political-economic 
status are able to leverage the benefits that can be realised following the creation of 
the ‘club good’ of an additional sub-county. However, this may worsen social exclusion 
and inequality, as non-elite members of the community are not able to derive the 
equivalent benefit. Furthermore, the creation of additional districts has been seen to 
direct resources away from service delivery in favour of the payment of salaries and 
allowances for new employees, as discussed in Chapter Four. This means that non-
elite members of the community are potentially being made worse-off from the loss of 
funding for public services that may arise following the creation of new districts. This 
uneven distribution of the benefits that are potentially generated by the creation of a 
new district can possibly contribute to social exclusion and economic marginalisation 
of non-elite actors at the sub-national level.  
 
Elite actors at the sub-county level: Employment opportunities  
 
For sub-county elites, who may have had more access to education than most 
citizens of the sub-county, there are clear advantages to the creation of a new sub-
county in the form of opportunities to gain employment at this level. Sub-counties 
employ both LC3 officials in elected roles, and public servants in employed roles.619 
These patronage opportunities bring one of the few chances to gain formal 
employment in a rural area,620 with the possibility of drawing a regular and dependable 
income (particularly for public servants), and a pension in retirement.621 These roles 
at the sub-county level can be doubly beneficial, as sub-counties’ administrative 
centres are generally located in rural areas. This means that an employee of the sub-
 
618 Conway and Chambers, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
619 Hicken, ‘Clientelism’. 
620 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. 




county can remain living in their village, allowing them to diversify their income sources 
by combining agricultural production with formal employment.622 These roles also 
bring the opportunity to access vehicles and fuel, which offer not just visible markers 
of status, but assets that can be used to benefit the worker in other ways. For example, 
an LC3 chairperson may be able to use their official vehicle to transport their home-
grown agricultural products to a market at a nearby district, thus allowing them to draw 
higher income from their agricultural produce as well as their employment. For elite 
actors at the sub-county level, therefore, the creation of a new sub-county introduces 
a club good, through which members can derive benefits and capture access to 
resources.  
 
Non-elite actors at the sub-county level: Services and market access 
 
For non-elite actors at the sub-county level, who have less education or 
experience in formal employment, the creation of a new sub-county brings a new 
trading centre, and a new market in which to conduct economic activity. Following the 
establishment of a new sub-county headquarters with a marketplace, citizens who live 
in rural areas, and whose income largely derives from agriculture, can travel to a 
marketplace more easily and cheaply than if this centre were more remote from their 
village. Rural agricultural workers then face lower transaction costs in selling their 
agricultural surplus, such as reducing the costs of hiring a ‘middle man’ to transport 
their output to the marketplace. As is the case for elite actors, the creation of a new 
sub-county represents the opportunity to diversify their income sources, and so 
improve the sustainability of their livelihoods strategy on the rural margin.623 They may 
also be better able to access public services that are to be provided at this level, such 
as a primary school or HC3. For these citizens, pursuing their access strategy of 
gaining access to public services via demanding the creation of additional sub-
counties is likely to be beneficial, as it reduces the distance they will need to travel in 
order to access public services. These improved outcomes provide an incentive for 
these residents to demand the creation of an addition sub-county, with headquarters 
nearby to their village.  
 





However, because non-elite actors are less likely to be able to capture benefits 
of formal employment that requires a specific education level, they may not be able to 
move into the ‘club good’ created by a new sub-national unit. This disparity introduces 
a risk of increased inequality between elite and non-elite actors at the sub-county level, 
with worsened social and economic inclusion. While both elite and non-elite actors are 
likely to be made better-off when a new sub-county is created in their area, elite actors 
are likely to benefit to a greater degree than will non-elite actors. This is reflected in 
the results of the household survey: when asked who benefits the most from the 
creation of a new district, respondents most commonly indicated ‘Politicians’ (51 per 
cent of respondents) and ‘Powerful people in the district’ (16 per cent of respondents). 
 
District-level incentives: District proliferation in pursuit of an urban livelihoods strategy 
 
At the district level, the creation of additional districts generates changes to 
livelihoods and access, but in a different manner from those changes at the levels of 
the village and sub-county. District capitals, while situated within a rural area, have 
features such as formal markets and shopping areas, secondary schools, transport 
connections to other district headquarters, and the district government headquarters 
and council chambers. District capitals therefore contain a range of livelihood options: 
some residents live entirely within the capital, with a broadly urban livelihood; some 
residents live in a nearby rural village, and travel to the capital for commercial reasons 
or to access services; a third group of residents live in rural areas and rarely or never 
travel to the capital.624 The creation of an additional district, with a new district capital, 
thus creates important dynamics at the level of the district, and affects different 
residents in diverse ways.  
 
Elite actors – those whose education level or economic status enables them to 
gain formal employment, and who are more likely to reside within or nearby the capital 
– can derive benefits from the creation of an additional district. This can take place in 
two ways. For elites actors who are not currently employed or elected within a district 






district presents the opportunity for access to formal employment. For those who 
currently hold a district-level elected position, there is less competition for re-
election.625 In this way, the creation of additional hierarchies generates a rationale for 
the creation of additional formal elected and bureaucratic roles. This section presents 
the benefits of the creation of an additional district for different actors at the district 
level, with reference to club goods, hierarchisation of public administration, and the 
opportunity for actors to implement a diversified urban livelihood. 
 
District-level elites seeking formal employment: Hierarchies and urban livelihoods  
 
Elite actors at the district level are able to derive benefits from the creation of 
an additional district through a range of channels, including by gaining employment 
directly from the district, or by becoming a subcontractor or other affiliated 
employment. For those residents of a district who are relatively elite (in terms of their 
education level or potential to obtain a role in formal employment), the creation of a 
new district represents a number of opportunities to progress their livelihood strategies 
and opportunities. District elites who have not yet been employed at the district level 
may be able to gain employment as a public servant following the creation of an 
additional district, due to the increased demand for staff that follows the creation of a 
new district. These roles carry both secure tenure and high status, and represent a 
sustainable and stable source of urban livelihoods.626 This employment allows district 
elites to gain access to regular salaries and to assets such as offices, computers and 
phones, from which additional personal businesses can be run. A District Senior 
Finance Officer describes627 this process: 
But for all issues, we look at employment. If there were alternative 
employment, we could say they could stop [creating new districts], 
but if there are no other employments, they continue creating, and 
they get our people jobs. Even our education structure, it does not... 
We have not... It has not enabled us to get skills, eh? Then we all 
must work in offices, so everyone looks for districts [as a source of 
 
625 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’. 
626 Scoones, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 
627 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 3. 3 February 2016.  
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employment]. So we voted on the condition that they were going to 
bring us a district. They give our kids jobs. Eh? [Laughs.] 
 
The creation of additional levels of hierarchies in the Ugandan public 
administration, as enacted by the creation of new districts and sub-counties, creates 
a reason or justification for the employment of additional officers. By seeking the 
creation of additional districts and sub-counties, elites at this level are able to create a 
sufficient justification for their own employment. In addition, sub-national elite actors 
are able to use this hierarchisation of sub-national structures in order to become part 
of a distinct club that is visible to the national government, and so leverage this club 
as the basis for claiming resources from the state. National government elites are 
themselves better able to implement their own patronage strategies, by creating new 
districts as a basis for offering employment opportunities to their clients at the sub-
national level.628  
 
Notably, the employment of additional elected leaders and public servants 
following the creation of a new sub-national unit will have the effect of drawing 
resources away from expenditure on services, as discussed in Chapter Four. That is, 
while elite actors are able to derive a benefit in terms of additional employment 
opportunities or contracts, non-elite actors are made worse-off from district 
proliferation because of reduced expenditure on public services. The poor-standard 
services that are available to sub-national areas, as described in Chapter Four, may 
be further worsened by the creation of additional districts, even though this generates 
employment and patronage opportunities for others.  
 
In this sense, the urban livelihoods of district elites can be expanded into new 
forms of employment, with greater dependability and stability than running businesses 
in the private sector alone. That is, elite actors are able to derive benefits from the 
creation of a new district via becoming a member of the club good that a new district 
represents. Indeed, the elites of districts are arguably the group of citizens who obtain 
the clearest benefit from district proliferation, and are most central to the interaction 
 
628 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 




between the district-level political-economy context and the implementation of 
decentralisation. A professor at Makerere University explains:629  
So when you look deep in the villages, it is basically the leaders – 
the community leaders – who are the kind of elite, who can talk 
about some – they are the elites in a rural setting, who are cognisant 
to the opportunities of decentralisation. Either they have participated 
as councillors, or they are the relatives of local leaders, or they are 
associated with, they have knowledge of, the works of local 
authorities, they are part of the contracts that are delivered to local 
firms. Now that is the category of people who has largely benefited 
from decentralisation. 
For these elites, the strong incentive to see an additional district created may mean 
that the leverage their political-economy connections especially strongly, such as 
through lobbying their local MP for their advocacy towards this.630  
 
In addition to elites who are able to be employed directly in the district 
administration and council, others are able to gain other livelihood opportunities from 
the creation of a new district. District elites who are able to gain a benefit from 
employment opportunities from the creation of an additional district, such as 
construction services for a new district headquarters, are also able to benefit from the 
creation of a new district. They may have skills in engineering, construction, or another 
relevant skill for the establishment of a new town centre; that is, they too are able to 
gain access to the ‘club good’ of a newly-created district. Once the new district centre 
is established, they can benefit from contracts for the creation of additional services, 
such as schools and healthcare centres, as well as water and sanitation and roads 
services. A Professor at Makerere University describes631 this situation:  
They are not directly with the government, but they are associated 
with people who are councillors or people who win contracts from 
the local authorities – those companies or organisations – and they 
 
629 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76. 20 May 2016.  
630 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
631 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 76. 20 May 2016. 
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do works. So in other words, those are the people who can feel [the 
effects of decentralisation]. 
These elites will not become employees of the district in a formal sense, but will benefit 
from a new district by gaining continual employment opportunities from it.632 These 
contractors are thus able to improve their urban livelihood strategies: their employment 
and residence in a relatively urban area can be sustained by the creation of an 
additional district. 
 
District-level elites seeking to maintain an elected role  
 
For some elected leaders, the benefit to be derived from the creation of a new 
district is reduced competition for re-election to their role in an LC5 council. Where a 
member of the district elite is concerned that they may not be re-elected to their role 
in the next election, this presents an incentive to seek the creation of an additional 
district. Gaining re-election as an LC5 councillor ensures continued access to 
allowances and other privileges, as well as being maintained in a powerful social 
position. When a new district is created, existing elites are able to retain their current 
roles more easily, while competitor elites can then be elected to the council of the 
newly-created district. This situation was described by an interview participant at the 
district level in one of the three studied districts:633  
I think there are too many districts. They have been motivated by 
political interests. ... And the reasoning they normally give is that, 
districts, to move services nearer to the people. But in my 
experience I have seen they are always created by the giant 
politicians – if, if myself and him [gestures to colleague], we are the 
giants of [their district], and I have fears about him, maybe he has 
more support than me, so in the game I can try to study and see, on 
which side does he have more support? And where do I have more? 
If a particular region is for me, then we propose and say let’s just 
 
632 Stokes, Political Clientelism. 




split it – cut my side and then cut that fellow with his much support 
that side, his side, so that we both survive. 
 
Rural residents on the urban margin: non-elite, but advantaged  
 
Districts are also resident to non-elite actors, who may lack the education, 
social status or inclination to become a member of the leadership of the district, and 
instead derive their income primarily from agriculture. For some of these non-elite 
households, their residence may be near enough to the district capital that they are 
able to access it easily, meaning that they are within the urban margin. For these 
actors, too, the creation of a new district nearby to their village can present a range of 
advantages. For such residents, who are broadly non-elite in the sense of not being 
able to gain formal employment at the district, there are nonetheless access and 
livelihood benefits that can be accessed from the creation of a new district. If residents 
on the rural-urban margin are able to travel to a district capital, the services and 
opportunities they are able to access will improve compared to residents in very-
remote village settings. Citizens who live near to a district centre, though still 
themselves rural agricultural workers, will face fewer barriers to accessing town-based 
services (such as the HC5) and economic facilities (such as markets and trading 
centres). This is the core of the argument that splitting districts into smaller areas 
brings services ‘nearer to the people’, as articulated634 here by a District Health Officer:  
So the positive aspect is that those challenges [splitting the district 
into smaller districts] have been reduced to a more manageable 
size. And that has taken services much, much nearer to the people.  
 
634 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 18. 11 February 2016. 
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In this sense, residents of the urban margin are able to expand their range of income 
sources, and access economic opportunities635 that would not have been available if 
their village had remained remote from its nearest (former) district capital.636  
 
This means that the creation of a new district – and so the establishment of a 
new district capital – will draw a cohort of rural citizens into this relatively proximate 
position.637 These citizens will still interact with government via their village’s LC1 
council, but can nonetheless travel to access services and facilities at the district level 
more easily. For them, the creation of an additional district represents both an access 
strategy (for services) and a livelihoods strategy (for access to marketplaces), giving 
them substantial incentives to support the creation of an additional district with its 
headquarters nearby to their village. In this sense, residents of the urban margin are 
able to gain the benefits of a club good, accruing to members of a newly-created 
district.  
 
Rural, non-elites at the district level, and the risk of social exclusion  
 
While the creation of a new district provides opportunities for district-level elites 
and for residents of the urban margin, other residents of districts may not derive an 
economic benefit from the creation of a new district. For residents of rural areas that 
are relatively remote from even a newer, nearer district capital, the creation of an 
additional district may have little impact on daily life. For these citizens, who are 
unlikely to travel to the district capital frequently or at all, the creation of new 
employment opportunities at the district level are not likely to have a substantial impact 
on their rural livelihoods strategies. The creation of additional hierarchies of 
government, likewise, is not likely to be meaningful; any communication with 
 
635 Note that this is in contrast to the predictions of the Lewis Model, which predicts that rural 
agricultural workers will be drawn into (and become a resident of) urban areas in order to gain 
employment in newly-formed industrial sectors. Most district capitals, particularly of new districts, do 
not yet host substantial industrial employment. Employment in district capitals is either in the 
government or council, or in services sectors (retail and hospitality). These employers do not create 
substantial demand for new employees from rural areas, who are likely to be relatively under-skilled, 
so the assumptions of the Lewis Model are unlikely to hold in this case. Instead, farm workers may 
travel to the district capital on a daily basis, to take advantage of economic opportunities – but remain 
primarily resident in rural areas, and primarily work in agriculture.  
636 Conway and Chambers, ‘Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’. 




government representatives is likely to be limited to the LC1 Council. This is reflected 
in the results of the household survey, in which respondents reported that they prefer 
to consult the LC1 Chair (62 per cent of respondents) and/or a local clan or tribal leader 
(51 per cent of respondents) when issues arise. Only 15 per cent of respondents 
reported communicating with officials from the LC2-5 levels. In this sense, residents 
of rural areas who work in subsistence farming, and are not sufficiently educated or 
well-connected to be considered part of the elite, are likely to be excluded from the 
‘club good’ of a newly-created district. These residents remain largely invisible within 
the institutions and architecture of the state hierarchy.  
 
District proliferation therefore risks worsening the social and economic space 
between elite and non-elite actors; between members of the club good of a new 
district, and outsiders to it. Those citizens who are not able to leverage the 
decentralisation system to gain greater economic and political opportunities and 
networks may be subject to social and economic exclusion. Furthermore, they could 
potentially be made worse-off, if the creation of an additional district results in 
resources being redirected from funding public services to paying the wage bill of the 
employees of a newly-established district.  
 
Links between district elites and national elites  
 
The creation of a new district will require the election of an additional LC5 
council. The creation of an additional district therefore creates the opportunity for a 
new group of elected elites to be formed, whereby they can lay claim to the status, 
allowances and office space that accrue to the holders of public office at the district 
level. District elites in elected roles hold strong influence over the policies that are 
formed by district governments, and so can be highly influential in ensuring that NRM’s 
core policies are indeed implemented at the sub-national level.638 The interaction 
between the political economy and decentralisation that occurs at the district level 
results in district elites who aspire to holding office at the LC5 level agitating for the 
creation of additional districts in their local area, via drawing on their connections and 
 
638 Wilkins, ‘Who Pays for Pakalast? The NRM’s Peripheral Patronage in Rural Uganda:’ 
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networks at the national level.639 There is an additional advantage for district-level 
elites in being visibly aligned to NRM, so that they are able to access the support of 
senior, national political leaders, as well as financial support for their election 
campaigns.640 Working with national MPs from local electorates, aspiring LC5 
members lobby the national government for the creation of an additional district.641 For 
MPs, the promise of a new district attracts votes; for district elites, the promise of a 
new district represents an urban livelihoods strategy for their benefit.  
 
Section conclusion: Drivers of district proliferation at district and sub-county levels  
 
This section has described the incentives and rationales that drive actors at the 
sub-county and district levels to seek the creation of additional districts. For both elite 
and non-elite actors at these levels, the creation of new administrative units generates 
opportunities to enhance and diversify their livelihood strategies, and to gain access 
to public services. By becoming a new administrative unit, a community becomes 
visible to the infrastructure and institutions of the state, creating a ‘club good’ from 
which its members can capture benefits. For non-elite actors in rural areas, however, 
the creation of additional districts or sub-counties is likely to have little impact, unless 
travel to the headquarters of these units becomes easier. In the absence of contact 
with the newly-created unit, rural households remain marginalised. Furthermore, if the 
creation of an additional district results in financial resources being redirected from 
service delivery to the payment of wages for new employees of the district, non-elite 
actors may be made worse-off. The capture of benefits from some community 
members, but the ongoing exclusion of others, represents a risk of worsening social 
inequality. Overall, the creation of new districts and sub-counties is likely to continue, 
as it represents the point of intersection between the interests of a wide range of 
actors. Actors at these levels have noted the opportunity to maximise their own political 
and economic interests through the continuing pursuit of district proliferation.  
 
639 Vokes and Wilkins, ‘Party, Patronage and Coercion in NRM’s 2016 Re Election in Uganda: 
Imposed or Embedded?’ 
640 ‘“Vote for NRM Flag Bearer” – President Urges Sheema District Youths | Uganda Media Centre’. 
641 For example, LC5 councillors from Pallisa recommend that two counties from Pallisa be separated 





7.5 District proliferation and the centre: Political survival, security and wealth 
creation 
 
The proliferation of districts since 1986 is testament to the mutual recognition 
amongst multiple actors in the Ugandan context of the benefits that can be generated 
and captured by the continual expansion of the decentralisation system. For actors at 
the central-government level, this includes the creation and capture of patronage 
networks, and of citizens’ votes.642 In addition, as will be discussed in this section, the 
creation of additional districts has become an extension of broader Ugandan 
Government political objectives, and the continuous drive to remain in office. District 
proliferation supports NRM’s objectives of transferring wealth to the sub-national level, 
and of maintaining peace and security. District proliferation thus supports a range of 
NRM’s objectives, beyond the creation of sub-national patronage networks.  
 
Central-government elites: District proliferation for gaining patrons and votes 
 
For elected leaders at the national level, the creation of additional districts is a 
political survival strategy: by responding to demands from citizens and elites for new 
districts, the national government can help to guarantee its own continued 
popularity.643 In the lead-up to elections, national politicians make a range of 
commitments to their constituents relating to the provision of public services, and the 
commitment to “bring” a new district or sub-county to the local area remains an 
important element of these claims.644 Constituents perceive that there is a causal 
relationship between obtaining a new administrative unit locally and the provision of 
public services, and so direct their votes to candidates who make this commitment.645 
District creation is also presented to voters as a strategy for creating employment 
 
642 Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Devolution and Outsourcing of Municipal Services in Kampala City, Uganda’. 
643 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
644 In a vivid example, an MP representing Tororo County made an emotional appeal for the creation 
of a new district on the floor of Parliament in 2015. Uganda Radio Network. ‘MP Ekanya ‘Attempts 
Suicide’ on House floor over a district.’ The Observer. 19 August, 2015. 
https://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/39368-mp-ekanya-attempts-suicide-on-house-floor-over-a-
district 
645 Or explicitly draw links between the creation of a new district and their electoral behaviour. See for 
example: Anon. ‘No District, No Support for NRM in these Elections, Residents Vow’. Uganda 




opportunities,646 with politicians implying that ‘sons and daughters of the soil’647 will be 
able to gain access to these opportunities, if that politician is elected. In the context of 
relatively few opportunities to obtain non-farming employment in rural areas, these 
promises of formal employment can represent a rare opportunity for a young person 
in a rural area to look to a future other than in subsistence farming. A commitment to 
create a new administrative unit in a rural area creates multiple political advantages 
for national-level elites, and creates a perception of being able to deliver resources to 
the ‘grassroot’.648 The successful delivery of public services is not currently being 
observed, as these services tend to be of poor quality; the commitment to deliver a 
new district is both more plausible to voters and more likely to be delivered.  
 
The creation of additional districts and sub-counties allows elite actors at the 
national level to create and control patronage networks of their supporters at the 
district level. Where there are geographical areas that have demonstrated strong 
support for the ruling party, national elites can establish a favourable relationship with 
local elites by granting their request for an additional administrative unit.649 Local elites 
will therefore by bound by a degree of gratitude to these national elite actors, in the 
sense of potentially being expected to repay this action with their political loyalty.650 
Furthermore, given that the creation of an additional district necessitates the creation 
of an additional seat in Parliament for a local Woman MP, the creation of a new district 
represents an opportunity for NRM to expand its political influence by capturing both 
the main seat and the Woman MP seat, as described in section 6.5. The political 
strength of the party is thus further ensured by the creation of a new district specifically, 
rather than simply new sub-counties, with a new district’s resulting new parliamentary 
seat. Conversely, where there are areas of support for opposition candidates, the 
decision to create an additional district can be withheld, to deny resources and status 
to district-level elites who have not demonstrated sufficient support for NRM.651  
 
 
646 Perrot, Makara, and Lafargue, Elections in a Hybrid Regime. 
647 Ayeko-Kümmeth, ‘Districts Creation and Its Impact on Local Government in Uganda’. 
648 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, ‘Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive 
Development in Uganda’. 
649 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. 
650 Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda. 




The decision to create an additional administrative unit therefore rests on 
calculations of political survival, patronage and clientelism, and on strategies of how 
to best generate sub-national support for the ruling party. Overall at the national level, 
the decentralisation system has been re-directed towards ensuring the continued 
popularity of the government, through granting new districts and sub-counties to areas 
that demonstrate strong support of the national government.  
 
District proliferation and political objectives: Wealth creation and internal security  
 
The creation of additional districts as an intensification of decentralisation can 
be implemented in order to pursue a variety of purposes. As the preceding section 
describes, new districts can be created in response to demands from grassroot actors 
for greater economic inclusion and improved standards of living. In this way, the 
interaction between the economic goals of citizens and decentralisation policy 
generates demand for the creation of additional districts. In addition to interacting with 
economic factors, decentralisation interacts with the political objectives of elected 
leaders, including the contemporary objectives of the ruling party. In the process of 
campaigning for re-election in 2016, NRM identified a platform of election 
commitments with a focus on security, stability, peace and inclusive economic growth. 
These goals are described in the NRM Manifesto 2016-2021.652  
 
Many areas of government policy are framed in terms of their contributions to 
these overarching goals. For example, below these headline goals of stability and 
inclusive economic growth, the NRM Manifesto653 then frames education policy in 
terms of skills development for young people, enabling them to participate in economic 
growth. However, because decentralisation policy is more wide-ranging, its 
contribution to overall government policies is more complex. Decentralisation can be 
adjusted in order to better realise the overarching goals of the ruling party, both in the 
terminology used to describe the policy, and in the way it is implemented. This section 
will argue that decentralisation is implemented in a manner that supports the 
realisation of the political goals of NRM, particularly in regard to its two central pillars 
 
652 National Resistance Movement, ‘NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress: Taking Uganda to 
Modernity Through Job-Creation and Inclusive Development’. 
653 National Resistance Movement, ‘NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress'. 
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for the 2016-2021 parliamentary term: wealth creation and security. It will be further 
argued that the rapid creation of additional districts intensifies NRM’s use of 
decentralisation to support these goals. District proliferation can, in this way, be 
understood as the outcome of decentralisation’s interaction with political factors within 
the Ugandan context.  
 
District proliferation in support of wealth creation  
 
The emphasis on wealth creation in the most recent election campaign results 
from a growing awareness that high economic growth rates over the past decade654 
have not generated substantial improvements in quality of life for a large proportion of 
Ugandan society. For residents of rural areas, whose primary economic activity 
remains subsistence farming, economic growth has had little tangible impact. NRM 
has utilised the phrases ‘wealth creation’ and ‘local economic development’ to suggest 
that inclusive economic growth will be implemented in rural areas. One major policy 
shift relating to inclusive economic development came in 2013, when Operation 
Wealth Creation (OWC) was announced by President Museveni. OWC supplements 
the NAADS program, and comprises the subsidised distribution of farming inputs to 
rural areas, delivered using labour and logistics of the UPDF. OWC has had a high 
profile, due to its inception as an initiative of the President, but has been criticised for 
not including the agricultural advice and extension activities that had been central to 
the NAADS program. Instead, OWC distributes farming inputs, such as seeds and 
fertilisers, without complementary support and advice. It is also argued that OWC 
tends to provide too few resources for the number of households in need, meaning 
that sub-national governments and councils face choosing who amongst their 
communities will receive these benefits. The inception phase of OWC was overseen 
by the brother of President Museveni, General Caleb Akandwanaho (also known as 
Salim Saleh).655  
 
During the 2016 election campaign period, wealth creation and inclusive 
economic development became core elements of NRM’s campaign, with the NRM 
 
654 According to World Bank data, Uganda’s annual GDP growth rate has averaged 6.3 per cent since 
1986, with a peak of 11.5 per cent in 1995. Source: https://data.worldbank.org. Analysis author’s own. 




Manifesto describing wealth creation in terms of improving household wealth, 
improving food security and achieving agricultural transformation.656 These goals are 
placed at the forefront of the Party’s objectives for this time period. Modernisation of 
agriculture is described as being crucial to the dual goals of improving household 
incomes, and acceleration economic activity.  
 
However, while wealth creation remains a key goal for the national government, 
the role of district and sub-county governments in the wealth-creation narrative is less 
clear. Unlike under the popular NAADS program, which had a clear role for district- 
and sub-county level agricultural extension workers to provide advice and training to 
local farmers, sub-national governments do not have a formal role in OWC.657 The 
annual workplans658 of the three studied districts indicate that none of the planned 
agricultural extension activities for the financial year 2015/16 were able to be 
completed, due to a lack of either funding delivered through the conditional grants, 
staffing, or vehicles to travel to remote farm sites. On the other hand, interview 
participants at the district level reported that they have been instructed to “consider” 
local economic development while developing their annual workplans. A District CAO 
explains659 this as follows:  
About 70 per cent of these funds that we will have discretion on, will 
be used for livelihoods and production. Though that also is 
conditional but it is positive – because over time we have spent a 
lot of the money provided on infrastructure – but with this change 
we will be spending money on putting food on the table. 
 
This view indicates that the connection of sub-national governments to wealth-
creation activities is simultaneously mainstreamed and marginalised: sub-national 
governments are expected to include wealth-creation activities in their annual 
workplans, but additional funding is not provided for this purpose. Rather than 
 
656 NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress: Taking Uganda to Modernity. Page 93.  
657 Prisca Baike, ‘Farmers up North Declare Operation Wealth Creation a Failure’, The Observer - 
Uganda, accessed 5 August 2018, https://observer.ug/o-biz/56101-farmers-up-north-declare-
operation-wealth-creation-a-failure.html. 
658 Analysis author’s own, based on documents obtained from http://budget.go.ug/budget/individual-lg-
budgets-and-performance-reports, relating to the three studied districts (Pallisa, Lira and Ntungamo). 
659 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 16. 10 February 2016. 
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including district and sub-county governments in the delivery of its flagship wealth-
creation program, the OWC, NRM has instead included decentralised governance 
structures in another way to achieve its wealth-creation goals. That is, the creation of 
additional districts allows the central government to be seen to generate wealth in 
specific locations.  
 
Creating a new district or sub-county serves several purposes in relation to 
generating wealth and economic activity at the sub-national level. Importantly, it 
creates employment directly, by generating employment demand for sub-national 
officials and supporting staff. According to the NRM Manifesto 2016-2021,660 in a 
section describing the achievements of the previous parliamentary term, 
decentralisation has been a successful mechanism for job creation:  
The NRM’s direct investments in infrastructure development, 
agricultural improvement and in the programmes for strengthening 
decentralisation and institutions at the centre continues to create 
jobs both in the formal and informal sectors. 
These permanent, ongoing, salaried employment opportunities can be important in 
locations in which subsistence farming is the main economic activity.661 The 
establishment of a new district or sub-county capital also generates economic activity 
more broadly, such as contracting opportunities to support the new government, and 
the creation of local marketplaces.  
 
In creating an additional sub-national unit, therefore, the government is able to 
generate targeted employment and economic activity in areas of its choosing, as a 
form of political patronage.662 These choices may be based on a desire to reward 
existing patronage networks, or to create additional networks.663 More broadly, 
however, new sub-national units may be created in locations where it would be 
politically beneficial to demonstrate this support for the local economy, such as areas 
that are economically marginalised or politically disengaged from NRM. By using 
 
660 NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress: Taking Uganda to Modernity through Job-Creation 
and Inclusive Development. 
https://www.nrm.ug/sites/default/files/manifestoes/NRM%20Manifesto%202016.pdf. Page 229.  
661 Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’. Page 93. 
662 Stokes, Political Clientelism. 




district proliferation as a strategy for gaining political advantage in the name of wealth 
creation, NRM is able to leverage decentralisation in pursuit of its political goals.  
 
District proliferation in pursuit of security and stability  
 
In addition to wealth creation, a second election commitment and subsequent 
policy goal nominated by NRM is the maintenance of security. After decades of civil 
conflict between the 1960s and 1980s, a central priority of many Ugandan voters is 
maintaining peace. According to narratives generated by the NRM itself, voters report 
that they view Museveni personally to have delivered and maintained peace in 
Uganda.664 As a result, NRM has implemented a range of policies aiming to maintain 
security, such as an expansion in the scale of the Uganda Police Force (UPF), UPDF 
and various associated organisations, such as paramilitary police. The NRM Manifesto 
2016-2021 specifies a target of a 1:500 ratio of police officers to the overall population, 
the development of training academies for the police and military, and the 
establishment of national service for young people. A specific link is also drawn 
between wealth creation and stability, in explaining the involvement of the UPDF in 
Operation Wealth Creation.665  
 
In addition to these measures to improve the size and capacity of military and 
policing agencies of government, decentralisation has also been utilised in support of 
maintaining security. In particular, the creation of additional districts has been 
implemented in locations where the addition of a new district has a spillover benefit for 
peace and stability. Additional districts can be created where conflict over resources 
has developed between rival tribal groups who live within one district.666 By dividing 
districts and allocating each tribe its own administrative unit, each tribal group gains 
control over a line of funding, and competition over scarce resources can be reduced. 
For example, in eastern Uganda, tensions between Iteso and Jopadhola communities, 
who are both resident in Tororo District, have led to calls for a new district to be 
 
664 ‘Ugandans Love NRM because of Security, Says Museveni’. Daily Monitor, 18 June 2018. 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Ugandans-love-NRM-because-security-Museveni/688334-
4618320-jc2un8z/index.html 
665 National Resistance Movement, ‘NRM Manifesto 2016-2021: Steady Progress: Taking Uganda to 
Modernity Through Job-Creation and Inclusive Development’. Pp.37-38. 
666 Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. 
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created.667 According to Iteso leaders, the Jopadhola (who are the majority tribe in the 
current district) do not adequately represent the interests of the Iteso community. The 
Iteso are mostly resident in one county of the district, leading to calls for that county to 
be separated from Tororo District and elevated to the status of a district of its own.668  
 
The creation of an additional district generates another advantage for the 
central government’s ability to deliver peacefulness in Uganda, in that it extends the 
reach of employees who undertake monitoring and surveillance of the population. The 
creation of additional districts necessitates the creation of district-level employment 
roles whose purpose is to promote community stability, and to report to the central 
government any threat to this stability. As explained by a District Planner,669 each 
district’s government includes a Resident District Commissioner, a District Internal 
Security Officer (DISO), and a Uganda Police post and stationed officers. The creation 
of a new district, particularly in regions that tend to resist central government rule, 
therefore allows the central government to increase its monitoring and surveillance 
over the population in these areas, through these roles. By bringing a new district 
headquarters nearer to the people, the central government is likewise able to keep a 
nearer eye on the people. For areas of Uganda in which support for political opposition 
parties is strong, the creation of additional districts may bring an unwelcome additional 
presence nearer to their populations. By using the decentralisation system to create 
additional administrative units, the central government is able to exercise increased 
oversight of the population, including of areas where opposition support is stronger. 
The interaction of political factors with decentralisation policy to create a proliferation 
of districts has therefore contributed to the maintenance of NRM’s authority. 
 
Through creating one or more additional districts in areas experiencing tensions 
amongst tribal groups, NRM is able to leverage decentralisation as a mechanism for 
achieving its goals relating to security and stability. The proliferation of additional 
districts is partly driven by NRM’s focus on achieving these security goals, and in effect 
 
667 Pius Opae Papa, ‘Tororo Rat Eater Angry at Museveni’. The Observer, 9 January 2014. 
https://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=29544:tororo-rat-eater-angry-at-museveni 
668 Anon. ‘Tracing Border Conflict between Jopadhola, Iteso in Tororo’. Daily Monitor, 29 May 2017. 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Tracing-border-conflict-between-Jopadhola-Iteso-
Tororo/689844-3944308-w9n3d6/index.html  




indicates that NRM has prioritised maintaining security over the public-finance 
challenges that are generated by creating additional districts. As well as increasing the 
level of funding and staffing available to the security sector, decentralisation can be 
implemented in ways that support the political objectives of the ruling party. District 
proliferation is framed in this policy context as being the outcome of the interaction 
between NRM’s political goals and objectives, and decentralisation policy.  
 
Section conclusion: District proliferation as the enactment of current political objectives  
 
In the current parliamentary term, the primary goals of NRM are twofold: to 
maintain security, and to enact wealth-creation and inclusive economic development. 
Decentralisation has been enlisted in the policy arsenal available to NRM in pursuit of 
these two goals, in the form of district proliferation. Firstly, regarding wealth creation, 
new districts and sub-counties have been created in order to facilitate the transfer of 
resources to specific locations. This wealth creation takes place through generating 
wealth through employment in the sub-national public service, or through economic 
and market activity at the new headquarters. This model represents an extension 
beyond the idea of district creation as a way of generating patronage networks 
amongst elites: instead, district creation brings benefits to a wider range of community 
members than the political elite, and allows NRM to claim success in its goals of 
generating inclusive growth. 
 
Secondly, regarding security and stability, new districts are created in locations 
of conflict between tribal groups, where these groups are competing for access to the 
resources of the state. By using decentralisation as a mechanism for transferring 
resources to marginalised tribes, or to tribes that perceive themselves as marginalised, 
NRM is able to placate frustrated tribal leaders and reduce tensions. As a result, NRM 
is able to claim success in its goal of maintaining security and stability within the 
community.  
 
In each of these policy areas, NRM has elected to accept the disadvantages of 
district proliferation, such as financial and staffing pressures in new districts, in order 
to gain political advantage; it has traded off easy management of public financial 
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management for gains in its stated policy goals. NRM has utilised decentralisation 
policy to generate political capital, in the hope of achieving progress towards its 
Manifesto goals. In this sense, the rapid creation of additional districts results from the 




7.6 District proliferation and group identity  
 
As described in the sections 7.4 and 7.5, the creation of additional districts has 
become a mechanism for households and elites at the sub-county, district and national 
levels to improve their options for survival, in both a political and livelihoods framing. 
The interaction between decentralisation and the political-economy context in Uganda 
has created opportunities for actors to engage with the decentralisation process in 
ways that generate the greatest benefit for themselves. These coinciding incentives 
intersect at the point of district creation: the addition of new districts that allow the 
greatest number of actors to capture the resources of the decentralisation process for 
themselves. This section addresses the ways in which actors in the Ugandan political-
economy context utilise the existence of tribal differences as a platform for capturing 
the benefits of decentralisation. By mobilising along lines of tribal difference, and 
utilising difference as a vector for demanding the creation of a new district, actors are 
able to generate benefits for themselves from the decentralisation system. This section 
explores the mechanisms by which this process occurs, and contemplates the longer-
term effects for the political-economy context of this phenomenon.  
 
New districts as an opportunity for self-identification and power 
 
The results from fieldwork undertaken for this thesis, as presented in Chapters 
Four and Five, raise an important issue relating to the proliferation of districts. In order 
to realise the ambition of gaining a new district in their region, and to access the 
resources and opportunities a new district brings, communities are seeking markers 
by which they can self-identify as a group.670 Once a community identifies a way in 
which they can label and differentiate themselves from their neighbouring 
communities, they are able to use this label as the basis for gaining an additional 
district.671 For example, they may argue that the tribal differences between themselves 
and other communities within their district means that there is insufficient cooperation 
or resource-sharing between themselves and their neighbours.672 Where the ‘other’ 
 
670 As discussed by Cornes and Sandler (Cornes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public 
Goods, and Club Goods.), identity can be the basis on which a club is formed, allowing for the capture 
of the benefits that accrue to member of a club good – such as a newly-created district.  
671 Boone and Nyeme, ‘Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania’. 
672 Habyarimana et al., Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. 
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community is one that holds the balance of leadership roles in the local LC5 and 
district-level public service roles, a community can argue that they are being 
disadvantaged or their needs ignored on the basis of their tribal difference. Having 
made this claim, districts can successfully argue the need for an additional district for 
themselves – their own tribal group – rather than remaining in a district with others 
who would seek to disadvantage them.  
 
In this way, tribal groups have a substantial incentive to make two distinctions 
based on tribe. The first is an incentive to self-identify; that is, to delineate themselves 
as a distinct group. The second is to distance themselves from neighbours: having 
self-identified as a distinct group, they must then further differentiate from their 
neighbours’ tribal identity.673 By deciding to self-identify as a distinct tribe, and to attach 
a label to the self-identified group in the form of a name for the tribe, communities can 
draw on tribal identities that have not been formally recognised for some time.674 By 
claiming this identity, and using it as the basis for seeking the creation of a new district, 
communities can leverage the decentralisation process in ways that allow them to self-
define as a group with the power to capture state resources. 675  
 
New districts and alliance-building  
 
A further advantage for communities that are able to obtain a new district via 
self-identifying as a distinct tribal identity is that this practice generates power and 
recognition for their tribal leaders. By self-identifying as a distinct tribal group, and one 
that differs from its neighbours in important ways, groups’ leaders are propelled into a 
higher status. No longer elders within the domain of a larger tribal group, leaders of 
newly-identifying tribes are able to claim positions of authority and power within a new 
identity. In this way, communities that seek to gain a new district via self-identification 
along tribal lines are engaging in two forms of nearness and identity. Firstly, through 
gaining an additional district they gain proximity to the formal mechanisms of 
government, such as having a new district council installed nearby to their village. 
Secondly, the creation of a new district that is based on a tribe claiming that they are 
 
673 Boone and Nyeme, ‘Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania’. 
674 Ahikire, ‘Localised or Localising Democracy’. 




disadvantaged generates a newly powerful group of tribal leaders for the new tribe, 
who are then responsible for decision-making on issues related to tribal identity.676 As 
explained by an Assistant Director at LGFC677, rather than having to travel a long 
distance to access tribal elders of the former tribal group, tribal elders are now locally 
available, newly recognised, and able to assume the important social roles performed 
by tribal leaders. In this way, communities are able to access more proximate tribal 
leadership and decision-making, as much as they are able to access more proximate 
formal governance and institutions of the state. The leveraging of the decentralisation 
process to create an extra district has brought tribal institutions ‘nearer to the people’, 
as much as formal state institutions. For groups whose tribe identity is contested, 
gaining formal recognition in the form of a new district can be an important step in 
establishing the identity of the group.678 As explained679 by a district Human Resource 
Officer, a disputed tribe can gain formal legitimacy as a distinct tribe, by having a new 
district established based on its geographic space.  
 
In this way, a group that has long been denied the formal recognition of their 
tribal identity is able to assert their claim to status of a group. By leveraging this group 
identity into the creation of a new district under their control, they lay claim not just to 
their self-identity, but to the assets and resources of the state in the name of this 
identity. 
 
New districts as peacekeeping: Recognition of tribal groups  
 
From the perspective of the central government, the interaction between 
decentralisation and the political economy that leads to the creation of districts based 
on tribal group boundaries serves its own purpose. The central government is able to 
use the creation of new districts, and the awarding of these districts to self-identifying 
tribes, as a mechanism for achieving two goals. Firstly, it can be used to maintain 
peaceful relationships between neighbouring tribes, by clarifying boundaries and 
 
676 Nsibambi, Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda : The Quest for Good Governance. 
677 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 69. 10 May 2016.  
678 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’. 
679 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 8. 4 February 2016.  
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resource allocations between them.680 Secondly, the creation of new districts for tribal 
groups can be used to reduce sub-national resistance to the central government, by 
surrendering a small amount of control over resources to defined groups.681  
 
Regarding the first of these, by creating a new district and awarding this district 
to a self-defined tribe, the central government is able to use the decentralisation 
process as a proxy for solving disputes between tribes.682 Where there are 
neighbouring tribal groups that dispute land boundaries, resource allocation by the 
district government, or another form of control over resources, the central government 
is able to mitigate these disputes.683 The creation of an additional district can be 
awarded to a group that feels aggrieved by its neighbours, or feels that its territory has 
been in some way impeded. The case of the Iteso and Jopadhola communities in 
Tororo District, as described earlier, is an example of how such a dispute can lead to 
a claim for new-district creation. In creating an additional district on these grounds, the 
central government is able to reduce the severity and longevity of disputes between 
neighbouring groups, using the decentralisation system to achieve this. The 
implementation of decentralisation has, in this way, been affected by the political 
economy in Uganda, where tensions between tribal groups are resolved by the 
manipulation of decentralisation via the creation of additional districts.  
 
Secondly, the central government is able to use the creation of an additional 
district to placate areas that may be dissatisfied with the current government, and the 
resources it is able to provide. This is particularly important in areas of Uganda that 
have been historically restive, or are perceived as being under-privileged and ignored 
relative to the rest of Uganda.684 Areas in the north and north-east of Uganda, while 
being the most sparsely-populated area of the country, have seen the creation of a 
large number of districts, as illustrated in the map of Ugandan districts on page 29. By 
using the creation of additional districts as a mechanism to transfer resources to areas 
of Uganda that have long felt themselves to be marginalised, the central government 
 
680 Grossman and Lewis, ‘Administrative Unit Proliferation’. 
681 Cammack et al., ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’. 
682 Branch and Cheeseman, ‘Democratisation, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from 
Kenya’. 
683 Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. 




is able to leverage the decentralisation system to further its popularity in 
disadvantaged regions of Uganda. When combined with policies that are designed to 
reduce the inequality between the north of Uganda and more prosperous areas in the 
south, such as the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), the creation of 
additional districts in the northern regions of Uganda have facilitated the transfer of 
resources to poorer regions. However, as described685 by a District Deputy CAO in an 
interview, the comparatively high levels of poverty in the northern regions of Uganda 
means that these districts tend to be the most affected by low staffing numbers, low 
revenue raising and low staffing capacity that have been described in section 6.2. The 
creation of additional districts without due regard for the financial viability of these 
districts has generated a large number of poorly-resourced and less-effective districts.  
 
Section conclusion: District proliferation as a tool for self-identification  
 
This section has discussed the ways in which groups of citizens self-identify as 
a distinct tribe in order to gain access to resources and power, or to bring assets nearer 
to themselves. Importantly, the use of a tribal identity in order to argue for the creation 
of an additional district may not be the first preference of the community; this may be 
utilised only after other attempts to claim a new district have been frustrated. By 
seeking the creation of an additional administrative unit on the basis of their shared 
tribal group, groups are able to claim a shared identity of their own, and to differentiate 
themselves from other groups of citizens. In effect, the practice of using differences 
between tribal groups as the basis for creating a new administrative unit leads to the 
formalisation of tribal differences within the community. The borders of administrative 
units start to overlap with the borders between tribal groups. The deepening of 
divisions between different tribes are therefore both incentivised, and formalised and 
made permanent, via the creation of additional districts.  
 
The decentralisation process has thus come to influence the national political-
economy, by giving parts of the community an incentive to differentiate themselves 
from their neighbours in order to be awarded an additional district or sub-county. The 
political context in Uganda has in turn affected the implementation of decentralisation, 
 
685 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 16. 10 February 2016. 
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as tribal groups that have long sought to be recognised as independent from their 
neighbours are able to achieve this goal through leveraging the decentralisation 
system. The interaction between decentralisation and the local political context has 
therefore generated an unexpected outcome: the creation of districts on the basis of 





7.7 Chapter Conclusion: District proliferation as a multi-actor political and 
economic strategy  
 
Unless the Ugandan population start appreciating that having a 
district does not translate into service delivery, we will continue 
having this challenge where every other sub-county, village, or 
homestead wants to become a district. 
- Principal Economist, World Bank, Kampala686 
 
The phenomenon of district creation persists in Uganda despite the 
acknowledgement from a range of sources of the challenges this proliferation causes. 
The rapid creation of additional districts has exacerbated the low staffing levels of 
districts, their low capacity for raising local revenue, and the crowding-out of 
development expenditure by wages. Nonetheless, the creation of districts and sub-
counties continues apace. This chapter has raised the advantages accruing to actors 
across the Ugandan political economy from the creation of additional districts, as were 
revealed by the research undertaken for this thesis. Through interviews, household-
level surveys and quantitative data, the incentives and motivations of actors emerge, 
and indicate that the creation of new districts is driven by a range of complex factors. 
Principally, the creation of new districts is driven by both supply and demand: supply 
from political leaders keen to implement a political survival strategy; and demand from 
communities who see a new district as a path that they perceive will lead to resource 
access and livelihood creation. Where these incentives and motivations coincide, the 
creation of new districts emerges.  
 
The existing field of literature687 relating to district proliferation in Uganda draws 
on the perspectives of elites, and so positions district proliferation as arising from the 
establishment of patronage networks. By incorporating the perspectives of non-elite 
 
686 Pers.Comm. Interview with author, number 81. 27 May 2016 
687 For example Elliott Green, ‘Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 45, no. 1 (1 March 2010): 83–103, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9058-8; and Guy Grossman and Janet I. Lewis, ‘Administrative 




actors at the sub-county and village levels, this research argues that the demand and 
supply of new districts in fact arises from the motivations of a wide range of actors.  
 
For political actors, these strategies focus on political survival, and accordingly 
on the supply of additional districts in ways that are politically beneficial (even when 
acknowledging the financial problems caused by the rapid creation of new districts). 
For district-level political actors, the creation of a new district creates additional 
opportunities to gain access to an LC5 council seat, and so direct resources towards 
key allies. At the central level, elected officials are able to gain popular support by 
creating an additional district, or by committing to do so if elected. The creation of 
additional districts presents an opportunity to reward loyal patronage networks with 
employment opportunities and access to resources following the creation of a new 
district. Conversely, a new district can be withheld from regions that are less 
supportive of the ruling party. For NRM, in particular, the supply of additional districts 
to strategically-chosen locations supports the core party goals of delivering wealth 
creation and security to the community. The creation of additional districts emerges as 
the outcome of the interaction between decentralisation and the political survival 
objectives and strategies of elected actors.  
 
For non-elite actors, at the district level and down to the village, the creation of 
an additional district assists in implementing an economic strategy for accessing 
resources and generating rural or urban livelihoods. New districts and sub-counties 
bring the chance to access marketplaces, participate in economic activity related to 
the establishment of a new headquarters, and benefit from government contracts. A 
smaller district reduces competition in access to agricultural inputs, and to accessing 
public services.688 However, where elites are more able to benefit from the creation of 
a new district than non-elite actors (such as gaining access to formal employment), 
the creation of a new district can have the effect of worsening inequality and social 
exclusion between elite and non-elite actors. In this sense, the creation of a new district 
functions as a ‘club good’, in which members can derive benefits from new-district 
 
688 Examples of the pervasiveness of this argument are found in local media, where the remoteness 
or size of a district is frequently cited as a reason for the creation of an additional district. For 





creation, but non-members are excluded from realising these benefits. Potential 
consequences of this creation of districts on the basis of tribal identities are that groups 
are actively incentivised to identify as separate from their neighbours; and, having 
gained a district ‘for’ their tribe, the boundaries between tribal groups are formalised 
and institutionalised in the form of a district boundary.  
 
At the grassroot level, the creation of an additional administrative unit is 
perceived to bring the delivery of public services, such as a new primary school that 
must689 be provided to a new sub-county. In this sense, the creation of a new district 
is perceived as having the potential to bring services that have heretofore not been 
provided by the decentralisation system. From the perspective of citizens at the 
household level in the studied field sites, the creation of an additional district may bring 
with it the public services and economic opportunities that are the hallmarks of 
development itself. As a result, villages in Uganda have begun to seek the creation of 
a new district or sub-county, via lobbying their local MPs or District Councils. In some 
locations, the desire for obtaining a new district is powerful enough that communities 
have begun to strengthen their tribal self-identification, and to argue that they are a 
distinct group compared to their neighbours. However, paradoxically, because the 
creation of new districts has been so rapid, many districts have weak financial 
resources with which to finance service delivery. The principal beneficiaries of the 
creation of a new district may in fact be sub-national elites, who are able to benefit 
from the employment opportunities presented by the creation of an additional district. 
The rapid creation of new districts may have the effect of worsening social and 
economic inequality between the elites who are able to benefit from new employment, 
and villagers who are not – and in fact may face worse service delivery by poorer 
governments. Nonetheless, villagers report that their perceptions of the creation of 
new districts is that services will ‘be brought’ nearer to the population. Demand for the 
creation of additional districts is thus fuelled by the interaction between 
decentralisation and the economic strategies of households and non-elite actors. It is 
hoped that the creation of additional, smaller districts will genuinely bring the benefits 
of development ‘nearer to the people’.  
 
689 According to the minimum service standards for public services, established by the national 
government. ‘Service Standards and Service Delivery Standards for the Health Sector 2016 | 







District Proliferation: Ever-Nearer to the People  
 
Alongside these formal models, and intertwined with them, are a 
host of instrumental uses to which the state apparatus is put, on 
behalf of individuals, cliques, factions, and class interests. Here the 
power of the state apparatus is put to use to the benefit of some, 
and to the detriment of others; the bureaucracy becomes the vehicle 
for the exercise of a particular kind of power; and this not as some 
kind of mistake or pathology, but as an essential part of which the 
bureaucracy in fact is, what it is all about. 
- Ferguson, ‘The Anti-Politics Machine’690 
 
In addressing the research question, How does the political economy interact 
with decentralisation in Uganda?, this thesis has addressed the rapid creation of new 
districts and sub-counties in Uganda since decentralisation was introduced in 1992. 
Research has drawn on political economy analysis to analyse an apparent paradox: 
the continuing creation of new districts, even though the economic and financial costs 
of this phenomenon are widely acknowledged. The research has analysed the 
strategies that have been put in place by a wide range of actors in the Ugandan 
context, to improve their own political survival and economic livelihoods. When 
combined, these strategies have had the effect of driving both the demand for, and 
supply of, additional districts.  
 
This thesis has argued that the outcome of district proliferation is not generated 
by the actions of elites alone; non-elite actors are likewise motivated to seek the 
creation of additional administrative units. Rural and urban livelihoods alike are 
 
690 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development,’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 




improved by the creation of new districts, bringing new economic opportunities and 
options to actors at the sub-national level. For elite actors, the creation of additional 
districts presents opportunities for political survival, in the form of patronage networks, 
reduced competition for parliamentary seats, and contributions to achieving the goals 
of the NRM Manifesto. In some locations, this drive for new districts has included 
seeking the creation of a district for a particular tribal group, after a group has been 
able to self-identify as a different, and marginalised, tribal group compared to their 
neighbours. 
 
This conclusion chapter begins by summarising the dual-directional nature of 
the interaction between decentralisation and the wider political economy, and 
analysing the phenomenon of district proliferation. A comparison of the research to the 
existing literature is then described, followed by commentary on areas for further 
research. Finally, this chapter describes the wider applicability of the research. The 
notion of district proliferation is identified as a mechanism for advancing political and 
economic goals, and for gaining ‘visibility’ for a community, as a strategy for leveraging 




8.1 The dual interaction of decentralisation and the political economy  
 
Returning to the research question posed in Chapter One that this thesis has 
sought to investigate – How does the political economy interact with decentralisation 
in Uganda? – this section will address the dual-directional approach implied by this 
research question. Decentralisation is not introduced into a vacuum; rather, it is 
introduced into an existing social, political, economic, historical and cultural context, 
and will both affect that context and be affected by it. This thesis has argued both 
directions of this dual-directional relationship: that decentralisation both affects the 
political economy in which it is implemented, and in turn, decentralisation is affected 
by the local political economy context.  
 
Decentralisation affects the political economy: Comparing theories and results 
 
The introduction of decentralisation into a country will necessarily affect the 
dynamics of decision-making over resources, processes of reform and change, and 
the authority to define priorities. Decisions on the expenditure of public funds, that 
were once made exclusively at the centre, will now be made in conjunction with leaders 
at the sub-national level. These actors will have their own interests and objectives, 
generating a need for negotiation and dialogue between different levels of 
government.691  
 
According to the existing theories and rationales relating to decentralisation, as 
described in section 2.1, there are two lines of argument that describe the ways in 
which decentralisation should affect the political-economy context in which it is 
implemented. They are, firstly, that decentralisation will generate improved 
responsiveness of government to local development priorities and needs, such that 
service delivery will be better targeted to these priorities.692 In this sense, plans and 
budgets for the expenditure of public funds will theoretically be conducted from the 
grassroot upwards, reversing the hierarchy of control of resource allocation. Secondly, 
decentralisation is argued to improve the participation of local communities in 
 
691 Asiimwe and Musisi, Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. 
692 Faguet, Jean-Paul, ‘Transformation from Below in Bangladesh: Decentralization, Local 




governance, with shortened paths for communications between citizens and their 
elected leaders.693 The greater proximity of local governments to citizens will reduce 
the barriers to communication and consultation between these groups, and reduce the 
transaction costs of this communication. Projects that are conducted using public 
funding will theoretically be scrutinised and overseen by the citizenry, rather than only 
by the bureaucracy. Combined with local elections, citizens will have the power to hold 
government to account for their expenditure of public funding.  
 
However, the results of research undertaken for this thesis suggest that these 
theoretical objectives of service delivery and participatory governance are not being 
realised in the studied field sites under the current decentralisation models in Uganda. 
Firstly, regarding participation, consultation and the responsiveness of governments 
to communities, research participants in the household survey described poor-quality 
service delivery, low levels of participation in bottom-up planning processes, and 
governments that have failed to respond to complaints about the poor quality of local 
public services. The intended effects of decentralisation on political and economic 
relationships, in which the citizen at the grassroot is engaged in planning, budgeting, 
monitoring and oversight, are not reflected in these results within the six studied 
communities. Instead, research participants report that the high levels of conditionality 
in funding transferred from the centre to the periphery prevent local governments from 
being responsive to local needs.  
 
When these qualitative results are combined with quantitative results from the 
national budget outcomes, this thesis has argued that sub-national governments have 
not been adequately resourced or given sufficient discretionary authority over 
expenditure to be able to respond to local development priorities. In the presence of 
top-down planning and budgeting, citizens’ enthusiasm for participation has waned, 
and expenditure on decentralised public services has fallen as a percentage of the 
national budget. While the introduction of decentralisation has affected the political 
economy in the studied locations, it has not generated its intended benefits. Local 
governments have been asked to handle additional responsibilities, thus generating 
raised expectations about their role in governance, but without receiving adequate 
 
693 Ahmad et al., ‘Decentralization And Service Delivery: Policy Research Working Papers’. 
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resources for this to be possible. The purported benefits of decentralisation have not 
been realised at the grassroot or sub-national level, causing frustration and 
disappointment amongst these actors.  
 
The political economy affects decentralisation  
 
The second aspect of the dual-directional analysis underpinning the research 
question asks in which ways the political economy has affected decentralisation as a 
policy in Uganda. The research undertaken for this thesis has analysed the ways in 
which the outcomes of decentralisation have diverged from its original rationales and 
goals, with a specific focus on the phenomenon of the very-rapid creation of new 
districts.  
 
Returning to the literature review described in Chapter Two, decentralisation 
has been framed by different authors using different lenses. For some, 
decentralisation is understood to be an technical reform, implemented in order to 
achieve economic or governance reform goals. The political economy context of a 
specific location will accordingly have little bearing on the outcomes of decentralisation 
reforms: decentralisation will achieve its goals of governance and economic 
improvements regardless of the context in which it is implemented.  
 
The results generated by this research, however, reveal that the trajectory of 
decentralisation as a policy in Uganda has been noticeably altered since its 
commencement in 1992. The number of districts has almost quadrupled, and 
continues to rise. The proliferation of new administrative units at the sub-national level 
has been generated by the actions of a range of individuals, from the highest levels of 
government to the village, as individuals pursue their own self-interest. For elected 
leaders, the creation of a new district that can then be ‘given’ to a community 
represents a political survival strategy. For district-level elites, a new district in their 
area represents opportunities for employment, and thus access to resources. For 
those living in urban or urban-marginal areas, a new district brings markets closer, and 
represents the improvement of their urban livelihood strategy. For the village level, the 




where the delivery of public services and utilities has not been successful as yet. The 
creation of additional districts is framed as the product of the supply of districts from 
political elites, and the demand for districts from non-elite and grassroot actors. The 
coinciding incentives of these actors has fuelled the proliferation of additional districts, 
and has fundamentally altered decentralisation as a policy.  
 
The outcome of decentralisation interacting with the political economy: District 
proliferation 
 
This thesis has argued that the rapid creation of new districts and sub-counties 
since the 1990s has been driven by the interaction of decentralisation and the political 
economy. There is a substantial financial burden imposed by the creation of a new 
district, and negative impacts on the transaction costs of service delivery conducted 
by ever-smaller district governments. The continued creation of additional districts, 
despite these well-known financial impacts, speaks to the political dividends that are 
created for elite actors from the creation of a new district. This thesis has found that 
actors across a wide spectrum of the political economy have seen potential benefits 
for themselves in the creation of a new district. Rather than being favourable to elite 
actors alone, a new district brings visibility and the opportunity to potentially claim state 
resources to non-elite and village-level actors, as much as to the elite. Accordingly, a 
wide range of actors have the incentive to seek the creation of a new district. The 
creation of new districts is the policy result of the coinciding incentives of a large 
number of actors, each of whom individually seeks the creation of a new district in 
order to maximise their own motivations and goals. The political economy has reached 
a point at which new districts are being rapidly created; this is unlikely to change unless 
the incentives of a substantial number of actors change to an alternative outcome.  
 
In addition to the financial challenges caused by the rapid creation of new 
districts, the results arising from this research suggest two unintended consequences 
that arise from district proliferation. Firstly, an incentive is created for those who would 
seek a new district for their community to identify as being a distinct tribe from 
neighbouring groups, in order to claim that ‘we’ need ‘our own’ district. Where new 
districts are created according to the boundaries between tribal groups, these 
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boundaries are then formalised and institutionalised in the form of new districts. 
Secondly, the creation of a new district allows sub-national elites, such as those who 
are well-educated, to gain access to resources such as salaries and contracts. 
However, non-elite members of society may be comparatively unable to derive these 
benefits. The creation of an additional district can therefore lead to the worsening of 
social exclusion and inequality, where some community members are able to benefit 
from the economic opportunities arising from a new district, but others are not. In this 
sense, it is theorised that a new district is analogous to a club good: members are able 







8.2 Decentralisation and the grassroot: Differences from existing literature 
 
Throughout this thesis, arguments have been made that differ from those made 
in the existing body of literature relating to decentralisation in Uganda. The research 
differs from the existing literature in two important ways: in relation to its underpinning 
assumptions about the nature of decentralisation; and regarding the research 
methodology.  
 
Decentralisation as a political mechanism  
 
Firstly, this thesis has moved away from the assumption expressed by many 
authors described in section 2.1, that frame decentralisation as a technical process 
that can be implemented to achieve governance-related goals. Since the 1980s, 
authors694 have argued that decentralisation can be used as a mechanism to achieve 
goals such as improving the efficiency of governance, reducing the scale of the central 
government, reducing poverty, and disrupting corruption and patronage networks. 
These authors have linked decentralisation to reforms undertaken for SAPs, or as part 
of broader ‘good governance’ reforms, under the assumption that decentralisation will 
not have broader implications for the political economy. Following from this, several 
researchers have argued that decentralisation in the Ugandan context was introduced 
as part of a suite of broader economic and governance reforms that were similar to 
those implemented in other national contexts.  
 
In contrast, as described in section 2.3, other researchers frame Ugandan 
decentralisation in a different light. Rather than decentralisation being imposed by 
external actors, and rather than having governance goals at its heart, these authors 
argue that decentralisation’s origins in Uganda are both domestic, and explicitly 
political. For these authors, decentralisation was introduced in the early stages of 
 
694 See for example Sam Hickey and Giles Mohan, ‘Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics 
of Development’, Development and Change, 2005, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2005.00410.x; G. Shabbir Cheema and 
Dennis A. Rondinelli, Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007); George A Larbi, ‘The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States’, 
1999; and Gita Gopal and World Bank, eds., Decentralization in Client Countries: An Evaluation of 
World Bank Support, 1990-2007 (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2008). 
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NRM’s rule, as a strategy for gaining popular support and claiming legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the Bush War.  
 
This latter framing of decentralisation – that its core goals are political, and 
focused on domestic considerations – suggests that there is an important place in the 
analysis of decentralisation for considering its implications for informal institutions. As 
argued by Hyden,695 informal institutions emerge from a local historical context, and 
determine a great deal of the ‘norms’ of behaviour for citizens in that context. District 
proliferation is thus best analysed within the context of a political economy framework, 
in which the specific, indigenous, domestic, political logic of the way decentralisation 
is implemented in the Ugandan context can be identified and analysed. If analysts of 
decentralisation in Uganda continue to regard decentralisation as an technical, 
externally-imposed mechanism, the importance of informal institutions to the trajectory 
of decentralisation in Uganda may be inadvertently discounted.  
 
Research methods: Inclusion of the grassroot perspective  
 
Rather than focusing on the perspective of elite actors and their motivations, 
this research has sought to appreciate the challenges and outcomes of 
decentralisation from the grassroot perspective. A household-level survey was 
conducted, in addition to elite interviews and quantitative analysis, to seek villagers’ 
perspectives on decentralisation, service delivery and governance. Participants in six 
field sites described their experiences of: poor-quality and unaffordable service 
delivery; elected officials who communicate with them only in the lead-up to elections; 
as well as the advantages that can be derived from interpersonal connections to 
powerful individuals and tribes.  
 
The perspectives and opinions of households revealed marked differences 
between the goals of decentralisation from policymakers’ viewpoints, and the lived 
experiences of those who are the recipients of public services and governance 
models. While elite actors expressed in interviews their confidence that participatory 
planning and budgeting is undertaken at local levels, villagers in the studied 
 




communities reported low levels of participation, rare village meetings, and attendance 
at meetings by invitation only. As a result of the inclusion of household perspectives 
in the research, doubt is cast on concepts such as participation and responsiveness: 
concepts that are central to the rationales for implementing decentralisation. 
 
The inclusion of the perspectives of household members into the research has 
also revealed that when viewed from the grassroot, district proliferation presents a 
perceived opportunity for non-elite members of the community to gain an advantage. 
Individuals at the household, and non-elite citizens at the sub-county and district, 
believe that they are also able to leverage advantages from the creation of an 
additional district or sub-county, such as the creation of new public services. Rather 
than being perceived as an attempt by central-government and district-level elites to 
control resources and gain political power, new-district creation is revealed as a 
strategy for a wide range of actors. District proliferation is shown to be as much a 
product of the demand for new districts, emanating from the grassroot, as it arises 
from the supply of new districts by elites.  
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8.3 Areas for further research  
 
The research undertaken for this thesis has included the viewpoints of a wide 
range of actors; nonetheless, there are avenues of enquiry that could not be pursued 
within the scope of a single research project. Further areas for research following from 
this thesis are described as follows.  
 
Firstly, further research could better compare the experiences of newer districts 
with those of older districts, in terms of their experiences in managing responsive and 
participatory governance. For this thesis, the author chose to focus on districts that 
had already been created by the commencement of multi-party elections in 2006, in 
order to be able to focus on ‘older’ districts. This enabled the author to draw on a large 
database of documents and budget reports, such as annual budgets and workplans 
for the three studied districts. Budget data, such as approved estimates and releases, 
were also readily accessible for Uganda’s older districts. This wealth of data would not 
have been available if one or more of the selected districts had been created more 
recently. Many new districts are yet to produce an annual budget or annual workplan, 
and (by definition) do not have historical budget data available in order to identify fiscal 
trends. While it was a decision of the author to draw comparisons between older 
districts, future research could benefit from comparisons amongst newer districts, or 
between new and old districts, provided that a long history of budgetary and planning 
documents are not required for the research.  
 
Secondly, it was beyond the scope of this thesis to include the viewpoints and 
governance challenges of the parish/LC2 level of government. Further research could 
benefit from an examination of this level of government, where changes begin to 
emerge from the wholly-rural experience of villages/LC1s. The LC2 is the first council 
to consolidate the development plans of a range of villages, which requires of them 
that choices be made amongst competing priorities. Useful research could be 





8.4 Wider applicability and contribution of the research  
 
Decentralisation is a policy mechanism in wide use worldwide. As discussed in 
section 6.4, the introduction of decentralisation requires significant expenditures on 
sub-national government structures, salaries, offices and equipment. In the context of 
a developing country with limited resources, this expenditure can have a high 
opportunity cost in in terms of foregone expenditure on social services, utilities or 
infrastructure. Despite this expense, decentralisation is thought to improve public 
service delivery and the quality of governance, and it continues to be implemented in 
many national contexts. This thesis has described the effects of decentralisation on 
the political economy, and vice-versa, in the Ugandan context, with Chapters Four to 
Seven describing in detail the contribution to the existing field of knowledge in this 
field. District proliferation is revealed by the research to result from the intersecting 
incentives and motivations of a range of actors in the Ugandan political economy. Each 
of these actors seeks the creation of a new district in order to support their own 
interests, in the form of their political survival or economic livelihoods strategy. This 
section discusses the wider applicability of this research, in seeking to understand the 
implementation of decentralisation and, in particular, the phenomenon of district 
proliferation.  
 
The grassroot: Careful understanding, and strategic action  
 
The inclusion of grassroot perspectives in the research undertaken for this 
thesis has illuminated the gulf between the theories, and the practical realities, of 
decentralisation in the Ugandan context. Respondents to the household survey 
describe selective or non-existent participation, government non-responsiveness to 
complaints, and poor-quality public services; in short, the goals and rationales of 
decentralisation are not consistently realised at the grassroot level. This suggests that 
policymakers and researchers are to be wary of assuming that decentralisation will 
deliver these goals, without testing the claims of central elites against the lived 
experiences of those at the grassroot. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that the 
introduction of consultation and participation mechanisms – such as village planning 
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meetings – are sufficient for the genuine realisation of consultation and participation 
themselves.  
 
Furthermore, research and policy must be mindful of assuming passivity on the 
part of rural households. In the household survey, villagers articulated strategies that 
they pursue in order to improve their own standards of living. In the absence of the 
high-quality public services they require, villagers look to the actions and promises of 
elected leaders, whose claim is that district proliferation brings services ‘nearer to the 
people’. As a result, gaining an additional administrative unit in the region in which 
they live becomes villagers’ goal, as a platform for subsequently demanding the 
delivery of services.696 Participants in the household-level survey undertaken for this 
research demonstrated a nuanced understanding of their livelihoods approaches, and 
strategic approaches to gaining the best possible advantage for themselves from 
existing governance arrangements. Just as for elites, non-elites likewise approach 
decentralisation with an eye to maximising their own utility, and undertake actions to 
achieve these goals.  
 
“I take my side, that fellow takes his side, and we both survive”: Economic incentives 
and social inclusion 
 
The research conducted for this thesis also draws attention to the possibility of 
governance reforms having unintended negative effects for equality and social 
inclusion. While the creation of additional districts and sub-counties in Uganda has 
allowed elite actors to derive benefits in terms of formal employment and access to 
resources, for non-elites, a different picture emerges. Non-elite actors, particularly 
those who work mainly in subsistence farming, have not necessarily realised benefits 
from the creation of new administrative units. Without the education background or 
skill set to benefit from formal government employment, supporting contracts, or 
commercial opportunities, rural farmers are excluded from the ‘club good’ of a new 
district. Social inclusion can be inadvertently worsened, and the poorest left further 
 
696 However, the rapid proliferation of districts, and the fiscal burden this generates, may make the 
future delivery of services weaker than is the case for older districts. Citizens’ understanding of the 
benefits that may accrue to their community following the creation of a new district, such as the 




behind in the economic growth narrative, as a result of policies that in fact aim to 
achieve improved standards of living. The uneven distribution of the benefits of district 
proliferation results from it being driven by individuals’ pursuit of their own self-interest: 
those who are the most able to self-advocate are the most likely to benefit.  
 
‘Steady progress’: Political survival as policy reality 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that when governance reforms intersect with 
political competition, the self-preservation instinct of political leaders will determine the 
manner in which such reforms are implemented. For political leaders, the introduction 
of new a reform – particularly one with the broad impacts of decentralisation – presents 
an opportunity for harnessing political forces. Far from considering decentralisation to 
be an administrative and technical reform, elected leaders in the Ugandan context 
have demonstrated their perception of it as an intensely political mechanism. The 
continued proliferation of additional districts, even where this is known to cause fiscal 
imbalances, and even following a brief moratorium, is testament to the perceived 
political benefit of supplying a new district. Furthermore, decentralisation has become 
intertwined with the achievement of the current NRM government’s central platforms: 
security and stability, and wealth creation. Decentralisation has therefore been 
repurposed as a strategy for achieving the overarching economic and political goals 
of the ruling party. The popularity of the creation of new districts – both their supply, 
by elected leaders, and demand from the broader population – suggests that the 





8.5 Conclusion: Nearer to the people  
 
The story of decentralisation in Uganda includes both disputed origins, and an 
uncertain future. Within the existing literature on Ugandan decentralisation, some 
argue that the story has domestic origins, and is political; it aims to draw the Ugandan 
population into NRM’s steady progress towards stability and wealth creation. A new 
district makes a community visible, and from this visibility comes a legitimate claim on 
resources.  
 
For others, the origins of decentralisation in Uganda are international, and its 
goals are governance-oriented; it generates accountability, efficiency, responsiveness 
and participation. This second perspective, dominated by analysis conducted from the 
viewpoint of the elite, views decentralisation through an instrumentalist lens. This body 
of literature asks how decentralisation can be utilised to improve the quality of 
governance and the inclusiveness of economic growth. Decentralisation is positioned 
as a tool for achieving better-targeted public services, and more consultative 
participatory governance.  
 
However, framing decentralisation from this top-down viewpoint risks 
undervaluing the experiences of those the grassroot level, whose perspectives present 
a different image of the impact of decentralisation. Viewed from underneath, tangible 
improvements to service standards remain elusive, and government remains remote. 
Villagers’ impressions depict decentralisation as not having yet reached the grassroot: 
‘nearness’ to the people has not yet been achieved. From the grassroot perspective, 
there is a need for more districts to be created: until decentralisation, and services, 
and government, and development itself, reaches the grassroot; until voices from the 












Appendix A: List of districts with region, parent district and date of commencement 
 
New districts take effect on 1 July of the given year  
 
Number Name Parent district Region Date of 
effect 
1.  Kampala n/a Central Pre-1986 
2.  Jinja  n/a East Pre-1986 
3.  Mbale n/a East Pre-1986 
4.  Moroto n/a North Pre-1986 
5.  Arua n/a North Pre-1986 
6.  Bombo n/a Central Pre-1986 
7.  Gulu n/a North Pre-1986 
8.  Masaka n/a West Pre-1986 
9.  Mbarara n/a West Pre-1986 
10.  Kasese n/a West Pre-1986 
11.  Kitgum n/a North Pre-1986 
12.  Kabarole n/a West Pre-1986 
13.  Iganga n/a West Pre-1986 
14.  Hoima n/a West Pre-1986 
15.  Kabale n/a West Pre-1986 
16.  Mubende n/a Central Pre-1986 
17.  Tororo n/a East Pre-1986 
18.  Bushenyi n/a West Pre-1986 
19.  Soroti n/a North Pre-1986 
20.  Luweero n/a Central Pre-1986 
21.  Mukono n/a Central Pre-1986 
22.  Mpigi n/a Central Pre-1986 
23.  Rukungiri n/a West Pre-1986 
24.  Kamuli n/a East Pre-1986 
25.  Kotido n/a North Pre-1986 
26.  Kapchorwa n/a North Pre-1986 
27.  Lira n/a North Pre-1986 
28.  Apac n/a North Pre-1986 
29.  Nebbi n/a North Pre-1986 
30.  Bundibugyo n/a West Pre-1986 
31.  Rakai n/a West Pre-1986 
32.  Kumi n/a East Pre-1986 
33.  Masindi n/a West Pre-1986 
34.  Kalangala Masaka West 1990 
35.  Kibaale Hoima West 1991 
36.  Kiboga Mubende Central 1991 
37.  Kisoro Kabale West 1991 
38.  Pallisa Tororo East 1991 




40.  Bugiri Iganga West 1997 
41.  Busia Tororo East 1997 
42.  Katakwi Soroti East 1997 
43.  Nakasongola Luweero Central 1997 
44.  Sembabule Masaka West 1997 
45.  Kamwenge Kabarole West 2000 
46.  Kayunga Mukono Central 2000 
47.  Pader Kitgum North 2000 
48.  Kyenjojo Kabarole West 2000 
49.  Mayuge Iganga West 2000 
50.  Sironko Mbale East 2000 
51.  Wakiso Mpigi  Central 2000 
52.  Yumbe Arua North 2000 
53.  Kaberamaido Soroti East 2000 
54.  Kanungu Rukungiri West 2000 
55.  Nakapiripirit Moroto North 2000 
56.  Ibanda Mbarara West 2005 
57.  Kabingo Mbarara West 2005 
58.  Kiruhura Mbarara West 2005 
59.  Kaabong Kotido North 2005 
60.  Kaliro Kamuli North 2005 
61.  Koboko Arua North 2005 
62.  Butaleja Tororo East 2005 
63.  Nakaseke Luweero Central 2005 
64.  Amuria Katakwi East 2005 
65.  Mityana Mubende Central 2005 
66.  Manafwa Mbale East 2005 
67.  Amolatar Lira North 2005 
68.  Bukwa Kapchorwa East 2005 
69.  Busiki Iganga West 2005 
70.  Amuru Gulu North 2006 
71.  Budaka Pallisa East 2006 
72.  Oyam Apac North 2006 
73.  Abim Kotido North 2006 
74.  Namutumba Iganga East 2006 
75.  Dokolo Lira North 2006 
76.  Bulisa Masindi West 2006 
77.  Maracha Arua North 2006 
78.  Bukedea Kumi East 2006 
79.  Bududa Mbale East 2006 
80.  Lyantonde Rakai Central 2006 
81.  Amudat Nakapiritpirit North 2010 
82.  Buikwe Mukono Central 2010 
83.  Buyende Kamuli East 2010 
84.  Kyegegwa Kyenjojo West 2010 
85.  Lamwo Kitgum North 2010 
86.  Otuke Lira North 2010 
87.  Zombo Nebbi North 2010 
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88.  Alebtong Lira North 2010 
89.  Bulambuli Sironko East 2010 
90.  Buvuma Mukono Central 2010 
91.  Gomba Mpigi Central 2010 
92.  Kiryandongo Masindi West 2010 
93.  Luuka Iganga East 2010 
94.  Namanyingo Bugiri East 2010 
95.  Ntoroko Bundibugyo West 2010 
96.  Serere Soroti East 2010 
97.  Kyankwanzi Kiboga Central 2010 
98.  Kalungu Masaka Central 2010 
99.  Lwengo Masaka Central 2010 
100.  Bukomansimbi Masaka Central 2010 
101.  Mitooma Bushenyi West 2010 
102.  Rubirizi Bushenyi West 2010 
103.  Ngora Kumi East 2010 
104.  Napak Moroto North 2010 
105.  Kibuku Pallisa East 2010 
106.  Nwoya Amuru North 2010 
107.  Kole Apac North 2010 
108.  Butambala Mpigi Central 2010 
109.  Buhweju Bushenyi West 2010 
110.  Agago Pader North 2010 
111.  Kween Kapchorwa East 2010 
112.  Sheema Bushenyi West 2010 
113.  Kagadi Kibaale  West 2016  
114.  Kakumiro Kibaale West 2016 
115.  Omoro Gulu North 2016 
116.  Rubanda Kabale West 2016 
117.  Namisindwa Manafwa East 2017 
118.  Pakwach Nebbi North 2017 
119.  Butebo Pallisa East 2017 
120.  Rukiga Kabale West 2017 
121.  Kyotera Rakai West 2017 
122.  Bunyangabu Kabarole West 2017 
123.  Nabilatuk Nakapiritpirit North 2018 
124.  Bugweri Iganga West  2018 
125.  Kasanda Mubende Central 2018 
126.  Kwania Apac North 2018 
127.  Kapelebyong Amuria East 2018 
128.  Kikuube Hoima West 2018 
129.  Obongi Moyo North 2019 
130.  Kazo Kirihura West 2019 
131.  Rwampara Mbarara West  2019 
132.  Kitagwenda Kamwenge West 2019 
133.  Madi-Okollo Arua North 2019 
134.  Karenga Kaabong North 2019 





Appendix B: List of survey questions for household survey  
 
As reported by the Research Assistant:  
A. Construction materials of walls, roof and floor 
B. Number of rooms in the main house, or huts in the household (as appropriate) 
C. From the house, can you still see a road (that a car can pass on)? 
D. Approximate distance from nearest public footpath  
E. Can you see any nearby sources of water? 
F. Can you see any sources of power (electric wires, solar panels)? 
G. Is the respondent male or female? 
 
Section 1 – Information about the Household  
1. Were you born in this district? 
2. If NO – When did you move here? 
3. What is your age? 
4. How many people live in this household (including children at boarding school, or 
people working away from home)? 
5. (Continued) How many are adults (over 18)? 
6. (Continued) How many are children (17 and under)? 
7. What is the main type of employment of the adults who live in this household? 
8. Which ethnic tribe are you from? 
9. Which is your religion? 
10. What is the highest level of education you have reached? 
11. How long have you lived in this household? 
12. Did you build this house [the main house], or was it already built? 
13. (Continued) If you built it yourself – Did anyone assist you to build it? 
14. Which of these do you have in this household: Electricity Television Stove/cooker 
Refrigerator Livestock – cow(s) Livestock – goat(s) Livestock – chicken(s) Mattress 
Water pipe Cell phone Kerosene lanterns or other lights  
15. Have you owned this in the past, but have had to sell it: Electricity Television 
Stove/cooker Refrigerator Livestock – cow(s) Livestock – goat(s) Livestock – 
chicken(s) Mattress Water pipe Cell phone Kerosene lanterns or other lights 
 
Section 2 – Information about the Village 
16. What is the biggest source of income for people in this village? 
17. What is the main religion of this village? 
18. What is the main tribal group in this village? 
19. Do you think there are any poor households in this village? 
20. In your opinion, how do you know which households are poor? 
 
Section 3 – Deciding on Development Priorities  
21. What do you think are the most important development priorities for this district? 
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22. How are the development priorities chosen for this district?  
23. Do you attend village meetings to decide on the development priorities for the 
village for the next year? 
24. Do most people in the village participate in the meetings about the district’s 
priorities? 
25. Who arranges these village meetings? 
26. Who speaks at village meetings?  
27. What issues are decided at village meetings? 
28. How much time in advance before a village meeting do you receive notice of it? 
29. How often do village meetings occur?  
30. Overall, in your opinion, does the government address the development priorities 
from this village? 
 
Section 4 – Services in the Village  
31. What kinds of public services are there in this village?  
32. Who provides these services? 
33. If you need to use a health service, do you have to pay fees (in cash)? 
34. (Continued) If NO, do you have to make a payment by contributing something, 
other than cash? 
35. Have you ever had to miss medical treatment because the fees were too 
expensive? 
36. (Continued) Has anyone else in this household had to miss medical treatment 
because the fees were too expensive? 
37. Has there ever been a time you needed a medicine, but there was no stock / 
supplies? 
38. If YES (there was a stock-out) – what do you do? 
39. Have you ever made a complaint about a service that was not provided, or that 
was poor quality? 
40. If YES – who did you speak to?  
41. If YES – what was the result of your complaint? 
42. Do all of the children in this household attend school? 
43. If YES: what type of school is it?  
44. If not all of your children attend school, why is this? 
45. Do you have to pay school fees (in cash)?  
46. (Continued) If NO, do you have to make a payment by contributing something, 
such as supplies or paint? 
47. Is it hard to find money for school fees? 
48. What do you do if you cannot find money for the fees? 
49. Have any of your children ever missed school for more than one week? 
50. (Continued) If YES: why was this?  
51. Do you know the head teacher of your children’s school? 
52. Are you a member of the Parent-Teacher Association of the school? 
53. Has there ever been a time when the teacher was absent for more than one week? 




55. If your children reached their school and the teacher has not attended for the day, 
what do you do? 
 
Section 5 – Community Leaders  
56. Do you know the name of the LC5 (District) Chief? 
57. Have you ever met the LC5 (District) Chief or any of the LC5 (District) Councillors? 
58. Do you know the name of at least one of the National Members of Parliament for 
this area?  
59. Have any of the National Members of Parliament ever visited this area?  
60. Have you ever met any of the National Members of Parliament? 
61. If YES: in what circumstances? 
62. Are any of the National Members of Parliament for this area from the same ethnic 
tribe as you?  
63. Is it important to you that the National Members of Parliament for this area are from 
the same ethnic tribe as you? 
64. Are any of the members of the LC5 (District Council) for this area from the same 
ethnic tribe as you? 
65. Is it important to you that members of the LC5 (District Council) for this area are 
from the same ethnic tribe as you? 
66. Did any of the election candidates visit this village before the election? 
67. (Continued) If YES: Which level of government were they seeking to be elected to?  
68. (Continued) If YES: Did they promise that they would bring anything to the village 
if they were elected? 
69. (Continued) If YES: Do you expect that they will deliver these things? 
70. In your opinion, why have there been no LC1 and LC2 elections since 2001?  
71. Do you know (on a personal level) anyone who works in the central government or 
the national bureaucracy (in Kampala)? 
72. Who do you think are the most powerful people in this village?  
73. (Continued) What makes them powerful?  
74. Do any religious groups or NGOs provide any services in this village? 
75. (Continued) If YES: Do you use these services? 
76. (Continued) If YES: Do you think these services are better-quality than services 
provided by the government? 
 
Section 6 – Connections in the Community  
77. What is the role of the traditional Kingdoms? 
78. Do you think the traditional Kingdoms are important? 
79. When you are working at your job, do you prefer to work with people who are from 
the same ethnic group as you? 
80. In your opinion, are some ethnic groups in Uganda more likely to benefit from 
economic opportunities than others? 
81. In your opinion, are some ethnic groups in Uganda more likely to be hold important 
political roles than other groups? 
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82. Are there any processes for resolving disputes or conflicts in the village? For 
example, a dispute over land ownership? 
83. (Continued) If YES: Who is the person who makes the decisions in these cases? 
84. Where do you find out information about what services are available to you? 
85. Where do you find out information about political issues? 
 
Section 7 – Forming New Districts  
86. In your opinion, do you think there is the right number of districts in Uganda? 
87. Would you be happy if another district was created in this area? 
88. When a new district is created, who benefits from it? 
89. (Continued) Of these options, who benefits the most?  
90. When a new district is created, who is made worse off from it? 
91. (Continued) Of these options, who loses the most? 
92. Do you think the creation of more districts makes service delivery better? 
93. Do you think the creation of more districts makes it easier for you to communicate 
with the government? 
94. Do you feel that you are involved in the process of making the annual budget? 
95. Have you heard of the annual budget being called ‘consultative’? 
96. (Continued) If YES – What do you think this word means? 





Appendix C: List of interview participants  
 
S/C denotes sub-county 
 
Date Location Interview number and interviewee job title 
29/01/2016 Kampala 1. Senior Economist, PAD – MoFPED 
03/02/2016 Pallisa  2. District Community Development Officer 
3. Senior Finance Officer 
4. District Health Officer  
5. District Planner  
6. Chief Administration Officer 
04/02/2016 Pallisa  7. District Education Officer  
8. Principal HR Officer  
9. District Agricultural Extension Officer  
10. District Production Officer  
05/02/2016 Kampala 11. Senior Economist, Fiscal Decentralisation 
Section, BPED – MoFPED  
12. Economist, Fiscal Decentralisation Section, 
BPED – MoFPED  
08/02/2016 Kampala 13. Senior Economist, PAD – MoFPED  
14. Principal Economist, Fiscal Decentralisation 
Section, BPED – MoFPED  
15. Economist, PAD – MoFPED  
10/02/2016 Lira  16. Deputy Chief Administration Officer 
17. District Education Officer, and Assistant District 
Education Officer 
11/02/2016 Lira  18. Assistant District Health Officer 
19. Chief Financial Officer 
20. Principal Human Resources Officer 
21. District Production Officer 
12/02/2016 Lira  22. District Planner 
15/02/2016 Kampala 23. Principal Economist, PAD - MoFPED 
05/04/2016 Kampala  24. Assistant Commissioner, PAD – MoFPED 
25. Senior Economist, ISSD – MoFPED 
08/04/2016 Kampala 26. Senior Economist, ISSD – MoFPED 
27. Commissioner, PAD – MoFPED  
11/04/2016 Kampala 28. Economist, ISSD – MoFPED 
29. Economist, BPED – MoFPED  
18/04/2016 Pallisa  30. Deputy Chief Administration Officer  




31. LC1 Chair  




32. Village elders x2 (in absence of LC3 officials) 
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20/04/2016 Pallisa – 
Opwateta S/C 
headquarters 
33. LC3 Chair  
20/04/2016 Pallisa – 
Opwateta S/C – 
Ogulia village 
34. LC1 Chair 
21/04/2016 Pallisa  35. Resident District Commissioner 
36. LC5 Chair 
37. Chief Administration Officer  
38. Attend LC5 Council’s Budget Approval Meeting 
21/04/2016 Pallisa – 
Opwateta S/C 
headquarters 
39. LC3 Speaker  
22/04/2016 Lira  40. Chief Administration Officer 
22/04/2016 Lira – Ogur S/C 
headquarters 
41. LC3 Chair  
22/04/2016 Lira – Amach-
Agila S/C 
headquarters 
42. LC3 Speaker 
22/04/2016 Lira – Amach-
Agila S/C – 
Akwachkilo 
village 
43. LC1 Chair 
23/04/2016 Lira – Ogur S/C 
– Chanpeciki 
village 
44. LC1 Chair  
25/04/2016 Lira  45. LC5 Speaker  
46. LC5 Vice-Chair  
27/04/2016 Ntungamo  47. Chief Administrative Officer  
28/04/2016 Ntungamo  48. Chief Financial Officer  
49. District Principal Human Resources Officer 
50. District Planner 
51. District Education Officer, and District Inspector 
of Schools 
52. District Health Officer  
53. LC5 Chair 




55. LC3 Chair plus school tour 
29/04/2016 Ntungamo – 
Ruhaama S/C – 
Mushasha 
village 
56. LC1 Chair  




57. LC1 Chair 
02/05/2016 Kampala 58. Economist, Education Sector, ISSD – MoFPED  




04/05/2016 Kampala 60. Assistant Commissioner, ISSD – MoFPED  
61. Principal Economist, ISSD – MoFPED  
05/05/2016 Kampala 62. Economist, BPED – MoFPED  
06/05/2016 Kampala 63. Assistant Commissioner, BPED – MoFPED  
64. Assistant Commissioner, ISSD – MoFPED  
65. Senior Economist – MoES  
66. Senior Economist – MoPS  
09/05/2016 Kampala 67. Assistant Commissioner, Health Services – 
MoH  
68. Principal Economist, ISSD – MoFPED  
10/05/2016 Kampala 69. Assistant Director – Local Government Finance 
Commission 
11/05/2016 Kampala 70. Assistant Commissioner, Planning and 
Budgeting – MoES  
13/05/2016 Kampala 71. Principal Economist – MoH  
72. Senior Economist – MoPS  
16/05/2016 Kampala  73. Senior Economist – MoLG and FINMAP 
17/05/2016 Kampala 74. Senior Economist – OPM  
18/05/2016 Kampala 75. Senior Economist – Uganda Local Government 
Association 
20/05/2016 Kampala 76. Professor, Public Administration – Makerere 
University 
23/05/2016 Kampala 77. Principal Economist – MoLG  
25/05/2016 Kampala 78. Consultant Economist – Budget Strengthening 
Initiative/ Overseas Development Institute 
26/05/2016 Kampala 79. Local Government Accountability project team 
– ACODE  
80. Team Leader, Support to Public Service 
Delivery project – UNICEF  






Appendix D: Full disaggregation of results from Household Survey  
 


























District Pallisa Pallisa Lira Lira Ntungam
o 
Ntungamo 


























































us road  
 
 
Construction materials of walls 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Bricks 17 18 15 15 7 6 
Mud 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Cement 0 0 3 0 1 5 
Earth 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Reeds 0 0 0 0 4 6 





Construction materials of roof 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Iron 15 12 11 3 18 18 
Grass/ 
Thatch 
3 6 7 15 0 0 
 
Construction materials of floor 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Cement 5 4 3 0 4 5 
Ground/mud/earth 12 13 15 18 8 9 
Sand 0 0 0 0 5 4 
Tiles 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Other response 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Differences in the construction materials of the homes of respondents reflect 
differences in both naturally-available materials in the studied districts, and in the 
respective poverty levels of the studied districts. In Ntungamo district, in Uganda’s 
wealthier south-west, homes of participants are more likely to be constructed using at 
least some artificial materials, such as cement and iron. In Lira and Pallisa, homes are 
constructed using materials that can be collected from the local natural environment, 
such as thatch. Particularly in Lira district, in Uganda’s conflict-affected northern 
region, houses of participants are constructed using thatching for rooves, and the bare 
earth or mud for flooring.  
 
Number of rooms in the main house, or huts in the household (as appropriate) 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1 or 2 9 7 0 5 2 1 
3 or 4 8 9 10 7 10 14 
5=/+ 0 1 8 6 6 2 
Other 
response 




Houses in Lira district tended to be in the form of multiple small huts gathered around 
a central courtyard, each belonging to one or two adult family members. Houses in 
Pallisa or Ntungamo tended to be a single building, with nearby smaller buildings used 
for bathrooms or storage. On average, the homes of participants in Ntungamo district 
were slightly larger than those of respondents in Pallisa district.  
 
From the house, can you still see a road (that a car can pass on)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 9 9 8 3 14 11 
No 2 3 9 14 4 7 
Other 
response 
7 6 1 1 0 0 
 
Approximate distance from nearest public footpath  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
≤10m 5 11 14 12 12 7 
11-50m 11 4 2 6 5 0 
51-100m 0 1 1 0 0 2 
100m+ 2 2 1 0 0 9 
N/R 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
The homes of participants in Lira district tended to be further from a road that would 
be passable by car, but nearer to a footpath, suggesting a greater use of foot transport 
or cycles in use in this area.  
 
Can you see any nearby sources of water? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 5 10 1 0 1 0 
No 12 8 17 18 17 17 
Other 
response 





Particularly in (arid) Lira and Ntungamo districts, the homes of survey participants did 
not have access to a visible source of water (a well, pump or borehole).  
 
Can you see any sources of power (electric wires, solar panels) 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 0 3 Solar 3 Solar 0 5 Solar 1 Solar 
No 17 15 15 18 13 16 
Other 
response 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Most homes of participants in the survey did not have access to electricity, and those 
that did have access to electricity had privately purchased a small household solar 
panel.  
 
Is the respondent male or female? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Male 11 8 8 12 6 6 
Female 6 10 10 6 12 11 
No response 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Research assistants were asked to interview the first person (aged over 18) whom 
they encountered upon entering a home or compound. Survey respondents were 




Section 1 – Information about the Household  
Were you born in this district? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 17 18 16 17 16 16 
No 1 0 2 1 2 2 
Other 
response 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
If NO – When did you move here? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
≤30 years 0 0 0 0 1 1 
>30 years  1 4 2 1 1 1 
n/a 17 14 16 17 16 16 
 
Most respondents had been born in the district in which they were a resident.  
 
What is your age? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
18 to 30 6 4 2 3 3 7 
31 to 40 2 7 3 3 2 1 
41 to 50 2 3 3 4 5 4 
51 to 60 1 3 6 5 5 2 
61+ 4 0 4 3 3 4 
Other 
response 
3 1 0 0 0 0 
 
How many people live in this household (including children at boarding school, or 
people working away from home)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1 to 4 5 1 3 4 4 10 
5 to 8 4 8 5 10 10 5 





(Continued) How many are adults (over 18)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1 to 2 8 8 9 9 9 16 
3 to 4 6 6 5 7 7 2 
4+ 4 4 4 2 2 0 
 
(Continued) How many are children (17 and under)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Zero 4 0 2 0 0 2 
1 to 3 3 3 6 9 8 9 
4 to 6 5 8 8 6 8 4 
6+ 6 6 2 5 2 2 
Other 
response 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Households of respondents in Pallisa district were on average larger than those of 
respondents in Lira or Ntungamo districts. Households of participants in Village 6 
(Ntungamo district) tended to be smaller than those of respondents in other villages. 
 
What is the main type of employment of the adults who live in this household? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Agric 16 18 18 18 18 16 
Health/Education 2 0 1 0 0 0 
More than one 0 2 2 0 0 0 
Another  0 0 0 0 0 1 Boda-
boda 
None 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Most respondents in all sites were engaged in agriculture as their primary source of 
employment.  
 
Which ethnic tribe are you from? 





17 18 18 18 16 17 
Other group 1 0 0 0 2 1 
 
Most respondents in each site were from the same tribal group as one another. This 
group differed from one site to another:  
V1 – Bagwere 
V2 – Bateso 
V3 – Lango 
V4 – Lango 
V5 – Banyankole  
V6 – Banyankole  
Noting that Pallisa district’s respondents came from two groups, located at the two 
sites. That is, despite the reasonably small size of Pallisa district, the residents of the 
two studied villages were concentrated in different language groups.  
 
Which is your religion? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Christian 
traditional 
17 13 17 12 15 13 
Christian 
evangelical 
0 3 1 6 3 5 
Muslim 1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
What is the highest level of education you have reached? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
None 2 3 1 1 3 4 
Primary 1-3 3 3 7 5 5 0 
Primary 4-7 6 11 5 8 6 11 
Secondary 4 1 3 4 3 3 
Tertiary 3 0 2 0 1 0 
 




 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
0-10 years 3 4 2 3 2 6 
11-20 years 1 4 1 4 9 4 
21-30 years 2 3 9 3 3 3 
30+ years 8 6 6 6 4 4 
Other 
response 
4 1 0 1 0 1 
 
Did you build this house [the main house], or was it already built? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
I built it 13 17 18 16 16 14 
Relative 5 1 0 2 1 1 
I rent it 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Someone 
else 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
(Continued) If you built it yourself – Did anyone assist you to build it? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
No 12 15 8 6 5 9 
Yes, 
spouse 
0 1 9 8 8 6 
Yes, 
relative 
4 1 0 3 0 1 
Yes, other 0 0 0 0 3 0 
n/a 2 1 1 1 2 1 
 
Which of these do you have in this household: Electricity Television Stove/cooker 
Refrigerator Livestock – cow(s) Livestock – goat(s) Livestock – chicken(s) Mattress 
Water pipe Cell phone Kerosene lanterns or other lights  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Electricity 0 0 0 0 4 1 
Stove/cooker 0 1 4 5 6 0 
Cow(s) 4 8 11 8 4 5 
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Chicken(s) 14 14 15 14 8 6 
Water pipe 0 0 1 1 5 0 
Lanterns  11 11 13 9 10 18 
Television 0 0 0 0 2 1 
Refrigerator 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Goat(s) 8 13 12 11 11 10 
Mattress 16 17 16 14 15 17 
Cell phone 8 12 11 12 15 15 
None of these  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Other 0 0 Pigs 0 Pig 0 
 
Many of the surveyed households keep livestock as a source of food, and a store of 
wealth. Cattle are more commonly kept in Lira than in the two other districts. Cell 
phones are more commonly reported in Ntungamo district, in reflection of the lower 
poverty levels in this region, and potentially referencing the greater share of 
households engaged in commercial agriculture.  
 
Have you owned this in the past, but have had to sell it: Electricity Television 
Stove/cooker Refrigerator Livestock – cow(s) Livestock – goat(s) Livestock – 
chicken(s) Mattress Water pipe Cell phone Kerosene lanterns or other lights 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Stove/cooker 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cow(s) 12 10 7 5 8 13 
Chicken(s) 15 10 3 5 5 13 
Lanterns  1 0 0 0 1 0 
Television 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goat(s) 12 9 4 4 13 14 
Mattress 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Cell phone 4 1 0 0 2 3 
None of these 1 1 9 12 3 3 
Other 
response 





Responses to this question illustrate the tradability of livestock, reflecting their use as 
a store of value. In the absence of formal banking services, livestock assets can be 
liquidated at times of hardship in order to provide a financial resource. The higher 
number of respondents who reported this outcome from Ntungamo perhaps reflects 
the higher level of economic activity in the south-west.  
 
Section 2 – Information about the Village 
What is the biggest source of income for people in this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Agriculture 18 17 18 18 18 18 
More than 
one 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
What is the main religion of this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Christian- 
traditional 
17 16 12 10 18 18 
Christian- 
evangelical 
0 0 0 2 0 0 
Another 
Christian 
0 0 0 3 0 0 
A mix of 
religions 
0 0 6 3 0 0 
Other 
response 
1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
What is the main tribal group in this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Dominant 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 
response 




Do you think there are any poor households in this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 15 16 18 18 17 15 
No 2 2 0 0 1 0 
I don’t 
know 
1 0 0 0 0 3 
 
While the majority of research participants answered that they do believe there are 
poor households in their village, the universal affirmative answer to this question in the 
two villages in Lira points to the higher level of poverty in the northern regions of 
Uganda.  
 
In your opinion, how do you know which households are poor? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Absence of:       
-Land / Tools 7 6 4 7 6 8 
- Housing  9 6 3 2 10 4 
- Clothing 4 5 2 1 0 1 
- Education / 
Fees 
5 4 5 8 2 1 
- Food 7 10 7 11 8 5 
- Livestock 3 4 4 7 4 3 
- Health 4 3 1 3 0 0 
- Income 5 6 5 9 7 6 
- Water 0 1 0 2 0 0 
- Transport 0 0 1 2 0 0 
- Radio 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Widows / 
orphans 
1 1 5 2 1 1 
Disabled / ill / 
elderly 






0 0 0 0 1 3 
 
Responses to this question reflect the importance of a household’s social and 
economic context in determining the poverty level of its inhabitants. Households 
containing individuals whose personal circumstances will contribute to 
impoverishment, such as an illness, are known within their own community to be 
vulnerable to poverty. That is, attributes of individual household members determine 
the vulnerability of that household to poverty.  
Across the three studied districts, commonalities are observed to some extent in the 
variables that suggest a risk of poverty for a particular household. In Lira district, in 
Uganda’s conflict-affected northern region, households that are comprised of widows 
or orphans are thought to be especially disadvantaged, as well as those without an 
income, and this is reflected in problematically-low levels of access to food. In Village 
5 in Ntungamo district, and in Village 1 in Pallisa district, poor-quality housing is 
thought by respondents to be an especially powerful indicator of poverty. For 
respondents in all three districts, a lack of access to food as an indicator of a household 
experiencing poverty. A lack of access to land or farming tools is also nominated by 
around one-third of respondents across all sites as indicating a risk of impoverishment 
for households.  
 
Section 3 – Deciding on Development Priorities  
What do you think are the most important development priorities for this district? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Roads 7 9 7 6 3 2 
Schools 10 11 6 11 3 2 
Healthcare 9 10 10 10 7 5 
Agriculture 5 4 9 7 9 8 
Livestock 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Water 3 6 4 5 0 1 
Electricity 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Governance 0 1 0 0 0 0 





0 1 2 2 0 4 
IDK 1 0 1 0 1 0 
 
Respondents in Pallisa and Lira Districts reported that their greatest development 
priorities for their districts related to public services and amenities, in particular roads, 
water supply, schools and healthcare, with at least half of the respondents in each 
district nominating these as priorities. In contrast, respondents in the two villages in 
Ntungamo District were less likely to nominate these as priorities. For respondents in 
Ntungamo, the development of agriculture is the most important development priority 
for their district, with half of the respondents in each village in Ntungamo nominating 
this as a priority. Income-generating activities were also nominated as a priority by 
respondents in Village 6 in Ntungamo District, where there was visible evidence of 
cash-crops being grown (such as coffee), suggesting that some residents of this 
village have been able to move beyond subsistence agriculture and into commercial 
farming.  
These findings accord with the comparative levels of development in these locations, 
with Ntungamo located within Uganda’s better-developed and more-prosperous 
south-western region, while Pallisa and Lira are located in the less-developed eastern 
and northern regions.  
 
How are the development priorities chosen for this district?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
The people 
decide 
1 4 7 9 10 5 
District 13 12 15 10 9 8 
National 
govt  
7 9 9 13 7 9 
People and 
govt  
1 4 0 3 2 0 
Another 2 4 2 3 4 0 
None of 
these 






3 2 9 6 7 1 
I don’t know  2 3 0 0 0 0 
 
Responses to this question suggest a mixed set of impressions and opinions on who 
is responsible for identifying development priorities for the district. In Village 1 and 2, 
in Pallisa, most respondents were of the view that either the district or the national 
government determines the district’s development priorities.  
Respondents in Lira District were also of the view that the people themselves are able 
to contribute to identifying the development priorities of the district. However, residents 
of Lira District were also likely to nominate the national government as the source of 
district development priorities. This is perhaps a reflection of the leadership by the 
national government of post-war reconstruction efforts in northern Uganda. Programs 
such as the PRDP are driven by the national government, rather than being fully 
decentralised to district-level governments, and this perhaps influences the opinion of 
villagers that this is the source of the development priorities of the district.  
In Village 5, in Ntungamo District, respondents suggested a stronger role for the village 
council, with 7/18 respondents nominating this level as having a role in determining 
local development priorities; 10/18 also suggested that the community itself plays a 
role. On the other hand, respondents in Village 6 (also in Ntungamo District) echoed 
the perspectives of respondents in Pallisa, in suggesting that the district and national 
governments have the most important roles in determining district development 
priorities. These outcomes suggest that while the village council in Village 5 may play 
an important and active role in development planning, that is not the case in Village 6, 
where the organisation level and skill of the village council may be lower.  
Relatively few respondents (10/108) nominated cooperation between the community 
and government as being the source of development priorities for the district, even 
though this scenario is the closest reflection of the purported officially-sanctioned 
prioritisation process. While the official bottom-up planning process suggests that 
communities and councils together determine development priorities, particularly at 




Do you attend village meetings to decide on the development priorities for the village 
for the next year? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, every 
time 
4 1 10 5 10 6 
Yes, 
sometimes 
2 5 4 5 6 7 
No, Not 
invited  
6 4 0 3 1 3 
No, no 
meeting held 
3 3 2 4 0 1 
No, [nothing 
added] 
2 1 2 1 0 0 
No, Too busy 1 0 0 0 0 0 
No, Too old 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No, Not paid 0 1 0 0 0 0 
IDK 0 3 0 0 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 6 6 14 10 16 13 
No 12 9 4 8 1 5 
Other 
response 
0 3 0 0 1 0 
 
Respondents in Pallisa district suggested that they are not likely to attend the village 
meeting, with 21/36 respondents answering that they do not attend. For some, this is 
because they are not invited to the meeting, suggesting that rather than being an open 
and village-wide meeting, village meetings are instead only open to selected 
individuals in the studied communities. This suggests that the resolutions and priorities 
that are determined within these meetings may not be fully representative of the entire 
community.  
Respondents in Lira District and Ntungamo were more likely to report that they attend 




question, the village council of Village 5 is potentially a more effective and active local 
government than in other locations.  
 
Do most people in the village participate in the meetings about the district’s priorities? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, Discuss 
issues 
3 2 8 8 5 4 
Yes, Gain a 
benefit 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
Yes, [nothing 
added] 
0 1 0 0 8 6 
TSE, Gain a 
benefit 








0 0 3 3 0 0 
TSE, Too 
busy 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
TSE, No 
interest 




0 0 0 0 1 0 
No, Not 
informed 
3 0 1 1 0 0 
No, No 
meeting held 
4 4 3 3 0 1 
No, Not 
interested 
1 0 0 0 1 2 
NR 1 2 0 0 0 0 
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IDK 3 6 0 0 1 3 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 3 3 8 8 15 12 
To some 
extent 
3 4 6 4 1 0 
No 8 4 4 4 1 3 
Other 
response 
4 7 0 2 1 3 
 
Across the three studied districts, responses to this question were variable. In Pallisa 
District, respondents were of the view that other villagers did not regularly attend local 
planning meetings, or the respondent was unsure of whether this was the case. 
Respondents in Lira District were divided amongst those who perceive that the village 
does attend, and those who do not. In Ntungamo, and particularly in Village 5, 
respondents tended to answer that most people in the village do participate in planning 
meetings.  
 
Who arranges these village meetings? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
LC1 Chair 5 9 15 11 18 16 
Another 
person 
3 2 6 9 2 2 
Other 
response 
11 8 3 8 0 1 
 
Who speaks at village meetings?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
LC1 7 10 13 9 16 13 
Other official 2 3 5 3 1 1 
Another  0 0 2 3 3 1 






11 8 4 8 2 4 
 
In Pallisa, respondents to this question suggest that the members of the village and 
the LC1 Chair each speak in village meetings. In Lira and especially in Ntungamo, 
respondents were more likely to respond that the LC1 Chair or another official speak 
in meetings, with fewer respondents answering that members of the community also 
speak in meetings. 
The high number of ‘other’ responses to this question reflects the high proportion of 
respondents who said they did not regularly attend village meetings, and thus 
answered ‘N/A’ to this question (and forthcoming questions relating to village 
development meetings).  
 
What issues are decided at village meetings? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Development 
issues 
3 4 6 2 6 3 
Education 3 1 4 0 0 0 
Healthcare 2 3 3 2 4 4 
Security 3 1 1 0 1 7 
Agriculture 1 2 4 3 8 6 
Income 
generation 
1 0 0 2 4 5 
Food security 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Conflict 
resolution 
0 2 5 3 1 2 
Water 0 2 5 5 5 2 
Roads 0 1 2 2 3 0 
Other 
response 
11 8 1 8 2 3 
 
In Ntungamo, the most commonly-discussed topics relate to income generation and 
agriculture. This is reflective of the higher importance of income-generating agriculture 
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in this location, with commercial farming being undertaken at the studied sites (rather 
than only subsistence agriculture). This is in accordance with south-western Uganda’s 
higher level of agricultural and economic development. This result is also reflective of 
respondents’ answer to Q 21, in which respondents were asked for their opinion on 
the most important development priorities for the village: respondents in these two 
sites also answered that agriculture and income generation were their principal 
priorities. Taken together, these two results suggest that the development priorities 
that are articulated by the villagers in these sites are also reflected in the issues that 
are discussed at the village-planning level.  
Respondents in Pallisa were more likely to suggest that the main topics discussed in 
village meetings are more general, relating to development overall, and education 
provision. When compared to the results of Q21, in which respondents nominated 
roads, healthcare, and agriculture as the development priorities of the district (in 
addition to education), this response suggests that the village planning meetings are 
not felt to be addressing the community’s own development priorities.  
The greater emphasis in Lira District on conflict resolution points to the recent conflict 
history of northern Uganda, and also suggests that efforts to reduce local conflict have 
been decentralised to the village level.  
 
How much time in advance before a village meeting do you receive notice of it? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1 day 0 0 3 0 2 1 
1 day - 1 
week 
0 0 4 2 5 0 
1 week 3 3 9 6 7 9 
1 week - 1 
month 
1 4 1 2 2 2 
1 month 2 0 0 0 0 2 
1 month + 1 1 0 0 0 0 
No notice 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Other 
response 





How often do village meetings occur?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Once per 
week 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
Twice per 
year  
0 2 1 1 0 1 
No regular 
schedule 
5 4 4 4 3 1 
Another 0 2 5 5 6 3 
Once per 
month 
2 1 5 1 8 9 
Once per 
year 
1 1 1 0 0 1 
Other 
response 
9 8 1 6 1 3 
 
Overall, in your opinion, does the government address the development priorities from 
this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, Services exist 0 0 2 4 7 4 
Yes, Nothing added 0 0 0 0 2 1 
TSE, Some services 
exist 
2 3 5 3 2 3 
TSE, 
Inefficiencies/delays 
2 5 0 0 1 0 
TSE, Nothing added 1 0 0 0 2 1 
No, Services are 
poor 
8 8 5 3 1 1 
No, Concerns 
unaddressed 
0 0 3 5 2 5 
No, Nothing added 1 0 0 0 0 0 




 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 0 0 2 4 9 5 
TSE 5 8 5 3 5 4 
No 9 8 8 8 3 6 
Other 
response 
4 2 3 3 1 3 
 
Responses to this question suggest that respondents in the different studied sites had 
different levels of satisfaction with the service delivery and responsiveness offered by 
the government. (For the purposes of this question, ‘government’ was not defined 
according to a specific level; the respondent instead answered the question with their 
impression of the entire government structure.)  
In Pallisa, around half of the respondents did not think that government was 
addressing the development needs of the village. In Village 2, some respondents 
answered that they did feel that government partly addressed the development needs 
of the village, but only partially, or with inefficiencies or delays.  
In Lira, nearly half of the respondents in each village thought that government was 
addressing the development needs of the village, with other responses balanced 
between approval of government (answering ‘Yes’), partial satisfaction (answering ‘To 
some extent’, with some services in existence) or uncertainty (answering ‘I don’t 
know’).  
In Ntungamo, responses were different between the two studied sites. In Village 5, 
where previous responses suggest that the village council is more active in local 
development planning and consultation, 14/18 respondents answered that they felt 
government was at least partially addressing local development needs (answering 
‘Yes’ or ‘To some extent’). However, in Village 6, responses were divided between full 
approval, partial approval, disapproval, and uncertainty. This suggests that 
respondents have had different experiences or hold different views on the extent of 
government success in addressing local development priorities in this location.  
 
Section 4 – Services in the Village  
What kinds of public services are there in this village?  




School(s) 18 18 9 5 17 17 
Health 
centre(s) 
6 4 1 7 9 16 
Tarmac 
road(s) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Murram 
road(s) 
17 17 7 10 4 14 
Bridge(s) 3 0 6 6 11 6 
Water 
pump(s) 
1 4 0 8 12 5 
Public 
latrine(s) 
1 1 2 0 0 0 
Agric 
extension(s) 
0 0 12 3 7 5 
Another 1 3 0 0 0 1 
None of these 0 0 0 5 0 0 
 
Who provides these services? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
National gov 7 9 9 10 18 15 
District gov 10 12 10 10 5 2 
Village 
council 
1 1 3 0 2 6 
NGOs 3 2 12 5 4 0 
Religious 0 0 0 0 8 1 
Another 1 1 1 7 4 2 
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I don’t know 3 4 0 0 0 0 
 
Across the three districts, respondents perceive that the public services that are 
available in their village are provided by a range of different levels of government. 
Consistently in Villages 2-6, at least half of the respondents answered that they believe 
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the national government to be responsible for service provision in their district. This 
rises to 15/18 in Village 6, and 18/18 in Village 15.  
However, in Villages 1-4, respondents suggested that they also perceive a role for the 
district government in delivering public services at the village level. That is, in Villages 
2-4, respondents perceive that the district and national governments together are 
responsible for service delivery.  
Only in Village 6, in Ntungamo, did 1/3 of villagers perceive that the village council 
plays a role in providing services. In Village 5, in which previous responses had 
suggested that the village council plays an important role in service planning and 
identifying priorities, few respondents (2/18) then perceived that the village council has 
a role in service delivery. This may be because respondents are able to discern the 
distinction between planning for service delivery and then implementing or providing 
services.  
The high responses in V3 (Lira District) reflects the recent post-conflict context in Lira, 
in which a large number of Ugandan and international NGOs have undertaken service 
provision in northern Uganda as part of a humanitarian response.  
 
If you need to use a health service, do you have to pay fees (in cash)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 1 2 3 0 5 4 
Yes, more  7 12 6 12 4 6 
No, never 10 4 8 6 9 8 
Other 
response 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
The answers given by respondents to this question were varied, even within one 
district, suggesting that respondents do not necessarily receive consistent treatment 
or management when they seek medical care. Almost the same number of 
respondents (45/108) answered that they do not ever have to pay a fee to access 
medical care, compared to 47/108 who answered that they have had to pay a fee on 





(Continued) If NO, do you have to make a payment by contributing something, other 
than cash? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 0 2 2 0 0 
No 10 6 7 3 9 8 
n/a 6 12 8 11 9 9 
I don’t 
know 
0 0 1 2 0 1 
 
Have you ever had to miss medical treatment because the fees were too expensive? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 0 3 2 1 3 7 
Yes, more 8 10 5 13 7 10 
No 10 4 11 4 8 1 
I don’t 
know 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Responses to this question suggest that when respondents are required to pay fees 
for medical treatment (as described in Q33), these fees are problematically expensive, 
and represent a barrier to accessing medical care.  
 
(Continued) Has anyone else in this household had to miss medical treatment because 
the fees were too expensive? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 0 4 4 0 3 5 
Yes, more 8 10 3 11 7 10 
No, never 10 4 11 6 8 1 
I don’t 
know 
0 0 0 1 0 2 
 
Continuing from Q35, responses to this question suggest that medical fees have had 
a detrimental effect on the ability of the respondent on their relative(s) in accessing 
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medical care. However, because fees are not applied consistently (as highlighted in 
Q33), these barriers to medical care are not universally encountered.  
 
Has there ever been a time you needed a medicine, but there was no stock / supplies? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 7 6 3 1 4 4 
Yes, more 10 10 15 16 11 11 
No, never 1 1 0 1 3 3 
I don’t 
know 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Responses to this question suggest that medical stock-outs are a consistent problem 
across each of the studied sites.  
 
If YES (there was a stock-out) – what do you do? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Assistance – 
leader 
1 1 0 2 0 0 
Assistance - 
relative 




11 11 16 14 14 15 
Did nothing / 
not get 
2 2 1 3 2 1 
Different 
medicine  
6 0 0 0 0 1 
Used local 
herbs 
2 1 0 1 0 0 
Other 
response 





Answers to this question suggest that where there are medical stock-outs, 
respondents must undertake the additional expense and effort of obtaining supplies 
elsewhere.  
 
Have you ever made a complaint about a service that was not provided, or that was 
poor quality? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, once 2 3 0 0 2 0 
Yes, more 3 10 4 2 3 3 
No, never 13 5 14 16 11 14 
No response  0 0 0 0 2 1 
 
A majority of respondents in Villages 1 and 3-6 suggested that they have not 
undertaken a formal complaint about service delivery quality or absences. Only in 
Village 2, in Pallisa, did a small majority of respondents (10/18) answer that they have 
done so on more than one occasion.  
 
If YES – who did you speak to?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
LC1 chair  5 13 3 1 2 0 
Parish 
official 
0 4 0 0 1 0 
LC3 official 4 10 3 1 1 1 
LC5 official 0 5 0 1 3 1 
National 
official 
0 2 0 0 1 1 
Someone 
else 
3 5 4 0 1 2 
n/a 9 1 14 16 13 15 
 
The respondents in Village 2 (Pallisa) who answered that they had complained about 
the poor quality or absence of services in their village then answered that they had 
directed their complaints to both the LC1 Chair and an LC3 official. For some 
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respondents (5/18) the complaint was elevated further, to the LC5 (district) level. The 
practice of reporting a complaint to more than one person suggests that the initial 
complaint, presumably to the LC1 Chair, was not resolved, with the result that the 
complainant escalated their complaint to the LC3 or LC5 levels.  
 
If YES – what was the result of your complaint? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Resolved 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Partly 
resolved 
2 3 0 1 1 0 
Not resolved 6 12 4 1 3 3 
n/a 9 1 14 16 13 15 
IDK 1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
The majority of respondents in Village 2 who had complained about a service reported 
that their complaint was not addressed.  
Only one respondent across all villages (1/108), in Village 5 (Ntungamo), reported that 
they felt their complaint had been fully addressed.  
 
Do all of the children in this household attend school? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
All 3 4 8 5 12 8 
Some 11 13 9 9 5 6 
None 0 1 0 3 1 3 
n/a 4 0 1 1 0 1 
 
If YES: what type of school is it?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Gov-Day 12 12 14 13 14 6 
Gov-
Boarding 
0 0 5 3 3 1 






1 2 6 1 0 2 
Religious 0 0 1 0 0 0 
n/a 4 1 1 4 1 4 
 
If not all of your children attend school, why is this? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Too 
expensive 
2 0 2 5 0 1 
Too young  9 14 7 7 2 6 
Too old  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Work  0 0 0 0 1 0 
They are ill 0 0 0 0 1 0 
n/a 7 3 9 6 13 11 
 
Do you have to pay school fees (in cash)?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 8 10 15 13 17 14 
No 6 7 2 1 0 0 
n/a 4 1 1 4 1 4 
 
Across the six studied sites, respondents reported being required to pay school fees 
for their children. However, in Village 1 and Village 2 (Pallisa), this was reported more 
frequently than in other locations.  
 
(Continued) If NO, do you have to make a payment by contributing something, such 
as supplies or paint? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes  3 4 3 4 1 0 
No 4 6 4 1 6 1 
n/a 11 8 11 13 11 17 
 
Is it hard to find money for school fees? 
 
 436 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, always 10 13 13 14 9 8 
Yes, 
sometimes 
2 2 3 0 5 2 
No 1 1 1 0 3 4 
n/a 5 2 1 4 1 4 
 
Respondents across all six of the studied sites reported that it is difficult to afford to 
pay (‘find money for’) school fees. However, this answer was less commonly reported 
in Villages 5 and 6 (Ntungamo District). In these locations, a small number of 
respondents (7/36) reported that it is never difficult to afford school fees, and a further 
7/36 reported that it is only sometimes difficult to afford school fees. These results are 
perhaps a reflection of the greater level of economic activity in Ntungamo District, 
located in south-western Uganda, such as through commercial farming.  
 
What do you do if you cannot find money for the fees? 




9 4 3 10 2 1 
Do extra 
labour/agric 
1 9 2 2 4 4 
Ask for 
extension 
2 1 5 2 6 3 
Borrow 
money 
1 1 6 1 1 2 
Sell an asset 1 1 2 2 1 1 
n/a 4 0 1 4 4 8 
IDK 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Respondents to this question reported a range of different strategies to manage 
challenges that arise in being able to afford school fees for their children. For some, 




fees can be paid. Others undertake additional labour, or produce an agricultural 
surplus that is then sold in order to raise money for fees. For still others, strategies 
involve either the acquisition of debt or the liquidation of an asset, suggesting that 
parents are willing to undertake financial hardship in order to ensure that their children 
are able to attend school. However, if the quality of the education that is then provided 
is of a low standard, a family may arguably be made worse-off by the children attending 
school, if challenging financial circumstances are entered into but the education 
received in return is poor.  
Responses to this question revealed different approaches undertaken in different 
villages. In Villages 1 and 4, the most common strategy undertaken was to remove 
children from school until fees could be paid (this strategy has been adopted by half 
of the respondents in each village at some stage). In Village 2, extra labour or 
agricultural production is the most common strategy. For those in Village 3, 
respondents most often seek to borrow money, or request an extension of the school. 
Requesting an extension was the most common strategy in Village 5 also, while in 
Village 6, respondents were more likely to respond that they are not often troubled by 
the need to raise money for school fees. For those who are, the main strategy involved 
was to undertake additional labour or agricultural production. These responses in 
Village 6 reflect the higher level of economic activity in place in this village (in 
Ntungamo District), with respondents able to use commercial farming to increase their 
access to the cash needed for payments of school fees.   
 
Have any of your children ever missed school for more than one week? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 9 12 8 12 8 7 
No 4 6 9 2 9 7 
n/a 5 0 1 4 1 4 
 
(Continued) If YES: why was this?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Child was ill  8 9 4 2 3 6 
Fees not 
paid 





2 3 0 0 1 0 
n/a 9 5 10 6 10 11 
 
The responses to questions 48, 49 and 50 suggest that in some locations, and in 
Village 4 (Lira District) in particular, school fees are difficult to afford; when fees cannot 
be paid, the child is removed from school; and that this outcome has occurred, and 
has caused children to miss more than one week of school on at least one occasion. 
The higher number of respondents who reported these outcomes from Village 4 
suggests that holding cash on hand is a particular problem in this location, perhaps 
suggesting an elevated level of poverty. The lower proportion of respondents who 
reported these outcomes in Village 5 and Village 6 suggest that higher levels of 
commercial-agriculture activity in these locations has had a positive impact on parents’ 
access to cash, and thus on children’s attendance at school.  
 
Do you know the head teacher of your children’s school? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 11 17 12 12 15 10 
No 3 1 5 2 2 4 
n/a 4 0 1 4 1 4 
 
Are you a member of the Parent-Teacher Association of the school? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 0 7 3 4 5 
No, [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
Not 
invited/elected 
5 13 8 6 2 2 
Not educated 2 4 0 0 1 0 
Too busy 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Not a parent 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Boarding 
school 




Too ill/elderly 3 0 2 0 0 0 
Not interested 1 0 0 3 0 1 
There is no 
PTA 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
n/a (no 
children) 
5 0 1 4 1 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 0 7 3 4 5 
No 11 18 10 11 11 7 
Other 
response 
5 0 1 4 3 6 
 
Respondents to this question in Villages 1-4 (Pallisa and Lira districts) report that they 
may not be participants in the PTA of their children’s school if they are not invited to 
join, or are not sufficiently educated. These responses suggest that rather than being 
an open forum for the management of school issues, the PTA is viewed in some 
locations as a selective institution. In Ntungamo District the responses were more 
evenly divided amongst parents who are members of the PTA and those who are not, 
suggesting a higher level of participation in this institution.  
 
Has there ever been a time when the teacher was absent for more than one week? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 4 5 4 4 4 2 
No 3 3 10 6 8 10 
n/a 4 0 1 4 1 4 
IDK 7 10 3 4 5 2 
 
(Continued) If YES: Why was this?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Teacher ill  6 7 1 0 2 1 
Teacher 
travelled  





1 0 0 0 1 0 
Teacher 
vacancy  
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Other 
response 
0 3 3 4 2 2 
n/a 11 7 14 14 14 16 
I don’t know 1 2 0 0 1 0 
 
If your children reached their school and the teacher has not attended for the day, 
what do you do? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
I do nothing 3 2 4 3 4 2 
Talk to 
headteacher 
7 10 9 8 5 5 
Children go to 
another class  
0 0 0 0 4 2 
Children come 
home 
1 3 0 1 1 0 
I would not 
find out 
0 0 3 2 0 2 
n/a 4 0 3 4 3 6 
I don’t know 3 3 1 0 1 2 
 
Section 5 – Community Leaders  
Do you know the name of the LC5 (District) Chief? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 14 15 13 17 14 14 
No 1 0 4 1 3 4 
IDK 3 3 1 0 1 0 
 
Have you ever met the LC5 (District) Chief or any of the LC5 (District) Councillors? 






0 1 3 5 6 1 
Yes, LC5 
Councillor 
11 3 4 0 2 0 
Yes, both  3 5 2 8 4 6 
No, neither 4 9 9 5 6 11 
 
Responses to questions 56 and 57 suggest that while respondents are in general 
familiar with the name of the LC5 Chair (implying that they may have voted for them), 
they were less likely to have met them. Only in Village 4 (in Lira District) had a majority 
of respondents reported that they had meet the LC5 Chief. In Village 5 (in Ntungamo), 
as many respondents had met the LC5 Chief as had not. In three villages (Villages 2, 
3 and 6) the majority of respondents reported that they had not met any members of 
the LC5 Council. 
 
Do you know the name of at least one of the National Members of Parliament for this 
area?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 16 13 15 18 15 16 
No 0 3 1 0 2 2 
IDK 1 2 2 0 0 0 
NR 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Have any of the National Members of Parliament ever visited this area?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 11 8 16 13 11 13 
No 7 9 2 4 7 4 
IDK 0 1 0 0 0 0 
NR 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Have you ever met any of the National Members of Parliament? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 6 4 12 8 8 7 
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No 11 11 5 10 9 11 
NR 1 3 1 0 1 0 
 
If YES: in what circumstances? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
During 
campaigns 
3 5 11 6 0 2 
To discuss 
needs 
6 2 1 1 1 0 
Providing a 
good 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
Village 
meeting 
0 1 3 0 6 5 
Coincidentally 0 1 0 0 1 1 
n/a 8 6 6 10 10 11 
IDK 1 4 0 0 0 0 
 
Are any of the National Members of Parliament for this area from the same ethnic tribe 
as you?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 11 11 18 18 16 17 
No 6 6 0 0 1 1 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 
Responses to this question suggest that in each of the studied sites, national MPs for 
the area are the same ethnicity as the respondents, pointing to a degree of correlation 
between electoral boundaries and tribal groups. Only in Pallisa District, where leaders 
have suggested sub-dividing the district due to tensions between the region’s tribal 
groups, were responses more mixed between those who are and those who are not 
of the same tribal group as the national MP.  
 
Is it important to you that the National Members of Parliament for this area are from 




 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Better 
communication 
6 11 4 8 10 8 
Yes – Better 
representation 
4 7 7 6 3 2 
Yes - nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 3 0 
No - service 
more important 
6 2 7 4 0 2 
No - tribes work 
together  
1 0 0 0 0 7 
No - Nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 10 18* 11 14 16 10 
No 7 2 7 4 1 9 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 0 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
 
The responses given by survey participants in response to this question varied from 
location to location. For most respondents, other than in Village 3, being from the same 
ethnic tribe is important because it makes communication easier (including in a 
common language).  
For respondents in Village 3, it is more important to be from the same tribal group as 
the local MP because it improves representation, and suggests that the tribe’s needs 
will be better represented in parliament than would be the case if the MP was from a 
different tribe. However, for just as many respondents in Village 3, and for some 
respondents in Village 1, it is more important to respondents that their local MP 
represent their interests successfully, rather than being from the same tribe.  
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In Village 6 (Ntungamo), respondents were evenly divided between wanting their MP 
to be from the same tribe as them because this eases communication, and being of 
the view that people from all tribes can work together successfully. Respondents from 
Village 6 were virtually the only respondents to put forward this view. Given that 
Ntungamo is located in south-western Uganda, the region that tends to dominate in 
senior parliamentary appointments, respondents may be seeking to argue that the 
national parliament represents all tribes equally, rather than favouring their community 
and region. However, this viewpoint was not shared by respondents in Village 5, who 
argued that it was important for MPs to be from their same tribe in order to facilitate 
better communication, and to a lesser extent, greater representation.  
 
Are any of the members of the LC5 (District Council) for this area from the same ethnic 
tribe as you? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 12 11 16 18 16 17 
No 6 6 1 0 1 1 
IDK 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 
Similarly to question 62, respondents here agreed that most members of the LC5 
Council are from the same tribe as themselves. In Villages 1 and 2, the two villages in 
Pallisa district, one third of the respondents felt that LC5 Council members are not 
from the same tribe as themselves, in reflection of the greater tribal heterogeneity in 
Pallisa District (at the time of the survey; Pallisa has since been sub-divided into two 
districts, potentially dividing tribal groups into different districts).  
 
Is it important to you that members of the LC5 (District Council) for this area are from 
the same ethnic tribe as you? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Easy 
communication 
5 8 5 4 8 8 
Yes - Better 
representation 




Yes - nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 5 1 
No - Service 
more important 
4 2 8 3 0 3 
No - Tribes 
work together  
2 1 0 1 1 2 
No - nothing 
added 
1 0 0 0 1 5 
IDK 1 3 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 10 12 10 14 16 10* 
No 7 3 8 4 2 10 
IDK 1 3 0 0 0 0 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
Responses to this question varied in different locations. In Villages 2, 5 and 6, a 
majority of respondents argued that they feel it is important for their elected leaders 
on the LC5 Council to be from the same tribe as themselves, in order to make 
communication easier (including in a common language). For respondents in Village 
4, being from the same tribe as LC5 Council members results in better representation. 
In Village 3, also in Lira District, respondents did not feel that it was important for LC5 
Council members to be from their same tribe (although responses to question 64 
suggests that in fact, they are likely to be), because the performance and service of 
Council members was more important. In Village 1, in Pallisa, respondents were 
divided amongst responses suggesting that being from the same tribe as an LC5 
Councillor leads to better communication, or better presentation, and responses 
suggesting that service was more important than tribal similarity. The more 
heterogenous tribal balance within the population of Pallisa District is perhaps 
reflected in this response, where respondents have in fact had the experience of being 
represented at the LC5 Council level by representatives from other tribes, and so have 




Did any of the election candidates visit this village before the election? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 14 14 18 17 18 18 
No 3 2 0 0 0 0 
NR 1 2 0 1 0 0 
 
(Continued) If YES: Which level of government were they seeking to be elected to?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
National 
parlt 
14 15 18 17 14 18 
District 
council 
14 15 18 15 16 18 
President 1 6 4 0 6 6 
Sub-C 
council 
15 17 18 12 16 18 
n/a 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IDK 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
(Continued) If YES: Did they promise that they would bring anything to the village if 
they were elected? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes, namely:       
Electricity 3 0 0 2 8 7 
Services 
(general) 
5 2 2 5 2 2 
Agriculture 1 0 5 7 1 1 
Water 1 6 3 6 3 7 
Roads 4 8 7 7 5 5 
School 3 4 2 11 3 0 
Healthcare  3 9 2 5 1 4 
District/sub-
county 




“Yes” 0 0 1 0 6 6 
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 
n/a 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IDK 0 1 5 1 0 0 
 
This question reveals that electoral candidates promise to communities that they will 
bring specific new amenities to specific locations, depending on the major concerns of 
voters in these locations. In Pallisa, candidates suggested they would deliver a new 
district, as well as improved services such as education and healthcare. In Lira, 
candidates focus on agriculture, water and roads. In Ntungamo, where households 
are engaged in commercial farming to a greater degree than in other locations in 
Uganda, candidates commit to providing electricity services, and to improving roads.  
 
(Continued) If YES: Do you expect that they will deliver these things? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 1 2 0 4 6 2 
To some 
extent 
2 4 2 4 2 2 
No  6 8 10 4 4 4 
n/a 1 0 3 1 0 0 
IDK 8 4 3 5 6 10 
 
However, responses to this question suggest that survey respondents are wary of 
election candidates’ ability or genuine intention to deliver the changes they promise, 
with a majority of respondents answering that they do not think, or do not know 
whether, candidates will deliver on their commitments.  
 
In your opinion, why have there been no LC1 and LC2 elections since 2001?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Too 
expensive 
1 2 5 3 1 0 





5 5 3 5 0 0 
There have 
been  
0 0 2 1 3 5 
Another  1 5 3 3 3 1 
IDK 10 8 7 8 11 14 
 
Do you know (on a personal level) anyone who works in the central government or the 
national bureaucracy (in Kampala)? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 4 1 0 12 7 
No  12 13 14 18 6 7 
IDK 4 1 3 0 0 4 
 
Responses to this question highlight the greater political and economic connectivity to 
Kampala that is held by residents of the south-west of Uganda. Respondents in Village 
6 and in particular Village 5 are much more likely to be personally familiar with 
someone who is employed in the central government or national-level bureaucracy 
than respondents from other districts. Respondents in Villages 3 and 4 (Lira District) 
were the least likely to be personally familiar with such a person, reflecting the relative 
political and economic disadvantage of northern Uganda.  
 
Who do you think are the most powerful people in this village?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
LC1 Chair  9* 11 16 18 14 11 
Business 
leaders 
1 1 4 5 0 4 
Religious 
leaders    
1 4 9 15 5 7 
Police 
officers 
7 7 9 13 5 6 






1 3 6 15 7 6 
Other civil 
servants  
1 2 3 6 1 4 
Other 0 1 6 9 0 1 
IDK   7 6 0 0 0 0 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
Responses to this question suggest that according to the participants in the survey, 
different individuals are thought to be in powerful positions in villages. For those in 
Pallisa district (Villages 1 and 2), around half of the respondents in each village 
suggested that the LC1 Chair and police officers are in powerful positions. Police 
officers and (near-unanimously) the LC1 Chair were also nominated in Villages 3 and 
4 in Lira District, along with religious leaders and teachers. In Villages 5 and 6 in 
Ntungamo, while LC1 Chairs were also thought to be powerful in the village context, 
police officers had less support. Teachers were instead nominated as powerful figures, 
along with medical workers and religious leaders, to a lesser extent.  
 
(Continued) What makes them powerful?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Job is 
important  
9 7 15 17 14 16 
Wealthy 5 0 2 1 9 5 
Political 
connections 
0 0 4 3 2 0 
Tribal 
connections  
0 0 0 0 1 0 
Another  4 7 8 11 2 4 
IDK 5 6 0 0 0 0 
NR 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Do any religious groups or NGOs provide any services in this village? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
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Yes, they are:       
Religious 0 1 0 2 3 0 
International  2 2 10 1 2 0 
Domestic 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Doesn’t name 0 0 1 2 1 0 
Names sector 1 0 0 0 0 0 
[nothing 
added] 
0 0 2 0 2 2 
No 13 13 2 12 8 11 
IDK 2 1 2 0 2 3 
NR 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
(Continued) If YES: Do you use these services? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 3 2 7 3 8 2 
No, 
because: 
      
Not selected 0 0 8 1 0 2 
Another 
reason 
8 11 1 2 0 0 
n/a 5 4 3 12 9 12 
IDK 1 1 0 0 1 2 
NR 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
(Continued) If YES: Do you think these services are better-quality than services 
provided by the government? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes:       
More 
accessible 
1 0 3 1 0 0 
Better quality 2 0 1 3 6 2 
[nothing 
added] 




TSE: Equal 0 0 4 0 0 1 
No:       
Govt better 2 3 1 1 0 0 
Not selected 0 0 4 0 0 0 
n/a 8 4 2 13 9 11 
IDK 5 11 3 0 3 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 3 0 4 4 6 2 
To some 
extent 
0 0 4 0 0 1 
No 2 3 5 1 0 0 
n/a (no 
services) 
8 4 2 13 9 11 
IDK 5 11 3 0 3 4 
 
Section 6 – Connections in the Community  
What is the role of the traditional Kingdoms? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Preserve 
culture 
3 3 4 7 1 1 
Unite people 5 2 3 9 1 0 
Dispute 
resolution 
1 2 6 5 0 0 
Another 0 2 6 2 1 0 
Has no 
importance 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
n/a / No 
kingdom 
0 0 0 0 6 7 
IDK 11 10 0 0 9 9 
 
Do you think the traditional Kingdoms are important? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
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Yes:       
Preserve 
culture 
4 3 4 8 0 0 
Solve 
disputes 
1 0 6 5 0 0 
Promote unity  1 2 4 5 1 0 
Another 2 3 2 2 1 1 
[nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
TSE 0 0 2 2 1 0 
No:       
No role/effect 5 1 0 0 2 5 
Seek power 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Dangerous 0 0 0 0 1 0 
[nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
n/a 0 0 0 0 0 1 
IDWTA 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IDK 4 9 0 0 11 9 
NR 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
When you are working at your job, do you prefer to work with people who are from the 
same ethnic group as you? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Easier 
communication 
5* 5 1 2 7 6 
Yes – We share 
culture 
1 6 0 0 5 0 








No - Tribes are 
equal 
2 2 5 5 0 2 
No - Want to 
work w others 
3 4 2 2 0 5 
No - nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 5 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 6 11 1 2 12 6 
Sometimes  3 1 1 2 1 0 
No 9 6 18 14 5 12 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
The responses that were given in answer to this question varied from one location to 
the next, with villages even within the same district yielding different responses. In 
Villages 2 and 5, in Pallisa and in Ntungamo districts respectively, respondents 
indicate that they prefer to work with others who are from the same ethnic tribe as 
themselves, because communication is easier and because they share the same 
culture. However, in the remaining villages, respondents suggested that they not 
necessarily prefer to work with members of their same tribe, because: tribes are equal; 
they like to have the experience of working with others; and in particular because they 
feel that a person’s work performance is more important than their tribal identity.  
 
In your opinion, are some ethnic groups in Uganda more likely to benefit from 
economic opportunities than others? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Some 
tribes 
favoured 
6 8 6 9 6 0 
Yes - More 
educated 
5 2 1 2 0 0 
Yes - 
Corruption 






1 7 4 2 2 1 
Yes - nothing 
added 
1 0 2 1 5 1 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
No - All are 
equal 








0 0 2 3 0 3 
No - nothing 
added 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
IDK 4 1 0 0 4 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes  14 17 13 15 13 2 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
No  0 0 5 4 1 9 
I don’t 
know 
4 1 0 0 4 4 
 
In answering this question, respondents tended to point to the greater favour that some 
tribes are looked upon than others, with one third of respondents nominating this as 
the reason they feel some tribes are more likely to benefit from economic opportunity 
for others. In Pallisa (Villages 1 and 2), respondents also expressed the opinion that 
some tribes are more educated, or better led, than others, and that this contributes to 




that some tribes are advantaged over others, arguing that all tribes are equal, or that 
those who benefit from economic opportunities do so because of their greater effort, 
rather than because of their tribe. The greater level of economic opportunity of people 
from south-western Uganda (including Ntungamo) represents an important context to 
this question, as those from Village 6 may be less inclined to acknowledge any role 
for tribal favouritism as contributing to their region’s greater levels of economic 
success.  
 
In your opinion, are some ethnic groups in Uganda more likely to be hold important 
political roles than other groups? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Some 
tribes 
favoured 
6 12 10 12 18 4 
Yes - More 
educated 
4 1 1 0 0 0 
Yes – Better 
led 




5 2 2 2 6 1 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 1 5 
No - All have 
an equal 
chance  
0 0 3 3 1 5 
No - Better 
educated  
0 0 1 1 0 0 
No - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
IDK 2 3 0 0 2 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
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Yes 17* 15 15 14 24 5 
To some 
extent 
0 0 0 0 1 5 
No 0 0 4 4 1 6 
I don’t 
know 
2 3 0 0 2 4 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
 
Similarly to Question 80, responses to this question were markedly different in 
Village 6 (in Ntungamo) than in the other five field sites. In Village 6, 5/18 respondents 
argued that some tribes are not more able to hold political roles than other tribes, 
because all tribes have an equal chance to lead. 5/18 argued that it is accurate to 
some extent, though not fully, to argue that some tribes have more access to political 
roles than others. A further 4 argued that some tribes are favoured, while 4 responded 
‘I don’t know’. The comparatively greater level of political power of people from south-
western Uganda, including Ntungamo, may perhaps contribute to a reluctance 
amongst some respondents to acknowledge any possible role for favouritism in the 
levels of political access and power of their tribes over others.  
In contrast, respondents in Villages 1-5 argued that it is the case that some tribes are 
more able to access important political roles than other tribes, with the most common 
comment being that some tribes are favoured for these roles over others. Four 
respondents in Village 1 also suggested that some tribes have had better access to 
education, and so are better able to access political roles for this reason.  
On balance, responses to this question suggest that survey participants perceive that 
some tribes have greater levels of access to political opportunities and roles than 
others, and that this access is based on tribal identity, rather than on other criteria. 
This result corresponds with literature that suggests than in the Museveni era, political 
leadership roles have disproportionately accrued to members of tribes from south-
western Uganda. 
 
Are there any processes for resolving disputes or conflicts in the village? For example, 




 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 18 18 18 18 15 14 
TSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No 0 0 0 0 1 3 
IDK 0 0 0 0 2 1 
 
(Continued) If YES: Who is the person who makes the decisions in these cases? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
LC1 
chair/council 
9 3 14 14 15 12 
LC2 
chair/council 
0 0 0 1 1 0 
LC3 
chair/council 
0 4 4 1 1 1 
LC5 
chair/council 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
Clan/tribal 
leaders 
10 12 13 14 3 3 
Police 0 0 1 6 2 5 
Land Board 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Other  2 1 6 4 1 2 
n/a 0 0 0 0 3 4 
 
Where do you find out information about what services are available to you? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Newspapers 0 1 2 3 5 3 
Radio 15 18 15 13 17 16 
TV 0 0 0 0 4 2 
Noticeboards 2 1 1 0 1 2 
Internet  0 0 0 2 0 0 
Govt office 7 6 0 0 1 0 
Another 
person  
0 9 15 17 12 12 
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Other 2 1 4 0 2 0 
 
Where do you find out information about political issues? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Newspapers 0 0 1 3 5 3 
Radio 15 16 14 10 17 15 
TV 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Noticeboards 1 0 0 0 3 2 
Internet  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Govt office 9 4 0 0 1 0 
Another 
person  
10 9 13 15 12 11 
Other 0 0 2 0 2 0 
 
Responses to Q84 and Q85 point to the importance of radio communications for 
conveying information regarding available public services, and information about 
political issues, with a large proportion of respondents nominating this is a principal 
information source. Furthermore, a majority of respondents reported that they obtain 
information about services and political issues from another person. Respondents in 
Village 1 (Pallisa) reported that they do not seek information about services that are 
available from another person.  
In Pallisa District, respondents in Village 1 and Village 2 report that they seek 
information about political issues and available services from the local government 
office, which was not reported by respondents in other areas. This suggests a greater 
level of familiarity with local government as a source of information in this area than in 
other regions.  
It is noteworthy that the main information sources for most respondents – radio, and 
another person – are each sources that do not require any level of literacy to be 
accessed. In the context of rural areas where education access is not high, this may 





However, these are also communication channels that can easily be influenced 
by government leaders if they should choose to do so, such as through campaigns 
regarding NRM-affiliated election candidates.  
 
Section 7 – Forming New Districts  
In your opinion, do you think there is the right number of districts in Uganda? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 2 8 7 4 6 5 
No – too 
many 
10 6 6 5 6 8 
No – not 
enough 
3 1 4 4 5 1 
IDK 3 3 1 5 1 4 
 
Responses to this question varied across locations, with a majority of respondents 
suggesting that they felt Uganda has either the right number of districts now (30 per 
cent of respondents), or too many (40 per cent). These responses were offered 
consistently across the studied districts. 
The goal of this question was not to seek a ‘correct’ response from participants about 
the number of districts in Uganda, given the complexities of district proliferation as a 
public policy issue. Instead, this question sought to understand respondents’ 
perceptions of whether the phenomenon of creating additional districts should 
continue, or whether the rapid creation of new districts had resulted in there being too 
many districts at present – in the perception of the respondent.  
When asked to explain the rationale for their response, verbal responses suggested 
that some respondents perceive that too many districts are too poorly resourced to be 
effective, rather than their overall number being too high. That is, respondents were 
not concerned that the raw number of districts was sufficient or too high, but that the 
districts that have been created more recently are too poorly-resourced to be effective. 
These responses were expressed consistently across all districts, including in Pallisa, 
where an additional district has subsequently been created.  
 
Would you be happy if another district was created in this area? 
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 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Current 
district is far  
2 2 2 0 0 1 
Yes - Brings 
services/devt  
5 7 6 8 3 5 
Yes - Creates 
jobs 
4 4 4 5 2 2 
Yes - Other 
areas have 
one 




0 0 1 2 0 0 
Yes - Better 
market access 




0 0 1 1 0 0 
Yes - No 
longer 
oppressed 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 2 
TSE: Depends 
on population 
1 0 4 1 1 1 
No - Districts 
are expensive 
1 2 0 0 1 0 
No - Services 
not improve 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
No - Not too 
large now 
0 0 0 0 5 5 
No - I do not 
benefit  




No - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 4 1 
IDK 3 0 0 1 1 0 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 11 15 15 17 6 10 
To some 
extent 
1 0 2 0 1 1 
No 4 3 1 1 11 7 
I don’t 
know 
2 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Responses to this question were reasonably consistent across the studied sites, with 
the exception of Village 5 (in Ntungamo District). For Villages 1-4 and 6, respondents 
tended to suggest that they would be happy if a new district were established in their 
area. Explanatory comments focused on respondents’ belief that the creation of 
additional districts brings with it improved services and development, and improved 
access to jobs. Notably, in the free comments, many villagers expressed the view that 
the creation of a new district brings development itself nearer to the village.  
The responses to this question suggest that in the studied sites, villagers do not 
perceive current levels of service delivery and employment opportunities to be 
sufficient, and perceive that they would be improved by the creation of a new, smaller, 
nearer district. This outcome implies that decentralisation has not yet succeeded in 
bringing improved services and development to the studied sites, according to the 
survey participants, and this situation would be improved through the intensification of 
decentralisation: the creation of additional districts.  
 
In Village 5, respondents commented that they did not feel their district is too 
large at the moment, despite Ntungamo in fact being one of Uganda’s largest districts 
(partly due to the rapid proliferation of districts in other areas). This potentially relates 
to the higher levels of economic activity and service delivery that tend to be present in 
south-western Uganda, where Village 5 is located, meaning that there is less demand 




When a new district is created, who benefits from it? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Villagers  0 3 9 8 9 8 
Farmers  2 2 8 8 6 3 
Poor people 0 1 5 4 6 3 
Politicians  11 15 10 9 15 14 
Technical 
officials 
7 9 3 6 5 3 
Children  1 2 2 1 2 3 
Powerful 
people  
13 10 7 8 6 6 
Everyone 3 1 5 5 4 3 
No one  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 4 7 4 4 4 2 
IDK 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 
(Continued) Of these options, who benefits the most?  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Villagers  0 1 1 2 3 2 
Farmers  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Poor people 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Politicians  4 15 10 4 9 13 
Technical 
officials 
6 1 1 1 1 0 
Children  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Powerful 
people  
6 6 1 1 2 1 
Everyone 1 0 2 3 2 0 
No one  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Other 2 3 2 5 0 1 
IDK 0 0 0 3 0 0 





Responses to questions 88 and 89 reflect respondents’ belief that the majority of the 
benefit of a new district accrues to those in power: to politicians, powerful people, and 
to a lesser extent, technical officials.  
 
When a new district is created, who is made worse off from it? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Villagers  6 13 5 5 6 5 
Farmers  10 7 7 5 2 0 
Poor people 12 10 8 5 4 5 
Politicians  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Technical 
officials 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Children  4 1 0 4 0 0 
Powerful 
people  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Everyone 0 0 0 0 2 0 
No one  1 1 4 5 4 7 
Other 0 2 3 3 2 2 
IDK 3 0 2 4 3 2 
NR 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
(Continued) Of these options, who loses the most? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Villagers  4 10 1 2 3 5 
Farmers  2 1 1 3 0 0 
Poor people 8 7 8 1 5 3 
Politicians  0 0 1 1 0 0 
Technical 
officials 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Children  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Powerful 
people  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Everyone 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No one  1 1 4 5 4 7 
Other 0 2 2 2 2 1 
IDK 3 0 0 4 4 1 
 
Do you think the creation of more districts makes service delivery better? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Services 
nearer/better 
4 10 10 10 8 8 
Yes - Creates 
jobs 




2 1 0 0 0 1 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 




1 0 5 1 0 1 
No - Dists 
perform poorly 
2 1 1 2 2 1 
No - Services 
not improve 
2 0 0 2 1 0 
No - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
IDK 4 6 0 1 1 2 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 8 12 12 13 13 16 
To some 
extent 
1 0 5 1 0 1 






4 6 0 1 1 2 
 
In response to this question, survey participants reported that in general, and across 
each studied site, they are of the opinion that the creation of a new district makes 
service delivery better. For a majority of respondents, the creation of an additional 
district improves service delivery by bringing services nearer to the village, or 
improving the quality of services. In Villages 1 and 2 (Pallisa District) some 
respondents expressed more uncertainty about whether the creation of a new district 
generates improved service delivery, with 10/36 respondents answering “I don’t know”. 
In Village 3, in Lira District, 5/18 respondents were not confident that services would 
definitely improve following the creation of an additional district, with 5/18 respondents 
answering “To some extent; services may improve”. 16/108 respondents (15 per cent) 
were of the opinion that the creation of an additional district would not improve service 
delivery, with several respondents highlighting the poor performance of districts as 
being a cause of poor services, rather than the number or size of districts.  
 
 
Do you think the creation of more districts makes it easier for you to communicate with 
the government? 




7 10 7 7 8 5 
Yes - Leaders 
will be locals 








0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Yes - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 5 6 
TSE – 
Effort/capacity 
2 0 2 2 0 0 
TSE - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
No - Leaders 
never 
communicate 
0 1 3 3 2 2 
No - [nothing 
added] 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
IDK 6 7 1 1 2 5 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 9 10 14* 12 13 11 
To some 
extent 
2 0 2 2 1 0 
No 1 1 4 3 2 2 
I don’t 
know  
6 7 1 1 2 5 
*Respondents were able to respond with more than one reason for their answer; total 
responses may tally to greater than 18 
For the majority of respondents, across each of the studied sites, the creation of 
additional districts is thought to make communication with government officials easier, 
with respondents answering that accessing and communicating with officials is easier 
with the creation of new districts. In Villages 3 and 4 (Lira District), respondents also 
reported that the creation of an additional district means that leaders are more likely 
to be members of the local community, making communication easier. However, in 
Villages 1 and 2 (Pallisa), 13/36 respondents (36 per cent) were unsure whether the 
creation of a new district makes communicating with leaders easier, answering ‘I don’t 
know’ in response to this question.  
 




 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes - Leaders 
listen 
1 0 1 1 2 2 
Yes - I pay taxes 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Yes - Budget is 
read out 
0 0 2 0 0 0 
Yes - [nothing 
added] 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
TSE 0 1 2 1 1 0 
No - No meeting 
occurs 
5 4 0 0 0 0 
No - Not 
asked/consulted 
10 7 9 3 8 4 
No - Budget is 
read only 
0 0 3 11 1 1 
No - [nothing 
added] 
0 1 0 0 4 7 
IDK 2 4 0 2 1 4 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Yes 1 1 4 1 3 2 
To some 
extent 
0 1 2 1 1 0 
No 15 12 12 14 13 12 
I don’t 
know 
2 4 0 2 1 4 
 
Across each of the studied field sites, respondents report that they do not feel that they 
are involved in the process of formulating the national budget, even though this is one 
of the stated goals of the bottom-up planning process.  
 
Have you heard of the annual budget being called ‘consultative’? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
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Yes 1 0 3 1 9 7 
No 16 14 14 17 9 11 
No response 1 4 1 0 0 0 
 
(Continued) If YES – What do you think this word means? 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
To be asked 
their views 
2 0 2 1 8 4 
[Anything 
else] 
1 0 3 0 2 8 
n/a 0 0 0 9 0 0 
I don’t know 8 11 0 0 1 0 
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